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Preface
Ever since the collapse of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s, financial reporting fraud 
has been a topic of great discussion, not only among accountants but also among regulators, 
legislators and the general public. In a broader context, accounting fraud was one of the 
principal causes listed by plaintiffs in class action suits brought by shareholders against public 
companies over the last several decades.
And then came Enron. Over the period of late 2001 through the first half of 2002, 
with a succession of high-profile bankruptcies of large companies related to accounting 
fraud, which included Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom, the world changed for ac-
countants. The US Congress responded with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
that imposed heightened corporate governance and internal control standards, and Congress 
restructured the accounting profession by placing supervision of audits of public companies 
in the hands of a government-appointed entity.
This book, a revised edition of the original published in 2003, is an attempt to address 
the fraud issue from the practical perspective, using illustrations and examples to explore 
fraud concepts, in addition to references to research findings and authoritative literature. The 
material cited in this book frequently focuses on findings of professionals and academicians 
studying fraud in publicly traded companies because financial information from those com-
panies is readily available, but the lessons learned from those studies are equally applicable to 
non-public companies, no matter the size or the industry. Furthermore, the heightened stan-
dards of corporate governance imposed on public companies by Sarbanes-Oxley and related 
regulations will spread to private companies as lenders and capital providers insist on better 
governance. A Certified Public Accountant (CPA) working in today’s post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
world should be well-versed in these issues, regardless of the type of company involved.
Today, CPAs also have to address the potential of financial reporting fraud in the con-
text in international as well as US domestic standards. This book will look at the challenges 
posed by the convergence of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Also, for this revised edition, a new 
chapter 14 will explore financial reporting fraud under US GAAP and IFRS and illustrate 
how what is fraud under one set of standards may not be fraud under another, and why.
Finally, CPAs are transitioning to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) that incorporates FASB pronouncements into a 
new structure. This revised edition cites to the ASC except when discussion of the individual 
pronouncements, such as the timing of the promulgation of a specific Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards, is appropriate.
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This book is written for CPAs at an advanced level and as such does not provide exten-
sive discussion of basic financial accounting standards or concepts. In fact, the entire book 
could be seen as a conversation between an audit manager or partner and a counterpart in 
forensic accounting. However, references to the ASC and other literature should quickly and 
easily guide anyone looking for more information.
Section 1 of the book, titled “The Problem,” lays the foundation for financial reporting 
fraud issues encountered by CPAs today.  Section 2, “The Fraud Battle,” discusses academic 
findings relating to financial reporting fraud and the response by business organizations. The 
final Section 3, “The CPA’s Fraud Battle,” discusses those items on a firm’s financial state-
ments that appear to be especially vulnerable to fraud and concludes with a discussion of 
financial reporting fraud under IFRS and its implications for the future.
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The Nature of Financial  
Reporting Fraud
Chapter 1 
Financial reporting fraud involves the alteration of financial statement data, usually by a 
firm’s management, to achieve a fraudulent result. These altered financial statements are the 
tools then used by a company’s managers to obtain some reward. The reward may consist of 
direct compensation, such as receiving a bonus that otherwise would not be paid without 
using altered, incorrect financial data to embellish management’s operating performance. 
On the other hand, the compensation may be less direct, in that managers avoid being fired 
for failing to achieve promised results. Compensation may also be indirect (for example, 
management may use fraudulent financial statements to raise additional capital that, in turn, 
allows a firm to expand and, presumably, enhance the value of shares held by management).
What Constitutes Financial  
Reporting Fraud?
What constitutes financial reporting fraud has been the subject of much debate because 
the lines between fraud and discretion are not always clear. It is easy to define fraud as a 
conscious effort by management to produce financial statements with materially wrong 
accounting data. It is almost as easy to identify as fraud misleading accounting entries that 
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management cannot justify under any applicable accounting standards. However, fraudulent 
acts become less obvious when cloaked in the mantle of accounting standards that are incor-
rectly applied. For example, the applicable accounting standard for most financial reporting 
in the United States is generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP), and those 
principles may allow management some discretion about when to recognize revenue or ex-
penses. To an even greater degree, less detailed International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs) may provide more discretion to management than the more detailed and specific 
U.S. GAAP. Management is free to take full advantage of that discretion, but in pushing ac-
counting concepts to their limit, management must be especially careful not to overstep. 
When operating on the edge of U.S. GAAP or IFRSs permissibility, internal controls are 
stretched heavily, and one mistake in a seemingly small area can result in significant and 
drastic consequences.
Honorable people can debate the most appropriate use of a principle when looking 
at the gray or more broadly permissive areas of accounting standards. However, less-than-
honorable people might make use of these gray areas to produce misleading financial state-
ments. This practice is found most often in concert with other misleading applications of 
accounting standards.
Those who commit fraud almost always fail to discuss their misuse of accounting and 
reporting principles in the notes to financial statements. Although the accounting for a cer-
tain transaction may appear to be supported by applicable literature, failure to disclose so as 
not to make the financial statements misleading takes the reporting entity out of compliance. 
Without knowledge of the impact of gray-area judgments in the preparation of financial 
statements, unsuspecting readers may mistakenly assume that revenues and expenses were 
accrued in a manner consistent with prior financial statements when, in fact, they were not. 
The end result may be that continuing operations appear to be profitable, although, in reality, 
there may be serious problems that the misuse of gray areas can cover up for a short period 
of time.
As with proving any type of fraud, one must generally show that there was scienter, 
meaning that the perpetrator knew that his or her actions were designed to mislead. For 
purposes of this book, a perpetrator with scienter—that is, a perpetrator who intends to use 
incorrect financial statements to mislead—will be referred to as a fraudster. Thus, when ac-
counting decisions purportedly in conformity with U.S. GAAP or IFRSs produce financial 
statements intentionally designed (with scienter) to mislead the reader, those decisions cross 
the line into fraud.
Legal and Regulatory Guidance and 
Standards
Numerous sources exist for guidance on the nature and standards to establish the existence 
of financial reporting fraud. These sources help the CPA determine fraud, where to look for 
it, and who is responsible.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Definition of Fraud
The principal concepts that govern fraud are codified in the U.S. securities laws and regula-
tions, especially Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 that states
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange,
a.  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b.  To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c.  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.
Public companies that list their stock to trade on U.S. exchanges must conform their 
reporting to U.S. GAAP (or IFRSs, which is allowed for certain foreign companies) and 
the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC under U.S. securities laws. (Similar rules 
exist for companies that are listed on foreign exchanges; the European Union, for example, 
requires listed companies to report financial statements prepared in conformity with IFRSs.) 
The SEC drew heavily on U.S. accounting and auditing literature when it addressed the 
issue of accounting gray areas for materiality and other issues, and those standards provide 
substantial guidance to determine financial reporting fraud not only for publicly traded 
companies but also for all firms issuing financial statements in conformity with either U.S. 
GAAP or IFRSs.
Key Fraud Laws and Definitions
In addition to SEC Rule 10b-5, several other important laws and accounting statements 
guide the CPA in matters dealing with fraud.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
One decades-old law that still carries significant weight today is the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977 (FCPA). This legislation, well known for cracking down on bribery of 
foreign businesses and officials, codified the requirement that all public companies maintain 
adequate internal controls. FCPA 78m states that the public company shall
(A)  make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately 
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of issuer; and
(B)  devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that—
 (i)  transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific 
authorization;
02-Chap01.indd   5 7/7/10   11:09:48 AM
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 (ii)  transactions are recorded as necessary ... to permit preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements...
Management, therefore, had to take responsibility for the firm’s financial statements 
and establish internal controls that ensured transactions were entered in accordance with 
management’s instructions. Further, management had to prepare its financial statements in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP or other criteria, such as regulatory accounting for regulat-
ed industries. The FCPA held management accountable if fraud existed in the financial 
statements.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Another area of law, contained in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (FSGM) estab-
lished by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, addresses the steps a company may take to miti-
gate criminal penalties if the company is ever found to have violated U.S. law. Those steps 
include establishing policies and procedures designed to implement an “effective compliance 
and ethics program” that would affect the culpability score calculated under the guidelines, 
as well as the conditions of a firm’s probation. The FSGM requires that a company “exercise 
due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct” and that the firm would “otherwise 
promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law.” The FSGM is quite detailed and provides a useful guide to the 
CPA desiring to implement an effective ethics program. The guidelines explain these con-
cepts in Section 8B2.1, as follows:
(b)  Due diligence and the promotion of an organizational culture that encourages ethi-
cal conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law ... minimally require 
the following:
 (1)  The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct.
 (2) (A)  The organization’s governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the 
content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall 
exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and ef-
fectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.
  (B)  High-level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organiza-
tion has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this 
guideline. Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be as-
signed overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program.
  (C)  Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-
day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. 
Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically to 
high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an 
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of 
the compliance and ethics program. To carry out such operational respon-
sibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources, appropriate 
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authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate 
subgroup of the governing authority.
 (3)  The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the sub-
stantial authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the or-
ganization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, 
has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective 
compliance and ethics program.
 (4) (A)  The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically 
and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects 
of the compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in 
subdivision (B) by conducting effective training programs and otherwise 
disseminating information appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles 
and responsibilities.
  (B)  The individuals referred to in subdivision (A) are the members of the gov-
erning authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the 
organization’s employees, and, as appropriate, the organization’s agents.
 (5)  The organization shall take reasonable steps—
  (A)  to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is fol-
lowed, including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;
  (B)  to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s compliance 
and ethics program; and
  (C)  to have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that al-
low for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employ-
ees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual 
criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.
 (6)  The organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and en-
forced consistently throughout the organization through (A) appropriate in-
centives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program; 
and (B) appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal conduct 
and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.
 (7)  After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reason-
able steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent fur-
ther similar criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications 
to the organization’s compliance and ethics program.
(c)  In implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the risk of 
criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify 
each requirement set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct 
identified through this process.
Although these guidelines are designed to help judicial and law enforcement personnel 
evaluate the extent to which a company that has violated legal standards is willing to change, 
the guidelines provide a template for any firm that wishes to establish a program to address 
ethics and compliance. Such a program that involves all levels of management, as described 
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in the preceding paragraph (b), is very useful in setting a proper tone at the top, a term that 
is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.
However, even though the monitoring requirements of the FSGM, described in the 
preceding paragraph (c), existed for many years, many companies had been slow to imple-
ment any such reporting system until the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(see subsequent discussion) and other post-Enron reforms. Only as more recent legislation 
and regulations imposed greater requirements on corporate audit committees and boards of 
directors have companies rushed to install the fraud reporting hotlines and other reporting 
systems envisioned in the FSGM.
From the CPA’s perspective if a company not under investigation by law or securities 
enforcement authorities implements the ethics and compliance provisions of the FSGM, 
that company and its management can hold up these actions as evidence of intent to prevent 
fraud. When the CPA is looking at an organization’s seriousness about fighting fraud, a clear 
indicator is whether the organization has implemented the preceding steps.
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53
In 1989, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards (SAS) No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1). This statement set out the basis for distinguishing the 
difference between fraud and honest error. Referring to accounting fraud as irregularities, SAS 
No. 53 stated 
[t]he term irregularities refers to intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or 
disclosures in financial statements. Irregularities include fraudulent financial reporting 
undertaken to render financial statements misleading, sometimes called management fraud, 
and misappropriation of assets, sometimes called defalcations. Irregularities may involve 
acts such as the following:
•   Manipulation,  falsification,  or  alteration  of  accounting  records  or  supporting 




cation, manner of presentation, or disclosure
Fraud had the element of intent that resulted in manipulation of financial statements, 
misrepresentation of transactions, or misapplication of accounting principles.
SAS No. 82
By 1997, the ASB had issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1), which replaced SAS No. 53 but essentially retained the 
SAS No. 53 definition of fraud and added the concept of how fraud affects financial state-
ment users. SAS No. 82 used the term intentional misstatement to characterize fraud, as follows: 
“Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements or omis-
sions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements to deceive financial statement users.”
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Now, in addition to the presence of management intent, fraud’s definition was expanded 
to include its purpose, which is to deceive the user.
SAS No. 82 also provided a list of 25 fraud risk factors—that is, red flags—to guide 
auditors in assessing risk and planning for an audit. The statement allocated the 25 red flags 
among three broad categories:
 1.  Management characteristics and influence over the control environment
 2.  Industry conditions
 3.  Operating characteristics and financial stability
Examples of red flags included aggressive or unrealistic forecasts, ineffective commu-
nication and support of entity values or ethics, and domineering management behavior to 
attempt to influence the audit’s scope.
Several years after the issuance of SAS No. 82, Barbara A. Apostolou, John M. Hassell, 
Sally A. Webber, and Glenn E. Sumners conducted research1 that evaluated the weight placed 
by 140 external and internal auditors on each of the 3 categories and on the red flags in 
each category. The researchers found that auditors had some fairly uniform feelings about 
circumstances most conducive to finding financial reporting fraud:
The aggregate decision model indicates that 58.2 percent of the total possible 100.0 
percent decision weight is associated with the group of red flags dealing with manage-
ment characteristics and influence over the control environment. Operating and finan-
cial stability characteristics were associated with 27.4 percent, while industry conditions 
red flags were associated with 14.4 percent of the total decision weight. Thus, red flags 
associated with management characteristics and influence over the control environment 
were rated about twice as important as operating and financial stability characteristics 
and about four times as important as industry conditions red flags. The three single-most 
important red flags, which account for almost 40 percent of the total decision weight, 
were all within the management characteristics category: (1) known history of securities 
law violations (14.6 percent), (2) significant compensation tied to aggressive accounting 
practices (12.9 percent), and (3) management’s failure to display appropriate attitude 
about internal control (12.6 percent).
Management characteristics and the control environment clearly stood out among audi-
tors as the most important indicators of potential fraud. Within that category, the red flags 
of history of violations, compensation tied to accounting, and lack of interest in internal 
controls led the list. Subsequent chapters of this book cover management characteristics and 
internal controls in greater detail.
SAS No. 99
The ASB continued to refine its auditing guidance with regard to fraud and in 2002 released 
a new standard, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), to supersede SAS No. 82. The new standard has a 
more extensive list of red flags organized into categories that look at (1) the incentives and 
1 Apostolou, B.A. et al., “The Relative Importance of Management Fraud Risk Factors,” Behavioral Research in Accounting 13, no. 1 
(January 2001).
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pressures on management to commit fraud, (2) opportunities to commit fraud, and (3) the 
attitudes and rationalizations found among those who commit fraud. See box 1-1 for a list of 
risk factors when fraudulent financial reporting results in misstatements.
Box 1-1: Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial Reporting
The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudu-
lent financial reporting.
Incentives/Pressures
 a.  Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity 
operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
  –  High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining 
margins
  –  High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product ob-
solescence, or interest rates
  –  Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either 
the industry or overall economy
  –  Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover 
imminent
  –  Recurring negative cash flows from operations and an inability to generate cash 
flows from operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth
  –  Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other com-
panies in the same industry
  –  New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements
 b.  Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations 
of third parties due to the following:
  –  Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional inves-
tors, significant creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that 
are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), including expectations created by manage-
ment in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or annual report messages
  –  Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—includ-
ing financing of major research and development or capital expenditures
  –  Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment or 
other debt covenant requirements
  –  Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant 
pending transactions, such as business combinations or contract awards
 c.  Information available indicates that management’s or those charged with governan-
ace’s personal financial situation is threatened by the entity’s financial performance 
arising from the following:
  –  Significant financial interests in the entity
  –  Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, 
and earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets 
for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow*
  –  Personal guarantees of debts of the entity
 d.  There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet finan-
cial targets set up by those charged with governance or management, including 
sales or profitability incentive goals.
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Box 1-1:  Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Opportunities
 a.  The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to 
engage in fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
  –  Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or 
with related entities not audited or audited by another firm
  –  A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that 
allows the entity to dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that 
may result in inappropriate or non-arm’s-length transactions
  –  Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate
  –  Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to 
period end that pose difficult “substance over form” questions
  –  Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in juris-
dictions where differing business environments and cultures exist
  –  Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven juris-
dictions for which there appears to be no clear business justification
 b.  There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
  –  Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner-
managed business) without compensating controls
  –  Ineffective oversight over the financial reporting process and internal control by 
those charged with governance
 c.  There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by the  
following:
  –  Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling 
interest in the entity
  –  Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or 
managerial lines of authority
  –  High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members
 d. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
  –  Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls 
over interim financial reporting (where external reporting is required)
  –  High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff
  –  Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving 
significant deficiencies or material weaknesses in internal control
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by those charged with governan-
ace, management, or employees, that allow them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent 
financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by the auditor. Nevertheless, the 
auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it in 
identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting. 
For example, auditors may become aware of the following information that may indicate a 
risk factor:
(continued)
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Box 1-1:  Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
(continued)
  •   Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity’s 
values or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate 
values or ethical standards
  •   Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the 
selection of accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates
  •   Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or 
claims against the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or 
violations of laws and regulations
  •   Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock 
price or earnings trend
  •   A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third par-
ties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts
  •   Management failing to correct known significant deficiencies or material weak-
nesses in internal control on a timely basis
  •   An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize re-
ported earnings for tax-motivated reasons
  •   Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting 
on the basis of materiality
  •   The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is 
strained, as exhibited by the following:
  –  Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, audit-
ing, or reporting matters
  –  Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints 
regarding the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report
  –  Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access 
to people or information or the ability to communicate effectively with those 
charged with governance
  –  Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially in-
volving attempts to influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection or 
continuance of personnel assigned to or consulted on the audit engagement
* Management incentive plans may be contingent upon achieving targets relating only to certain accounts or selected activities 
of the entity, even though the related accounts or activities may not be material to the entity as a whole.
Reprinted from Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316).
When looking for early warning indicators, the CPA should first focus attention on the 
incentives and motives for fraud, then move on to opportunities and rationalizations. When, 
for instance, in the midst of well-known industry problems, a firm in that industry provides 
guidance to securities analysts that earnings will not be affected, a red flag emerges. Upon 
further investigation, the CPA may determine that management has another incentive in 
that the firm’s compensation plan awards bonuses based on accounting results. Then, there 
may be opportunity to manipulate financial results because key senior managers dominate a 
fairly green and inexperienced staff that would not likely question management’s decisions. 
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Finally, management would rationalize the use of fraudulent accounting because it enhances 
the value of company stock.
This book examines incentives and motives in some detail, and through the use of ex-
amples and illustrations, it looks at opportunities and rationalizations, as well.
Elimination of the Quantitative Materiality 
Loophole
Qualitative Materiality
With the publication of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, Materiality, in 1999, 
the SEC staff made clear that fraudulent accounting entries known to senior management 
could not be left unadjusted if they were deemed “immaterial” using some mechanical, 
quantitative standard, such as a percentage of net income. Relying purely on a quantitative 
basis, which was a common practice before the publication of SAB No. 99, was no longer 
acceptable. With the publication of SAB No. 99, qualitative materiality clearly took first po-
sition when the SEC staff stated, “Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users 
of a registrant’s financial statements. A matter is ‘material’ if there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable person would consider it important.” Therefore, any item that could alter 
a reader’s perception of the financial condition of a company could be considered mate-
rial. (Chapter 3 provides further analysis of materiality from the perspective of the users of 
financial statements, and the entire text of SAB No. 99 is found in appendix B found at the 
end of this book.) 
The SEC staff provided examples, which are summarized in box 1-2.
Box 1-2: SEC Example of Qualitative Misstatements
Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small misstate-
ment of a financial statement item are—
  •   whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or 
whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in 
the estimate [footnote omitted]
  •   whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends 
  •   whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations 
for the enterprise 
  •   whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa 
  •   whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s 
business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s opera-




other contractual requirements 
  •   whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensa-
tion—for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other 
forms of incentive compensation
  •   whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.
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The following illustrates the first bullet point in box 1-2. Suppose management legiti-
mately had to book an estimate of a patent asset’s value when it was acquired (along with 
some other assets that were equally hard to value). Later in the reporting period, as the pat-
ented technology was licensed, the value of the patent became clearer, and that value was 
less than the originally booked amount. If the difference between the original and correct 
value was less than the firm’s quantitative materiality threshold (for example, 5 percent of 
assets), then, applying just a quantitative standard, management would be able to argue that 
no adjustment was required. SAB No. 99 most likely would require management to make 
the adjustment because a more precise value is obtainable.
Likewise, when looking at income statement items, the SEC staff viewed the practice of 
indulging fraudulent and clearly erroneous entries up to some arbitrary percentage limit as 
a license for management to mislead:
The staff believes that investors generally would regard as significant a management 
practice to over- or under-state earnings up to an amount just short of a percentage 
threshold in order to “manage” earnings. Investors presumably also would regard as sig-
nificant an accounting practice that, in essence, rendered all earnings figures subject to a 
management-directed margin of misstatement.
Undoubtedly, auditors would continue to use quantitative standards when planning an 
audit, and SAB No. 99 does not require correction of “small misstatements” if correction 
requires “major expenditures.” However, when examining financial statement accounts, in 
most cases, detected fraudulent intentional misstatements would be deemed material, ac-
cording to SAB No. 99. Although SAB No. 99 is just a staff position and not approved by 
the SEC Commissioners, it’s issuance effectively ended any loophole that fraudsters may 
have had before the issuance of SAB No. 99 to rely purely on a mechanical application of 
quantitative materiality as a means of justifying fraudulent entries.
Quantitative Materiality
In addition to imposing qualitative standards for materiality, the SEC pursued other steps 
to lower the triggers for quantitative materiality. In regards to W.R. Grace & Co.,2 Grace’s 
management set up and used reserves (called “cookie jar reserves”; see chapter 3) to man-
age the reported earnings of its principal health care subsidiary, National Medical Care, 
Inc. (NMC). In 1991 and 1992, NMC earned profits in excess of targets given to securities 
analysts, and NMC took the excess profits to a reserve account that had no stated purpose. 
In 1993 and 1994, NMC’s actual profits were under the announced targets, so management 
drew down on the reserve to increase reported earnings. This technique is called earnings 
smoothing, and it is done to show consistent growth over several reporting periods (the 
rationale for smoothing earnings is discussed in detail in chapter 3). Grace’s outside auditors 
knew about the reserve, recognized that it violated U.S. GAAP (see chapter 11 for a discus-
sion of reserve accounting), and proposed adjusting entries. Grace’s management refused to 
2 As cited in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141 (June 30, 1999).
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make the adjustments, and the auditors passed on the adjustments because, when looked at 
from the perspective of Grace’s consolidated financial statements, the NMC subsidiary ad-
justments did not appear to be material.
The SEC disagreed. Grace’s management had focused the attention of securities analysts 
on the performance of NMC and believed that NMC’s perceived steady, consistent growth 
in earnings was important enough to Grace’s stock value that management was justified in 
using reserves to manage NMC’s earnings. In the SEC’s decisions issued in this matter, the 
SEC bootstrapped materiality from Grace’s Health Care Group, mostly consisting of NMC, 
to the overall company:
... the inclusion of the excess reserves in the Health Care Group segment information 
for the period 1991 through 1994 resulted in a material misstatement of segment infor-
mation which, in turn, was material to Grace’s consolidated financial statements taken as 
a whole for one or more periods during the relevant period.
In other words, because NMC was material to the Health Care Group and the Health 
Care Group was material to Grace, improper use of reserves to manage NMC earnings was 
material to Grace. Setting aside the fact that the reserve account itself would fail the qualita-
tive materiality test because it was not set up in accordance with U.S. GAAP, the quantitative 
materiality test was lowered from the consolidated company level down to the segment level 
and even further to the level of a specific subsidiary in Grace. In the SEC’s view, if manage-
ment touts the performance of a specific subsidiary and then manages its earnings, Grace 
would indicate quantitative materiality at the subsidiary level.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Recordkeeping and Verification
When accounting frauds were tied to the collapse of Enron Corp., Global Crossing Ltd., and 
WorldCom, all occurring within the few months from December 2001 to June 2002, Con-
gress reacted rapidly by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was signed 
by the president on July 30, 2002. SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) to oversee the audit and auditors of public companies (referred to as issuers 
in the act because those companies issue shares that are publicly traded).
Among the duties of the PCAOB, Congress wanted the newly formed entity to “es-
tablish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other 
standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers.”3 With regard to auditing, 
quality control, and ethics, Congress mandated that auditors describe in each audit report the 
testing of the internal control structure and the procedures used by the company to imple-
ment those controls. Specifically, SOX states that the audit report must present
I.  the findings of the auditor from such testing;
II.  an evaluation of whether such internal control structure and procedures—
3 Section 101(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the act).
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 (aa)  include maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; 
 (bb)  provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the issuer 
are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and 
directors of the issuer; and 
III.  a description, at a minimum, of material weaknesses in such internal controls, and 
of any material noncompliance found on the basis of such testing.4
Thus, with SOX, the recordkeeping requirements of the FCPA are set out in greater 
detail, and the auditors are charged with testing and reporting on the adequacy of controls 
relating to the maintenance of those records. Auditors are also required to report material 
weaknesses or “any material noncompliance” relating to internal controls. Although one 
could argue that these steps are already required under U.S. generally accepted auditing stan-
dards, the requirements for these procedures now carry the force (and enhanced penalties 
under the act) of federal law.
Internal Control Report
In addition, SOX Section 404 of required management to submit to the SEC an internal 
control report with the company’s annually filed financial statements and disclosures. That 
internal control report would
 1.  state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and
 2.  contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting.5
In addition to the previously described auditor’s evaluation of internal controls under 
Section 103 of the act, under Section 404(b), outside auditors are required to “attest to, and 
report on” management’s assessment of company internal controls, as well. To perform that 
assessment, the PCAOB promulgated auditing standards, first as Auditing Standard No. 2, 
An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction With an Audit 
of Financial Statements (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Auditing Standards), 
which for audits of fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007, was superseded by 
Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated 
with An Audit of Financial Statements (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Auditing 
Standards). These standards, especially Auditing Standard No. 5, provide useful guidance to 
CPAs for the assessment of internal controls. Specifically, paragraph 14 of Auditing Standard 
No. 5 states that
4 SOX Section 103(a)(2)(A)(iii).
5 SOX Section 404(a).
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the auditor should evaluate whether the company’s controls sufficiently address identi-
fied risks of material misstatement due to fraud and controls intended to address the 
risk of management override of other controls. Controls that might address these risks 
include—
•   Controls over significant, unusual transactions, particularly those that result in late 






inappropriately manage financial results.
Chapter 3 of this book provides examples of the preceding points by looking at major 
fraud-prone issues, such as loss contingencies, cost shifting, and revenue recognition, to show 
how controls were overridden or did not exist and how the CPA can detect the problem.
Audit Committee Requirements
Most noteworthy are the requirements in SOX relating to audit committees. The audit com-
mittee is defined as
A.  a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors 
of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer; and
B.  if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of 
the issuer.6
At least one member of the audit committee must be a financial expert (or the company 
must disclose why it does not have such an expert). The financial expert is a person who has
1.  an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial  
statements;
2.  experience in—
 A.  the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable issu-
ers; and
 B.  the application of such principles in connection with the accounting for esti-
mates, accruals, and reserves;
3.  experience with internal accounting controls; and
4.  an understanding of audit committee functions.7
SOX Section 202 requires the audit committee to approve all audit (and nonaudit) ser-
vices, effectively giving the audit committee the power to hire and fire auditors. Section 204 
of the act spells out the minimum content of reports that the auditor must provide to the 
audit committee, which consist of
6 SOX Section 2(a)(3).
7 SOX Section 407(b).
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(1)  all critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
(2)  all alternative treatments of financial information within generally accepted ac-
counting principles that have been discussed with management officials of the is-
suer, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the 
treatment preferred by the registered public accounting firm; and
(3)  other material written communications between the registered public accounting 
firm and the management of the issuer, such as any management letter or schedule 
of unadjusted differences.
In short, SOX requires identification and discussion of the treatment of critical account-
ing policies, including any differences of opinion (alternative treatments) by and among 
company management and its outside auditors. Congress wanted to encourage a frank dis-
cussion among the audit committee, company management, and outside auditors of the use 
of accounting principles with material impact that were subject to different interpretations. 
However, in no place does the act define critical accounting policies. For help with the term, 
one must look to SEC pronouncements, in particular the proposed rules contained in Re-
lease Nos. 33-8098 and 34-45907, which set out the SEC’s criteria for determining critical 
accounting policies and estimates. This book will examine those criteria in detail, building 
upon the actual examples used in the SEC’s proposed rules.8
Clearly, the act places tremendous reliance on the audit committee as the last line of 
defense within the firm against financial fraud. If, as Congress intended, management and 
auditors make full disclosure to the audit committee of the material accounting policies 
most subject to differing interpretation, the audit committee becomes the final arbiter of any 
judgment calls before release of the financial statements.
The act also makes clear that the audit committee is not the only party responsible for 
overseeing the audit process and the adequacy of internal controls. Just to make sure that se-
nior management understands its responsibilities, Section 302 of the act requires the princi-
pal executive officer and the principal financial officer to certify that the financial statements 
are fairly presented and that
4. the signing officers—
 A.  are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
 B.  have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating 
to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by 
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic 
reports are being prepared;
 C.  have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls as of a date with-
in 90 days prior to the report; and
 D.  have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their 
internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date;
8 Certain chapters draw upon the hypothetical assumptions presented in the SEC’s examples. To illustrate specific types of financial 
reporting fraud, additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subsequently, the SEC-recommended disclosures to the audit 
committee are presented to illustrate how those disclosures would have increased the likelihood of fraud detection. The examples, as 
modified for purposes of this book, reflect the opinions of the author, not the SEC. The reader is encouraged to read the SEC’s proposed 
rules in their entirety, which are included in appendix A found at the end of this book.
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5.  the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of 
the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function)—
 A.  all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which 
could adversely affect the issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and 
report financial data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any material 
weaknesses in internal controls; and
 B.  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employ-
ees who have a significant role in the issuer’s internal controls; and 
6.  the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were signifi-
cant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect 
internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective 
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.9
By requiring that principal officers certify they have disclosed material internal control 
weaknesses to the auditor and the audit committee, Congress has emphasized the officers’ 
role in communicating material weaknesses and forced those officers to make a public dec-
laration (subject to significant penalties for perjury) to that effect. In summary, Congress has 
placed responsibility for internal controls squarely on the shoulders of senior management. 
This book will also discuss in detail the role of senior management in the act and prevention 
of financial reporting fraud.
Although SOX principally applies to public companies, the act and related reform mea-
sures have set the tone for corporate governance in private companies, as well. Concerns 
about financial reporting fraud among those who provide capital to private entities, such as 
banks and venture capitalists, will drive implementation of public company standards into 
the nonpublic sectors. Indeed, a venture capitalist frequently looks to take private companies 
public, which is the preferred exit strategy to realize return on investment, and it is advisable 
that private companies in a venture capitalist’s portfolio preparing to go public become fully 
compliant with the act because the window for initial public offerings in the primary capital 
markets opens and closes without much warning. Therefore, whether the CPA works with 
public or nonpublic entities, knowledge of all the relevant standards is essential.
Financial Fraud in the World of IFRSs
Effective March 4, 2008, the SEC allowed foreign private issuers to meet U.S. filing require-
ments using IFRSs financial statements without having to reconcile those financial state-
ments to U.S. GAAP. This SEC decision opened the door to the use of IFRSs in the United 
States and laid the groundwork for the roadmap later adopted by the SEC that would require 
the use of IFRSs in place of U.S. GAAP for more U.S. registrants in future years. Although 
the roadmap sets out tests and requirements before the SEC mandates conversion to IFRSs, 
it is becoming ever more likely that U.S. financial fraud examiners will encounter IFRSs, if 
they haven’t already.
9 SOX section 302(a).
02-Chap01.indd   19 7/7/10   11:09:51 AM
20
Financial Reporting Fraud
IFRSs are less detailed in their guidance than U.S. GAAP in that their standard setter, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), chooses to use simplified, broad-based 
standards in place of more detailed prescriptions whenever possible. Simplicity is one of the 
IASB’s guiding principles, and the IASB will succeed in maintaining simplicity if it can resist 
pressure to promulgate detailed guidance for specific circumstances. IFRSs will purposely 
provide less detailed guidance to accountants, allowing for a wider range of presumably 
equally valid interpretations of a given standard. In other words, two separate reporting enti-
ties in the same industry could more readily reach different conclusions on the same standard 
and report different financial results under IFRSs. The impact of such latitude on financial 
fraud will be significant, and the chapters that follow will discuss IFRSs to the extent pos-
sible. In addition, chapter 14 will provide examples of IFRSs-related fraud issues and discuss 
what lies ahead with IFRSs implementation.
Research on Fraud
Research carried out in 1998 and 1999 for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO), and published in COSO’s Fraudulent Financial Report-
ing: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, found that when it came to executing 
financial reporting fraud, the most common kinds of fraud methods were the following:
 1.  Fictitious revenues
 2.  Premature revenues
 3.  Understatement of expenses and liabilities
 4.  Overstatement of assets
 5.  Fictitious assets
 6.  Capitalized expenditures that should be expensed
 7. Misappropriation of assets
Chapter 7 covers these methods in more detail; however, the preceding methods tend to 
fall into the following three broad categories:
 1.  Earnings manipulation
 2.  Earnings management10
 3.  Balance sheet manipulation
These three topics will be covered in each of the next three chapters.
10 No distinction is made in accounting literature between earnings management and earnings manipulation. However, the author 
makes this distinction for ease in explaining different concepts of financial reporting fraud affecting the income statement.




Earnings manipulation is the direct alteration of accounting data for the purpose of fraudu-
lently changing reported income. For example, booking a sale that clearly does not meet 
the requirements for revenue recognition inappropriately increases revenues. Conversely, 
capitalizing marketing costs as an asset, contrary to guidance in accounting literature, inap-
propriately decreases current period expenses. Notice also that both examples affect the 
balance sheet, as well; recognizing fictitious sales inflates accounts receivable, and deferring 
marketing expenses creates some type of amortizable asset. However, because the primary 
intent of these manipulations is to increase earnings rather than create assets, these practices 
are classified as earnings manipulation.
Although there is no distinction in accounting literature between earnings management 
and earnings manipulation, to better explain the impact of financial reporting fraud on the 
income statement, earnings management is treated as a subset of earnings manipulation and 
is discussed separately in chapter 3. Earnings management generally involves the manipula-
tion of a series of earnings data to achieve a perception of profitability or growth in earn-
ings, or both, as illustrated in the W.R. Grace & Co. case,1 discussed in chapter 1. The focus of 
this chapter is on the type of earnings manipulation designed to give a one-shot boost to 
earnings.
1 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141 (June 30, 1999).
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Research has shed much light on the motives for earnings manipulation. The Commit-
tee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) sponsored research 
published in 1999 (the COSO report) that examined Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) enforcement actions for the period 1987–97 (see chapter 7 for a more complete dis-
cussion of the findings). The COSO report found that motives for financial reporting fraud 
generally fell into the following three broad categories. Firms or individuals attempted to
 1.  increase the stock price to increase the benefits of insider trading and obtain higher 
cash proceeds when issuing new securities.
 2.  obtain national stock exchange listing status or maintain minimum exchange listing 
requirements to avoid delisting.
 3.  avoid reporting a pretax loss and bolster other financial results.
These three areas will be examined in detail in the following sections: “Earnings Im-
provement,” “New Securities Price Enhancement,” and “Exchange Listing.”
Earnings Improvement
Stock Compensation and Insider Trading
The motive to improve earnings usually works in concert with other motives—rarely does it 
stand alone. For example, one of the most common ancillary motives for earnings manipula-
tion may be found in a firm’s management compensation plan. Such plans generally reward 
management based on reported earnings performance and, therefore, set the stage for po-
tential manipulation. To compound the motive for fraud, the form of compensation paid to 
management for performing well is not just cash; stock (or some equivalent, such as options, 
stock appreciation rights, or deferred compensation plans) is frequently a large component of 
compensation, which increases in value if senior managers can fraudulently increase reported 
earnings before selling their shares.
Over the last several decades, management consultants, compensation committees, and 
academicians advocated the use of stock as a component of compensation to align the inter-
ests of management with those of the firm’s shareholders. Without significant share owner-
ship, the advocates claimed, management was free to pursue its own self-interests, granting 
to itself ever-higher cash salaries, benefits, and perquisites, and in a period of placid boards 
stocked with friends of management, the only recourse for unhappy shareholders was to sell 
their shares. The cost of paying for management was referred to as agency cost because man-
agement served as the agent for shareholders, and management was empowered to run the 
company on their behalf. Agency cost was presumably higher if management did not have 
significant equity ownership—hence, the push for equity-based compensation plans.
Once management received stock (or equivalent) awards under the compensation plan, 
managers immediately began to look for opportunities to sell some or all of their shares. 
The reasons behind managers’ desire to dispose of their equity varied but most had to do 
with lack of diversification. Typically, a manager compensated with stock quickly finds his 
or her personal portfolio dominated with employer shares. Further, given that the source of 
the manager’s cash earnings is the same source as the major securities holding in his or her 
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portfolio, a significant amount of financial security for that manager rests in just one firm: 
the manager’s employer. Therefore, the manager has every incentive to diversify as soon as 
possible.
However, for senior management who may have significant portions of their net worth 
reflected in employer shares and who may also have the ability to manipulate earnings (due 
to lax internal controls, for example), a tremendous incentive exists to maximize net worth 
by fraudulently increasing reported earnings to increase share price long enough to allow 
them to dispose of their shares. Due to the price/earnings (P/E) multiplier used to value 
securities, a small, fraudulent increase in earnings per share (EPS) may translate into a much 
greater increase in stock price on the order of 15–40 times, or more. When a senior executive 
is trying to liquidate large numbers of shares, such an increase is meaningful. If the fraudulent 
increase in reported earnings helps meet stock analysts’ expectations or changes negative 
earnings to positive, the impact on share price may be much greater. During the late 1990’s 
Internet boom market, then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt observed that companies missing 
the consensus estimate among securities analysts of EPS by as little as one penny per share 
saw their stock price hammered because investors sold immediately after earnings were an-
nounced. Senior executives wishing to avoid such a drop in share price would push hard to 
find the extra penny, probably through some type of manipulation.
Stock compensation provides a powerful motivator for income statement manipulation 
and subsequent illegal insider trading. A manager who is heavily compensated in stock will 
need to sell to diversify. If the stock is volatile, such that small changes in reported earnings 
have a significant impact on market price, and if actual earnings do not appear to be meet-
ing expectations, the manager will come under pressure to manipulate earnings from the 
perspective of personal net worth and from colleagues in similar situations. If the manager 
gives in to the pressure and then sells shares, that manager likely trades on material non-
public information—information that the books are cooked—and is guilty of illegal insider 
trading.
Contingent Compensation
In addition to the drive to pay management in stock, compensation experts added the re-
quirement that pay (whether cash or stock) be made contingent upon performance. This 
contingency was also designed to align management’s interests with those of shareholders. 
Management compensation agreements, for instance, may require the achievement of some 
absolute level of net income or an increase in net income over some benchmark to trigger 
bonus payments. Also, to give the contingent compensation plan the power to motivate man-
agers, consultants urge compensation committees to make bonuses a significant part of total 
compensation. The end result is that managers certainly are motivated to increase reported 
earnings, but some managers, faced with the prospect of seeing their compensation fall sig-
nificantly if they fail to hit their goals, succumb to the temptation to manipulate earnings. 
Even though the compensation experts may have been correct and justified, in theory, to try 
to align management’s interests with shareholders’, they may have unwittingly set up strong 
motivators for financial reporting fraud. Certainly, incentive compensation is a valid concept, 
but it must be implemented with well-designed and rigorously enforced internal controls.
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New Securities Price Enhancement
The discussion of stock and insider trading thus far has largely centered on the impact of 
earnings manipulation on shares trading in the secondary securities markets (that is, the trad-
ing of previously issued shares on the regulated exchanges and other markets). In contrast, 
the primary securities markets consist of that group of investors (principally institutions and 
investment banks) who purchase newly issued stock; those investors may then begin trading 
that stock in the secondary markets after shares are issued. The primary markets present yet 
another opportunity for financial statement fraud, especially earnings manipulation, because 
share values are usually a function of projected future income.
When most people think about newly issued securities, they think of initial public offer-
ings (IPOs) of shares of companies that were not previously publicly traded. True, IPOs con-
stitute a part of the primary securities markets but so do the sales of new shares by firms that 
already have other identical shares trading publicly. The latter are referred to as seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) because at the time of the sale of new shares, other seasoned outstanding 
shares are already trading. Both IPOs and SEOs present unique opportunities for fraudsters, 
but in either case, the fraudsters’ objective is usually the same: to raise more capital than they 
could if they told the truth about their firm’s financial condition. With the extra capital, the 
fraudsters can then award themselves larger compensation packages, acquire related entities 
at overvalued prices, or simply stay afloat longer while incurring operating losses.
IPOs
Companies preparing to go public are under intense pressure to clean up their books and, if 
actual results are insufficient, to enhance historical earnings to be published in the offering 
prospectus through fraudulent methods. For firms that were privately held for some period 
of years before the IPO, numerous fraud motives and methods exist. (Chapter 5 also covers 
the special pressures exerted on private firms by venture capitalists.) In the privately held 
environment, a firm’s primary reporting responsibilities are to banks and tax authorities; 
shareholders and management are typically closely aligned (if not one and the same), making 
their reporting needs secondary. However, for public companies, the reporting priority shifts 
to shareholders, especially those not in management, who do not have access to financial 
information about the firm beyond its published financial statements.
As discussed in chapter 5, one area of greatest concern for potential fraud in private 
firms is related party transactions. If one company out of a group of related companies plans 
to go public, the expense sharing and revenue allocations among the related entities, done 
most likely for tax minimization, needs careful review, as well as thorough documentation. 
A tax fraud scheme probably has elements of financial fraud, as well, except the financial 
fraud may not be effectuated until other people (investors) begin to rely on those financial 
statements. For example, say that two related firms shared manufacturing plant facilities in 
a number of locations, but due to heavy development costs, one firm’s marginal income 
tax rate was only 10 percent and the other firm’s rate was 35 percent. Assume that when 
management, which was presumably the same for both firms, began to allocate rent expense 
for the shared facilities, management devised a fraudulent expense sharing arrangement that 
03-Chap02.indd   24 7/6/10   2:19:21 PM
Chapter 2: Earnings Manipulation
25
allocated deductions away from the firm with a low marginal tax rate to the firm incurring 
a higher marginal tax rate, based on incorrect space usage assumptions. That scheme would 
violate various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.2 However, should the low marginal 
rate firm later go public, its historical financial statements would not reflect an accurate share 
of its expenses; rent expense would be too low. An investor or investment banker relying on 
those financial statements to value the shares may underestimate future rent expense. The 
end result is financial reporting fraud arising from tax fraud and an overvaluation of the IPO 
shares.
IPOs present interesting challenges to CPAs in that a private company is moving into 
the public reporting environment. Ideally, the process occurs over a period of years as inter-
nal and external auditors prepare for the control reviews and certifications mandated by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing 
Standard 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit 
of Financial Statements (AICPA, PCAOB Standards and Related Rules, Auditing Standards), re-
viewed in chapter 1. This process typically requires extensive mapping of controls to identi-
fied risks, with procedures described to address each risk.
Hopefully, any deficiencies in controls are identified and corrected. However, because 
the company is new to public reporting requirements, a real possibility exists that not all risks 
would be identified, sometimes simply because company personnel may have overlooked 
a risk that went unidentified in prior years without anyone raising a question. Continuing 
with the preceding rent allocation example, related party risks would certainly be a part of 
the IPO company’s control mapping matrix, and the mapping may even include a procedure 
to assess rent agreements between related parties for appropriateness of rent rates, expense 
pass-throughs, and other provisions. But, if the space usage allocation had been in place for 
several years and no one raised any issues, it may not appear on the matrix at all, and the fraud 
would continue undetected.
As the rent allocation example illustrates, when fraudsters move from the private to the 
public environment, their motives shift, in this case from tax evasion to financial reporting 
fraud. Also, fraud schemes hatched to defraud lenders and tax authorities when a company is 
private take on new dimensions when that company goes public. To serve as a deterrent, the 
securities laws impose strict liability standards on company management when a company 
goes public. IPO shares are registered under the Securities Act of 1933, and that act does not 
require proof of scienter (knowledge) on the part of management to establish a securities 
fraud claim. Therefore, if the financial statements filed with an IPO registration are wrong, 
there is no need for plaintiffs who lose money (or the SEC) to prove that management knew 
about the misstatements; plaintiffs need only establish that they were harmed. This standard 
of proof differs from cases involving fraud that occurs subsequent to the IPO while the stock 
is trading in the secondary market. Any such claim relating to post-IPO trading would be 
pursued under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 and that act does require proof of sci-
enter on the part of management.
2 See Revenue Procedure 2002-18 for a discussion of IRS-imposed reallocations used to correct such schemes.
3 Commonly referred to as a 10b-5 claim in reference to the antifraud rule promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
cited in chapter 1.




SEOs are not immune from fraud, either. Academic research has found several curious events 
surrounding firms that issue new shares in an SEO. Michael Gombola, Hei Wai Lee, and 
Feng-Ying Liu cited research that found share prices declined only slightly (approximately 3 
percent) after a firm announced an SEO.4 Some price decline is expected because the firm is 
increasing its outstanding shares, thus diluting earnings, at least in the near term; in the long 
run, the firm hopes new capital provided in the SEO will provide additional earnings that 
compensate for, and eventually reverse, any near term dilution. Reviewing other research, 
Gambola, Lee, and Liu found that actual performance declined after an SEO did not meet 
expectations:
Despite the price decline at the announcement, Loughran and Ritter (1995) show fur-
ther substantial declines after the SEO announcement. Their findings suggest that to ac-
count fully for the post-offering stock price underperformance over a five-year horizon, 
the price decline accompanying the announcement should be as large as 44%. Their 
research indicates that the stock of firms offering seasoned equity remains substantially 
overvalued long after the announcement is made public. Similarly, McLaughlin, Safied-
dine, and Vasudevan (1996) show a significant decline in profitability during the three 
years following the announcement. This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis 
that firms offering seasoned equity issues are overpriced following the offering.5
Clearly, something is amiss. The market may be consistently overoptimistic, hoping for 
quicker, higher returns from the new capital infusion than actually occurs, or the share prices 
at the time of the announcement may be inflated by fraudulent financial statements. The lat-
ter possibility appears to be more probable because fraud would result in raising more capital 
that, in turn, could have been invested to produce earnings that the fraudsters hope would 
cover up the fraud in later periods. The following example illustrates how this is done:
The Operating System Co., a U.S. publicly traded company, designs and sells software that 
enhances the data processing performance of mainframe computers. Operating System 
recently acquired, in a purchase transaction, the assets of Data Mover Corp., a firm that 
develops and distributes software designed to improve distributed processing capabilities 
through quicker data transfers. The transaction was financed by junk bonds placed with 
institutional investors. Operating System’s management believed that Data Mover’s product 
would complement their own and that because the target market for both products was the 
same (mainframe user), there was an opportunity to reduce redundancies in the combined 
sales forces and achieve a synergistic benefit from the acquisition. In other words, only 
one salesperson was now needed to call on an Operating System or Data Mover customer 
instead of two.
Example Scenario
4 Gombola, Micahel, Hei Wai Lee, and Feng-Ying Liu, “Evidence of Selling by Managers After Seasoned Equity Offering Announce-
ments,” Financial Management 26, no. 3 (1997): 37–53.
5 Ibid.
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Operating System’s CFO recognized that trimming the sales force could have poten-
tially adverse consequences for some customer relationships, so she set up loss contingen-
cies for possible early contract cancellations, write-offs of accounts receivable, and product 
discounts to accommodate unhappy customers. The loss contingencies were set up under a 
balance sheet account titled “Acquisition Reserves.” The charge for these reserves went to 
goodwill (see chapter 11 for a discussion on setting up acquisition reserves).
Soon after the acquisition, Operating System decided to float an offering of new shares 
and secured, at the company’s annual meeting, the approval of its shareholders to issue the 
shares. Proceeds from the offering, net of offering expenses and underwriters’ fees, would 
be used to pay down the high interest rate acquisition debt. When Operating System’s 
CFO contacted the firm’s investment bankers who would manage the offering, the invest-
ment bankers noted that Operating System’s stock price had slumped after the Data Mover 
acquisition because the market did not believe that synergies from the acquisition would be 
significant. “You’re going to have to prove to the Street that you will indeed have synergies 
from this acquisition in your next quarterly filing, or we will have to discount the offer-
ing price severely,” said the managing director of the investment banking firm. This put 
the CFO under significant pressure because she had assured senior management that she 
believed the price the new shares would fetch would be close to the current price of shares 
already trading on the market. Her pricing assumption was important because management 
did not want to see significant dilution.
The next quarterly filing with the SEC was due in two weeks; the quarter had ended 
one month earlier. The CFO had to think fast. She knew that in the weeks after the acquisi-
tion, senior sales managers decided to have Data Mover sales personnel pair up with Oper-
ating System salespeople to make joint calls on common customers to minimize customer 
defections to competitors. As a result of this executive decision, the hoped-for redundancy 
reductions were not showing up as quickly as planned. On the other hand, the joint sales 
calls had so far resulted in fewer unhappy customers, so the acquisition reserves went 
largely untapped, although it was still too early to tell whether they would be needed.
The CFO concluded that she could, in her words, “recharacterize” the acquisition 
reserves to include redundant sales salaries as an acquisition expense. Even though an-
ticipated personnel terminations were accounted for in a separate charge, she rationalized 
that carrying the extra sales personnel on the payroll was an expense incurred in lieu of 
the expected losses from unhappy customers. The CFO instructed the controller to charge 
the redundant salaries to acquisition reserves instead of payroll expense. The controller, 
when later asked why he did not question the CFO’s instruction, said that he believed that 
because the account title for the reserves was so broadly worded, “the acquisition reserves 
could be used for just about any acquisition-related expense that came up.”
By running the expense for redundant personnel through the balance sheet account, 
the CFO was able to show a reduced payroll cost, compared with the combined payroll 
of both Operating System and Data Mover before the acquisition, in the quarterly income 
statement filed with the SEC. The investment bankers were pleased and priced the offer-
ing of new shares with only a small discount from quoted prices on shares already trading. 
As an added bonus, when the market saw that payroll cost had declined due to perceived 
synergies in the acquisition, the price of Operating System’s stock increased, covering most 
of the underwriting costs of the seasoned equity offering.
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Although this example deals with loss contingencies, as discussed in Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805, Business Combina-
tions (specifically FASB ASC 805-20-25), the facts here do not require much analysis in that 
area (however, see chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion of reserves). Essentially, the 
CFO attempts to justify debiting salary costs against reserves set up for other purposes, 
which violates U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; moreover, it is not likely that 
redundant salary costs would even qualify as a loss contingency. The fact that the ac-
count title is ambiguous is irrelevant; the stated purposes for the reserves were to absorb 
anticipated financial consequences of unhappy customers. The fact that management 
spent more money than originally planned to keep the customers happy does not allow the 
company to access those reserves.
Furthermore, to use the reserves to effectively hide salary expense to give the ap-
pearance of improved operating results is deceptive without adequate disclosure, which 
was pointedly missing in the preceding example. Materiality may not even be a workable 
defense in this situation. The amount of the payroll costs squirreled away in reserves may 
not have been large relative to overall net income, from the perspective of quantitative ma-
teriality, but the fact that investment bankers and their clients, the primary capital market 
investors, were closely observing payroll costs caused that payroll item to rise in impor-
tance. Using the W.R. Grace & Co. standard discussed in chapter 1, the SEC would likely 
assert that materiality should be judged against the increase in operating income caused 
by reclassifying some of the payroll costs. From the perspective of qualitative materiality, 
relying on SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Materiality, the SEC would likely go fur-
ther to assert that any knowing violation of accounting standards, such as using reserves 
for reasons contrary to their original intent, is material, regardless of the amount.
 Example Analysis
Exchange Listing
Finally, earnings manipulation may help a company obtain or retain its listing on a stock 
exchange. The initial and continued listing requirements of many exchanges provide for 
some type of net income test. Although companies failing this test may qualify for initial or 
continued listing under other tests, such as overall market capitalization, companies whose 
share prices have declined sharply in a weak market may find net income manipulation to 
be their only hope. 
For example, a company that desires to become listed to trade on the NASDAQ Stock 
Market may apply under its choice of several different listing standards, which vary depend-
ing upon which NASDAQ market the company hopes to be listed: the NASDAQ Global 
Select Market for firms with large market capitalization, the NASDAQ Global Market for 
firms with midsized market capitalization, and the NASDAQ Capital Market (formerly, the 
SmallCap Market), as summarized in appendix 1 at the end of this chapter. To become listed 
on the NASDAQ Global Select Market for the first time, a firm must meet at least one of 
three initial listing standards.
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The first NASDAQ Global Select Market initial listing standard requires a firm desiring 
to be listed to have reported pretax earnings of at least $11 million in aggregate over the 
last 3 prior fiscal years and pretax earnings of at least $2.2 million in each of the 2 most 
recent fiscal years, with positive pretax earnings in the 3 prior fiscal years. For pretax earn-
ings, listing requirements state that “NASDAQ will rely on a company’s annual financial 
information as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the company’s 
most recent periodic report and/or registration statement.” Initial listing requirements for 
both the NASDAQ Global and Capital Markets also provide an option to qualify using ei-
ther pretax or posttax earnings, though at lower levels and shorter time periods. Therefore, 
fraudsters target reported earnings if earnings would otherwise come up short of the listing 
requirements.
Other ways exist to obtain an initial listing without referring to earnings, but the al-
ternatives are subject to manipulation, as well. For example, the second and third NASDAQ 
Global Select Market initial listing standards do not have an income requirement but do 
require that the firm demonstrates certain levels of market capitalization and revenue. Rev-
enues can be manipulated through a number of schemes (see chapter 13). Market capital-
ization, which is the product of the listing firm’s outstanding shares in each class of stock 
outstanding multiplied by the respective price per share for each class of stock, is also subject 
to manipulation through financial reporting fraud, though less directly. As will be illustrated 
subsequently, the trading price of a listed stock can be a function of reported EPS, and a 
fraudster can manipulate those reported earnings. Similar to market capitalization, many of 
the NASDAQ listing standards also refer to market value of listed securities, the product of those 
shares listed on an exchange multiplied by the price per share, and the market value of publicly 
held shares (MVPHS), the product of price per share multiplied by the number of shares in 
the hands of nonaffiliated public shareholders. The latter would exclude shares held by an of-
ficer, director, or 10 percent shareholder of a listing firm. Manipulating the reported EPS can 
affect NASDAQ’s definition and use of market capitalization, market value of listed securities, and 
market value of publicly held shares. It is not surprising that the COSO report found exchange 
listing to be a significant objective of fraudsters.
Mathematical formulas help illustrate how fraudsters manipulate share prices to increase 
a firm’s market capitalization to fraudulently obtain a NASDAQ listing. For example, assume 
the fraudsters were targeting MVPHS, which is a function of shares outstanding (in the hands 
of nonaffiliated shareholders) multiplied by the price per share. Price per share is a function 
of the P/E multiple applied to forecast EPS, and analysts typically forecast earnings begin-
ning with historical earnings. Substituting historical, basic EPS in the place of forecast EPS 
for simplicity, the MVPHS equation becomes the following:
MVPHS = (Total shares outstanding − Shares held by directors, officers, 
and major shareholders) × P/Ehistorical × Basic EPShistorical
EPS is a function of earnings; therefore, from the equation, it is clear to see that reported 
earnings are an important driver in this listing standard.
Manipulating EPS can affect other NASDAQ listing metrics, such as the minimum bid 
price required for initial and continued listing on all NASDAQ markets. Bid price is the inside 
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(or highest) bid quoted at the end of a trading day for a given stock, and the listing standards 
require a minimum bid price of $1 to remain listed on any of the NASDAQ markets. Bid 
price, using historical earnings in the place of forecast earnings, is simply the last two terms 
of the previous equation:
Bid price per share = P/Ehistorical × Basic EPShistorical
Other factors can affect the price of a share of stock from day to day, such as institutions 
or market makers purchasing or selling large blocks of stock, limited trading volume (liquid-
ity) in the stock on a given day, and overall market movements. However, over the long run, 
the earnings metric is the key driver.
Therefore, given that reported earnings are either an explicit or implicit component of 
the listing standards, income statement manipulation to achieve or maintain listing on an 
exchange becomes an important tool for fraudsters.
Why is exchange listing so important? A delisted or unlisted firm can trade its shares on 
the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) market, assuming the firm is current with 
its filings with the SEC. The OTCBB is an electronic market within which shares are traded 
between brokerage firms on behalf of their customers. However, unlike the NASDAQ mar-
kets, no requirement exists that a firm traded on the OTCBB have a minimum number of 
market makers. Market makers are securities brokerages that meet certain requirements and 
have publicly stated to the market that they stand ready to make a market in a given security. 
As such, a market maker usually maintains an inventory of shares in the security to accom-
modate an investor who wishes to purchase some shares when, at that moment, no ready 
sellers are in the market. The market maker is obligated under the SEC’s Firm Quote Rule to 
stand behind its quotes with the capability to fulfill an order at the quoted price and quantity. 
In this manner, the market maker helps maintain an orderly market by providing liquidity. 
Without a market maker, a purchaser who comes to the market wishing to buy shares may 
find that, absent a ready seller, he or she may have to place an order at a substantial premium 
over the last trade just to attract a seller into the market. On the flip side, a seller who shows 
up and is not lucky enough to encounter a buyer at that moment may have to part with 
his or her shares at a steep discount to attract a buyer. Therefore, liquidity is important, and 
market makers provide that liquidity.
How much is liquidity worth? According to some studies, quite a lot. The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago provides an extensive 
database of returns on stock investments dating back to 1925 and is used in a wide range of 
academic and research studies. The CRSP database omits some securities returns after the 
stock is delisted, so two researchers, Tyler Shumway and Vince Warther, studied the impact of 
delisting on the last returns reported for securities immediately before delisting.6 Their find-
ings told users of the CRSP database that if a specific stock was delisted for failure to meet 
the minimum maintenance standards of the exchange and the CRSP did not have a delisting 
6 Shumway, Tyler and Vincent A. Warther, “The Delisting Bias in CRSP’s Nasdaq Data and Its Implications for the Size Effect,” Journal 
of Finance 54, no. 6 (1999): 2361–79.
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return, a decrease of 30 percent from the last return while the stock was listed would be a 
reasonable estimate of the impact of delisting if the stock had been traded on either the New 
York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. For stocks that had been traded on 
NASDAQ, the impact of delisting, according to the researchers, was an enormous decline of 
55 percent; more than half the value of a NASDAQ firm’s common stock would likely be 
lost if the stock is delisted.
Valuation studies of shares issued by public companies that are restricted (that is, not 
allowed to be traded like the companies’ publicly registered shares) provide some additional 
guidance. Those studies compare the price of a given company’s publicly traded securities 
with the price of restricted shares issued by the same company to determine the discount 
for lack of liquidity. Restricted shares may only be traded under strict time and weekly vol-
ume limits set by securities regulations.7 Although OTCBB shares remain freely tradable, the 
market in which they trade is much less liquid than those exchanges that require a minimum 
number of market makers to support every listed stock; therefore, the OTCBB liquidity is 
in some ways similar to restricted stock liquidity. The studies found that the restrictions pro-
duced, on average, a 20 percent to 40 percent discount from the price of the publicly traded 
shares. Even at the low end, a 20 percent hit to a firm’s market capitalization can be a serious 
blow and provides ample incentive for fraudsters to manipulate income to keep their firms 
listed on established markets.
Conclusion 
Three primary motives for earnings manipulation cited in the COSO report (earnings im-
provement, new securities price enhancement, and exchange listing) provide a starting point 
for CPAs to identify issues that may lead to earnings manipulation. From the viewpoint of 
fraud prevention, the three areas signal the need for better internal controls—controls that 
address specific issues raised by each motive and controls that are rigorously enforced once 
in place.
For example, a firm with a management compensation plan tied to reported earnings 
may wish to carve certain internal accounting personnel out of the plan so their compensa-
tion is not tied to earnings. Under this internal control recommendation, personnel who 
have responsibility for signing off on earnings would not have a compensation-related mo-
tive to manipulate those earnings. To make sure that this internal control step functions as 
planned, the firm will need to establish a separate reporting chain so that, for compensation 
matters at least, those personnel do not report to managers in the incentive plan. A reporting 
line from the accounting personnel to the compensation committee of the board of directors 
may be appropriate, for example. In this recommendation, the internal controls address the 
fraud motives typically found in incentive compensation plans and are designed to rigor-
ously enforce accounting standards by using a separate reporting line to a committee of the 
board.
7 See SEC Rule 144.





The following tables summarize the initial and continued listing standards of the NASDAQ markets.  
NASDAQ uses a multitier market system that differentiates between more mature companies and 
smaller, usually younger, companies. The first set of tables summarize the listing standards for the  
NASDAQ Global Select Market, the market for the largest companies; the second set of tables sum-
marize the listing standards for the NASDAQ Global Market, a market for midsized companies; the third 
set of tables summarize listing standards for the NASDAQ Capital Market, a market for smaller compa-
nies. Among the various listing standards, the requirements for earnings, bid price, and market value of 
publicly held shares tend to be the principal, though not exclusive, targets of fraudsters using earnings 
manipulation. Corporate governance requirements exist for all companies listed on any of the markets, 
and those standards include requirements for audit committees, which are discussed in more detail in 
chapters 7–8.
NASDAQ Global Select Market
Initial Listing
Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three financial standards and the ap-
plicable liquidity requirements.
Financial and Qualitative Requirements












5315(e) and  
5315(f)(3)(C)
Standard 4  
Listing Rules  






Aggregate in prior 
three fiscal years ≥ 
$11 million 
and 
Each of the two most 
recent fiscal years ≥ 
$2.2 million 
and 
Each of the prior 




Aggregate in prior 
three fiscal years ≥ 
$27.5 million 
and 
Each of the prior 
three fiscal years 
≥ $0
N/A N/A
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5315(e) and  
5315(f)(3)(C)
Standard 4  
Listing Rules  




Average ≥ $550 
 million over prior  
12 months
Average ≥ $850  
million over prior  
12 months
$160 million
Revenue N/A Previous fiscal year ≥ $110 million
Previous fiscal year  
≥ $90 million N/A
Total assets N/A N/A N/A
$80 million in the 
most recently  
completed  
fiscal year
Stockholders’ equity N/A N/A N/A $55 million
Bid price5 $4 $4 $4 $4
Market makers6 3 or 4 3 or 4 3 or 4 3 or 4
Corporate  
governance7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
1  These requirements apply to all companies, other than closed-end management investment companies. A closed 
end management investment company, including a business development company, is not required to meet the 
financial requirements of Rule 5315(f)(3). If the common stock of a company is included in The NASDAQ Global Se-
lect Market, any other security of that same company, such as other classes of common or preferred stock, which 
qualifies for listing on The NASDAQ Global Market shall also be included in The NASDAQ Global Select Market. 
2  In calculating income from continuing operations before income taxes for purposes of Rule 5315(f)(3)(A), NASDAQ 
will rely on a company’s annual financial information as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in the company’s most recent periodic report and/or registration statement. If a company does not have three 
years of publicly reported financial data, it may qualify under Rule 5315(f)(3)(A) if it has: (i) reported aggregate 
income from continuing operations before income taxes of at least $11 million and (ii) positive income from 
continuing operations before income taxes in each of the reported fiscal years. A period of less than three months 
shall not be considered a fiscal year, even if reported as a sub period in the company’s publicly reported financial 
statements. 
3  In calculating cash flows for purposes of Rule 5315(f)(3)(B), NASDAQ will rely on the net cash provided by operat-
ing activities reported in the statements of cash flows, as filed with the SEC in the company’s most recent periodic 
report and/or registration statement, excluding changes in working capital or in operating assets and liabilities. 
   A period of less than three months shall not be considered a fiscal year, even if reported as a stub period in the 
company’s publicly reported financial statements. 
4  In the case of a company listing in connection with its initial public offering, compliance with the market capitaliza-
tion requirements of Rules 5315(f)(3)(B) and 5315(f)(3)(C) will be based on the company’s market capitalization at 
the time of listing. 
5  The bid price requirement is not applicable to a company listed on The NASDAQ Global Market that transfers its 
listing to The NASDAQ Global Select Market. 
6  A company that also satisfies the requirements of Rule 5405(b)(1) or 5405(b)(2) is required to have three market 
makers. Otherwise, the company is required to have four market makers. An electronic communications network 
(ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
7  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance require-
ments as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)




Companies must meet all of the criteria in their specific category:
NASDAQ Global Select Market Initial Listing Requirements


















Average monthly trading 




















Publicly held shares3 1,250,000 1,250,000 1,250,000 5315(e)(2)
Market value of publicly 
held shares 
or 











1  Companies affiliated with another company listed on The NASDAQ Global Select Market. For purposes of Rule 
5315, a company is affiliated with another company if that other company, directly or indirectly though one or more 
intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control of the company. For purposes of these rules, 
control means having the ability to exercise significant influence. Ability to exercise significant influence will be 
presumed to exist where the parent or affiliated company directly or indirectly owns 20% or more of the other 
company’s voting securities, and also can be indicated by representation on the board of directors, participation 
in policy making processes, material intercompany transactions, interchange of managerial personnel, or 
technological dependency.
2  Round lot and total shareholders include both beneficial holders and holders of record. 
3  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)
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Continued Listing
Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three standards:





Market Value Standard 
Listing Rules 
5450(a) and 5450(b)(2)
Total Assets/Total Revenue 
Standard Listing Rules 
5450(a) and 5450(b)(3)
Stockholders’ equity $10 million N/A N/A
Market value of listed 
securities2 N/A $50 million N/A
Total assets and Total 
revenue (in latest fiscal 
year or in two of last 
three fiscal years)
N/A N/A $50 million and $50 million
Publicly held shares3 750,000 1.1 million 1.1 million
Market value of publicly 
held shares $5 million $15 million $15 million
Bid price $1 $1 $1
Total shareholders4 400 400 400
Market makers5 2 4 4
Corporate governance6 Yes Yes Yes
1  Companies must meet the bid price and total shareholders requirements as set forth in Rule 5450(a) and at least 
one of the Standards in Rule 5450(b). 
2  The term, “listed securities”, is defined as “securities listed on NASDAQ or another national securities exchange.” 
3  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company. 
4  Total shareholders include both holders of beneficial interest and holders of record. 
5  An electronic communications network (ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
6  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance 
requirements as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)





Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the four standards:



















Income from continuing 
operations before 
income taxes (in latest 
fiscal year or in two of 
last three fiscal years) 
$1 million N/A N/A N/A
Stockholders’ equity $15 million $30 million N/A N/A
Market value of 
listed securities3 N/A N/A $75 million N/A
Total assets and Total 
revenue (in latest fiscal 






Publicly held shares4 1.1 million 1.1 million 1.1 million 1.1 million
Market value of 
publicly held shares $8 million $18 million $20 million $20 million
Bid price $4 $4 $42 $4
Shareholders 
(round lot holders)5 400 400 400 400
Market makers6 3 3 4 4
Operating history N/A 2 years N/A N/A
Corporate governance7 Yes Yes Yes Yes
1  Companies must meet the bid price, publicly held shares, and round lot holders requirements as set forth in Rule 
5405(a) and at least one of the Standards in Rule 5405(b). 
2  Seasoned companies (those companies already listed or quoted on another marketplace) qualifying only under 
the Market Value Standard must meet the market value of listed securities and the bid price requirements for 90 
consecutive trading days prior to applying for listing. 
3  The term, “listed securities”, is defined as “securities listed on NASDAQ or another national securities exchange.” 
4  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company. 
5  Round lot holders are shareholders of 100 shares or more. The number of beneficial holders is considered in 
addition to holders of record. 
6  An electronic communications network (ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
7  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance 
requirements as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)
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Continued Listing
Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three standards:





Market Value Standard 
Listing Rules 
5450(a) and 5450(b)(2)
Total Assets/Total Revenue 
Standard Listing Rules 
5450(a) and 5450(b)(3)
Stockholders’ equity $10 million N/A N/A
Market value of listed 
securities2 N/A $50 million N/A
Total assets and Total 
revenue (in latest fiscal 
year or in two of last 
three fiscal years)
N/A N/A $50 million and $50 million
Publicly held shares3 750,000 1.1 million 1.1 million
Market value of publicly 
held shares $5 million $15 million $15 million
Bid price $1 $1 $1
Total shareholders4 400 400 400
Market makers5 2 4 4
Corporate governance6 Yes Yes Yes
1  Companies must meet the bid price and total shareholders requirements as set forth in Rule 5450(a) and at least 
one of the Standards in Rule 5450(b). 
2  The term, “listed securities”, is defined as “securities listed on NASDAQ or another national securities exchange.” 
3  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company. 
4  Total shareholders include both holders of beneficial interest and holders of record. 
5  An electronic communications network (ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
6  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance 
requirements as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)





Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three standards:












Stockholders’ equity $5 million $4 million $4 million
Market value of publicly 
held shares $15 million $15 million $5 million
Operating history 2 years N/A N/A
Market value of listed 
securities3 N/A $50 million N/A
Net income from 
continuing operations
(in the latest fiscal year
or in two of the last three
fiscal years)
N/A N/A $750,000
Bid price $4 $4 $4
Publicly held shares4 1 million 1 million 1 million
Shareholders (round lot 
holders)5 300 300 300
Market makers6 3 3 3
Corporate governance7 Yes Yes Yes
1  Companies must meet the bid price, publicly held shares, round lot holders, and market makers requirements as 
set forth in Rule 5505(a) and at least one of the Standards in Rule 5505(b). 
2  Seasoned companies (those companies already listed or quoted on another marketplace) qualifying only under 
the Market Value of Listed Securities Standard must meet the market value of listed securities and the bid price 
requirements for 90 consecutive trading days prior to applying for listing. 
3  The term, “listed securities”, is defined as “securities listed on NASDAQ or another national securities exchange.” 
4  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company. In the case of ADRs, at least 400,000 shall be issued. 
5  Round lot holders are shareholders of 100 shares or more. The number of beneficial holders is considered in 
addition to holders of record. 
6  An electronic communications network (ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
7  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance 
requirements as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)
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Continued Listing
Companies must meet all of the criteria under at least one of the three standards:












Stockholders’ equity $2.5 million N/A N/A
Market value of listed 
securities2 N/A $35 million N/A
Net income from 
continuing operations
(in the latest fiscal year
or in two of the last three
fiscal years)
N/A N/A $500,000
Publicly held shares3 500,000 500,000 500,000
Market value of publicly 
held securities $1 million $1 million $1 million
Bid price $1 $1 $1
Public holders4 300 300 300
Market makers5 2 2 2
Corporate governance6 Yes Yes Yes
1  Companies must meet the bid price, publicly held shares, market value of publicly held shares, public holders, and 
market makers requirements as set forth in Rule 5550(a) and at least one of the Standards in Rule 5550(b). 
2  The term, “listed securities”, is defined as “securities listed on NASDAQ or another national securities exchange.” 
3  Publicly held shares is defined as total shares outstanding, less any shares held directly or indirectly by officers, 
directors or any person who is the beneficial owner of more than 10% of the total shares outstanding of the 
company. 
4  Public holders of a security include both beneficial holders and holders of record, but does not include any holder 
who is directly or indirectly an executive officer, director, or the beneficial holder of more than 10% of the total 
shares outstanding. 
5  An electronic communications network (ECN) is not considered a market maker for the purpose of these rules. 
6  In addition to the above quantitative requirements, companies must comply with all corporate governance 
requirements as set forth in the Rule 5600 Series.
(© Copyright 2010, The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission.)
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A subtler variant of earnings manipulation is earnings management. Although both involve 
the manipulation of accounting data, earnings management attempts to manipulate reported 
earnings over multiple reporting periods to give the impression of consistent profitability 
and growth, usually with the objective of meeting previously published forecasts. However, 
the reasons fraudsters engage in earnings management go beyond simply trying to meet a 
forecast. A company that demonstrates consistency in growth reaps significant financial ben-
efits, which translate into a higher stock price. If actual earnings for a given period under-
shoot or overshoot the desired level needed to show that consistency, the fraudster attempts 
to use improper accounting entries to adjust earnings up or down to meet that target.
Stock analysts and business appraisers like predictable trends. Their job, when it comes to 
valuing a company, is to forecast earnings, and a consistent trend in historical earnings makes 
predicting future earnings much easier. Moreover, predictability lowers the risk that the ana-
lyst’s or appraiser’s estimate is off and narrows the range of possible outcomes. A business ex-
periencing consistent growth in earnings between 4 percent and 6 percent per year is much 
easier to value than a firm with earnings that swing from negative 15 percent to positive 25 
percent. For that latter firm, a forecast looking 5 years out could have a number of widely 
divergent outcomes. For example, 5 years of negative 15 percent per year change in earnings 
puts earnings in year 5 at 44 percent of the base year earnings, whereas 5 years of 25 percent 
04-Chap03.indd   41 7/6/10   2:20:30 PM
42
Financial Reporting Fraud
annual growth produce year 5 earnings equal to over 300 percent of base year earnings. In 
contrast, the more predictable firm, after 5 years, will have earnings ranging from 122 percent 
to 134 percent of base year earnings. Clearly, the more predictable firm is easier to value.
However, there is more to predictability than making an analyst’s or appraiser’s job easier. 
The capital markets respond in a similar fashion. The more predictable a firm’s earnings, as 
a general rule, the lower its cost of equity capital, and lower capital costs, in turn, contribute 
to higher stock prices.
Manipulating Cost of Equity
The price of a share of a company’s stock can be represented as the present value of future 
expected cash flows that consist of the regular and liquidating dividends forecast for all fu-
ture years (that is, in perpetuity). Those cash flows are discounted to the present using the 
company’s cost of equity, which is the rate of return required by outside investors to place 
their investment capital with the company. The lower the cost of equity, the lower the rate 
demanded by outside investors that is used in the denominator to discount future expected 
cash flows to the present, and the lower the discount rate, the higher the present value of 
the stock. For example, assume a company pays dividends of $20 per share annually, forecast 
to remain constant in perpetuity. If its cost of equity is 10 percent, the price per share will 
be $20 divided by 10 percent, or $200. However, if the firm’s cost of equity is 15 percent, 
the extra 5 percent demanded by outside investors will lower the share price by $67 ($20/ 
15% = $133).
Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model to Determine 
the Cost of Equity
Modern portfolio theory, as developed by William Sharpe, John Lintner, and others, dem-
onstrated that a particular stock’s return (both price appreciation and dividends) could be 
estimated with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) frequently used by valuation experts 
to determine a firm’s cost of equity capital. For illustration purposes, assume that there are 
two publicly traded companies: Consistent Co. and Volatile, Inc. Consistent’s stock has risen 
steadily over the last decade and is fairly predictable. Volatile’s stock gyrates significantly from 
period to period.
The CAPM formula, using Consistent as an example, is as follows:
RConsistent = Rf + ßm,Consistent (Rm – Rf)
in which
RConsistent is the total rate of return (from dividends and price ap-
preciation) of Consistent’s stock and reflects the return demanded 
by outside investors to invest capital in Consistent stock;
Rf is the risk-free rate (such as the rate on a Treasury bond);
Rm is the long term rate of return on all stocks in the market (usu-
ally approximated by the returns on the S&P 500 or a broader 
index);
04-Chap03.indd   42 7/6/10   2:20:30 PM
Chapter 3: Earnings Management
43
(continued)
(Rm – Rf) is the amount by which returns of the overall market 
exceed the risk-free rate (that is, the equation in parentheses mea-
sures the excess returns of the market); and
ßm,Consistent, called by its Greek letter beta, is a measure of the 
change in excess returns of Consistent’s stock relative to changes 
in excess returns of the overall market. In other words, a stock 
with a beta of 1.0 has excess returns (over the risk-free rate) that 
tend to track the excess returns of the market for any given period 
of time, whether the market is going up or down.
By way of example, if over the next year, the market is expected to increase 15 percent 
over the risk-free rate and Consistent stock has a beta of 1.0, the excess returns on Con-
sistent’s stock (returns from dividends and price appreciation in excess of the returns on 
Treasury bonds) should also increase by the same percentage. As another example, assume 
Volatile has a stock with a beta of 2.0. When the market increases by 15 percent in a given 
year, Volatile’s stock has excess returns of 30 percent; however, if the market declines by 15 
percent, Volatile’s stock declines by 30 percent, but Consistent’s stock declines only by 15 
percent. Therefore, stocks with higher betas, like Volatile’s, have greater volatility of returns.
The Price of Volatility
The market extracts a penalty for volatility. Using the CAPM formula as a predictive tool 
and continuing the examples of Consistent and Volatile, assume the risk-free rate is forecast 
to be 5 percent, and the market excess return is forecast to be 15 percent.
The expected return on Consistent’s stock will be as follows:
RConsistent = 5% + (1.0 × 15%) = 20%
The expected return on Volatile’s stock will be as follows: 
RVolatile = 5% + (2.0 × 15%) = 35%
Because expected return reflects the rate of return required by outside investors to place 
their funds with either company, Volatile’s cost of equity is 15 percentage points more than 
Consistent’s cost of equity due to the fact that Volatile’s stock moves twice as much (that 
is, is more volatile) relative to the overall market than Consistent’s stock. Given that each 
firm’s cost of equity discounts its future cash flows available for equity holders to the pres-
ent, the discount rate for Consistent’s forecast dividends are lower than the discount rate for 
Volatile.
To illustrate the impact of that lower discount rate, assume that Consistent’s dividends 
are expected to be $10 per year, and Volatile’s dividends are expected to be $15 per year (both 
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cash flows are without growth and projected in perpetuity). The value of a share of Con-
sistent’s stock is $10 divided by 20 percent cost of equity, or $50.00. The value of a share of 
Volatile’s stock is $15 divided by 35 percent cost of equity, or $42.86. Therefore, even though 
Volatile’s stock pays a dividend expected to be 1.5 times that of Consistent’s dividend, Vola-
tile’s stock has a lower value because it is more volatile.
Why Manipulate Earnings?
The motive for earnings management is closely tied to this example. If a firm is free to ma-
nipulate its earnings, financial theory says it will do so to make its earnings more predictable 
or, perhaps more to the point, to make the firm’s growth in earnings more predictable. With 
steady, predictable growth in reported earnings that appears to be unaffected by the firm’s 
industry sector or perhaps even the overall economy, returns on that stock appear to be less 
volatile than returns from its peer group and maybe even less volatile than the rest of the 
market. In other words, by earnings manipulation, the firm appears to be less risky than its 
peers and less risky relative to market returns, and it succeeds at lowering its beta. Then, with 
a lower beta, the manipulator’s cost of capital declines, and therefore, without having to raise 
dividends, the manipulator is able to raise its stock price.
Manipulating Growth
The importance of steady growth does not just affect cost of equity. The perception of 
growth increases valuation in even more direct ways. For companies with high cost of equity 
capital, growth is the principal mechanism used to enhance share value. In other words, if a 
firm incurs high cost of equity due to high volatility of its returns relative to the market, the 
firm can make up for some of that cost by convincing investors that it will grow rapidly in 
future years.
Using a Gordon-Shapiro Model to Determine  
Share Value
To value stocks, securities analysts use a range of tools, including variants of the Gordon-
Shapiro perpetual dividend discount model. To illustrate the model in its basic, single stage 
form, assume Volatile has no marketable debt. According to the single stage model, the share 
price of Volatile’s stock is determined as follows:
PVolatile = [DVolatile (1 + g)] / (RVolatile – g)
in which
PVolatile is the current market price per share of Volatile stock;
DVolatile is Volatile’s current annual dividend per share;
RVolatile is the return on Volatile’s equity equal to its cost of equity 
capital (previously calculated); and
g is the annual compound growth rate for Volatile dividends.
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To illustrate, assume Volatile has been able to demonstrate a long term growth rate, albeit 
a volatile one, of 15 percent. Volatile’s initial annual dividend remains at $15, and cost of eq-
uity is 35 percent. The single stage model calculates the price of Volatile’s stock as follows:
PVolatile = [$15 (1 + 15%)] / (35% – 15%)
 = $86.25
Therefore, adding a 15 percent growth rate, Volatile’s stock price rises from $42.86, the 
value assuming no growth, to $86.25, or double its stock price. (The preceding equation 
used to value Volatile’s stock without growth was actually the single stage model with g set 
to zero.) 
The Reward of Consistency and Growth:  
Price/Earnings Multiples
Companies that are successful in combining both consistency and growth are rewarded with 
high price/earnings (P/E) multiples on their stock. For example, Consistent had a lower beta 
and cost of equity, but if it managed to achieve growth of 15 percent, its share price would 
be as follows:
PConsistent = [$10 (1 + 15%)] / (20% – 15%)
 = $230.00
Even though Consistent paid initial dividends of only $10 per share compared with 
Volatile’s $15, with the same growth rate of 15 percent, Consistent’s share price is much 
higher than Volatile’s $86.25 per share due to lower cost of capital.
Why was Consistent’s cost of equity capital less? Its more consistent earnings allowed 
the market to assign a lower beta, bringing its stock price (ignoring growth) to $50, or more 
than $7 over Volatile’s (no-growth) price, even though Volatile paid a much larger dividend. 
Combined with growth, Consistent’s stock price really took off, moving to $230 and achiev-
ing a price that was more than two and one-half times Volatile’s $86.25.
The P/E multiple is the measure that ties all these concepts together. Assume both 
Consistent and Volatile pay 75 percent of their earnings in dividends (that is, their dividend 
payout ratio is 75 percent). To obtain the earnings per share (EPS) denominator component 
of the P/E multiple, EPS would equal the annual dividend divided by the payout ratio; in 
the present case, EPS would equal the current dividend divided by 75 percent. Consistent’s 
EPS is $13.33 ($10 / 75%), and Volatile’s EPS is $20.00 ($15 / 75%). To contrast consistency 
and growth, assume Consistent has both and Volatile has neither. As previously calculated, 
when both earnings consistency and growth were included in Consistent’s stock price, that 
price was $230.00. Recall that when Volatile, with its high cost of equity capital due to its 
volatile earnings history, had no growth, its stock price was $42.86. The P/E multiples for 
each would then be as follows:
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P/EConsistent = $230.00 / ($10 / 75%) = $230.00 / $13.33
 = 17.25
P/EVolatile  = $42.86 / ($15 / 75%) = $42.86 / $20.00
 = 2.14
Although this example was designed to emphasize the differences, the firm that exhib-
its consistent earnings and earnings growth (Consistent) has a markedly higher P/E than 
the firm that exhibits volatile earnings and no growth (Volatile). The P/E ratios effectively 
convey the impact of both consistent earnings and predictable growth; that makes P/E the 
prime target for fraudsters, and earnings manipulation is the tool of choice they use to inflate 
P/E.
Sustaining Share Price: How Fraudsters 
Benefit
Fraudsters want to manage earnings to increase stock prices for many reasons. Chapter 2 
discusses issues relating to executive stock compensation and bonus plans tied to a specific 
period’s financial performance. For plans that pay out based on long term, multiperiod per-
formance, fraudsters are similarly motivated to use a series of earnings manipulations (that 
is, earnings management) to achieve higher-than-justified stock and bonus awards. But the 
motives for earnings management are broader and may include fraudsters’ efforts to use earn-
ings management to support the share price of a publicly traded company until they can sell 
their holdings.
Getting Around Time Restrictions
The fraudsters may need to engage in such an effort if time restrictions prevented the grant-
ing or sale of company shares at an earlier date. Examples of stock granting, or sale restric-
tions and inducements, are outlined in box 3-1.
Box 3-1: Time Restriction Fraud Examples
1.  Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that postpone ownership until a 
future date
2.  Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers from acquiring shares until 
specified dates or the occurrence of specific events
3.  Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 144 restrictions that limit the num-
ber of shares that can be sold on U.S. securities exchanges on a given trading day
4.  Income tax provisions that afford more favorable tax treatment to long term capital 
gains on the disposition of shares that meet the holding period requirements
5.  Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding significant blocks of stock past 
some event, such as an annual shareholders’ meeting, before they can be sold
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The following example ties together the concepts of earnings management and 
motive:
Acme Aerospace Inc. had a long and storied record in the United States of achieving consis-
tent earnings and dividend growth, and along with that growth, came a rising stock price 
that made investors and analysts happy. Acme’s principal operating segments consisted 
of defense aircraft (30 percent of last fiscal year’s earnings), civilian aircraft (50 percent of 
earnings), and satellite components manufacturing (20 percent of earnings). Acme had 
weathered the consolidations in the defense industry following the fall of the Berlin Wall by 
successfully implementing company-wide cost reduction measures and shifting its focus 
away from defense products. These adjustments kept growth on track and earned Acme’s 
CEO the title of “miracle worker.” 
Not surprisingly, Acme’s executives were well compensated. Although Acme’s execu-
tive salaries were handsome, the bulk of executive compensation came in the form of cash 
and stock bonuses contingent on long term performance of the company: 
 1.  The cash bonus plan paid significant bonuses if earnings targets were met for each 
year of a five-year period; if targets were not met for a given year, the bonuses were 
scaled back or eliminated. Acme reported earnings under U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP).
 2.  The stock bonus plan granted shares of stock to senior management if the price of 
Acme’s shares reached certain levels and remained above those levels for a period 
of at least 90 days within each year of the 5-year measurement period. Acme’s stock 
was traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
The compensation committee of Acme’s board of directors believed that the emphasis 
on bonuses helped align management’s interests with those of Acme’s shareholders. The 
compensation committee, after conferring with its consultants, set the stock price targets 
for cash and stock bonuses each year (for each 5-year period), with objectives of achieving 
15 percent growth over each prior year’s earnings.
Budgets were set for each business segment such that as they rolled up to the corpo-
rate level, Acme could achieve both the cash bonus and stock bonus targets for that year. 
The cash bonus targets were keyed to earnings growth, and the budgets could be set ac-
cordingly, with a projected year-over-year increase in profits of 15 percent. The stock bonus 
targets, set to a specified stock price, were more difficult to gauge. Acme had recently 
achieved a P/E ratio of 22, and if that ratio could be maintained and if the cash bonus earn-
ings target could be met, Acme’s CFO felt that the stock bonus would come in, as well. The 
budgets for the current fiscal year were a stretch and left little room for error, but manage-
ment thought they were achievable.
However, by the end of the first quarter, the satellite components manufacturing divi-
sion began to experience problems. Commercial launches were postponed or canceled 
because satellite communications ventures failed to attract new customers and traffic on 
existing satellites did not grow as expected. Several of Acme’s contracts were terminated, 
idling a plant and some equipment; other customers announced that they would not exer-
cise renewal provisions in their contracts after current production was complete, so it was 
probable that more equipment would be idled later. Needless to say, the satellite division 








The CFO had a serious problem if the satellite division failed to perform. Due to news 
of problems with Acme’s satellite customers, Acme’s stock was starting to gyrate as rumors 
of customers declaring bankruptcy came and went. Acme’s treasury department routinely 
tracked share price volatility to measure the firm’s weighted average cost of capital—the 
average of Acme’s cost of equity and cost of debt weighted for the market value of each. 
The treasury group was responsible for assessing an internal finance charge, for perfor-
mance measurement purposes, for funds from financing activities used by a given division 
based on each division’s capital expenditures and working capital demands. The corporate 
treasurer reported to the CFO that if Acme’s stock continued to oscillate widely, the cost of 
equity component would have to increase as Acme’s beta increased. The CFO knew that 
a higher cost of equity not only would affect Acme divisions that were net users of capital 
funds but also would cause the securities analysts who track Acme stock to adjust, at some 
point, their discounted cash flow models and lower their P/E forecasts. With a lower P/E 
ratio, the CFO knew that achieving the stock bonus target would be close to impossible.
To allay market concerns about the satellite division’s impact on Acme’s earnings, the 
CFO believed that reported earnings over the next several quarters would be key. Those 
earnings needed to come in on target with analysts’ expectations to demonstrate that Acme 
could weather the problems in the satellite industry just as it had earlier weathered those 
in the defense industry. The CFO’s most immediate problem was the idle plant and equip-
ment: an impairment charge, he thought, would tank earnings and eliminate any chance 
for Acme’s stock to hit the bonus target. To complicate matters, more equipment would 
likely be idled in future quarters as work was completed on existing contracts that would 
not be renewed or replaced. In addition, the CFO would have to assess how the company 
could find a way to make up the profit lost on the canceled satellite contracts. Finding more 
revenue would be quite a challenge because demand for components in the aerospace 
industry was tied to contracts that have already been awarded and did not fluctuate much 
over a one-year period.
Over a series of late nights, the CFO and his staff came up with a plan. The corporate 
controller noted that the plant and most of the equipment that were idled were initially ac-
quired in a purchase combination earlier in the current calendar quarter when the satellite 
division acquired the assets of Orbit Company. The controller recommended an adjustment 
of the purchase price to allow for a contingency for idled plant and equipment, which he 
believed was permitted under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) 805-20-25. The controller proposed to debit goodwill from the 
purchase transaction and credit a reserve account on the balance sheet for the plant and 
equipment that was idled now. Then, Acme could take the impairment charge for the idle 
plant and equipment in the current quarter and debit the contingent liability instead of an 
income statement account. The CFO thought this was “a brilliant solution.” In regard to the 
equipment that would likely become idle in future quarters (and was not part of the Orbit 
transaction), the CFO instructed the controller to list the equipment as “in transit” to several 
of Acme’s defense division aircraft components plants to be used in aircraft parts produc-
tion. The CFO did not check with the aircraft components plant managers to see if they 
actually needed the equipment.
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Turning to the problem of lost profits on cancelled contracts, the CFO asked his 
contract analyst to “revisit” the estimates she made for profitability on certain long term 
aircraft components contracts. Acme recognized revenue and related costs on its long 
term contracts on the percentage of completion method. In most cases, Acme served as 
subcontractor to a prime contractor, and in Acme’s defense segment, the prime contractors 
were fulfilling procurement contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The CFO 
pointed out to the contract analyst that depreciation, storage, and relocation costs from the 
idled equipment that was “in transit” needed to be included in the estimates for those DOD 
contacts that were bid on a cost plus basis: as the cost of the contract increased, the CFO 
knew that the revenues and recognized profit would increase, as well. In each successive 
quarter, as more equipment was idled, the equipment immediately generated revenue as 
related expenses were added to the cost base for defense contracts. The CFO also told the 
controller that charges to the reserves and redesignations of “in transit” equipment costs 
were not to be handled by plant controllers nor reflected on plant financial statements; he 
wanted these items to be handled at the corporate level “so as not to burden plant control-
lers with these issues.”
At year-end, the CFO carefully supervised the analysis of goodwill under FASB ASC 
350-20-35 to make sure there was no impairment. The Orbit transaction was not quantita-
tively material to overall operations, he thought, so he hoped that his revenue estimates 
for the remaining Orbit assets would not be scrutinized too thoroughly by auditors. Even if 
he did have to write down the Orbit goodwill, the CFO felt he could explain the impairment 
as a onetime event with no impact on future earnings. After all, the cost shifting he had 
accomplished with regard to the idled plant and equipment had protected Acme’s gross 
margin and allowed the firm to meet its earnings growth target. As the securities markets 
saw Acme report earnings in line with expectations, trading in Acme stock calmed down, 
and the P/E ratio remained at 22, thus allowing Acme management to meet that year’s stock 
price target. When the CEO announced the year-end cash and bonus awards, he threw a 
dinner party in honor of the CFO.
This case illustrates the misuse of acquisition-related contingencies (see chapter 11) and 
the failure to take impairment charges to income. For a manufacturer, the unanticipated 
write-off of plant and equipment is generally a serious threat to achieving a performance 
bonus because it is next to impossible for the manufacturer, in the near term, to find 
enough new customers and bring its products into production to make up for the charge to 
net income. If performance bonuses are tied to tight budgets, management will find taking 
write-offs to be quite difficult because those write-offs will likely sacrifice a major portion 
of management’s compensation.
In this example, the fraudsters had two objectives in mind. First, they wanted to 
protect the budget so earnings growth targets were achieved, keeping management on 
track to receive the entire cash performance bonus. Second, the fraudsters wanted to avoid 
alerting the securities markets to the fact that problems in the satellite industry would af-
fect Acme. If the markets were to detect problems in that segment, securities analysts
 (continued)
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might adjust their cash flow projections or discount rates to reflect slower growth due 
to the drag on future profits caused by satellite industry problems. Even though current 
reported EPS might not be greatly affected because the satellite division accounted for only 
20 percent of Acme’s net income, lowering the growth rate would increase the discount 
rate used in the single stage model and lower the P/E ratio. With a lower P/E, the fraudsters 
believed they would miss the stock bonus target.
To pull off these objectives, the fraudsters needed to hide asset impairments over sev-
eral quarters (that is, engage in earnings management). To lower the chance of detection, 
they split the impairment charges between two schemes. The first would create contingen-
cies from a previous acquisition that would then absorb the impairment charge relating to 
currently idle plant and equipment. The second scheme would route the cost of soon-to-be 
idle equipment over to the defense division, where Defense Department (DOD) cost plus 
contracts could turn the extra expense into income. Both schemes violated U.S. GAAP, and 
if the company reported under International Financial Reporting Standards, it would have 
violated related standards, as well.
For the acquisition contingency scheme, the controller’s reference to FASB ASC 805 
was only, at best, partially correct. FASB ASC 805-20-25 does provide for contingencies, but 
the criterion for recognizing such a liability requires the acquirer in a business combination 
to determine that it was probable that a liability had been incurred as of the acquisition 
date, meaning that it was probable at the acquisition date that one or more future events 
confirming the existence of the liability will occur.1
The issue of idle plant and equipment was likely not even contemplated at the time of 
the Orbit acquisition. The acquisition probably was made because, at that time, manage-
ment thought there were few foreseeable problems with the satellite business. Therefore, 
it would not be possible at a later date to create a contingent liability for idle equipment 
that met the probable standard as of the acquisition date. Without being considered a part 
of Orbit’s purchase price, the contingency could not create or increase goodwill, as the 
controller did when he debited goodwill and credited a contingency account.
The second scheme of placing idled equipment in some state of limbo was a more 
straightforward fraud, but the CFO hoped to avoid detection by dribbling in small amounts 
over several quarters in future periods. Here, the fraudsters actually violated a second U.S. 
GAAP principle, in addition to failing to take an impairment charge. The example stated 
that “it was probable that more equipment would be idled later” due to discussions with 
Acme’s satellite customers. Accordingly, assuming the amount of equipment that would 
be idled could be reasonably estimated, a loss contingency under FASB ASC 450-20 should 
have been established (with a charge to current earnings) for that entire amount in the 
current quarter, not spread out over several future quarters. Such a hit to earnings coming 
in an early quarter was not what the fraudsters wanted because the write-off would have 
alerted the markets to problems Acme was having in the satellite division and would have 
imperiled the P/E ratio. However, loss contingencies are required under U.S. GAAP for pre-
cisely that reason: to alert financial statement readers of future problems.
1
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification 805-20-25-20.
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Being a public company, the fraudulent accounting used to hide losses was, if deemed 
material, a violation of federal securities laws. Specifically, the accounting scheme likely 
violated SEC Rule 10b-5 because it was designed to defraud with the “intent to omit to 
state a material fact [that is, the asset impairments] necessary in order to make the state-
ments made [Acme’s quarterly income statements], in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made [problems with the satellite industry market], not misleading.”
In addition to violating U.S .GAAP and SEC rules by allocating unmerited equipment 
expenses to DOD contracts, the fraudsters also likely violated U.S. Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and are liable under federal procurement fraud statutes (also, if material, 
SEC regulations would have required disclosure of FAR violations, as well).
The example contained some clues that could have signaled these frauds. Adjustments 
to a purchase price after the acquisition should be scrutinized carefully. Looking at the 
requirements to qualify as an acquisition-related contingency, the contingency must have 
existed at the time of the acquisition, and the contingency must have been probable to oc-
cur. Facts should generally emerge at the time of acquisition that help determine the prob-
able threshold and provide sufficient inputs for a fair value estimate. Any delay beyond 
that time should be a red flag to the CPA.
Another flag is found in the recurring reclassifications of idle equipment into a holding 
category, such as “in-transit” in the example. Setting aside the audit question regarding 
whether the machines would actually be moved and put back in service, just looking at the 
series of entries in the holding category account would indicate that equipment was being 
idled and placed “in-transit” on a regular, recurring basis. Those recurring entries beg the 
question, did management see this coming? If the answer is “Yes,” a loss contingency 
for, at the least, estimated moving costs and downtime may be needed for future periods. 
More important, in the process of investigating the need for the loss contingency, the CPA 
would likely discover that the equipment in the example never went back into productive 
service.
The goodwill impairment analysis was the CFO’s Achilles’ heel because the controller’s 
“brilliant idea” manufactured additional goodwill from the Orbit acquisition that might not 
withstand the first step of the goodwill impairment test under FASB ASC 350-20-35. Assum-
ing the satellite segment is the appropriate reporting unit, if the fair value of that segment 
did not equal or exceed the segment’s carrying value on Acme’s books, Acme might have 
to take a write-down to earnings under the second step of the goodwill impairment test. 
Adding more goodwill for the idled plant and equipment would increase the carrying value 
of the satellite segment on Acme’s books. An honest analysis of the lower fair value under 
the first step due to reduced prospects for the satellite industry might have triggered a re-
assessment of implied fair value of goodwill under the second step, reversing all the CFO’s 
efforts to cover up the problems in the satellite segment. Therefore, a possible addition 
to audit procedures would be the review of activity in setting acquisition-related contin-
gencies, especially any contingencies set up or adjusted at, or long after, the acquisition 
date. Indeed, possibilities exist for fraudsters to exploit the first step test performed at the 
operating segment or reporting unit level in such a manner to shield their fraud from the 
second step analysis, and this issue will be explored in greater depth in chapter 11.
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Flexibility in Accounting: A Numbers 
Game?
Management, fearing the precipitous decline that can result if analysts scale back their growth 
estimates, may believe that the company must engage in earnings management to meet ana-
lysts’ expectations. In this environment, the moral issue of reporting earnings that truly mea-
sure the company’s economic activity is a matter of management intent. The very nature of 
accrual accounting leaves open the possibility that management judgment, even within the 
bounds of relevant accounting literature, may be colored by the intent to show the company 
in the best possible light. Accrual, deferral, and allocation procedures designed to permit 
the allocation of revenues and expenses, gains, and losses across reporting periods also allow 
management considerable leeway about when to declare earnings. When, within this process, 
does discretion become the intent to deceive? Within what limits should management be 
acting to permit investors to properly price the company’s securities in the market? How 
much earnings smoothing actually misrepresents the trend of economic performance versus 
the irregularities of cash flows?
Earnings management is fraudulent if improper accounting is used to hide true com-
pany performance. Arthur Levitt, when serving as chairman of the SEC, expressed the SEC’s 
concern about this subject in a 1998 speech titled “The Numbers Game” when he stated 
that “[f]lexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations. Abuses such 
as earnings management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is employed to 
obscure actual financial volatility. This in turn, masks the true consequences of management’s 
decisions.”
Thus, Levitt acknowledged that there is flexibility in accounting. CPAs may reach differ-
ent, though defensible, conclusions when applying accounting literature. Earnings manage-
ment occurs when company management, in Levitt’s words, attempts to “exploit” account-
ing flexibility by reaching a conclusion that “masks the true consequences” of its actions.
Failure to Perform Punishes the Stock Price
Within this range of discretion, management of publicly traded companies, especially growth 
and high-tech companies, have been under tremendous pressure to perform from both ana-
lysts and investors. Failure to report continued profit growth has resulted in dramatic punish-
ment to the stock price, even if the shortfall is by only a few cents per share. Even perfor-
mance that was good by historical standards can cause a price decline if earnings are below 
analysts’ expectations. This kind of market reaction has been an incentive for companies that 
are just meeting analysts’ forecasts or even falling slightly below to show a modest increase 
in reported profit.
Discovery of earnings manipulation can lead to the dismissal of senior executives, law-
suits by shareholders, and sharp declines in the price of the company’s stock. Other conse-
quences will be a decline in the number of analysts following the company and an increase 
in the number of short sellers.
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Types of Earnings Management
In his 1998 speech, Levitt focused on three main fraudulent practices used to enhance 
earnings:
 1. Big bath restructuring charges
 2. Cookie jar reserves
 3. Materiality
Big Bath Restructuring Charges
Big bath restructuring charges are the large one-time charges associated with a restructuring. 
Management may take a big bath charge on the assumption that the company stock price 
will get pummeled whether the restructuring charge is large or small. Using that logic (which 
may be correct), management opts for the big charge by establishing large loss contingencies 
for shutting down operations or shifting operations to other areas. If the contingency esti-
mates are too large and actual expenses do not consume the entire contingency, management 
can later reverse the unused portion back into income. As an added bonus, the reversal back 
to income may occur at a time when earnings need a boost because of disappointing cur-
rent operating results. Hence, Levitt observed that overestimation can leave charges that are 
“miraculously reborn as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short.”
Cookie Jar Reserves
Fraudulent managers tend to cloak their deception in an accounting rule, although, in reality, 
the accounting rule is not properly applied or other accounting rules are broken. The use of 
loss reserves is a good example of the abuse of an accounting principle to manage the final 
earnings figure. In a calendar quarter in which a company expects to outperform market ex-
pectations, it might create a loss contingency—frequently referred to as a reserve—for future 
losses on such items as long term contracts to create the effect of lowering earnings closer 
to the market consensus forecast. Then, in a future quarter, after the company has internally 
predicted it will not make enough income to meet market expectations, management can 
reverse some of the reserves on the grounds that future contract losses no longer appear 
probable.
On the surface and viewed in isolation, the creation and reversal of the loss contingen-
cies may appear unrelated to earnings expectations. U.S. GAAP provides for the booking of 
loss contingencies, provided that the loss contingencies are both quantifiable and probable. 
However, when misused by a fraudster, the possibility of losses on future contracts most 
likely existed before the establishment of the loss contingency and continued to exist after 
the contingency was reversed into income. The reserves become an accounting artifice used 
by management to manage earnings to meet market expectations. Moreover, in this example, 
management violated U.S. GAAP either by creating the loss contingency without justifica-
tion or reversing the contingency without any change in the degree of risk that the loss 
would in fact occur. Such loss contingencies, manipulated to manage earnings, are known 
as cookie jar reserves because management can reach into the cookie jar and pull them into 
income whenever the need arises.




Underlying the discussion of financial statement fraud to this point is the assumption that 
the accounting manipulations cited are all material, in that the manipulations significantly 
change the information presented in the financial statements. Much of the accounting litera-
ture contains provisions that except immaterial amounts from a given accounting standard. 
However, the evolution of the definition of materiality has introduced another element of 
judgment into determining whether there is fraud.
The SEC decided to weigh in on this matter when it issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 
(SAB) No. 99, Materiality (discussed initially in chapter 1; the full text is included in ap-
pendix B found at the end of this book), which helped clarify some of the key materiality 
concepts. One issue the SEC addressed head-on was the use of quantitative materiality to 
waive accounting violations. A blind application of quantitative materiality essentially looks 
at the monetary amount of an accounting entry (or series of entries) that was indefensibly 
improper. If the amount was less than some arbitrary standard, such as 5 percent of net in-
come, neither management nor company auditors would insist on changing that entry, even 
though it blatantly violated accounting standards. The SEC said that although quantitative 
standards may serve as a starting point for investigating potential accounting irregularities, 
relying exclusively on an arbitrary percentage to avoid the application of appropriate ac-
counting standards has no basis in accounting literature (or in U.S. securities laws).
In 1980, FASB issued Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information, which addressed materiality in paragraph 132, as follows:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light 
of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that 
the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed 
or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.
In other words, materiality is viewed from the standpoint of the reader of financial state-
ments. If the correction of an erroneous accounting item would probably cause the reader to 
come to a conclusion different from the conclusion reached upon reading the uncorrected 
statement, the item is material.
When the International Accounting Standards Board looked at materiality, the board 
adopted a similar definition, with the clarification that materiality bears upon the economic 
decisions made by users of financial statements:
Omissions or misstatements of items are material if they could, individually or col-
lectively, influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial 
statements. Materiality depends on the size and nature of the omission or misstatement 
judged in the surrounding circumstances. The size or nature of the item, or a combina-
tion of both, could be the determining factor.2
Before the release of FASB Concepts Statement No. 2 and International Accounting 
Standard 1, Presentation of Financial Statements, the Supreme Court, in reviewing a securi-
ties case3 involving materiality issues, ruled that a fact is material if there is “a substantial 
2 Paragraph 11 of International Accounting Standard 1, Presentation of Financial Statements.
3 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Therefore, both account-
ing literature and the Supreme Court look to the reader or user of the financial statements 
and ask whether it is probable or substantially likely that the reader would have come to a 
different conclusion. If the answer is “Yes,” the item in question is material.
Conclusion
Earnings management is one of the most subtle areas of financial statement fraud because it 
takes place over several reporting periods and frequently involves judgment calls on material-
ity. The materiality issues, especially the qualitative issues, are difficult because they require 
the CPA to climb into the mind of the financial statement user and ask what information 
would change his or her opinion. More guidance now exists in the form of SAB No. 99 
and case decisions coming from the SEC, such as the W.R. Grace & Co. case.4 The CPA’s 
challenge is to place all information that was available to readers of financial statements 
in the context of the events occurring at the time that the information was available. Did 
management focus attention on one specific segment or performance metric that elevated 
seemingly immaterial accounting misstatements to a material level? Conversely, did financial 
statement or other disclosures mitigate or lessen the impact of a misstatement because read-
ers had better information from the disclosures and were likely relying on those disclosures 
instead of specific elements of the financial statements? These are questions the CPA must 
weigh and assess using professional judgment.
4 Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141 (June 30, 1999).
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The balance sheet used to be the backwater of financial statement fraud. The more sophis-
ticated fraudsters were supposed to focus on earnings because multiples of earnings drove 
valuations, and inflated valuations led to illicit gain. Due to the multiplier effect of the price/
earnings (P/E) ratio, a small fraudulent change in earnings could produce a much larger in-
flated stock value. According to conventional wisdom, only second-tier fraudsters bothered 
with the balance sheet because potential monetary rewards were smaller for the fraud effort 
required. Now, however, balance sheet frauds have become more complex and the potential 
rewards much greater as the balance sheet has grown in importance and the fraudsters have 
devised more sophisticated ways to implement their schemes.
Growing Importance of the Balance Sheet
A balance sheet represents a firm’s financial position as of a certain date. Although histori-
cal cost was the primary basis of accounting under both U.S. generally accepted account-
ing principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), literature 
is evolving about the valuations of balance sheet assets and liabilities. Over the last decade, 
accounting standard setters have moved closer to reflecting values for assets and liabilities at 
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current prices, or fair value, especially if the values of those assets and liabilities are volatile 
and subject to significant change over short periods of time. For example, financial assets may 
be marked to their fair values under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Account-
ing Standards Codification (ASC) 825-10-15-4 or chapter 4 of IFRS 9, Financial Instruments. 
Even presumably less volatile assets, such as plant and equipment, under certain circumstanc-
es, must be written down due to impairment under FASB ASC 360-10-35 and International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 36, Impairment of Assets. FASB ASC 360-10-35 and IAS 36 also 
allow reversal of impairment charges (a write-up of asset value) under certain circumstances. 
Thus, the balance sheet, with some justification, has gained more importance because it has 
become a more accurate reflection of current values of assets and liabilities. Lenders and in-
vestors have come to place more reliance on the balance sheet. Indeed, numerous academic 
studies, starting with work done by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in the early 1990s, 
have tracked the relationship between a firm’s book value (that is, its shareholders’ equity 
as reflected on its balance sheet) and its market value and found that book value contains 
meaningful information for investors looking for undervalued stocks.1
Fraudsters manipulate balance sheets either directly through the booking of incorrect 
accounting entries or indirectly by keeping transactions off the books entirely. The latter 
category (the indirect method) has grown significantly in sophistication and importance.
The motives for balance sheet manipulation frequently relate to reporting requirements 
established by lenders, rating agencies, and regulators who tend to focus more heavily on 
balance sheet items. Typical bank revolving loan covenants, for example, may set out one or 




If the borrowing company’s balance sheet accounts violate the loan covenants, two 
events occur:
 1.  The firm may be in default under the terms of the loan and subject to accelerated 
repayment of the loan.
 2.  The firm may be precluded from any future loan advances.
Therefore, the fraudster may wish to increase the stated value of short term assets, such 
as receivables and inventory, in order to improve a current ratio, or the fraudster may need to 
keep the debt-to-equity ratio down by not recording liabilities.
Moreover, a publicly traded firm that was in trouble on its bank revolving line of credit, 
or revolver for short, would have additional incentive to commit a fraud because it would 
otherwise have to report to securities regulators that it was in default under its revolver loan 
covenants and, as a likely consequence, suffer a decline in its stock price. Similarly, compa-
nies in regulated industries, such as insurance and banking, must maintain certain amounts 
of capital to meet regulatory requirements. Failure to do so may result in sanctions or even 
closure by the regulators.
1 Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French, “Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns,” Journal of Finance 50, no. 1 
(1995): 131–55.
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Direct Methods of Balance Sheet 
Manipulation: Fraudulent Entries
The most straightforward form of balance sheet manipulation involves the use of fraudu-
lent entries that inflate the recorded values of assets or reduce the values of liabilities. These 
entries require overriding internal controls and, to be sustained over long periods of time, 
fooling internal and outside auditors (and the audit committee, if constituted by the firm’s 
board of directors). If there is collusion, especially among senior personnel, the fraud may be 
especially difficult to detect, but collusion is risky from the fraudster’s perspective because 
there is always the possibility that one of the conspirators could turn in the others. For that 
reason, indirect methods of balance sheet fraud, which rely less on outright collusion (see the 
following section), have become more popular.
The motives for direct manipulation are usually straightforward and relate to raising 
capital, both debt and equity, for the firm. By inflating booked asset values on the balance 
sheet or reducing liabilities, the fraudster establishes an illicit basis for greater borrowing 
capacity. Also, the same actions may make a firm look more financially sound to a potential 
equity investor. For example, an asset-based lender that loans funds to a firm as a percentage 
of reported values of inventory may unwittingly extend more credit than it should if inven-
tory values are overstated. Similarly, a factor that discounts a firm’s accounts receivable may 
overextend credit if there are fictitious receivables.
However, direct balance sheet manipulation does not necessarily take place in a vacuum. 
Through earnings manipulation, for example, cost of goods sold may be understated using a 
fraudulent system that fails to relieve inventory as products are shipped. The result is not only 
a lower cost of goods sold on the income statement but also an inflated inventory figure on 
the balance sheet.
An asset-based lender may have the impression that there is more collateral than is actu-
ally present. In the same manner, earnings manipulation that increases sales revenue probably 
increases accounts receivable, as well, assuming the fraudster has fabricated sales for which 
no one has paid. As receivables increase, the factor, in the short-run at least, is led to believe 
the firm expects to receive more accounts receivable cash flows in the future. With greater 
expected, though fraudulent, future cash flows, the factor is tricked into extending more 
credit and then is left without collateral if the firm declares bankruptcy.
Indirect Methods of Balance Sheet 
Manipulation: Hiding Transactions
The indirect method of balance sheet manipulation is more devious. Here, the fraudsters at-
tempt to hide transactions or deflect transactions to another entity when those transactions 
should have been recorded on the company’s books. These maneuvers are done for many 
reasons:





agement mistakes by failing to record impairments and write-downs.
	 •	 	Fraudsters	may	wish	to	hide	liabilities	to	avoid	difficult	questions	from	lenders,	cur-
rent investors, potential investors, and regulators.
	 •	 	Fraudsters	may	wish	to	manipulate	financial	ratios	to	make	a	firm	look	stronger	than	
it really is.
What makes these frauds so devious is that they are more difficult to detect because the 
CPA is most likely faced with trying to find transactions that did not get booked in the firm’s 
transactions journals. Failing to record an asset impairment, for example, requires special 
procedures to detect and correct the fraud, and as an example later in this chapter illustrates, 
determining whether an actual fraud has been committed requires a significant amount of 
judgment. It is not always clear when an asset is impaired, and fraudsters take advantage of 
every element of accounting judgment to avoid the write-down.
Compounding the devious nature of an indirect balance sheet fraud, such as failing to 
record an asset impairment, is that the fraudster can concoct a passingly plausible story for 
why the impairment is not necessary, and that story may, for a time, convince coworkers and 
senior managers that all is well. Therefore, armed with a seemingly credible story, the fraud-
ster does not need to engage in the dangerous task of building a conspiracy or expanding 
an existing conspiracy beyond a few people. The fraud is implemented with a much lower 
risk of detection.
Manipulation Techniques: Examples
The following examples illustrate how fraudsters accomplish balance sheet manipulation. 
The first example scenario demonstrates a direct method fraud; the second example shows 
the indirect method.
Direct Method Example: The Case of the  
Vanishing Payables
This example looks at a number of issues, but the principal fraud is an inappropriate write-
down of debt on the balance sheet. The firm used in the example, Betascott (a name taken 
from a Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] proposed rule release),2 is shown as a 
publicly traded company to cover some issues that arise due to public disclosure require-
ments, but the fraud and motives illustrated can be found in nonpublic companies, as well.
2 This example is taken from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907. To 
illustrate certain aspects of financial reporting fraud, additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subsequently, the SEC-
recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illustrate how those disclosures would have increased the likeli-
hood of fraud detection. The examples, as modified for purposes of this book, reflect the opinions of the author, not the SEC. The reader 
is encouraged to read the SEC releases in their entirety, which are included in appendix A at the end of this book.
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Betascott Company manufactures and sells data storage devices, principally computer hard 
drives, and files its financial statements with the SEC under U.S. GAAP. Betascott has two 
subsidiaries, each focused on different markets: the Megadrive subsidiary manufactures 
and assembles hard drives for mainframe systems, and the Pocketdrive subsidiary assem-
bles hard drives for personal computers.
Pocketdrive buys some of its components from Megadrive and records a credit to inter-
company payables with each purchase. Megadrive periodically uses Pocketdrive assembly 
personnel during peak demand periods. The intercompany payables are rarely settled in 
cash; usually, Pocketdrive offsets those payables against amounts Megadrive owes. No bills 
are produced; the subsidiary controllers merely keep a running tally of the components 
shipped and labor used. Discrepancies at the end of the fiscal year are closed to a balance 
sheet account labeled “Intercompany” because, according to the controllers, the discrepan-
cies tend to reverse themselves every few years and are not worth the time to track down. 
“After all,” Megadrive’s controller told the outside auditors, “the amounts will simply wash 
out in the intercompany eliminations when the consolidated financial statements are pre-
pared.” No one has reconciled the “Intercompany” account since the two subsidiaries were 
formed over 15 years ago.
When talking to investors and securities analysts, Betascott’s management touts Pock-
etdrive’s rapid earnings growth because Megadrive’s profits have been declining signifi-
cantly over the last several years due to increased competition. Both Betascott’s and Pocket-
drive’s management determined that, due to Megadrive’s poor profitability, it was better 
for Pocketdrive to arrange its own bank financing. Pocketdrive’s revolving credit facility 
requires it to maintain certain balance sheet ratios, including a current ratio of at least two-
to-one. However, in the present year, even Pocketdrive is experiencing problems with lower 
margins on its products, and the profit forecast for the rest of the year is bleak. To make 
matters worse, some of Pocketdrive’s customers have gone bankrupt, and Pocketdrive has 
had to write off significant accounts receivable. The write-offs threaten to bring the current 
ratio below the two-to-one threshold, at which point the bank could accelerate Pocketdrive’s 
loan or, at a minimum, refuse to give the company any more credit. Pocketdrive depends 
heavily on the bank line to meet its obligations because Betascott is already strained trying 
to keep Megadrive afloat.
Pocketdrive’s controller, whose bonus is contingent on Pocketdrive performance, pre-
sented a plan to Pocketdrive’s management to “clean up” the accounts payable. The con-
troller’s plan essentially reversed any unbilled payables outstanding for more than 90 days. 
“If our vendors have not sent us a bill within 3 months of delivering components,” he told 
the subsidiary’s managing vice president, “they’ve probably forgotten about the shipment, 
and we certainly are not going to remind them!” The vice president asked which vendors 
have failed to send a bill, and the controller named some unaffiliated suppliers who have 
overlooked a few shipments. The vice president then asked how much the “clean-up” will 
contribute to their problem with the current ratio, and the controller responded that the 
ratio should climb to 2.5:1 by year-end. The vice president approved the plan, suspecting 
that most of the improvement in the ratio is attributable to write-offs of intercompany pay-
ables owed to Megadrive. However, the vice president conveniently forgot to tell Betascott 
management about the “clean-up” plan, and Pocketdrive’s controller reported to the bank 
that Pocketdrive was in compliance with all requirements of the credit facility agreement, 
including the minimum current ratio.
Example Scenario




3 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1141 (June 30, 1999).
This example illustrates how deficient internal controls, particularly at a firm’s subsidiary 
level, can contribute to, and make possible, a fairly simple scheme to write off payables. 
Although the scheme was originated to avoid problems with an outside lender, there were 
many motives involved. The subsidiary’s managing vice president wanted to avoid making 
what might have been a career-limiting report to senior management at Betascott stating 
her company was going to violate loan covenants. The violation would have probably been 
a reportable event that would have triggered a filing with the SEC explaining that a key 
source of financing was no longer available and that the debt may become immediately 
due and payable. Moreover, because Betascott management had focused investor and ana-
lyst attention on the performance of Pocketdrive, any negative news would likely devastate 
the stock price, and lawsuits filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys purporting to represent sharehold-
ers would follow. 
As for the Pocketdrive controller, he was probably motivated mostly by cash. His bo-
nus depended on earnings performance of Pocketdrive, and although the “clean-up” plan 
was designed to solve the problem with the bank, the controller knew that the payables 
write-off would help reduce cost of goods sold on the income statement and increase gross 
margin. With a higher gross margin, reported profits would be higher. Because Pocket-
drive’s margins were being squeezed by competition, the “clean-up” would bring those 
margins closer to their historical average and, thus, probably escape notice of auditors 
who rely on historical averages to detect anomalies. The controller set out to manipulate 
the balance sheet and produced the ancillary benefit of manipulating the income statement 
so that he would get his bonus.
Was there collusion? Most likely. Even though the vice president was not told about 
the write-off of payables to Megadrive, the reduction in total payables was so significant 
that she had to suspect that intercompany payables were a primary contributor because 
it was very unlikely that unaffiliated vendors would forget to bill for such large quantities 
of shipments. Furthermore, the vice president’s failure to inform Betascott’s management 
implies that she knew something was amiss and did not want any internal auditors looking 
into the matter. At the very least, the vice president was negligent in failing to make further 
inquiry herself.
One can readily see a number of ways this fraud could have been detected earlier 
or stopped. Tightening up on internal controls by simply reconciling the “Intercompany” 
account would have highlighted the write-off and led to some follow-up inquiry. But the 
root of the problem was grounded in the visibility of Pocketdrive, purposely engineered by 
Betascott’s management. Whenever management focuses attention in such a specific man-
ner, the pressure on that operating segment is intense. Therefore, the focus of internal and 
external auditors should likewise follow. 
This illustration also points out to auditors the importance of treating business seg-
ments that operate as stand-alone entities as separate audit entities, as well. In the W.R. 
Grace & Co. case,3 management attempted to assert that fraudulent accounting entries on 
the books of a division were not material when looked at in the context of Grace’s consoli-
dated financial statements. The SEC’s enforcement division prevailed by pointing out that 
Grace’s management had trumpeted the division’s earnings growth and prospects, thereby 
moving the materiality test down from the corporate level to the division level. The mes-
sage to auditors is clear: if management is talking up a certain segment of the company, 
that segment should be subjected to additional testing procedures using a materiality 
standard geared to the financial statements of the segment.
 Example Analysis
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Indirect Method Example:  
The Missing Impairment Loss
Continuing with the Betascott example, the following scenario looks at the failure to book 
an impairment loss on assets:
The hard drive industry is subject to intense competition and significant shifts in market 
share among the competitors. In the last three years, Betascott’s Megadrive subsidiary has 
reported falling sales and market share, which caused Betascott to incur an overall loss 
from operations in the prior fiscal year. Betascott discussed this trend in the “Manage-
ment’s Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A) section of its Form 10-K filing with the SEC for 
that year.
As of year-end, Megadrive had a carrying value of $200 million in property, plant, and 
equipment (PP&E) used in producing hard drives serving as collateral on approximately 
$160 million of secured debt. Debt covenants provided that Megadrive would be in default 
if collateral value declined below the balance of the loans, and default would immediately 
accelerate payment of the entire principal. The company’s accounting policies require that it 
test long lived assets for impairment whenever indicators of impairment exist. Megadrive’s 
controller knew that the prior fiscal year loss from operations in that subsidiary, coupled 
with Megadrive’s falling sales and market share, were indicators of a potential impairment 
of the hard drive-related PP&E. 
The controller asked his assistant to prepare a cash flow projection over the expected 
lives of the assets, in accordance with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Ac-
counting Standards Codification (ASC) 360-10-35. That accounting standard sets out a two-
step process:
 1.  If the sum of the future cash flows expected to result from the assets, undiscounted 
and without interest charges, is less than a company’s reported value of the assets, 
the full carrying value of the asset is not recoverable.
 2.  If the asset is not recoverable, as determined in the first step, an impairment charge 
must be recognized equal to the excess of the carrying value of the assets over the 
fair value of those assets. 
So that the controller could get a sense of the amount of the impairment should they 
fail the first test, he asked his assistant to determine the fair value of Megadrive’s PP&E, as 
well.
For the first test, the assistant consulted several industry forecasts, including one 
study commissioned by Betascott last year. Most of the forecasts predicted a moderate 
turnaround in sales and gross margins over the next several years. Then, in preparing 
a forecast of future sales, the assistant looked at recent sales data for existing products, 
planned timing of new product launches, customer commitments related to existing and 
newly developed products, and current unsold inventory held by distributors. From those 
data, she constructed a current estimate of expected future cash flows for Megadrive’s 
PP&E, undiscounted and without interest charges. To her chagrin, she found the sum of 
those undiscounted cash flows, no matter which industry forecast she used, was under the 
reported value of the PP&E, indicating that the assets were impaired.
(continued)
Example Scenario




To assess the amount of the impairment, the assistant applied a discount rate to the 
cash flows to determine its fair value, in accordance with the provisions of FASB Statement 
No. 144. The assistant recognized that both hard drive sales and margins had declined 
over the last 3 years, producing an operating loss last year. To predict a turnaround, as the 
industry forecasts had done, the assistant believed there was significant risk in the cash 
flow forecast she had prepared. Therefore, the assistant selected a discount rate that was in 
excess of Betascott’s cost of capital, assuming that market participants valuing these assets 
would discount expected cash flows at a higher rate for the same reason. Using that dis-
count rate, she discounted her forecast cash flows to the present and determined that the 
PP&E had a fair value of $170 million. Megadrive would have been required to recognize an 
impairment loss of approximately $30 million if the assistant’s estimate of those discounted 
future cash flows was correct.
Upon seeing the assistant’s analysis, the controller realized that there was a serious 
problem and went to Megadrive’s managing vice president. An impairment charge of $30 
million would lower the value of Megadrive’s PP&E to a point just $10 million above the 
minimum default trigger under the debt covenants with Megadrive’s lenders. Although the 
vice president thought she might be successful in shopping around for a valuation from 
outside valuators that did not produce as large an impairment, she felt that any disclosure 
of an impairment, no matter how small, would likely cause the lenders to bring in their own 
valuation experts who would not be as pliable, and the $10 million margin was just too 
close for comfort. Also, thanks to disclosures in the “MD&A” section of Betascott’s Form 
10-K about deteriorating margins, she knew that lenders were already skittish about the 
security of their loans. An additional disclosure of impairment would bring attention she 
did not need.
However, the vice president knew that a recently introduced product for high-speed 
data access applications was seeing some success. The new product was called the Stored 
line of hard drives. The controller’s assistant had used an estimate of future Stored sales 
that adjusted down the rosy forecasts prepared by the marketing department; the market-
ing numbers were always adjusted by a discount factor that historically had proven to 
be a good estimate of the percentage of deals marketing would actually close. The vice 
president told the controller that the assistant’s reliance on the historical discount for the 
Stored line was inappropriate because she personally knew of potential sales not recorded 
in marketing’s sales pipeline analysis. “This time,” she told the controller, “the marketing 
guys are being conservative, and we should use their forecasts for the Stored line without 
any discount. Rerun the numbers accordingly.” In actuality, the potential sales referred to 
by the vice president were nothing more than casual conversations she had with attendees 
at a trade convention the prior month, but no one else knew that was the case.
The assistant reran the forecast, as instructed. The undiscounted future cash flows 
totaled $220 million, mostly due to the marketing department’s hope that future sales of the 
Stored line would achieve 40 percent market share within 3 years. Therefore, using the in-
flated sales data, the first step of the FASB ASC 360-10-35 test was apparently met because 
undiscounted future cash flows now exceeded the $200 million carrying value of the PP&E. 
Megadrive barely escaped reporting an impairment charge.
05-Chap04.indd   64 7/6/10   2:21:26 PM
Chapter 4: Balance Sheet Manipulation
65
The vice president concocted a story that others bought into, partly because of the power 
of her position and partly because the others may have desperately wanted a solution. This 
indirect fraud—the failure to book an impairment—was achieved without the overt need for 
the vice president to recruit a conspiracy due, in large measure, to the strength of the story.
In retrospect, the controller should have questioned abandoning the historical hair-
cut given to marketing’s forecasts, but the controller probably saw some of marketing’s 
forecasts come true in the past and, not being a marketing expert himself, most likely felt 
he was out of his field of expertise to question the vice president’s judgment. One item, 
though, may have been gnawing at the controller’s conscience: how often is it that mar-
keters leave potential sales out of their forecasts? If the answer is not often, if ever, the 
controller may have sought out help, but where does he turn? This is the point where an 
audit committee designated to take up and confidentially investigate questions raised by 
employees could step in. That committee could then access the necessary expertise to 
assess the cash flow forecast. The controller, therefore, should have had a mechanism to 
bring this issue to the attention of the audit committee.
Obviously, this is a hard fraud to catch without some insider sounding the alarm, and 
the warning signs that independent auditors may notice are few. In all likelihood, the audit 
plan for asset impairment will call for the auditors to review Megadrive’s management 
forecast of future cash flows and assess the reasonableness of the forecasts. There is a 
good chance the auditors may notice and inquire about the lack of a reduction in market-
ing’s forecast for the Stored line, but because there is little historical data on that line, the 
auditors may conclude that the forecast is reasonable under the circumstances.
However, the auditors can go further. Paragraph .34 of Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 114, The Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged With Governance 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol 1, AU sec. 380), states that 
The auditor should communicate with those charged with governance the following  
matters:
a.  The auditor’s views about qualitative aspects of the entity’s significant accounting 
practices, including accounting policies, accounting estimates, and financial state-
ment disclosures.
Therefore, the auditor is required to inform those charged with governance, the audit 
committee in this example, of the qualitative aspects of significant accounting estimates. 
In doing so, it may help the audit committee, if the auditor also spelled out the range of 
possibilities for those accounting estimates that are most critical and subject to material 
change. In the example of Betascott, the auditors could point out that although Megadrive 
did not record an asset impairment on its PP&E, the cash flow forecast provided only a 10 
percent margin before an impairment was required. That disclosure may then prompt the 
audit committee to review the issue more thoroughly. Such a review might lead, in turn, to 
reconsideration of the Stored line forecast.
Assuming that the estimate of sales for the Stored line is defensible, the following is a 
suggested disclosure for Betascott, taken from the SEC’s proposed rule release (included in 
appendix A at the end of this book):
(continued)
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Application of Critical Accounting Policies
We evaluate our property, plant and equipment (“PP&E”) for impairment whenever 
indicators of impairment exist. Accounting standards require that if the sum of the future 
cash flows expected to result from a company’s asset, undiscounted and without interest 
charges, is less than the reported value of the asset, an asset impairment must be recog-
nized in the financial statements. The amount of impairment to recognize is calculated by 
subtracting the fair value of the asset from the reported value of the asset.
[W]e reviewed our hard drive-related PP&E [in our Megadrive subsidiary] for impair-
ment as of [year-end], due to a trend of declining sales and market share. We determined 
that the undiscounted sum of the expected future cash flows from the assets related to 
[Megadrive’s PP&E] exceeded the recorded value of those assets, so we did not recognize 
an impairment in accordance with [U.S.] GAAP. [Megadrive’s PP&E] represents approxi-
mately two-thirds of our total PP&E.
We believe that the accounting estimate related to asset impairment is a “critical 
accounting estimate” because: (1) it is highly susceptible to change from period to period 
because it requires company management to make assumptions about future sales and 
cost of sales over the life of the hard drive-related PP&E (generally seven years); and (2) 
the impact that recognizing an impairment would have on the assets reported on our bal-
ance sheet as well as our net loss would be material. Management’s assumptions about 
future sales prices and future sales volumes require significant judgment because actual 
sales prices and volumes have fluctuated in the past and are expected to continue to do 
so. Management has discussed the development and selection of this critical accounting 
estimate with the audit committee of our board of directors and the audit committee has 
reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it ....
Our estimates of future cash flows assume that our sales of hard drive inventory will 
remain consistent with current year sales. While actual sales have declined by an average 
of approximately 2% per year during the last three years, our introduction of the Stored 
line of hard drives in August ... has resulted in a 0.5% increase in market share over the 
last five months of [this year], and a corresponding increase in sales of 5% over the com-
parable 5-month period last year. We therefore have assumed that sales will not continue 
to decline in the future. We have also assumed that our costs will have annual growth of 
approximately 2%. This level of costs is comparable to actual costs incurred over the last 
two years ....
In each of the last two years, we have tested [Megadrive’s] PP&E for impairment and 
in each year we determined that, based on our assumptions, the sum of the expected fu-
ture cash flows, undiscounted and without interest charges, exceeded the reported value 
and therefore we did not recognize an impairment. Because [this year’s] sales were lower 
than those in [the prior two years], despite the improvement in the latter part of the year, 
and because our estimates of future cash flows are assumed to be consistent with current 
year sales, the current year impairment analysis includes estimated sales that are 2% and 
5% less than those assumed in the [prior] impairment tests ....
As of [year-end], we estimate that our future cash flows, on an undiscounted basis, 
are greater than our $200 million investment in hard drive-related PP&E. Any increases 
in estimated future cash flows would have no impact on the reported value of the hard 
drive-related PP&E. In contrast, if our current estimate of future cash flows from hard 
drive sales had been 10% lower, those cash flows would have been less than the reported 
amount of [Megadrive’s] PP&E. In that case, we would have been required to recognize 
an impairment loss of approximately $30 million, equal to the difference between the fair 
value of the equipment (which we would have determined by calculating the discounted 
value of the estimated future cash flows) and the reported amount of [Megadrive’s] PP&E. 
A $30 million impairment loss would have reduced PP&E and Total Assets [of Betascott 
as of year-end] by 10% and 3%, respectively. That impairment loss also would have in-
creased Net Loss Before Taxes, for the [current year], by 100%.
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If we had been required to recognize an impairment loss on [Megadrive’s] PP&E, it 
would likely not have affected our liquidity and capital resources because, even with the 
impairment loss, we would have been within the terms of the tangible net-worth covenant 
in our long-term debt agreement [with our lenders].4
The SEC’s proposed rule that would require such extensive disclosure in public filings, 
as previously illustrated, has not been approved by the SEC. However, at the very least, 
a company’s senior management or auditors could provide a statement similar to this 
proposed disclosure to the company’s audit committee. Then, the audit committee would 
clearly be on notice that not only was there an important issue involving asset impairment 
but also that the magnitude of the issue was significant, as well.
Conclusion
As accounting standard setters move from the traditional historical cost basis toward a fair 
value standard for the balance sheet, the balance sheet has become more valuable and, like-
wise, a greater target for fraud. Manipulation of the balance sheet occurs directly when 
fraudulent accounting entries are made that alter account balances or indirectly when fraud-
sters deliberately fail to record a transaction. The indirect method of fraud is the most dif-
ficult to catch because it requires the CPA to look for something that was not booked (that 
is, no audit trail exists).4






that would be at risk should financing be cut off
	 •	 	Need	to	convince	lenders	and	investors	to	increase	the	firm’s	capital
	 •	 	Desire	to	manipulate	earnings,	combined	with	balance	sheet	manipulation,	to	obtain	
other objectives, such as performance bonuses
The general warning signs of balance sheet manipulation include those found in all 
areas of financial statement fraud: poor tone at the top of the organization (see chapter 7), 
lax internal controls, and external pressure to perform. The pressures that tend to give rise to 
balance sheet fraud typically come from creditors (and regulators in regulated industries) that 
use balance sheet accounts as measures of financial security (also see box 1-1 in chapter 1).
The best preventative measures are good internal controls and a functioning internal au-
dit mechanism that allows employees to raise issues confidentially with the audit committee 
and have those issues thoroughly investigated. Outside auditors can also play an important 
role by identifying critical accounting policies and estimates and flagging them for the audit 
committee. In addition to flagging the issues, auditors can also explain the range of values 
used for key estimates and the consequences if lower (or higher) values turn out to be cor-
rect. Armed with the right information, the audit committee can better perform its function 
and assess whether decisions made by management require further inquiry.
4 SEC Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907.
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Special Issues for Closely  
Held Companies
Chapter 5 
Publicly traded companies have received much attention with regard to financial statement 
fraud for two reasons. First, market reaction to the disclosure of the frauds is generally swift 
and severe, accompanied by significant share price declines, with the news media devoting 
extensive coverage to the issues related to the fraud. Second, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), with jurisdiction over public companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges, 
has been in the forefront of both setting standards by which fraudulent actions are judged 
and, working in concert with the Department of Justice and other agencies, the prosecution 
of fraud in publicly traded companies. However, closely held private companies can equally 
well experience every type of fraud discussed in this book; only the motives and timing are 
slightly different
Although the management of closely held companies might not have to worry about 
securities analysts’ expectations, other parties, such as outside shareholders, bankers, and 
venture capitalists (VCs), may demand better earnings performance. These demands might 
lead management to employ any of the earnings manipulation schemes discussed in earlier 
chapters. Of course, if management bonuses are a function of increased earnings, a motive 
for earnings manipulation exists, regardless of whether the company is publicly traded. The 
timing of these pressures may differ from that of public companies, though. If the outside in-
vestors are passive, the moment of performance assessment for management will most likely 
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be the end of the fiscal year. Management of public companies, on the other hand, may feel 
pressure to hit targets quarterly, which is when they have to publish their financial statements. 
However, whether the pressures come annually or quarterly, the motives for fraud still exist.
The flip-side of earnings manipulation that improperly creates additional income for 
financial reporting purposes is earnings manipulation that improperly lowers income for tax 
reporting purposes—tax fraud. To achieve this result, the manipulator may be operating with 
two sets of books that do not properly reconcile: one for investors and bankers (the financial 
reporting books) and one for the tax authorities (the tax books). Most companies, of course, 
maintain separate, tax-basis books that allow them to determine tax gains and losses from 
asset dispositions, for instance. The difference between the fraudster’s tax books and legiti-
mate tax books is that the fraudster’s books do not reconcile to the financial reporting books 
through legal reconciling entries. For example, if for tax purposes, a fraudster improperly 
shifts costs from low tax rate affiliates to high tax rate affiliates, the tax books of the affiliates 
will not correctly reconcile with the financial reporting books, even though the consolidated 
financial reporting statements may appear to be just fine.
The Pressure to Placate Outside 
Shareholders
Those shareholders of private companies who are not part of management may find them-
selves in the minority. The founders of the company usually serve in management positions, 
and if the need to raise capital is not so great to force the company to go to VCs (see “The 
Pressure to Go Public From VCs” section of this chapter), the founders and key managers can 
retain control as they sell shares to outsiders.
The minority outsiders, although they are outvoted by insiders, can nevertheless make 
demands on management. State laws generally protect minority shareholders if the majority 
owners attempt to implement a financial or share distribution plan that favors the majority 
over the minority. Setting up a stock bonus plan for management, for instance, may require 
minority shareholder approval. To obtain approval, management may attempt to placate mi-
nority shareholders’ concerns by demonstrating strong financial performance, and if actual 
firm performance is lacking, management may seek to dress up the income statement with 
some earnings manipulation.
The Pressure to Satisfy Bank Lenders
For the closely held firm, the bank is the typical source of debt financing. When bankers 
make loans, they generally tie covenants in the debt instrument to a firm’s balance sheet to 
provide some assurance that there will be sufficient assets available to collect on the loan in 
the event of default. For instance, the covenants may require the firm to maintain a maxi-
mum debt-to-equity ratio and a minimum amount of shareholders’ equity. The covenants 
also define the events that cause a default, and balance sheet accounts may be a part of the 
numerical and ratio tests the bank imposes to determine whether the firm has suffered a 
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material adverse change that would allow the bank to call the loan due and place the firm 
in bankruptcy, if necessary. In addition, for revolving credit facilities that allow for periodic 
borrowing, repayment, and borrowing again, banks usually establish a borrowing base. That 
base is a calculated dollar amount that is usually a percentage of receivables and inventory. 
The firm may borrow up to the amount of the base but no more, effectively limiting the use 
of the bank’s funds to financing current assets.
The motives for, and methods of, balance sheet fraud on lenders apply to the closely held 
company, as well as public companies (see chapter 4). However, in light of the importance of 
bank financing to the closely held company, the CPA should be especially aware of the po-
tential for fraud in this context. The motives for private firm management to manipulate the 
balance sheet to avoid a cutoff of bank financing are especially important because alternative 
sources may not be readily or cheaply available. Therefore, the CPA should carefully watch 
those accounts (usually balance sheet items) that are used in the tests imposed by the bank. 
Also, the CPA should keep in mind that there is a potential for fraud, not just to avoid a 
material adverse change or default event, but also to improperly expand the borrowing base. 
For example, the borrowing base calculation may be set at 80 percent of accounts receivable, 
but only those receivables outstanding for less than 90 days are counted. If the firm receives 
partial payment from a customer for a recent bill, the firm may apply that payment to an 
older bill, perhaps for a different customer, to keep the recent bill in the borrowing base. 
Likewise, the firm may attempt to cancel old bills and reissue them just to keep a larger bal-
ance in the under 90 days category. Therefore, the CPA needs to pay special attention to the 
activity within accounts receivable when receivables are part of the borrowing base.
The Pressure to Go Public From VCs
If the private firm is funded by VC, pressure to perform can be enormous. For instance, VCs 
in high technology ventures generally look to cash out of their investments within 3–5 years, 
earning an annualized rate of return in excess of 40 percent over their entire portfolio of ear-
ly stage companies. However, the VCs also expect that most of the firms they back will fail, a 
few will break even, and only about 10 percent to 20 percent will succeed. For those com-
panies lucky enough to succeed, the VCs expect annualized rates of return of approximately 
100 percent or more to make up for the losses sustained in firms that did not succeed. 
The Uncertain Initial Public Offering Window
The exit plan for most VCs is usually an initial public offering (IPO) of stock to be publicly 
traded. Part of the shares offered to the investing public consist of those shares held by the 
VCs. In some public offerings, the VCs cash out all their shares through the IPO; in other 
offerings, the VCs may retain some of their ownership after the firm goes public. However, 
the IPO market is fickle, and favorable conditions come and go based on the direction of the 
overall stock market and how the firm’s peer group is performing. Therefore, when an IPO 
window opens, investment bankers may join with the VCs to push firm management to go 
public, regardless of the firm’s financial position. The VCs are looking for their exit so they 
can book a handsome return to show their investors; the investment bankers are looking for 
a big fee.




Consequently, the period leading up to going public is a time of intense pressure and nego-
tiation. For this reason, the Securities Act of 1933 sets stricter liability standards for firms go-
ing public than the standards under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that govern trading 
in securities after firms go public. Essentially, if there is fraud in the IPO filing, referred to as 
the registration statement, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes strict liability, such 
that there is no need to show that firm management had knowledge of that fraud; manage-
ment is presumed to know about the fraud and is held accountable. Conversely, under Sec-
tion 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, if fraud occurs in the secondary, post-IPO 
market, management must have knowledge of the fraud (that is, scienter) in order to be held 
responsible.
Nevertheless, the CPA must be especially alert when looking at the books and records 
of firms planning to go public. Prior to going public, a private firm may not have been as 
meticulous in its recordkeeping as needed to comply with financial reporting standards. De-
spite the strict liability standards imposed by the Securities Act of 1933, management may 
attempt to manipulate financial data, not so much to deliberately mislead but to make up for 
past sloppiness, though both may be a factor. Sloppiness may prompt management to change 
accounting methods to cover up past inaccuracies or to use improper estimates to give the 
appearance of compliance. The CPA should watch out for changes in accounting methodol-
ogy management makes just before the IPO to improve reported earnings, as illustrated in 
the following example:
Link Company develops and installs software applications that perform supply chain 
management functions. Link is based in the United States, is privately held, and reports its 
financial results using U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Link’s princi-
pal product is JIT, a package that allows manufacturers to control the level of inventories 
so components arrive just in time on the production line. Link was founded 3 years ago by 
a management team that left a competitor and located seed capital from a VC firm. Link 
ownership was split 20 percent to management and 80 percent to the VCs.
Link management had aggressively pushed the development of JIT over the years, 
focusing principally on adding features demanded by customers. As Link added features as 
new modules and integration capability to JIT, the development staff made little attempt to 
track and separate which changes constituted minor modifications and which were signifi-
cant additions; their attention was purely on the development process. As a result, docu-
mentation was sloppy, and it was not clear when planning, designing, coding, and testing 
were completed for any given JIT module.
Because management and the VCs were interested only in the monthly cash burn rate, 
neither paid much attention to the financial statements. Link’s CFO, a 28-year-old who had 
previously worked at Link’s auditing firm before coming to Link, simply expensed all devel-
opment costs because she felt that trying to separate capitalizable costs under Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification 985-20-25 would be too much 
trouble, and it did not appear that anyone cared.
Example Scenario
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(continued)
Then, Link’s CFO received a call from her VC counterpart. The VC director explained 
that his investment banker had determined that the recent surge in tech stocks had opened 
the window for Link to go public. The VC director went on to say that his investors view this 
opportunity as the best time to exit and cash out all their shares. Because the VC firm held 
voting control, the CFO knew Link management would have to comply, even though she 
wanted another year to show improved profitability. 
However, the VC director had an additional request. To allow the VC shares to be 
cashed out entirely in the IPO, the new investors would want some comfort that Link’s 
earnings were improving sufficiently over time. Otherwise, it would look like the VCs were 
bailing from a bad investment and leaving the IPO investors with “a dog.” The director 
said that his investment banker told him that Link’s “earnings need to be spruced up a bit” 
to achieve that result. The VC added that he wanted a restatement that would capitalize 
enough development costs to achieve a “20 percent reduction in development expense on 
the income statement”; he wanted the adjustments made quickly because he did not know 
when the IPO window would close, and outside auditors would be coming soon.
Link’s CFO concluded that because documentation was so poor and the time was so 
short, she would implement the 20 percent reclassification. “After all,” she rationalized, 
“20 percent seems like a reasonable amount, and if we are called into question about the 
amount we capitalize, we ought to be able to find sufficient documentation when we have 
the time to look for it.” The CFO also knew that the auditors performing due diligence, 
being rushed as well, would likely rely on her “analysis” of capitalized development costs 
and accept a “judgmental sample” she selected from what little documentation she had to 
support the capitalization reclassification.
The principal warning sign for possible fraud was that there was a change in accounting 
method just before the IPO. Hopefully, the CFO’s hunch is wrong, and the auditors would, 
upon discovering the change, insist upon making a thorough examination. The auditors 
may have to spoil the IPO party by insisting that more study of development costs be per-
formed, but it would not be the first time auditors held up an IPO.
An additional warning sign was the relative inexperience of the CFO. Lack of experi-
ence probably meant that she did not have an appreciation for the strict liability standards 
of the securities laws that would likely affect her and the other members of the manage-
ment team, even though others may not have known about the fraud.
However, other members of Link’s accounting staff would have to be involved to make 
the reclassification. If the other staff had little accounting experience themselves, they 
might accept the CFO’s rationale that 20 percent seemed the right amount, and documen-
tation could be done later. However, an inexperienced staff should serve as an additional 
warning sign because a more experienced accountant might have questioned the reclas-
sification. Because Link was going public, the exchange listing requirements probably 
mandated that the firm establish an audit committee (if it did not have one already), so an 
experienced accounting staff member could have taken the issue to that committee.
 Example Analysis




The need to value shares in a closely held company may also give rise to earnings manage-
ment. If shares are being valued for sale or any other purpose, such as collateral for a bank 
loan to a major shareholder, earnings management may be employed to achieve the ap-
pearance of a steady rise in earnings, which, in turn, could produce a higher-than-justified 
valuation.
Although valuation specialists will use a variety of methods to value privately held com-
panies and their stock, one of the most common is the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. 
Using DCF, the valuation specialist forecasts cash flows for future years, usually 5-10 years 
from the valuation date. After the last forecast year, the specialist will calculate a terminal 
value using a formula similar to the single stage model discussed in chapter 3 but with a few 
changes:
TVPrivate = [CFPrivate T (1 + g)] / (RPrivate – g)
in which
TVPrivate is the market value in the terminal year of the 
forecast of the private company;
CFPrivate T is the private company’s forecast annual net 
cash flow in the terminal year;
RPrivate is the cost of capital for the private company; and
g is the annual compound growth rate for the private 
company’s cash flows after the terminal year.
Notice that in contrast to the formula in chapter 3, the preceding formula calculates the 
value of the entire firm (called the enterprise value) as of a future date, not just the value of 
a share of stock in that firm. To get to share value, one must deduct the value of debt from 
enterprise value and divide the remainder by the number of shares outstanding (assuming 
one class of stock).
The valuation specialist will discount the forecast future net cash flows, including the 
terminal value, to the present using the firm’s cost of capital. For a five-year projection pe-
riod, the equation is as follows:
PVPrivate  = [CFPrivate 1 / (1 + RPrivate)] +
 [CFPrivate 2 / (1 + RPrivate)2] +
 [CFPrivate 3 / (1 + RPrivate)3] +
 [CFPrivate 4 / (1 + RPrivate)4] +
 [CFPrivate 5 / (1 + RPrivate)5] +
 [TVPrivate / (1 + RPrivate)5]
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in which
PVPrivate is the present value of discounted forecast net cash flows 
for the private company, including the discounted present value of the termi-
nal value at the end of the fifth year (the last term of the equation);
CFPrivate y is the forecast annual net cash flow for the private company at the 
end of a given year;
(1 + RPrivate )y is the discount formula for year y using the private company’s 
cost of capital as the discount rate; and
TVPrivate is as defined previously.
In many cases, especially with high growth companies, the terminal value (TVPrivate) will 
be the single largest component of the present value of the firm (PVPrivate), even with dis-
counting, because it is an estimate of earnings into perpetuity. Therefore, a fraudster, desiring 
to get the most for his or her fraud efforts, will focus his or her manipulation on influencing 
that terminal value. To see how, it is useful to break out the components of the terminal value 
equation: CFPrivate T, RPrivate and g.
To influence CFPrivate T in the terminal year, the fraudster essentially needs to spin a good 
story and convince the valuation specialist that, in spite of weak net cash flows in the past, the 
firm will be increasingly profitable in future years so that by the terminal year it is printing 
money. Such a story may not be compelling, and even if the valuation specialist buys it, the 
specialist will likely raise the cost of capital (RPrivate) to compensate for the higher risk associ-
ated with an aggressive cash flow forecast. However, higher RPrivate will defeat the fraudster’s 
efforts by lowering the discounted present value of the firm.
The fraudster may have better luck manipulating past years’ earnings to give the im-
pression of a steady high rate of growth. That manipulation will likely affect the valuation 
specialists’ selection of RPrivate and g. Although the benefits to the fraudster of manipulating 
growth (g) is obvious, the manipulation of cost of capital (RPrivate) is a little more nuanced. 
The cost of capital is the weighted value of the cost of equity and the posttax cost of debt:
RPrivate = [WE × RPrivate Equity] + [WD × RPrivate Debt]
in which
WE and WD are the weights for equity and debt, respectively, to reflect the cur-
rent or expected capital structure of the firm that together add to 100 percent 
and
RPrivate Equity and RPrivate Debt are the private company’s cost of equity and posttax 
cost of debt, respectively.
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The posttax cost of debt is estimated by multiplying the current market rate, as of the 
valuation date, on long term debt instruments similar in quality to those of the private com-
pany by one minus the effective tax rate. The cost of equity, when the firm’s stock is not 
publicly traded, is usually estimated using the following components:
RPrivate Equity = Risk Free Rate + 
 [Equity Risk Premium × Average Guideline Companies Beta] + 
 Firm Size Premium + 
 Firm-Specific Risk Premium
The first four terms, risk free rate, equity risk premium, average guideline companies 
beta and firm size premium, are available from market data sources or valuation studies. 
Depending on the parameters of the valuation, the risk free rate could be the rate on a long 
term U.S. Treasury bond, as of the valuation date, taken from auction or bond market quotes. 
The average beta for guideline companies, generally publicly traded companies in the same 
industry as the private company, is available from market data services (a publicly traded 
firm’s beta is a measure of that firm’s share price volatility relative to the overall market—see 
chapter 3). The equity risk premium, a measure of long term returns in excess of the risk free 
rate, and the firm size premium, a measure of additional risk found empirically in small firms, 
can both be obtained from academic studies and valuation services.
However, the last term, firm-specific risk premium, is more judgmental in that there may be 
no studies or sources that provide empirical quantities. Instead, firm-specific risk will reflect 
the valuation specialist’s opinion of the risks relating to the cash flow projections used in 
the DCF model that are unique to the firm. The fraudster hopes to shape that opinion by 
manipulating historical earnings to create the illusion of steady predictable growth. Just as 
the appearance of predictable growth lowered the discount rate for publicly traded Constant 
Company, compared with Volatile, Inc., as discussed in chapter 3, to produce a higher share 
value for Constant, the fraudster’s manipulation to create the appearance of steady growth 
for the private company gives the valuation specialist a false sense of comfort that the private 
company will achieve its forecast cash flow and growth targets, thus lowering the specialist’s 
selected firm-specific risk premium. In addition, the valuation specialist may be especially 
impressed, through the fraudster’s deceit, by the appearance of consistent growth relative to 
the guideline companies used to provide the average beta; the specialist would then select a 
lower firm-specific risk premium (which could actually be a negative adjustment) to com-
pensate for the perceived difference in risk between the private company and the guideline 
peers.
To see the magnitude of impact of such a fraud, assume the private company’s cost of 
equity before the firm-specific risk premium is 15 percent. Assume further that a reasonable 
estimate of the private company’s firm-specific risk premium is 10 percent, but the fraud-
ster has convinced the valuation specialist that the premium should be 3 percent due to the 
illusion of steady uninterrupted growth in prior years’ earnings. Therefore, an appropriate 
cost of equity is 25 percent, and the manipulated cost of equity is 18 percent. For simplicity, 
assume there is no debt so that the cost of capital equals the cost of equity. If the forecast 
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cash flow in the terminal year is $1 million and the expected growth rate is 3 percent, the 
terminal values for the appropriate and manipulated cost of capital are as follows:
TVPrivate Appropriate = [$1,000,000 × (1 + 3%)] / (25% – 3%) = $4,681,818
TVPrivate Manipulated = [$1,000,000 × (1 + 3%)] / (18% – 3%) = $6,866,667
The manipulation raised the terminal value of the private company by nearly 50 per-
cent. However, the fraudster gets an additional bonus by manipulating cost of equity because 
the terminal value and cash flows from previous forecast years are discounted at the lower 
manipulated rate (18 percent in the preceding illustration) instead of the appropriate rate 
(25 percent). To continue the illustration, assume for simplicity the forecast period is 5 years 
and that the discounted present value of cash flows from the first 5 years adds to zero; there-
fore, the value of the private company equals the discounted terminal value. Then, using the 
appropriate and manipulated cost of equity as previously calculated, the private company’s 
value is as follows:
PVPrivate Appropriate = $4,681,818 / (1 + 25%)5 = $1,534,138
PVPrivate Manipulated = $6,866,667 / (1 + 18%)5 = $3,001,483
Therefore, the manipulation of one single component, firm-specific risk, nearly doubled 
the calculated value of the firm. If the fraudster had also succeeded in manipulating growth 
assumptions, the results would be even more dramatic because growth affects not only the 
g value in the preceding formulas but also influences the net cash flow components of the 
forecast. The end result of earnings management in a closely held company is similar to the 
effect of earnings management on the price/earnings (P/E) multiple of publicly traded 
companies (see chapter 3): both can significantly influence valuations.
Use of Nonaccrual Accounting Standards
For most publicly traded companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange, U.S. GAAP is the stan-
dard of accounting because those firms must file financial statements with the SEC, and the 
SEC requires those statements to conform to U.S. GAAP. Foreign companies listed in the 
United States are allowed to file under either U.S. GAAP or International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRSs), and the SEC is studying whether to allow U.S. registrants to file 
under IFRSs in future years, assuming certain conditions are met. Private companies may 
use other accounting methods, sometimes referred to as other comprehensive basis of accounting, 
such as cash basis or tax basis methods. Both alternative methods offer unique opportunities 
and methods for fraudsters.
06-Chap05.indd   77 7/6/10   2:22:20 PM
78
Financial Reporting Fraud
Cash Basis and Accrual Basis
For a closely held company, reducing fraud in the financial statements starts with requiring 
that financial statements presented to the board of directors and outsiders be in conformity 
with accrual basis standards of either U.S. GAAP or IFRSs. Some closely held firms use 
cash basis accounting, but the timing of cash flows in cash basis accounting can lead to the 
manipulation of financial statements. For that reason, U.S. tax laws generally require corpora-
tions to report on an accrual basis when gross receipts exceed an average of $5 million per 
year over the prior 3 tax years.1
Accrual basis accounting looks to economic events to determine whether a debt is 
incurred or revenue is earned; the time of the occurrence of those events may be quite 
different from when cash is paid or received. Accrual basis accounting limits the possibility 
for fraud because it is not dependent upon the timing of cash payments. For example, cash 
basis accounting may not require financial statement recognition of a debt, and the debt 
would not be apparent to a reader of those statements until the debt is paid and an expense 
is recorded. Conversely, cash basis accounting can accelerate revenue recognition if the firm 
receives cash payments for services to be rendered in future periods and records the receipts 
as revenue in the current period. Under both cases, accrual basis accounting would properly 
reflect the existence of the debt and deferral of revenues.
Tax Incentives
One of the most common uses of financial information from private companies is for in-
come tax reporting purposes, and most taxable entities will strive to reduce reported income 
to minimize income taxes. Firms can and do maintain separate records for book and tax 
reporting with the objective of reporting as much income in the former and as little income 
in the latter as possible. Firms can legally lower taxable income to levels well below book net 
income through a number of allowable exclusions, deductions, and accelerated write-offs. 
For example, when a firm sells assets at a gain on an installment sale basis under which the 
seller will receive payments over a period of years, that firm can defer recognizing a portion 
of the gain until future tax periods for income tax purposes.2 Under U.S. GAAP and IFRSs, 
the gain is recognized entirely in the year of sale.
However, the corporate alternative minimum tax imposed on earnings and profits 
through the adjusted current earnings (ACE) mechanism3 has reduced, to some extent, the 
perceived advantage of using two sets of books. The ACE adjustment was designed to bring 
alternative minimum taxable income to a level closer to book-basis (financial reporting) net 
income. Gains from installment sales, for instance, are recognized in the year of sale under 
ACE, just as they are under U.S. GAAP.
To achieve fraudulent income minimization as a tax reduction strategy, a private firm 
may be willing to take on expenses that should otherwise be shared with other related par-
ties, including owners. Conversely, a firm that has significant net operating loss (NOL) car-
ryforwards for tax purposes may be willing to absorb income from other related parties. For 
1 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 448.
2 IRC Section 453.
3 IRC Section 56.
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example, assume two firms are under common ownership, and one firm (a manufacturer) 
makes products used by the second firm (its customer). However, the manufacturer has a 
sizeable NOL from prior tax years. The related party customer, wishing to minimize its taxes, 
may allow the manufacturer to mark up the price of products it sells so the manufacturer 
reports more income to use up its NOL carryforward. The (illicit) markup has the effect of 
increasing the customer’s inventory cost that, eventually, reduces its income and taxes and 
does not cause the manufacturer to pay any current period tax. Aside from being subject 
to penalties and other measures for tax fraud,4 the manufacturer’s and customer’s financial 
reporting-basis books are fraudulent, as well. Moreover, the manufacturer appears to be more 
profitable than it otherwise is. Thus, tax reduction can be an incentive for private companies 
to manipulate earnings.
The Correlation of Company Size and Fraud
Additional fraud reduction measures for private companies include the implementation of 
internal controls and promoting an ethical environment, as described in reports by the Com-
mittee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) and discussed 
in chapter 7. The findings of COSO are especially applicable to private companies because 
research conducted and sponsored by COSO found that smaller companies (those with less 
than $100 million in assets) were more susceptible to fraud.
The importance of financial statement fraud reduction measures increases directly with 
company size. For a very small company, fraudulent financial statements that slightly inflate 
earnings or assets could be used to secure a bank loan or small investment, but little else. Steps 
taken to prevent fraud at that level should reflect the potential for damages resulting from such 
misstatement. For larger companies, or small companies fraudulently representing themselves 
as larger companies, potential damages are more serious; steps taken to reduce fraud should 
therefore be more visible and systematic. For example, a middle market company—a firm with 
$10 million to $100 million in assets—should implement reviews of internal controls at least 
once per year by outside CPAs and more frequently by internal accounting staff. If budgets 
allow, a significant fraud reduction measure would include hiring an internal auditor, who 
is a CPA, to assess the effectiveness of each business unit’s controls. Assessments of internal 
control adequacy would help significantly with early fraud detection.
The Audit Committee’s Role
As illustrated in the Link Company example, the reporting of irregularities to an audit com-
mittee comprising independent board members is one of the most important fraud preven-
tion measures available to closely held companies. The opening of such a formal reporting 
channel increases the likelihood that corrective action will be taken. Without such a report-
ing channel, management, even if not directly involved in a fraud, might be inclined to sweep 
4 IRC Section 6663.
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the problem under the rug for fear of reprisal or embarrassment. Private companies are not 
required to have an audit committee; however, they should at the very least have indepen-
dent directors (see chapter 8 for a discussion of the independence of outside directors). The 
closely held firm that has no outside directors has a high potential for financial statement 
fraud, and a significant step to reduce the risk of fraud would be the appointment of such 
directors. Indeed, in an era of heightened sensitivity to the potential of fraud, the presence of 
an active audit committee is one of the best signals to capital providers, such as commercial 
bankers, investment bankers, and venture capitalists, that a firm is taking seriously the validity 
of its reported financial results.
Conclusion
Closely held companies present special and unique fraud opportunities and motives. Pres-
sures from outside investors, banks, and VCs tug and pull firm management in many direc-
tions and may vary in intensity, depending on the financial objectives of the firm. A firm 
looking to minimize dilution of ownership will likely be more reliant on bank financing 
and, thereby, more susceptible to bank-related financial statement fraud, probably focused on 
the balance sheet. A firm looking at venture capital financing will come under different, and 
perhaps unexpected, pressures, probably focused on the income statement, if the VC’s exit 
strategy is to take the firm public. For firms that do not intend to go public, outside inves-
tors may be a key source of capital and a key target of fraud. To add more complexity to this 
mix of funding scenarios, the closely held company may report its financial results on a basis 
other than accrual accounting.
To adequately detect and prevent against fraud in closely held companies, the CPA must 
either be a bit of a generalist or have access to a wide range of expertise. The CPA should 
have an understanding of how closely held companies are financed and the pressures they 
face. The CPA should also have a feel for how tax minimization affects management deci-
sions. A functioning audit committee is also a key resource and fraud prevention measure 
for closely held businesses, and the CPA should strongly encourage clients to adopt such a 
committee or designate at least one outside board member to function in that capacity. See 
chapter 8 for more discussion on the topic of audit committees.
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Government Entities
Chapter 6 
It may come as a surprise to some, but management in not-for-profit entities (NFPs) and 
government entities does have reason to engage in financial statement fraud. Instances of 
management pilfering the assets of a charitable organization and using financial fraud to 
cover up the theft have been well publicized. Likewise, most people think of government 
fraud as asset theft or conversion. However, both NFPs and governmental entities have mo-
tives and means that lie below the obvious; auditors and CPAs simply need to dig a little and 
be aware of the circumstances—some similar to companies in the public and private sector 
and some completely unique—that can lead to fraud.
NFPs: Similar to and Yet Separate From  
the For-Profit World
For the most part, motives and issues that affect closely held companies (see chapter 5) also 
affect NFPs, but the terms are somewhat different. In a desire to secure or retain bank fi-
nancing, for instance, the NFP may wish to show itself to be fiscally responsible by showing 
a positive reported change in net assets on the NFP’s statement of activities. To accomplish 
this objective, management may attempt to record contributions as revenue before receiving 
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firm commitments from donors. This scheme is essentially the same as a for-profit entity 
prematurely recognizing revenue to produce positive net income on its income statement.
Similarities exist with closely held companies, as well. Issues that a for-profit company 
has with outside shareholders are akin to those that NFP management encounters with 
the board or trustees empowered with overseeing NFP activities. If management wishes to 
secure a pay raise, for example, showing improved financial results (a positive change in net 
assets) would help support the request.
However, some differences set NFPs apart. 
Reputation Over Compensation
The one key difference between NFPs and for-profit firms is that management compensa-
tion may not be quite as strong a motivator. Instead, NFPs and their managers, especially 
those looking to the public for support and donations, are very concerned about their im-
age (perhaps more so than for-profit companies). As a result, management of an NFP that 
is facing financial problems may hope to cover up the issues so the reputations of manage-
ment and the NFP are not tarnished. The desire to protect reputations can be as strong an 
inducement for NFP management to manipulate financial data as any contingent bonus in 
the for-profit world.
Revenue Recognition
Unlike in closely held companies, recognizing revenue may be difficult for the NFP because 
it is not always clear when a donor has made a firm commitment or merely an expression of 
interest. Also, as will be seen in the following example, not all funds coming into an NFP are 
revenue: the NFP may be acting as an agent or transferor for other beneficiaries.
Classifying and Tracking Restricted Funds
When an NFP receives donations, the revenue may be restricted in regard to how it can be 
spent or invested (and the earnings from the investments also may be restricted). In addition 
to purpose restrictions, restrictions may be time limited (that is, temporary) or exist in perpe-
tuity (that is, permanent). Paragraphs 3–4 of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 958-605-451 state
Contributions received by not-for-profit entities (NFPs) shall be reported as restrict-
ed support or unrestricted support. An NFP shall distinguish between contributions 
received with permanent restrictions, those received with temporary restrictions, and 
those received without donor-imposed restrictions. Contributions without donor-im-
posed restrictions shall be reported as unrestricted support that increases unrestricted 
net assets. 
Restricted support increases permanently restricted net assets or temporarily re-
stricted net assets. A restriction on an NFP’s use of the assets contributed results either 
from a donor’s explicit stipulation or from circumstances surrounding the receipt of 
the contribution that make clear the donor’s implicit restriction on use. Contributions 
1 International Financial Reporting Standards do not address accounting for not-for-profit entities; therefore, all citations in this section 
are to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.
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with donor-imposed restrictions shall be reported as restricted support; however, donor-
restricted contributions whose restrictions are met in the same reporting period may be 
reported as unrestricted support provided that an NFP has a similar policy for reporting 
investment gains and income (see paragraph 958-320-45-3), reports consistently from 
period to period, and discloses its accounting policy.
Therefore, donor restrictions must be carefully observed because they determine wheth-
er and how contributions are classified. Then, once recorded, temporarily restricted contri-
butions must be monitored to determine if and when they become unrestricted, as discussed 
in FASB ASC 958-205-45-9:
An NFP shall recognize the expiration of a donor-imposed restriction on a contribution 
in the period in which the restriction expires. A restriction expires when the stipulated 
time has elapsed, when the stipulated purpose for which the resource was restricted has 
been fulfilled, or both. If two or more temporary restrictions are imposed on a contribu-
tion, the effect of the expiration of those restrictions shall be recognized in the period 
in which the last remaining restriction has expired.
These requirements to properly account for restrictions present significant classification, 
reporting, and documentation challenges that require extensive attention to detail. Given 
that NFPs try to limit administrative costs (see the next section), it is frequently the case that 
an NFP’s accounting personnel are strained to keep up, either because the NFP cannot hire 
accountants with sufficient training and experience or there simply are not enough on staff 
to get the job done.
Strain on accounting personnel presents an opportunity for a fraudster who may wish 
to show more unrestricted funds available to allow, perhaps, an increase in compensation 
or some other benefit. The fraudster may be able to convince inexperienced personnel to 
incorrectly book a transaction or, if personnel are too busy, to simply not bother to verify or 
monitor how funds are classified.
Expense Ratios
Many NFPs desire to demonstrate to potential donors that a significant portion of each 
contribution goes into worthwhile programs and is not spent on administrative functions, 
referred to as supporting activities by FASB ASC 958-720-20. An example of a measure used 
to assess the relative amount spent on nonprogram costs is the ratio of support expenses as a 
percentage of total revenues. Such expense ratios are typically compared with ratios of other 
NFPs in the same field to determine which are more efficient. The lower the expense ratio, 
the more funds are presumably employed in charitable activities rather than being consumed 
in administration or other functions. A strong incentive exists to classify as much expense as 
possible away from support to program activities to minimize the ratio.
FASB ASC 958-720-45-3 defines program services as follows:
Program services are the activities that result in goods and services being distributed to 
beneficiaries, customers, or members that fulfill the purposes or mission for which the 
NFP exists. Those services are the major purpose for and the major output of the NFP 
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and often relate to several major programs. For example, a large university may have 
programs for student instruction, research, and patient care, among others.
FASB ASC 958-720-45-6 defines supporting activities as follows:
Supporting activities are all activities of an NFP other than program services. Generally, 
supporting activities include the following activities:
a. Management and general activities 
b. Fundraising activities 
c. Membership development activities. 
In discussing management and general activities, paragraphs 7–8 of FASB ASC 958-
720-45 state the following:





e.  Financing, including unallocated interest costs pursuant to paragraph 958-720-
45-24
f.  Soliciting funds other than contributions, including exchange transactions 
(whether program-related or not), such as government contracts, and related 
administrative activities
g.  Disseminating information to inform the public of the NFP’s stewardship of 
contributed funds
h.  Announcements concerning appointments
i.  The annual report
j. Related administrative activities
k.  All management and administration except for direct conduct of program ser-
vices or fundraising activities.
The costs of oversight and management usually include the salaries and expenses of 
the governing board, the chief executive officer of the NFP, and the supporting staff. If 
such staff spend a portion of their time directly supervising program services or catego-
ries of other supporting services, however, their salaries and expenses shall be allocated 
among those functions.
In discussing fundraising activities, paragraphs 9–10 of FASB ASC 958-720-45 state the 
following:
Fundraising activities include the following:
a. Publicizing and conducting fundraising campaigns
b. Maintaining donor mailing lists
c. Conducting special fundraising events
d.  Preparing and distributing fundraising manuals, instructions, and other  
materials
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e.  Conducting other activities involved with soliciting contributions from indi-
viduals, foundations, government agencies, and others.
Fundraising activities include soliciting contributions of services from individuals, re-
gardless of whether those services meet the recognition criteria for contributions in the 
Contributions Received Subsection of Section 958-605-25.
In discussing membership development activities, FASB ASC 958-720-45-11 states the 
following:
Membership development activities include the following:
a. Soliciting for prospective members and membership dues
b. Membership relations
c. Similar activities.
As the following example demonstrates, these definitions are not always as easy to im-
plement as they appear:
The Snail Darter Foundation is an NFP organization established by environmental activists 
to perform research and educate others on behalf of endangered species. It is a qualified 
tax-exempt entity under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3), and its primary 
source of revenues consists of solicited, tax-deductible contributions from individuals. Snail 
Darter also receives about 30 percent of its funding from grants provided through the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to perform certain research.
The executive director of Snail Darter is tasked with overall management of the founda-
tion’s operations, as well as fundraising, and reports to the foundation trustees. The staff 
numbers between 20 and 30 people in various full- and part-time positions, and the current 
year budgeted revenues are $6 million.
In past years, the executive director had been rather successful in raising funds, includ-
ing grants from the EPA, but he was getting restless with his current position and had his 
eye on a more prestigious job at the Sierra Club. He knew a senior program director at the 
Sierra Club was due to retire at the end of next year, creating an opening. To be a serious 
contender, the executive director needed to show strong continued fundraising and operat-
ing skills in the current year and next year.
However, in January of the current year, a new administration took office in Washing-
ton, D.C., and the EPA severely cut back on funding for research conducted by nongov-
ernmental organizations, such as Snail Darter. Although grants made under the previous 
administration would be funded into the current year, the result of the change in policy was 
that several of Snail Darter’s research grant applications submitted a few months earlier 
were returned, and no more would be accepted. When the executive director asked the 
bookkeeper (Snail Darter had no controller) to assess the impact of the loss of the research 
grants, the bookkeeper responded that grant revenue for the current year would be approxi-
mately one-third of the amount budgeted, causing a shortfall of $600,000 in total revenues.
(continued)
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To be in the running for the Sierra Club position, the executive director had to dem-
onstrate an ability to grow fund revenues over time, and if he could show an increase in 
revenues in a changing political environment, he thought that would put him at the top of 
the list. The executive director projected that fundraising from individuals would increase 
in the current year by $300,000 to $500,000, but with the loss of $600,000 of government 
research funds, his plan for advancement was in peril. Moreover, a net loss of revenues 
could potentially affect the standing of the executive director’s reputation among fellow 
environmentalists, as well: a decline in Snail Darter’s revenues would be seen as a loss of 
political influence.
The executive director’s first action was to prepare to operate at a lower level of rev-
enues. He could pare back the research program staff as their grant-funded work came to 
an end, but his supporting activities costs would still remain. Making any reductions to ad-
ministrative staff was next to impossible because they were already thinly spread. The end 
result would be the likely increase in Snail Darter’s supporting expenses as a percentage 
of revenues. However, that increase would cause embarrassment for the executive direc-
tor in the future because he frequently stressed to potential donors the high percentage of 
revenues going to programs at Snail Darter, relative to other organizations.
After giving the matter some thought, the executive director instructed the bookkeeper 
to allocate 20 percent of the supporting expenses to the various programs because “at least 
a portion of the work performed by our administrative staff directly helps our programs.” 
That reason made sense to the bookkeeper, who felt underappreciated and thought that 
including a portion of the cost in the program budgets would elevate the status of admin-
istrative staff. Thus, the executive director put in place some “insurance,” as he referred to 
the expense allocation, to protect Snail Darter’s historically low expense ratio in the event 
that he could not replace the lost grant revenues in the current year.
Making up for the revenue shortfall would prove more challenging. The executive 
director had previously been approached by Trees Unlimited Foundation, an NFP that was 
just starting, to share Snail Darter’s mailing list of donors. The executive director jealously 
guarded that list and would not let anyone have it, but he offered to make a mailing on be-
half of Trees Unlimited whereby contributions from the mailing would come to Snail Darter, 
and Snail Darter would, in turn, make distributions of the funds to Trees Unlimited. Not only 
did this method protect the names of people on the donor list from disclosure to outsiders, 
it gave the executive director—he thought—a way to recognize the contributions as revenue 
to Snail Darter that would replace some of the shortfall. Under the plan, the funds would 
flow through to Trees Unlimited, net of any out-of-pocket costs and a fee for staff time.
Although the donor list was tapped out for contributions to Snail Darter, the Trees Un-
limited appeal struck a responsive chord, and donors came up with approximately $100,000 
of contributions, but that was not enough to restore growth. The executive director had one 
more idea. In previous lawsuits filed by Snail Darter to halt plant relocations to environmen-
tally sensitive areas, the executive director had come to know officials at a labor union that 
had supported Snail Darter in the suits. The union now wanted to make donations to certain 
prolabor candidates for public office; however, because of past legal problems and a pend-
ing criminal investigation, the candidates did not want to accept the money from the union. 
A union official suggested to the executive director that the union make the contributions to 
Snail Darter and that Snail Darter send those contributions on to the appropriate candidates 
(after deducting a “handling fee”). To the executive director, the concept sounded similar to 
the Trees Unlimited proposal, and because the union’s list of candidates had positions sup-
portive of Snail Darter’s cause, the executive director believed he could not object.
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The union’s contributions, when added to the Trees Unlimited funds, covered the short-
fall due to loss of the research grants. The increase in donor contributions to Snail Darter, 
forecast by the executive director, materialized, as well, bringing in a 15 percent increase 
in revenues over the budgeted amount and giving the executive director the strong fund-
raising performance he needed to be a serious candidate for the Sierra Club position. As 
an added benefit, the allocation of a portion of administrative costs to program expenses, 
combined with the increase in contributions, caused the expense ratio for the current year 
to decline markedly as supporting expenses dropped and revenues went up. The executive 
director made sure the bookkeeper recorded the outflow of funds to Trees Unlimited and 
the candidates as program costs, so the statements given to the trustees “would not raise 
any unnecessary questions.”
This example sets up a number of issues to discuss. First, the executive director’s alloca-
tion of 20 percent of administrative costs to program expenses was arbitrary and unsup-
portable under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP). Perhaps after 
appropriate analysis, some of the fundraising costs could be allocated to programs, in ac-
cordance with FASB ASC 958-720-45-28, because a portion of fundraising typically includes 
education materials, and environmental education is a purpose of Snail Darter. Manage-
ment and staff expenses may only be allocated to programs if, according to FASB ASC 958-
720-45-8, “such staff spend a portion of their time directly supervising program services.” 
There was no evidence in the example scenario that any staff directly supervised research 
or education programs. The 20 percent was probably selected to scale back supporting 
expenses to stay in line with rebudgeted revenues that were expected to drop by the same 
percentage due to loss of government grants. The result was precisely the “insurance” the 
executive director mentioned: protection for the NFP’s expense ratio. The lesson for CPAs 
is to insist on documentation for expense allocations, even though such documentation 
may be hard to come by given the typical workload handled by NFP staff.
The Trees Unlimited funds create a more subtle complication. Appropriate U.S. GAAP 
guidance is found in FASB ASC 958-605-25-24, which states
Except as described in the following paragraph and paragraph 958-605-25-27 
[regarding variance power and financially interrelated entities, respectively], a 
recipient entity that accepts assets from a donor and agrees to use those assets 
on behalf of or transfer those assets, the return on investment of those assets, 
or both to a specified beneficiary is not a donee. It shall recognize its liability to 
the specified beneficiary concurrent with its recognition of cash or other finan-
cial assets received from the donor.
(continued)
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Therefore, unless an exception applies, funds that simply flow through an NFP on their 
way to another beneficiary must be recorded as a liability of the NFP, not as revenue when 
received or program expense when disbursed. Because Snail Darter and Trees Unlimited 
are not financially interrelated entities,2 the only exception potentially relevant in this case 
is found in FASB ASC 958-605-25-25, which states that the contributions can be booked as 
revenues “if the donor explicitly grants the recipient entity variance power—that is, the uni-
lateral power to redirect the use of the transferred assets to another beneficiary.” For the 
example scenario, no specific mention is made of variance power. Whether there is vari-
ance power frequently becomes an issue of the latitude granted to the recipient organiza-
tion from the donors. In this case, when Snail Darter solicited contributions to go to Trees 
Unlimited, Snail Darter may have made an explicit or implicit promise that all funds raised, 
net of expenses, would go to Trees Unlimited. It is likely that the understanding of the 
donors was such. It would fall to the executive director to make a case that his organization 
had variance power, and his case looks weak. This example of the flow-through charitable 
contributions illustrates a key area CPAs should examine in the context of potential finan-
cial statement fraud at NFPs.
The case of the political contributions is clearer and has graver repercussions. Setting 
aside whether running the union contributions through the NFP is a violation of cam-
paign finance laws, the contributions to political candidates violate the IRC Section 501(c)
(3) prohibition on participating in any political campaign. As such, the contributions fall 
outside the stated purpose of Snail Darter’s program activities. The stated activities were 
research and education; if political campaigning had been listed as one of the NFP’s activi-
ties, the IRS would not likely have granted it 501(c)(3) status. Therefore, it would not qualify 
as a program expense, and Snail Darter, acting as an agent for the union, would have to 
record the funds as a liability until dispersed. The political contributions would not increase 
revenues. More important, loss of 501(c)(3) status may severely hamper the NFP’s ability to 
raise funds in the future because those contributions would no longer be tax deductible.
In this example, the motives for the executive director were not explicitly monetary. 
His desire to present himself as a qualified candidate for a more prestigious position at a 
larger organization was a key driver, but his and his organization’s reputation was just as 
important. Therefore, the CPA, when looking for motives, may find nonmonetary motives 
playing a larger role with NFPs.
The lack of internal controls is evident but, unfortunately, not that uncommon. If an 
NFP truly cannot afford to hire a knowledgeable accountant, the trustees or board mem-
bers must step in and take on some review, and perhaps approval, functions. If those func-
tions make the trustees or board members uneasy, perhaps priorities should be rearranged 
to allow for retaining the appropriate personnel. Frequently, the establishment of strong 
internal controls within an NFP is a matter of priorities competing with the NFP programs. 
The CPA must carry the argument for strong controls and spell out the consequences if 
controls fail. Working in favor for the CPA are state laws that impose civil and criminal 
penalties on NFP management and its trustees in the event of fraud. For NFP trustees who 
frequently have distinguished business and social careers and who serve for little or no 
pay, the prospect of litigation or prosecution in the event of fraud is not at all welcome. 
In addition, the consequences of financial fraud for the NFP itself may include irreparable 
harm to the NFP’s reputation, loss of tax-exempt status, and loss of government grants and 
public donations.
2
2 Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification 958-605-25-27.
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Government Entities
Governmental entities have motives to publish misleading financial statements, and those 
motives are quite similar to those for NFPs. This section looks at motives and methods used 
within governmental entities.
The Significance of Compensation and Reputation
Compensation actually can be a motive in government. Even though salaries in grade are set 
by governing bodies (such as legislatures), promotions depend, at least in part, on perceived 
capabilities. Perceived capabilities in government, to no small degree, depend on reputation. 
Managers who, due to adverse circumstances, find their governmental units in difficult fi-
nancial condition may find that the desire to protect their reputations will cause them to at-
tempt to manipulate financial reports. Therefore, the motivational elements present in NFPs 
are also found in government.
The Dangers in Greater Disclosure
New reporting standards may also provide incentive for fraud. As Governmental Account-
ing Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34, Basic Financial Statements—and Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis—for State and Local Governments was implemented at various levels 
of government through 2003, the format for financial reporting by governmental entities 
became more like the reporting by publicly traded companies. In fact, GASB Statement 
No. 34 mandated a “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A) section as required 
supplemental information that is similar in nature and objective to the MD&A required by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. The “Summary” section of GASB Statement No. 
34 stated
MD&A should provide an objective and easily readable analysis of the government’s 
financial activities based on currently known facts, decisions, or conditions. MD&A 
should include comparisons of the current year to the prior year based on the govern-
ment-wide information. It should provide an analysis of the government’s overall finan-
cial position and results of operations to assist users in assessing whether that financial 
position has improved or deteriorated as a result of the year’s activities. In addition, it 
should provide an analysis of significant changes that occur in funds and significant bud-
get variances. It should also describe capital asset and long-term debt activity during the 
year. MD&A should conclude with a description of currently known facts, decisions, or 
conditions that are expected to have a significant effect on financial position or results 
of operations.
These MD&A requirements have expanded since GASB Statement No. 34 was issued 
and are now listed in GASB Codification of Governmental Accounting and Financial Reporting 
Standards (GASB Codification) Section 2200.106-.109.
With the additional MD&A disclosures, come motives for fraud. For instance, if a gov-
ernmental fund is faced with having to report that its financial position has deteriorated as a 
result of the year’s activities, its managers may attempt to manipulate either the balance sheet 
or the statement of revenues, expenditures, and fund balances.
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For the most part, fraudulent manipulation techniques discussed elsewhere in this book 
apply to governments, as well, but the following sections discuss a few fraud areas that are 
unique to government.
Methods for Hiding Problems
In the past, governments may have been able to report only selected information to the 
public, thus avoiding embarrassing disclosures of bad news, until the problem became so 
severe that it required drastic action. However, with the issuance of GASB Statement No. 
34, governments were required to issue government-wide financial statements with certain 
larger funds broken out and then reconciled to the government-wide statements. Will all this 
disclosure reduce fraud? Not likely; it simply will force fraudsters to become more creative.
Fraudsters in government may try to hide problems by shifting them among different 
funds, and a plethora of different types of funds are used in government. GASB Codification 
Section 1100.103 lists the following fund types:
In fund financial statements, governments should report governmental, proprietary, and 
fiduciary funds to the extent that they have activities that meet the criteria for using 
those funds.
a. Governmental funds (emphasizing major funds)
  (1) The general fund
  (2) Special revenue funds
  (3) Capital projects funds
  (4) Debt service funds
  (5) Permanent funds
b. Proprietary funds
  (6) Enterprise funds (emphasizing major funds)
  (7) Internal service funds
c. Fiduciary funds (and similar component units)
  (8) Pension (and other employee benefit) trust funds
  (9) Investment trust funds
 (10) Private-purpose trust funds
 (11) Agency funds.
If within one government-wide reporting unit, one fund has problems and another does 
not, a loan or transaction from one to the other may cover up the issue, at least for a short 
period of time.
Gray Areas in Revenue and Asset Classification
To the government, revenues are taxes, fees, fines, and other assessments. However, some rev-
enues come to the government for special purposes, such as building a convention center or 
funding secondary education. Those revenues are restricted and must be separately tracked. 
Similarly, on the balance sheet, as first set out in GASB Statement No. 34, “[t]he net assets of 
a government should be reported in three categories—invested in capital assets net of related 
debt, restricted, and unrestricted.”3 Therefore, just as with NFPs, governments must properly 
determine how revenues create net assets in each of those categories.
3 Now as codified in Governmental Accounting Standards Board Codification of Governmental Accounting and Financial Reporting 
Standards Section 2200.115.
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There are often ambiguities that provide ample room for fraudsters to maneuver. For 
example, a fund set up to receive revenues earmarked for a special purpose may fulfill that 
special purpose, at least for the current fiscal year, and have excess funds left over. A fraudster 
trying to deal with a shortfall of revenues in the general fund may be able to loan money 
from the special purpose fund, although that would require some documentation and would 
leave a paper trail.
A more clever solution would be to leave the excess funds where they are and simply 
allocate the excess funds to the general fund’s assets. One method to accomplish recording 
the assets in a different fund would be to reclassify the revenues in excess of special purpose 
needs as those revenues are received, hoping that the multiple small reclassifications will go 
unnoticed.
Another more straightforward method would be to consolidate the special purpose fund 
into the general fund if the special purpose fund was not so large that it did not need to be 
separately disclosed. Indeed, GASB contemplated this issue when developing its financial 
disclosure requirements, as contained in GASB Codification Section 2300.104–.105:
One of the key aspects of the reporting entity concept is that users should be able to 
distinguish between the primary government and its component units. Thus, because 
the notes and required supplementary information (RSI) are integral parts of the finan-
cial statements, they should distinguish between information pertaining to the primary 
government (including its blended component units) and that of its discretely presented 
component units.
Determining which discretely presented component unit disclosures are essential 
to fair presentation is a matter of professional judgment and should be done on a com-
ponent unit-by-component unit basis. A specific type of disclosure might be essential 
for one component unit but not for another depending on the component unit’s signifi-
cance relative to the total component units included in the component units column(s) 
and the individual component unit’s relationship with the primary government.
If the CPA suspects fraud in a governmental entity, the investigation should include, and 
perhaps start with, an analysis of the component unit-by-component unit basis that origi-
nally determined which units were included or excluded from the financial statements.
Conclusion
Financial statement fraud at NFPs and governmental units has common motivators in com-
pensation and reputation, with both playing equal roles. This shift away from the dominant 
role compensation plays in for-profit company financial statement frauds will require CPAs 
to approach suspected fraud in NFPs and governments in a different way. In the for-profit 
company, if the CPA can figure out who got rich from the fraud scheme, he or she may be 
close to identifying the perpetrators. In an NFP or government unit, no one may be rich as a 
result of the fraud scheme—someone just may have kept his or her job and reputation (until 
caught), and that may be motivation enough.
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The rules of accounting for NFPs and governments are markedly different from those of 
for-profit companies, but the methods to implement financial statement fraud still deal with 
the basic concepts of manipulating assets, revenues, expenses, and other items. The challenge 
for the CPA is to master the specific accounting rules in these specialized areas because the 
fraudsters have done so and will attempt to hide their moves in the arcane technicalities 
embedded in NFP and governmental accounting.
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Research Findings on Fraudulent 
Accounting
Chapter 7 
Significant and path-breaking research into financial statement fraud has been conducted 
since the 1980s when the savings and loan industry collapsed and audit failures were con-
tributing factors. The AICPA, among others, led the research effort by participating in the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), a voluntary private sector organization 
dedicated to improving the quality of financial reporting. COSO was sponsored and funded 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, chaired by James C. Treadway, 
Jr., then executive vice president and general counsel of PaineWebber Incorporated, and it 
came to be known as the Treadway Commission. 
In October 1987, the Treadway Commission published the Report of the National Com-
mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987 Treadway report). The report covered a wide 
range of research projects, but chief among them was a review of all accounting and disclo-
sure cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against public com-
panies over the prior five years. In 1999, to continue the work begun with the 1987 Tread-
way report, COSO sponsored further research published under the title Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: 1987–1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (the 1999 research report). That 
report sought to identify and examine company and management characteristics in corpora-
tions involved in financial statement fraud by reviewing SEC enforcement actions over the 
1987–97 period, picking up where the 1987 Treadway report left off. In addition, between 
09-Chap07.indd   95 7/6/10   2:23:45 PM
96
Financial Reporting Fraud
the 1987 Treadway report and the 1999 research report, in 1992, COSO published Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework (the internal control report) in an effort to derive a common 
definition of internal control and identify its key components. In 2010, COSO updated the 
1999 research report with the publication of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An 
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (the 2010 research report), available at www.coso.org.
The 1987 report, and the 1999 and 2010 research reports provided the basis used today 
to identify the motives and conditions found in companies that engage in fraudulent finan-
cial reporting. The reports also identified numerous internal control weaknesses addressed 
by the internal control report. This chapter reviews report findings that are important from 
the CPA’s viewpoint. One key area in all the reports was the audit committee’s role, which, 
because of its importance, is covered in a separate chapter (see chapter 8).
The 1987 Treadway Report
In addition to reviewing a large quantity of published research in the area of fraudulent 
financial reporting, the Treadway Commission sponsored 10 research projects with external 
academicians and practitioners and launched 20 studies conducted by its own staff (paid for 





It is interesting to see that these particular topics were discussed in the 1980s because 
each returned to the forefront of discussions among practitioners in the recent past:
	 •	 	Prior	to	passage	of	the	Sarbanes-Oxley	Act	of	2002,	nonaudit	services	to	audit	
clients had been the focus of extensive discussions between the SEC and major ac-
counting firms. Nonaudit services were sharply limited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 as part of the post-Enron reforms.
	 •	 	Surprise	write-offs	were	one	of	the	topics	chosen	by	Arthur	Levitt,	former	SEC	
chairman, for a speech delivered in 1998, one decade after the 1987 Treadway report. 
He referred to them as “‘big bath’ restructuring charges” (see chapter 3). The write-
offs were addressed in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 100, Restructuring 
and Impairment Charges, issued in 1999.
	 •	 	The	accountant’s	responsibility	for	the	detection	of	fraud	has	been	a	long-standing	
ongoing issue and was specifically addressed in Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, and subsequently in 
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), which replaced SAS No. 82 in 2002 (see chapter 1).
One study conducted by the COSO staff is of particular interest: the review of SEC 
cases	involving	fraudulent	financial	reporting.	Looking	at	all	accounting	and	disclosure	cases	
from July 1, 1981, to August 6, 1986, the staff reached the following conclusions:
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	 •	 	Forty-four	percent	of	the	cases	against	public	companies	occurred	in	industries	that	
were experiencing, or about to experience, a general economic decline.
	 •	 	Eighty-seven	percent	of	the	cases	against	public	companies	involved	manipulation	
of the financial disclosures versus misappropriation of assets for personal gain (3 
percent). Frequently used techniques were
	 •	 –  improper revenue recognition methods (47 percent),
	 •	 –  deliberate overstatements of company assets (38 percent), and
	 •	 –  improper deferral of current period expenses (16 percent).
	 •	 	In	27	percent	of	the	cases	against	public	companies,	the	SEC	alleged	that	other	infor-
mation disseminated to the public was inadequate or otherwise contained false and 
misleading statements.
	 •	 	In	45	percent	of	the	cases	against	public	companies,	the	SEC	alleged	that	the	fraud	
occurred because of a breakdown of the company’s internal controls. In many of these 
instances, the company had adequate internal accounting controls; however, these 
controls were overridden by management.
	 •	 	The	SEC	cited	a	member	of	upper-level	corporate	management	(CEO,	president,	or	
CFO) as being involved in 66 percent of the cases against public companies.
	 •	 	Although	84	percent	of	all	public	companies	are	audited	by	national	public	account-
ing firms, 74 percent of the actions brought against independent public accountants 
were against smaller, regional, or local firms or sole practitioners.
The findings place senior management at the scene of the fraud in two-thirds of the 
cases, setting the stage for the internal control report to conclude that the tone at the top 
of an organization was very important, a message echoed by the 1999 and 2010 research 
reports, as well. Regarding the methods used by fraudsters, the findings gave early warnings 
of revenue recognition and asset overstatement problems that would continue into the next 
several decades.
Standard Setters Play Catch-Up
In the 1990s, accounting standard setters attempted to address the issues raised by COSO 
and others. Concerning revenue recognition problems, in December 1999, the SEC issued 
SAB No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, later revised in 2003 with SAB No. 
104, Revenue Recognition (see chapter 13 and Appendix C). In the United States, some of the 
overstatement problems were addressed in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Statement No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived As-
sets to Be Disposed Of,	issued	in	March	1995	and	later	superseded	in	August	2001	by	FASB	
Statement No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, and now 
codified in FASB Accounting Standards Codification 360, Property, Plant, and Equipment. The 
U.S. accounting standards literature in both areas has since been modified and expanded by 
later pronouncements of the SEC, FASB, and the Emerging Issues Task Force. The Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee, the predecessor to the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), issued International Accounting Standard 36, Impairment of Assets, in 
1998, and the IASB has updated the standard several times. 
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The 1999 and 2010 Research Reports
In 1998, COSO commissioned a study led by three academicians, Mark S. Beasley, Joseph 
V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson, to follow up on the findings of the 1987 Tread-
way report. The researchers surveyed SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs) issued over the period 1987–97 to identify approximately 300 companies involved 
in alleged financial statement fraud. Of those companies, the researchers randomly selected 
204 to review in-depth, and they published their findings in March 1999.
The 2010 research report, authored by the same academicians with the addition of Terry 
L.	Neal,	followed	the	same	methodology	looking	at	AAERs	over	the	period	of	1998–2007,	
identifying 347 cases of alleged fraudulent financial reporting. This study period, though, 
picked up the quantitatively large, headline-grabbing cases of Enron and Worldcom, among 
others.	As	a	result,	the	average	(or	mean)	size	of	reported	frauds	increased	from	$25	million	
in the 1999 research report to $400 million in the 2010 research report. Admittedly, these 
averages were skewed by those large fraud cases, but even measuring by the median size fraud 
(the fraud in the middle of the list of frauds ranked from smallest to largest), the study found 
an	increase	from	$4.1	million	in	the	1999	research	report	to	$12.05	million	in	the	2010	re-
search report. Therefore, by either measure, the magnitude of fraud increased from the 1987-
1997 period of the 1999 research report to 1998-2007 period of the 2010 research report.
Some of the principal report conclusions of interest to accountants today deal with find-
ings about the operating and financial condition of the companies that were the subject of 
SEC fraud investigations, the quality of internal controls at those companies, and the nature 
of the frauds committed. The following sections summarize the findings of the 2010 research 
report in each area.
Operating and Financial Condition
Size and Market Listing
Outside of the well-publicized fraud companies, the typical company cited in an AAER was 
middle-market with median assets of $93 million and median revenues of $72 million, and 
at least three-quarters of the firms cited had less than $674 million in either assets or annual 
revenues. Nevertheless, these data are about four to six times the magnitude of similar data 
in the 1999 research report.
The percentage of fraud firms cited in the AAERs was disproportionately high for The 
NASDAQ OMX Group markets. Over the period of the 2010 research report study, the 
number	of	fraud	companies	that	traded	on	a	NASDAQ	market	was	50	percent	of	all	fraud	
companies; however, NASDAQ accounted for only about 24 percent of all listed companies. 
For that reason, this book refers to NASDAQ listing standards often when examining the 
impact of stock markets on financial reporting fraud.
Financial Stress
Earnings reported in the years preceding the fraud gave the researchers information about 
earnings trends. For 313 of the 347 companies in the sample, the researchers were able to 
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obtain clean financial statements for the years prior to frauds identified in the AAERs. With 
data from those companies, the researchers concluded: 
Some of the sample companies were financially stressed in the period preceding the 
fraud	period.	The	median	net	income	was	only	$875,000,	with	the	25th	percentile	fac-
ing	net	losses	of	nearly	$2.1	million.	The	75th	percentile	had	net	income	just	over	$18	
million in the year before the fraud allegedly began. Similarly, cash flow from operations 
averaged $246 million, while median cash flow from operations was only $317,000. This 
closeness to break-even positions was consistent with what was observed in COSO’s 
1999 study.
Leadership and Board Committees
Just as the 1987 Treadway report found top management was heavily involved in fraudulent 
activity, the percentages were worse in the 1999 and 2010 research reports. The researchers 
recorded the positions of individuals named in the AAERs who were related to a cited finan-
cial statement irregularity. Aggregating those individuals by title, researchers found that 83 
percent of the cases studied in the 1999 research report and 89 percent of the cases studied 
in the 2010 research report, the CEO or CFO, or both, were involved. The 1987 Treadway 
report placed the percentage of senior level involvement at 66 percent. Thus, the trend in 
fraud is more senior management involvement, and the tone at the top of an organization 
becomes a paramount issue.
The researchers, after reviewing the motives for fraudulent behavior of senior manag-
ers, determined that incentive compensation plans were a key concern. They also found that 
outside pressures, such as meeting analysts’ expectations, played a role. The 1999 research 
report concluded the following:
The frequency of CEO and CFO involvement highlights the importance of assessing 
key performance pressures faced by senior executives. Boards of directors and audit 
committees need to consider the potential for these pressures when designing execu-
tive compensation plans for their key executives. Board of director and audit committee 
members need to exercise professional skepticism when evaluating top management 
actions. Boards and audit committees may also look for pressures from outside the orga-
nization for meeting key company performance targets. Monitoring perceived pressures 
from the investment community to meet stated performance expectations, for example, 
may be warranted for boards, audit committees, and auditors.
The 2010 research report, while citing compensation structure as a recurring issue raised 
in AAERs, reached the statistically significant finding that “fraud firms were significantly 
less likely to have maintained a compensation committee than no-fraud firms.” Without a 
separately constituted compensation committee, review of compensation plans falls entirely 
upon the board of directors, and perhaps weighed down with other responsibilities, the 
entire board does not thoroughly consider how plan structures may encourage fraud. Thus, 
CPAs have another clue to examine if a firm does not have a compensation committee.
The 1999 research report also found problems with audit committees. First, audit com-
mittees of AAER companies met only once per year or were nonexistent. Furthermore, 
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approximately two-thirds of audit committee members had little accounting or finance ex-
perience. Also, 60 percent of audit committee members who were supposed to be indepen-
dent actually had significant ties to the company, making them what the researchers called 
“grey directors.” In addition, approximately 40 percent of the AAER companies had family 
relationships between officers and directors.
Concurrent with the publication of the 1999 research report, in 1999 the New York 
Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers (now the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority) jointly issued Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC report), which 
resulted in enhanced audit committee requirements. Drawing upon the 1987 Treadway re-
port findings, among others, the BRC report recommended, and the national stock markets 
implemented through their listing standards, changes to improve audit committee compe-
tence and independence.
The NASDAQ OMX Group, for example, now sets a standard for most listed companies 
that requires three independent directors, at least one of which must be financially literate:
Marketplace Rule 5605(c)(2)(A)—Audit Committee Composition 
Each Company must have, and certify that it has and will continue to have, an audit 
committee of at least three members, each of whom must: (i) be independent as defined 
under	Rule	5605(a)(2);	(ii)	meet	the	criteria	for	independence	set	forth	in	Rule	10A-
3(b)(1) under the [1934 Securities Exchange] Act (subject to the exemptions provided 
in Rule 10A-3(c) under the Act); (iii) not have participated in the preparation of the 
financial statements of the Company or any current subsidiary of the Company at any 
time during the past three years; and (iv) be able to read and understand fundamental 
financial statements, including a Company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash 
flow statement. Additionally, each Company must certify that it has, and will continue 
to have, at least one member of the audit committee who has past employment experi-
ence in finance or accounting, requisite professional certification in accounting, or any 
other comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial 
officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities.
In	Marketplace	Rule	5605(a)(2),	NASDAQ	defines	an	independent director by describing 
relationships that could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment:
“Independent Director” means a person other than an Executive Officer or employee of 
the Company or any other individual having a relationship which, in the opinion of the 
Company’s board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judg-
ment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. For purposes of this rule, “Family 
Member” means a person’s spouse, parents, children and siblings, whether by blood, 
marriage or adoption, or anyone residing in such person’s home. The following persons 
shall not be considered independent:
(A)  a director who is, or at any time during the past three years was, employed by 
the Company;
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(B)  a director who accepted or who has a Family Member who accepted any 
compensation from the Company in excess of $120,000 during any period of 
twelve consecutive months within the three years preceding the determination 
of independence, other than the following:
 (i)  compensation for board or board committee service;
 (ii)  compensation paid to a Family Member who is an employee (other than 
an Executive Officer) of the Company; or
 (iii)  benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan, or non-discretionary  
compensation.
  Provided, however, that in addition to the requirements contained in this 
paragraph (B), audit committee members are also subject to additional, more 
stringent	requirements	under	Rule	5605(c)(2).
(C)  a director who is a Family Member of an individual who is, or at any time 
during the past three years was, employed by the company as an Executive  
Officer;
(D)  a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a partner in, or a controlling 
Shareholder or an Executive Officer of, any organization to which the Com-
pany made, or from which the Company received, payments for property or 
services	in	the	current	or	any	of	the	past	three	fiscal	years	that	exceed	5%	of	the	
recipient’s consolidated gross revenues for that year, or $200,000, whichever is 
more, other than the following:
 (i)  payments arising solely from investments in the Company’s securities; or
 (ii)  payments under non-discretionary charitable contribution matching  
programs.
(E)  a director of the Company who is, or has a Family Member who is, employed 
as an Executive Officer of another entity where at any time during the past 
three years any of the Executive Officers of the Company serve on the com-
pensation committee of such other entity; or
(F)  a director who is, or has a Family Member who is, a current partner of the 
Company’s outside auditor, or was a partner or employee of the Company’s 
outside auditor who worked on the Company’s audit at any time during any 
of the past three years.
(G)  in the case of an investment company, in lieu of paragraphs (A)–(F), a director 
who is an “interested person” of the Company as defined in Section 2(a)(19) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the board of directors or any board committee.
Even though it is worthwhile to see how the securities markets addressed the issue of 
audit committee quality, it is just as important for CPAs who consult to private companies 
to understand these standards, as well. The audit committee is the linchpin to the internal 
control mechanism (see chapter 8). Many types of material financial fraud perpetrated by 
firm management can be detected (and perhaps prevented) by an effective audit committee. 
Although private nonlisted companies are not subject to these rules by statute, any private 
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company that is serious about demonstrating its commitment to high business ethics should 
nevertheless adopt an audit committee structure similar to those imposed on public compa-
nies by the nation’s securities markets.
Nature and Duration of Fraud
Regarding how fraud was committed, the 2010 research report1 found that the number 
of companies was split somewhat evenly between improper revenue recognition and asset 
overstatement, with the former slightly edging out the latter, as shown in table 7-1. Fictitious 
revenues and premature recognition of revenues were common in the revenue recognition 
category; overstating existing assets dominated the asset overstatement category. Table 7-1, 
taken from the 2010 research report, summarizes the findings:
Table 7-1:  Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques






Overstatement of Assets (excluding accounts receivable 
overstatements due to revenue fraud):
51%Overstating existing assets or capitalizing expenses—46%
Recording fictitious assets or assets not owned—11%
Understatement of Expenses/Liabilities 31%
Misappropriation of Assets 14%
Inappropriate Disclosure (with no financial statement line item effects)  1%
Other Miscellaneous Techniques (acquisitions, joint ventures, netting of 
amounts, etc.) 20%
Disguised through use of related party transactions 18%
Insider trading also cited 24%
*  The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the category totals 
due to multiple types of fraud employed at a single company. Also, because the financial statement frauds at the 
sample companies often involved more than one fraud technique, the sum of the percentages reported exceeds 
100 percent.
(Copyright © 2010, The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission [COSO]. Reprinted with 
permission.)
The researchers elaborated on the methods cited in the AAERs to perpetrate the alleged 
frauds:
 •	 	the revenue misstatements were primarily due to recording revenues fictitiously or 
prematurely by employing a variety of techniques that include the following:
1 Beasley, Mark S. et al. Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1998-2007: An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 2010.
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	•	 	Sham sales. To conceal the fraud, company representatives often falsified inventory 
records, shipping records, and invoices. In some cases, the company recorded sales for 
goods merely shipped to another company location. In other cases, the company pre-
tended to ship goods to appear as if a sale occurred and then hid the related inventory, 
which was never shipped to customers, from company auditors.
	•	 	Conditional sales. These transactions were recorded as revenues even though the 
sales involved unresolved contingencies or the terms of the sale were amended sub-
sequently by side letter agreements, which often eliminated the customer’s obligation 
to keep the merchandise.
	•	 	Round-tripping or recording loans as sales. Some companies recorded sales 
by shipping goods to alleged customers and then providing funds to the customers 
to pay back to the company. In other cases, companies recorded loan proceeds as  
revenues.
	•	 	Bill and hold transactions. Several companies improperly recorded sales from bill 
and hold transactions that did not meet the criteria for revenue recognition.
	•	 	Premature revenues before all the terms of the sale were completed. Gener-
ally this involved recording sales after the goods were ordered but before they were 
shipped to the customer.
	•	 	Improper cutoff of sales. To increase revenues, the accounting records were held 
open beyond the balance sheet date to record sales after the goods were ordered but 
before they were shipped to the customer.
	•	 	Improper use of the percentage of completion method. Revenues were over-
stated by accelerating the estimated percentage of completion for projects in process.
	•	 	Unauthorized shipments. Revenues were overstated by shipping goods never or-
dered by the customer or by shipping defective products and recording revenues at 
full, rather than discounted, prices.
	•	 	Consignment sales. Revenues were recorded for consignment shipments or ship-
ments of goods for customers to consider on a trial basis.
Several of these issues were addressed by the SEC in SAB No. 101 and later in SAB No. 
104 (see chapter 13).
Asset overstatements fell into a number of categories, but the most common were inven-
tory and accounts receivable, as shown in table 7-2.
(Copyright © 2010, The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission [COSO]. Reprinted with permission.)
Table 7-2:  Asset Accounts Frequently Misstated 
Asset Accounts Typically Overstated Number of Sample Companies Involved
Inventory 51
Accounts receivable 43
Property, plant and equipment 24




09-Chap07.indd   103 7/6/10   2:23:47 PM
104
Financial Reporting Fraud
The finding that inventory and accounts receivable fraud accounted for nearly half of 
asset overstatements directs the CPA back to those steps that auditors rely upon to test ex-
istence and valuation: performing physical inventory; sending confirmations to third parties; 
and testing values using marketplace data, including data on customer solvency.
Duration
The 2010 research report found that the period of time over which financial reporting 
frauds are committed has lengthened compared to findings in the 1999 research report:
Fraud periods extended on average for 31.4 months, with the median fraud period 
extending 24 months. This was slightly longer than the average and median fraud pe-
riods of 23.7 months and 21 months, respectively, reported in COSO’s 1999 study. ... 
The longest problem period was 180 months (and it was 168 months for two other 
companies).
While looking at duration, though, the researchers found something even more interest-
ing in that the frauds generally started with quarterly reports and then continued to include 
annual reports. This finding tells CPAs to watch for the warning signs of fraud, well before 
the end of the fiscal year. For instance, a regional manager engaging in improper revenue rec-
ognition may brag at a firm-sponsored conference in the middle of a fiscal year that he or she 
was able to meet sales goals when most other regions had great difficulty. If not investigated 
early and stopped, his or her practices may spread to other regions in subsequent quarters as 
other managers see revenue manipulation as the only way to keep up, and they rationalize 
that because another region got away with it, they can, as well. 
Internal Control Report
After the 1987 Treadway report pointed to internal control failures that gave rise to the 
frauds, COSO published an analysis of the internal control framework in 1992. One ob-
jective of the internal control report was to reach a common definition of internal control. 
COSO concluded that internal control was
a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, 
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the 
following categories:
1. Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
2. Reliability of financial reporting.
3. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
COSO recommended implementation of five interrelated components of internal con-
trol to ensure reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws. Actually, 
the five components are closer to steps in a process of implementing internal controls, and 
the steps follow a specific order:
	 •	 	Control environment. This is the term COSO used to express the organization’s tone 
at the top that is charged with setting ethical standards to establish a control con-
sciousness among the people, management, and board of an organization.
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	 •	 	Risk assessment. The organization must identify, assess, and then manage risk. More 
importantly, it must implement a process that addresses risks associated with change.
	 •	 	Control activities. The organization must implement the policies and procedures that 
affect the risk management concepts identified in the previous step.
	 •	 	Information and communication. Having developed policies and procedures, the orga-
nization must communicate them internally and externally to customers, suppliers, 
and shareholders.
	 •	  Monitoring. An ongoing process assesses the quality of internal controls through inde-
pendent evaluation of internal and external auditors.
These concepts, or steps, provide the CPA with a simple but workable model for de-
termining the adequacy of internal controls. When fraud that went undetected for a period 
of time finally materializes, a failure in one or more of the internal control steps is usually 
present, as well.
For example, the Boeing Company adopted recommendations from the internal control 
report and came up with a list of criteria to be used to establish an unsatisfactory rating. 
Dennis Applegate and Ted Wills, in their 1999 article “Struggling to Incorporate the COSO 
Recommendations into Your Audit Process? Here’s One Audit Shop’s Winning Strategy,” 
described Boeing’s warning signs for each step:
	 •	  Control environment
	•	 –  “Hard controls” [specific procedures] are missing or inadequate.
	•	 –  There are verified instances of breakdowns of “soft controls” [general policies].
	 •	  Risk assessment
	•	 –  Management has not predefined relevant objectives.
	•	 –  Such objectives are incompatible with broader objectives.
	•	 –  Management has not identified relevant risks to achieving its objectives.
	•	 –  Management does not have a basis for determining which risks are most critical.
	•	 –  Management has not ensured mitigation of critical operating risks.
	•	 –  Audit tests detect key risks not previously contemplated by management.
	 •	 	Control	activities
	•	 –  Key control activities are not functioning as intended.
	•	 –  Management’s risk mitigation strategy is not adequately reflected within control 
activities.
	 •	 	Information	and	communication
	•	 –  Key metrics are not identified, collected, and communicated.
	•	 –  Employees do not understand their control responsibilities, and this is pervasive.
	•	 –  Customer or supplier complaints and disputes are not resolved, or remedial action 
is not undertaken in a timely manner.
	 •	 	Monitoring
	•	 –  Management has not established a means of determining the quality of the inter-
nal control system over time, either through independent evaluations or ongoing, 
structured, and independent process checks.




	•	 –  The ratings of all components should be considered to determine whether con-
trols provide reasonable assurance that management objectives will be achieved. A 
strength in the internal controls of one component may compensate for a control 
weakness in another.
The last sentence illustrates some of the compromises that are made when internal con-
trols are implemented. It was the authors’ contention that strength in one area could possibly 
compensate for weakness in another. Many companies, when implementing procedures such 
as these, have to operate knowing that certain controls may be inadequate. CPAs, who tend 
to see any control deficiency as a chance for fraud, should try to understand the cost-benefit 
analysis that allows companies to operate with less-than-perfect controls. That said, CPAs 
should not hesitate to bring all observed weaknesses to management’s attention because 
such weaknesses may provide the opening fraudsters need. Then, by quantifying the fraud 
potential, the CPA may be able to drive the cost-benefit analysis to a different conclusion 
that results in strengthening of internal controls.
Conclusion
COSO brought attention to the nature of financial reporting fraud through its studies, and 
its findings helped shape the development of a significant amount of accounting literature 
and securities regulations. For CPAs, COSO studies provide a roadmap to help look for 
fraud.
Internal control failures, which include lack of appropriate ethical standards set by senior 
management, were found to be the root cause of the frauds COSO investigated. The key 
check and balance that assures compliance with internal controls is the audit committee, and 
here, COSO identified the weaknesses in audit committees so the securities markets could 
modify their listing criteria to address those problems. The audit committee role is indeed 
critical, and chapter 8 examines its role in greater detail.
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Chapter 8 
The audit committee is at the epicenter of the fight against financial statement fraud. An-
swerable to the board of directors and comprising members of that board, the audit com-
mittee sits at the crossroads of information flow between other key players in the internal 
control process. For that reason, in September 1998, the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASDAQ Stock Market sponsored the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effec-
tiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the Blue Ribbon Committee) to explore opera-
tional and regulatory means to enhance the functions of audit committees. Many of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee’s recommendations were implemented, including the audit committee 
member requirements discussed in chapter 7.
CPAs should understand the role of the audit committee in preventing, detecting, and 
correcting financial statement fraud so that should fraud occur as a result of internal control 
failure, they are in a position to recommend appropriate corrective action.
Key Players in Internal Control
To appreciate how the audit committee functions, CPAs must understand the role of oth-
er participants in the internal control process. Each participant operates within prescribed 
10-Chap08.indd   107 7/6/10   2:24:27 PM
108
Financial Reporting Fraud
bounds, but those bounds either intersect or overlap to provide checks and balances. The fol-
lowing discussion is a simplified illustration of how the various parties interact and portrays 
the participants in roles they typically perform.
Financial Management
Members of financial management primarily responsible for the functions of internal con-
trols include the CFO, the corporate controller, and the corporate treasurer, among others. If 
there is an internal audit function within a company, the chief audit executive (CAE) is cer-
tainly another management member responsible for internal controls, but internal auditors’ 
duties and responsibilities are operationally different from the other listed positions in that 
internal auditors do not originate accounting transactions. For that reason, internal auditors 
comprise a distinct and separate function within the internal control framework.
The CFO, controller, treasurer, and other financial management personnel are primarily 
responsible for preparing financial statements and the related disclosures. Their role in the 
control framework is to implement the policies and procedures established by senior man-
agement (see chapter 7 for a discussion of the process used to develop those policies). They 
are the front line in the battle against financial statement fraud because they are the ones who 
propose, approve, and book financial accounting entries.
Many people perform these functions in order to maintain segregation of duties, a fun-
damental internal control concept. Firms implement segregation of duties to cause, as best as 
possible, a fraudster wishing to alter accounting data to collude with another person. Collu-
sion raises the risk of detection because it may force the fraudster to reveal his or her scheme 
to others who may not only reject the idea but turn the fraudster in, as well. If collusion 
works initially, such that accounting data are manipulated, the conspirators may break ranks 
with each other at a later point when others inquire into questionable transactions. Thus, 
collusion forces more than one person to participate in a scheme, and the more schemers 
involved, the greater the chance of detection.
Senior Management
Fraudsters can circumvent the internal control protections, such as segregation of duties, if 
policies and procedures are weak or if there is a corporate climate of lax enforcement of 
controls. Both policies and procedures and the control environment are the responsibility 
of senior management. Establishing adequate control policies and demonstrating a com-
mitment to those policies in the day-to-day decisions senior managers make are principal 
components of setting the proper tone at the top.
Failure to set a proper tone invites opportunities for senior managers and others to 
impose their will on subordinates to violate accounting rules, although they may rationalize 
the process by saying they are only bending the rules or taking advantage of accounting gray 
areas. When performance pressures arise, as they inevitably do, senior managers operating in 
an environment of poor controls may, in turn, exert pressure on subordinates to manipulate 
accounting data. With such weak controls, the subordinates either go along out of ignorance 
or believe they have no alternative.
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Internal Auditors
The internal auditors are the onsite verifiers of financial accounting data, but they cannot 
be everywhere at once or catch every irregularity. They provide long term and continuous 
monitoring of accounting and other corporate functions. If the internal auditors adequately 
identify key areas of risk, and if corporate management gives them adequate resources, they 
can test and evaluate those accounting functions most likely to experience problems. How-
ever, they must be selective because the internal audit budget is always limited (as are all cor-
porate resources), and in being selective, internal auditors have to be effective in identifying 
areas of potential fraud, or they may overlook problems entirely.
Audit Committee
If internal auditors or others within a corporation do discover an accounting irregularity, 
there must be a mechanism to report the issue to the appropriate people who will take cor-
rective action. If the suspected fraudsters are in senior management, that reporting mecha-
nism becomes critical because the fraud detectors cannot be made to report their findings 
to the fraud perpetrators. Here is where the audit committee comes in. It is a committee of 
the board of directors that acts under a grant of authority from that board to receive reports 
from internal auditors and other company personnel on suspected financial statement fraud. 
Upon receiving such a report, the audit committee is empowered to investigate the issue and 
present its finding to the entire board of directors.
Because the audit committee may receive information about misdeeds of senior man-
agement, in most cases, the securities markets have limited the membership of audit commit-
tees to outside directors who have few, if any, ties to senior management. Therefore, the audit 
committee, in theory and hopefully in practice, provides a safe refuge for fraud detectors if 
senior management is implicated.
The audit committee is also responsible for fulfilling the board’s obligation to oversee 
the establishment of adequate financial internal control policies and procedures. Effectively, 
the audit committee reviews and assesses the adequacy of controls that are the responsibil-
ity of senior management to develop. In a sense, the audit committee provides an objective 
second opinion on management’s policies.
Finally, the audit committee is charged with hiring the external auditors and communi-
cating with those auditors on important accounting judgments and internal control issues.
External Auditors
External auditors perform more functions than just the annual audit. As discussed in chapter 
1, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires auditors of public companies to attest to, and 
report on, management’s assessment of the company’s internal controls. The Blue Ribbon 
Committee recommended, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted, 
rules that require auditor review of interim quarterly financial statements before filing with 
the SEC, so an audit committee should have frequent discussions relating to accounting is-
sues and controls over the course of the year. In particular, according to paragraph .34 of 
AU section 380, The Auditor’s Communication With Those Charged With Governance (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1) 
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[t]he auditor should communicate with those charged with governance the following 
matters:
 a.  The auditor’s views about qualitative aspects of the entity’s significant account-
ing practices, including accounting policies, accounting estimates, and financial 
statement disclosures.
 b.  Significant difficulties, if any, encountered during the audit.
 c.  Uncorrected misstatements, other than those the auditor believes are trivial,  
if any.
 d.  Disagreements with management, if any.
 e.  Other findings or issues, if any, arising from the audit that are, in the auditor’s 
professional judgment, significant and relevant to those charged with gover-
nance regarding their oversight of the financial reporting process. [References 
omitted.]
The need to inform the audit committee or, more generally, those charged with gov-
ernance, as audit literature reads, about significant difficulties, uncorrected misstatements, 
and disagreements between the auditor and management when they occur is obvious. With 
regard to item (a) listed above, the additional guidance in paragraphs .37–.38 of AU section 
380 may be helpful:
Generally accepted accounting principles provide for the entity to make accounting 
estimates and judgments about accounting policies and financial statement disclosures. 
Open and constructive communication about qualitative aspects of the entity’s signif-
icant accounting practices may include comment on the acceptability of significant 
accounting practices....
The auditor should explain to those charged with governance why the auditor 
considers a significant accounting practice not to be appropriate and, when considered 
necessary, request changes. If requested changes are not made, the auditor should inform 
those charged with governance that the auditor will consider the effect of this on the 
financial statements of the current and future years, and on the auditor’s report.
Therefore, the auditors provide an objective opinion on accounting positions taken by 
management over the course of the year, including accounting estimates and policies and 
financial statement disclosures.
If external auditors detect fraud by senior management or any fraud that has a mate-
rial effect on the financial statements, they are required, under generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS), to report that fraud directly to the audit committee. Paragraph .17 of AU 
section 317, Illegal Acts (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1), states the following:
The auditor should assure himself that those charged with governance are adequately 
informed with respect to illegal acts that come to the auditor’s attention [footnote omit-
ted]. The auditor need not communicate matters that are clearly inconsequential and 
may reach agreement in advance with the audit committee on the nature of such mat-
ters to be communicated. The communication should describe the act, the circumstanc-
es of its occurrence, and the effect on the financial statements. Senior management may 
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wish to have its remedial actions communicated to the audit committee simultaneously. 
Possible remedial actions include disciplinary action against involved personnel, seeking 
restitution, adoption of preventive or corrective company policies, and modifications of 
specific control activities. If senior management is involved in an illegal act, the auditor 
should communicate directly with those charged with governance. The communication 
may be oral or written. If the communication is oral, the auditor should document it.
If the company is publicly traded (or otherwise required to make filings with the SEC), 
then upon notification of fraud by the auditors, the audit committee must act decisively and 
quickly to force changes by senior management. Section 10A(b)(2)–(4) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 provides explicit instructions:
If, after determining that the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer, or 
the board of directors of the issuer in the absence of an audit committee, is adequately 
informed with respect to illegal acts that have been detected or have otherwise come 
to the attention of the firm in the course of the audit of such accountant, the registered 
public accounting firm concludes that—
 (A)  the illegal act has a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer;
 (B)  the senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has not caused 
senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions with re-
spect to the illegal act; and
 (C)  the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected to warrant departure 
from a standard report of the auditor, when made, or warrant resignation from 
the audit engagement; the registered public accounting firm shall, as soon as 
practicable, directly report its conclusions to the board of directors.
An issuer whose board of directors receives a report under subparagraph (C) above 
shall inform the [Securities and Exchange] Commission by notice not later than 1 busi-
ness day after the receipt of such report and shall furnish the registered public account-
ing firm making such report with a copy of the notice furnished to the Commission. 
If the registered public accounting firm fails to receive a copy of the notice before the 
expiration of the required 1-business-day period, the registered public accounting firm 
shall—
 (A) resign from the engagement; or
 (B)  furnish to the Commission a copy of its report (or the documentation of any 
oral report given) not later than 1 business day following such failure to receive 
notice.
If a registered public accounting firm resigns from an engagement under subpara-
graph (A) above, the firm shall, not later than 1 business day following the failure by the 
issuer to notify the . . . furnish to the Commission a copy of the report of the firm (or 
the documentation of any oral report given).
Therefore, if the audit committee fails to act appropriately when fraud is reported, the 
external auditor, referred to as the registered public accounting firm because auditors of public 
companies must register with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, must no-
tify the audit committee that, in the auditor’s opinion, the committee and the board have 
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failed to act. At that point, within one day of receipt of the auditor’s notification, the audit 
committee must notify the SEC that it received such a notice, at which point it is likely that 
the SEC would begin an investigation of its own. If the audit committee fails to notify the 
SEC within the required time, the external auditor must inform the SEC the next day.
The provisions of Section 10A place significant responsibilities upon the audit com-
mittee to take corrective action in the event material fraud is detected by external auditors 
because failure to do so will result in rapid notification to the SEC.
Principal Blue Ribbon Committee 
Recommendations
It is worthwhile for CPAs to know at least some of the key recommendations of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee because, even if they have not been implemented by standard setters 
yet, several are on their way to being implemented as part of the post-Enron reforms, and all 
serve as guidelines for the effective functioning of audit committees.
Charter and Reporting Lines
The Blue Ribbon Committee recommended, and the stock markets adopted, the require-
ment that audit committees write and publish their charters. The committee explained its 
rationale, “Just as good boards often adopt formal guidelines on how they should operate, a 
good audit committee should memorialize its understanding of its role, responsibilities, and 
processes in a charter.” NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 5605(c) spells out the requirements of 
a charter (see box 8-1):
Box 8-1: NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 5605(c)
(1) Audit Committee Charter 
Each Company must certify that it has adopted a formal written audit committee charter 
and that the audit committee has reviewed and reassessed the adequacy of the formal writ-
ten charter on an annual basis. The charter must specify:
 (A)  the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities, and how it carries out those 
responsibilities, including structure, processes, and membership requirements;
 (B)  the audit committee’s responsibility for ensuring its receipt from the outside 
auditors of a formal written statement delineating all relationships between the 
auditor and the Company, … and the audit committee’s responsibility for actively 
engaging in a dialogue with the auditor with respect to any disclosed relation-
ships or services that may impact the objectivity and independence of the auditor 
and for taking, or recommending that the full board take, appropriate action to 
oversee the independence of the outside auditor; and
 (C)  the committee’s purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the Company and the audits of the financial statements of the 
Company.…
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Box 8-1: NASDAQ Marketplace Rule 5605(c)
IM-5605-3. Audit Committee Charter
Each Company is required to adopt a formal written charter that specifies the scope of 
its responsibilities and the means by which it carries out those responsibilities; the outside 
auditor’s accountability to the audit committee; and the audit committee’s responsibility 
to ensure the independence of the outside auditor. … Rule 10A -3(b)(3)(ii) under the Act 
requires that each audit committee must establish procedures for the confidential, anony-
mous submission by employees of the listed Company of concerns regarding questionable 
accounting or auditing matters. The rights and responsibilities as articulated in the audit 
committee charter empower the audit committee and enhance its effectiveness in carrying 
out its responsibilities.
Paragraph (C) in box 8-1 implements another Blue Ribbon Committee recommenda-
tion: that external auditors are ultimately accountable to the board and the audit committee 
of the board that nominates, hires, and fires the auditor. Thus, the reporting lines are clearly 
established from the audit committee (or board) directly to the external auditor, and notably, 
company management is not in that reporting line. That is not to say that auditors should ig-
nore or refuse to confer with company management; to the contrary, auditors should engage 
in active and frequent discussions with management about audit execution and findings. 
However, if external auditors defer to management when seeking explanations for potential 
irregularities without bringing those irregularities to the attention of the audit commit-
tee (or others charged with governance), that behavior infers that management has indeed 
moved into the reporting chain where it should not be: between the audit committee and 
the external auditors. Management was precisely kept out of that chain so that it could not 
filter the findings of the auditors before presenting information to the audit committee.
With reporting lines come lines of communication. The Blue Ribbon Committee 
summed up the objective of an effective flow of information:
[T]he lines of communication and reporting should facilitate independence from man-
agement and encourage the outside auditors and the internal auditors to speak freely, 
regularly and on a confidential basis with the audit committee.
Thus, both outside and internal auditors are brought into the same line of communica-
tion. To effect this line of communication for internal auditors, at least some part of their re-
porting requirements should be to the audit committee, as well. The end result should be that 
internal auditors cannot be unduly influenced by management evaluations and resistant to 
raising accounting and reporting issues with the audit committee. The CPA should observe 
that the CAE has frequent and, if necessary, private meetings with the audit committee. Also, 
those meetings should occur even if the CAE has nothing to report because it is important 
that audit committee members be allowed an opportunity to explore any issues or concerns 
they may have, and because any system of internal controls can be improved, such meetings 
would be time well spent. Lack of direct contact between internal auditors and the audit 
committee over the course of a fiscal year should be a warning flag that complacency has set 
in, and with complacency, comes the opportunity for fraud.
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Communications Between the Auditor and  
Audit Committee
The discussion to this point has focused on the quantity and direction of communications 
between auditors and the audit committee, but the Blue Ribbon Committee also addressed 
the quality of those communications, as well. As previously stated, AU section 380 requires 
auditors to provide their opinions to the audit committee regarding a company’s account-
ing estimates, accounting policies, and financial statement disclosures. AU section 316, Con-
sideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1), adds 
affirmative obligations for the auditor to inquire of management about whether there was 
knowledge of fraud or suspected fraud (paragraph .20) and for the auditor to make similar 
inquiries of the audit committee (paragraph .22).
The Blue Ribbon Committee went further:
The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) re-
quire that a company’s outside auditor discuss with the audit committee the auditor’s 
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting 
principles as applied in its financial reporting; the discussion should include such is-
sues as the clarity of the company’s financial disclosures and degree of aggressiveness 
or conservatism of the company’s accounting principles and underlying estimates and 
other significant decisions made by management in preparing the financial disclosure 
and reviewed by the outside auditors. This requirement should be written in a way to 
encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.
The SEC has proposed regulations that would implement this suggestion by requir-
ing company management to identify a limited number (perhaps three to five) of critical 
accounting policies (CAP). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires audit committees to 
review CAP, but the SEC proposals provide more explicit guidance. CAP would consist of 
either an accounting policy that management adopted when there were other choices or an 
accounting estimate that was subject to material changes if there were other equally valid es-
timates available. For each CAP, management would provide a range of alternative account-
ing policies or estimates that the audit committee would review (or state in the company’s 
annual filing with the SEC why the audit committee did not review CAP). To see how this 
proposal would work, see the indirect method example in chapter 4.
Therefore, if management provides the audit committee with management’s selection of 
CAPs, at the very least, this starts a dialogue between the audit committee and management 
on where the potential problems lie. The audit committee may believe that management’s 
list was not large enough or that it glossed over a serious issue, at which point the committee 
can send management back to do more analysis. The end result is that the audit committee 
is better informed about potential problem areas and, preferably, that management has been 
challenged on its selection and analysis of CAPs. Here, a CPA who is not the auditor may be 
able to perform a special service as a consultant to the audit committee to help the commit-
tee evaluate management’s CAP submissions.
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Audit Committee Overload
After having reviewed the issues related to audit committees, it is easy to see that tremendous 
responsibility rests upon committee members. Although much has been said about the audit 
committee members’ legal risks possibly being more than the risks faced by other board 
members, the CPA should focus on whether the audit committee is attempting to do too 
much without the proper resources. John Olson, who served on a panel looking into the 
function of audit committees for the National Association of Corporate Directors, compiled 
a list of audit committee duties in 19991 (see box 8-2):
Box 8-2: 1999 NACD Audit Committee Duties
Several recent examples of audit committee charters identify more than twenty separate 
“duties” frequently assigned to audit committees. These duties include private meetings 
with both the external and internal auditors and a review of:
(i) financial statements and accompanying notes; 
(ii) the 10-K Annual Report filed with the SEC; 
(iii) quarterly and other private reports filed with the SEC; 
(iv) financial press releases; 
(v) the external audit plan; 
(vi) the internal audit plan;
(vii) staffing and quality of internal audit; 
(viii) audit fees; 
(ix) non-audit (consulting and other) work and fees of the external auditors; 
(x) codes of conduct; 
(xi) the system of internal controls; 
(xii) compliance with codes of conduct and internal controls; 
(xiii) litigation exposure; 
(xiv) risk identification and risk management; 
(xv)  performance of the chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, and head of 
internal audit; 
(xvi) the annual “management letter” (from the outside auditors); 
(xvii) expense reports of senior management; 
(xviii) management “conflict of interest” transactions with the corporation; and 
(xix)  alleged fraudulent actions or violations of law reported by internal compliance 
programs or, under the terms of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA), by the outside auditor. 
Of course, the audit committee is generally charged with selecting, or at least recom-
mending, the external auditors, periodically reviewing their performance, approving their 
fees and, where the committee deems appropriate, recommending a change in auditors.
(Excerpted from “How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective,” by John F. Olson, 1999, Business Lawyer, 
54:3. © Copyright 1999 by the American Bar Association. Reprinted with permission. This information or any or por-
tion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or 
retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.)
1 Olson, John F., “How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective,” The Business Lawyer 15(3): 1097-1111 (May 1999).
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Given that the list was compiled in 1999 before the implementation of stock market 
listing changes brought about by the Blue Ribbon Committee and before proposed SEC 
regulations related to critical accounting policies, the list has expanded and will most likely 
continue to expand. If Olson’s list were contained in a single audit committee charter, the 
committee would clearly be spread too thin, and that is a dangerous condition that CPAs 
should try to identify.
With knowledge of the proper functions of internal controls and the role of the audit 
committee, the CPA should help the board of directors remove unnecessary duties from the 
audit committee charter. For instance, performance assessments of financial management 
should be assigned to a compensation committee, if that is a function that the board wishes 
to take on; otherwise, senior management can assess all firm personnel, with the possible 
exception of the CAE, who should have board-level input. Reviewing expense reports and 
potential conflict of interest situations can also be assigned to other board committees. For 
other functions, the audit committee may require additional resources (and perhaps its own 
budget). The audit committee, for example, should be able to hire consultants to assist in its 
review of financial reports, internal controls, and legal requirements if the demands of the 
workload so require or additional expertise is needed.
Conclusion
The audit committee occupies a pivotal position in the fight against financial reporting 
fraud. The structure proposed by the Blue Ribbon Committee requires both internal and 
external auditors to report to the audit committee. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (dis-
cussed in chapter 1) mandates that for public companies, the audit committee approve all 
audit services, and private firms would be well-served to follow this requirement, as well. 
GAAS requires external auditors to both confer with the audit committee and make inqui-
ries of that committee about actual or potential fraud.
However, one of the most important developments in the prevention of financial re-
porting fraud is the audit committee’s review of critical accounting policies (which is re-
quired for public companies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). If those policies, and 
the related accounting estimates, are brought to the attention of the audit committee, the 
committee will have a platform from which to make further inquiry and launch investiga-
tions, if necessary. The key issue is whether the audit committee sees all material policies and 
estimates. The chapters found in section 3 will examine some of the more difficult fraud 
issues and how the audit committee, working in concert with internal and external auditors, 
can identify those issues.
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Financial Statement Fraud
Chapter 9 
Can fraud be predicted from the characteristics of companies that are the subject of Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions? Can fraud be predicted using the 
financial data of fraudster companies? According to empirical studies, the answer is a quali-
fied “Yes.” There appear to be common characteristics among companies that subsequently 
engage in financial statement fraud. If a company has some or all of those characteristics, 
though, that does not necessarily mean the company will commit fraud. The quantitative 
predictors merely serve to provide warning signs to the CPA, in addition to the qualitative 
warning signs discussed in the preceding chapters.
Academic Research
In addition to the research conducted by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
(COSO), discussed in Chapter 7, other researchers examined financial statement fraud. One 
important study published in 1999, “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” was per-
formed by Messod D. Beneish of Indiana University, who asked whether one could predict 
financial fraud just by examining publicly available financial statements. Beneish’s study (the 
prediction study) looked for quantitative fraud warning signs by analyzing financial ratios 
and other data from companies that were known manipulators and those that were nonma-
nipulators. Like the COSO-sponsored studies, Beneish used SEC Accounting and Auditing 
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Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and published reports of restated financial statements to 
identify 74 companies as earnings manipulators from 1987 to 1993.
Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies
Similar to findings in COSO’s research, the prediction study found that most manipulators 
were located in the manufacturing and services industries. In total, Beneish identified 74 
manipulator companies and then matched those companies by 2-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification code to data from 2,332 other companies that presumably were nonmanipula-
tors. For each manipulator company, he obtained data for the fiscal year immediately before 
the year the manipulation occurred (similar to the methodology used in COSO’s research) 
and compared that company’s data with its nonmanipulator peers’ financial statements for 
the same period. As with COSO’s research, the prediction study reported that in each ma-
nipulator and nonmanipulator category, there were many small companies, with relatively 
few large companies, with small medians for assets and sales contrasted with the large mean 
values. Comparing the two categories of companies, manipulators were smaller in terms of 
assets and sales; they were also less profitable, slightly more leveraged, and growing much 
faster than nonmanipulating companies. 
When looking at the AAERs and press reports, earnings manipulation typically oc-
curred by (1) recording fictitious revenues or inventory or unearned or uncertain revenues 
or (2) capitalizing costs improperly.
Ratio and Index Analysis
Based on prior academic research, the prediction study hypothesized that earnings manipula-
tion was more likely to occur (1) when companies’ prospects were poor, (2) when cash flows 
did not match accrued income, and (3) when management had compensation incentives to 
manipulate earnings. This analysis led to eight different financial statement ratios that were 
tested on each manipulator company by first looking at the change in that company’s ratio 
from the year before manipulation to the manipulation year. Then, the same analysis was run 
on the nonmanipulators from the same industry and the same period. If a given ratio for the 
manipulators was statistically different from those for the nonmanipulators, it was likely that 
the ratio had some predictive value. In other words, if a ratio passed this test, a CPA looking 
at any two successive fiscal years of financial data for a company could use the ratio to see if 
there was a warning sign to indicate that the second year’s data may be manipulated.
Of the eight ratios, five passed the test as statistically significant. The following de-
scribes each statistically significant ratio. Beneish converted most of the ratios into indexes 
to provide more easily applied benchmarks. For the formulas presented, current year income 
statement and balance sheet items are indicated with a subscript t, and prior year items have 
a t-1 subscript. The change in account balances from one year-end to the next year-end is 
denoted by . The formulas were adapted from Beneish, Messod D., “The Detection of 
Earnings Manipulation,” Financial Analysts Journal (September/October, 1999): 27.
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Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index = (Accounts Receivablet / Salest) / 
(Accounts Receivablet-1 / Salest-1)
When a company attempts to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, receivables may 
provide a telltale sign because the fictitious customers have failed to pay. If receivables spike 
relative to sales levels, the possibility exists that some of the sales were fictitious. The days sales 
in receivables index (DSRI), designed to capture this effect, is the year-over-year comparison 
of the annual receivables/sales ratio, with the current year’s ratio in the numerator and the 
prior year’s ratio in the denominator. Thus, the index, like all the other indexes in this study, 
should be roughly equal to 1 if receivables as a percentage of sales do not change from year 
to year. However, if receivables are beginning to become large in relation to sales and the 
index increases significantly beyond 1:1, fraudulent sales practices may be coming into place. 
The predictive study actually found that the index for manipulators was close to 1.5:1. The 
year-over-year change in days sales in receivables was about 3 percent for nonmanipulators 
but over 46 percent for manipulators. Manipulators showed an increase of about 42 percent 
in days sales in receivables over the average change for the nonmanipulator peer group. Of 
course, one should look for other explanations, such as a more liberal credit policy, that could 
have resulted in increased receivables, but an exceptionally large increase in receivables rela-
tive to sales might suggest revenue manipulation.
Gross Margin Index
Gross Margin Index = [(Salest-1 – Cost of Salest-1) / Salest-1] / 
[(Salest – Cost of Salest) / Salest]
Companies facing poor earnings prospects have a greater incentive to manipulate earnings. 
Based on metrics used in analysts’ reports, Beneish selected gross margin as a proxy for future 
profitability. If gross margin shrinks from one year to the next, future prospects of profitabil-
ity are dimming, and management may be more inclined to resort to earnings manipulation, 
perhaps by booking fictitious revenues or through some other method. The gross margin in-
dex (GMI) is the year-over-year comparison of gross margins taken as a ratio, with the most 
recent year in the denominator. If the GMI is greater than 1, gross margins have weakened. 
Statistically, this index was one of the stronger predictors, so a GMI significantly greater than 
1 is a red flag that financial statement manipulation may be present. The predictive study 
found that the GMI for manipulators was about 1.2:1.
Asset Quality Index
Asset Quality Index =
  1 – [(Current Assetst + Net Fixed Assetst) / Total Assetst]___________________________________________________________
  1 – [(Current Assetst-1 + Net Fixed Assetst-1) / Total Assetst-1]
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Manipulators may try to hide expenses by capitalizing them as intangible assets (see chapter 
12 for a discussion of these techniques). In the first year this capitalization occurs, the quality 
of the assets on the balance sheet will decline. The predictive study defined poor asset qual-
ity as the amount of noncurrent assets, exclusive of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), 
relative to total assets in a given year. The noncurrent assets, outside of PP&E, were assumed 
to be most subject to manipulation and would include goodwill, deferred costs, and other 
intangibles. The asset quality index (AQI) ratio measures the proportion of the current year’s 
percentage of presumed poor quality noncurrent, non-PP&E assets to the prior year’s per-
centage. An AQI greater than 1 indicates that more costs may be capitalized in the current 
year, and thus, reported expenses may be too low. The end result is a warning flag for earnings 
manipulation. AQI for manipulators in the study was found to be 1.25:1.
Sales Growth Index
Sales Growth Index = Salest / Salest-1
Exceptionally strong sales growth from one year to the next may, by itself, indicate the pres-
ence of financial statement fraud in the form of revenue manipulation. The sales growth 
index (SGI) is the ratio of sales for the current year over sales from the previous year, and 
it turns out to be the strongest indicator of manipulation in the predictive study, with ma-
nipulators showing 60 percent 1-year growth compared with 10 percent growth for non-
manipulators. Any dramatic increase in the SGI on the order found in the study, which for 
manipulators ranged from a 34 percent to 58 percent increase over nonmanipulator peers, 
should alert the CPA to possible problems.
Total Accruals to Total Assets
Total Accruals to Total Assets =
 Working Capitalt –  Casht –  Current Taxes Payablet –  Current 
portion of LTDt –  Accumulated depreciation and amortizationt_______________________________________________________________________
                                                        Total Assetst
A firm running short of cash may also be motivated to engage in balance sheet manipulation 
to secure additional sources of capital. To identify cash trends, Beneish looked at changes in 
working capital and reasoned that a firm running low on cash would see the composition 
of its working capital shift away from cash to receivables and inventory. He then devised the 
total accruals to total assets (TATA) measure (which was not an index) to assess the amount 
of working capital (net of cash) relative to total assets. In other words, a firm with a lot of 
cash will have a lower TATA compared with a firm that has a little cash. To make TATA less 
subject to fluctuation from company to company, he deducted from working capital the 
change in current maturities in long term debt and income taxes payable. He then deducted 
the change in accumulated depreciation and amortization balances as a proxy for capital 
expenditures. A firm running short of cash will have a higher TATA measure. The study 
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found that TATA for nonmanipulators was 0.018; the measure for manipulators was 0.031, 
or about 72 percent higher. A TATA measure in excess of 0.03 would be an indicator of a 
potential fraud motive arising from cash shortages. In addition, the TATA measure, which 
reflects noncash working capital to total assets, probably picks up the increases in receivables 
that typically accompany revenue manipulation.
These characteristic measures provide a quick and easy means of detecting the possibil-
ity of financial statement fraud. They are indicators and do not by themselves prove fraud. 
However, CPAs may want to consider including these characteristic measures in their finan-
cial statement analyses. Also, as an element of internal control, an internal auditor or control-
ler could apply these measures when reviewing financial information, especially data from 
subsidiaries and divisions. An increase in the magnitude of any of the characteristic measures 
previously discussed should trigger additional inquiries. Such inquiries may very well head 
off an incipient fraudulent scheme.
Application of Predictive Measures
The following example demonstrates how the characteristic measures can indicate the po-
tential for fraud and how those measures interrelate with one another. The facts and data are 
simplified to allow the reader to follow the characteristic measure calculations:
Medical Products Specialties (MPS) is a wholesaler and distributor of pharmaceutical  
products. Its customers include major drug store chains and independent drug stores.  
It provides both prescription and over-the-counter products. Early in the previous fiscal 
year, MPS was acquired by Great Drug Co., a major pharmaceutical manufacturer, in a 
purchase transaction for a price that many considered to be high, relative to MPS’s histori-
cal earnings. 
As a result of the high price paid, MPS’s management was under pressure from Great 
Drug to at least maintain, if not grow, its earnings. A decline in earnings so soon after the 
acquisition, although not very significant to Great Drug overall, would make Great Drug’s 
senior management look bad.
The once-lucrative prescription drug market had changed markedly over the last 
few years as insurers changed their formularies to favor lower cost generic drugs. Thus, 
margins were dropping as more generics were prescribed. On the other hand, the ability 
of health care providers to substitute drug treatment regimens for more expensive proce-
dures, such as surgery, meant that prescription drug sales were increasing. In its monthly 
reports to Great Drug senior management, the MPS unit reported that these trends contin-
ued throughout the year, causing MPS sales to increase significantly while its gross margin 
declined. With that explanation, Great Drug senior management was content with MPS’s 
performance, as long as earnings did not decline.
MPS closed its books on the current year in preparation for the year-end audit. The cur-
rent year was MPS’s second fiscal year as a subsidiary of Great Drug. As part of the closing 
process, Great Drug’s internal audit department received the following preliminary MPS 








Income Statements Year 1 Year 2
Sales $1,000 $1,500
Cost of goods sold 600 1,200
Gross profit $  400 $  300
Selling, general, and 
administrative expenses 300 200
Net income before taxes $  100 $  100
Balance Sheets, as of the 
Last Day of Year 1 Year 2
Cash $  400) $  200)
Receivables 300) 700)
Inventory 300) 500)
Plant, property, and equipment 2,000) 2,100)
Less: Accumulated depreciation (1,200) (1,300)
Intangibles 500) 800)
Total assets $2,300) $3,000)
Current payables $  200) $  400)
Long term debt (all noncurrent) 600) 1,000)
Equity 1,500) 1,600)
Total liabilities and equity $2,300) $3,000)
Although MPS was not considered an important profit center by Great Drug manage-
ment and did not get much attention, the chief audit executive (CAE) became interested in 
the subsidiary when she observed sales increasing dramatically without any increase in 
pretax profit. She knew sales of generics were increasing, but she was not aware of any 
expansion of the sales staff or channels of distribution that would readily explain such a 
large increase in sales. The CAE then asked one of her staff members to prepare an analysis 
of predictive ratios to see if warning flags emerged.
The results of the staff analysis are as follows:
DSRI = (700 / 1,500) / (300 / 1,000) = 1.56
GMI = [(1,000 – 600) / 1,000] / [(1,500 – 1,200) / 1,500] = 2.00
 {1 – [(200 + 700 + 500 + 2,100 – 1,300) / 3,000]}
AQI =  ____________________________________________  1.23
 {1 – [(400 + 300 + 300 + 2,000 – 1,200) / 2,300]}
SGI = 1,500 / 1,000 = 1.5
 Working capital = (200 + 700 + 500 – 400) – (400 + 300 + 300 – 200) = 200
 Cash = (200 – 400) = –200
 Accumulated depreciation = 1,300 – 1,200 = 100
Current maturities of LTD and income taxes payable are assumed to be zero.
TATA = [200 – (–200) – 100] / 3,000 = 0.10
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Comparison to peer group benchmarks:
Characteristic MPS Peer group % over peers
DSRI 1.56 1.03  51%
GMI 2.00 1.10  82%
AQI 1.23 1.04  18%
SGI 1.50 1.20  25%
TATA 0.10 0.05 100%
Based on the analysis, the CAE drew the following conclusions:
•   MPS’s significant sales growth could not be justified by the switch to generics alone; 
it was well ahead of the peer group that would presumably experience the same ef-
fect in their reported sales. Peer group sales did increase by 20 percent, but MPS was 
well ahead of that benchmark, with 50 percent growth. The CAE had to acknowledge 
the SGI was a red flag.
•   In a similar analysis, the CAE concluded that the decline in gross margin at MPS 
was out of line with the rest of the industry. Yes, the peer group experienced some 
deterioration in margins but not to the extent of MPS, which had a GMI that was 82 
percent greater than its peers. The GMI suggested that MPS was not as profitable as 
in the past, and the CAE was suspicious about how it could maintain its pretax profit. 
•   The CAE noted that the DSRI was well over peer group levels, as well. Receivables 
growth accompanied by large sales growth were indicators of possible fictitious 
sales, so the CAE then looked at a recent receivables run for additional insight. The 
accounts receivable by customer file showed that a large number of new accounts 
were opened in the last few months of year 2 and had yet to be paid. Inflated sales 
could be one explanation for how profits were maintained.
•   Looking further, the CAE observed that the TATA measure was significantly high, 
confirming her preliminary belief that some sales may be fictitious because MPS was 
running low on cash. Using the increase in receivables as a reason, MPS requested 
and received from Great Drug an additional $400 million in interest-only loans over 
the course of year 2. The question that ran through the CAE’s mind was, where did 
the money go? She saw $200 million probably provided for increased inventory, but 
that left another $200 million unaccounted for.
•   The CAE got her answer when she looked at the AQI. The AQI is generally rather 
stable for wholesalers because intangibles and other noncurrent assets rarely fluctu-
ate significantly. Here, MPS’s change in noncurrent assets was 18 percent over the 
peer group change, and that index caused the CAE to examine the large change in 
intangibles—an increase of $300 million over year 2. Her investigation later revealed 
that $100 million of sales expenses had been capitalized because, according to the 
MPS controller, the expenses were incurred as part of a major marketing push for 
certain pharmaceutical products and should have a “long term impact” on future 
sales. Because this marketing effort was performed with existing personnel, the effect 
of the capitalization was to shift $100 million from selling, general, and administrative 
expenses to the balance sheet. The CAE then noted that the shift helped MPS make 
up for a $100 million decline in gross profit and thereby maintain its pretax profit.
•   However, there was more to the intangible assets analysis. Spending $200 million of 
cash from Great Drug’s loan, MPS had purchased a series of prospective customer 
lists through various sources, several the CAE had never seen before. When her 
staff investigated the list purchases, they found that the firms that sold the lists were 
owned by senior members of MPS’s management.
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The characteristic measures were not proof in themselves that MPS had committed fraud, 
but they did prove to be good indicators. Analysis of the indicators helped direct the CAE 
to certain areas of the financial statements that, in turn, led to further investigation, such as 
looking more closely at accounts receivable and intangibles. The characteristic measures 
also interrelate with each other: For example, the SGI and the DSRI, when giving the same 
signal, add weight to the possibility of revenuemanipulation.
 Example Analysis
Conclusion
COSO and academic research can provide useful guidelines for internal and external audi-
tors, as well as forensic accountants, in helping prioritize areas of investigation. Rarely does 
the CPA receive sufficient funding, whether as an internal or external auditor, to allow 
examination of every financial statement account. Indeed, generally accepted auditing stan-
dards require the auditor to assess at an early stage the possibility of financial statement fraud 
in order to perform the audit efficiently and effectively.
Furthermore, the analytical procedures described in this chapter can guide external 
auditors in the additional procedures required by AU section 316, Consideration of Fraud in 
a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1), when there are specifically 
identified risks of material misstatement due to fraud. Paragraph .52 of AU section 316 states 
that the nature, timing, and extent of procedures may need to be changed if there are specific 
risks. An increase in SGI that is out of line with peer companies may indicate that the nature 
of evidential matter collected may change to include more independent sources to verify the 
existence of customers. Similarly, an increase in DSRI may suggest a shift in the timing of 
receivables testing to the end of the period. An increase in TATA, for example, may point to 
an increase in the extent of testing performed on intangible assets. Analytical procedures have 
long been a part of the audit process, but with empirical evidence providing certain indica-
tors, auditors now have better tools that will allow them to fulfill their responsibilities.
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Loss Contingencies and  
Asset Impairments
Chapter 10 
Fraud related to loss contingencies and asset impairments tends to follow the same formula: 
ignore the issue and cover it up if necessary. Accounting literature requires recognition to 
warn financial statement readers that there may be problems ahead; fraudsters want to keep 
those problems out of sight. Disclosure of a problem poses difficulties for management in 
that
 1.  investors and analysts may begin to adjust downward their expectations of future cash 
flows due to the problem, thus reducing the firm’s share price.
 2.  lenders may become nervous if they detect a material adverse change in the firm’s 
financial position (or if there is an outright breach of a lending covenant that sets 
minimum asset or equity values) and call their loans.
 3.  management may lose its performance-linked incentive compensation (or perhaps 
even face employment terminations).
For these reasons, loss contingencies and asset impairments tend to be swept under the 
carpet, with management thinking that if they can be kept out of sight, they can be kept 
off the financial statements. As such, the CPA faces some especially difficult challenges in 
detecting these irregularities, but some useful warning signs exist that may appear and lead 
the CPA to an unrecorded liability.




A loss contingency is defined in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) glossary as “[a]n existing condition, situation, or set of circum-
stances involving uncertainty as to possible loss to an entity that will ultimately be resolved 
when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.”
FASB ASC 450-10-05-5 adds that the “[r]esolution of the uncertainty may confirm … 
the loss or impairment of an asset [or the] incurrence of a liability.” In a financial statement 
fraud context, the resolution of a material and probable uncertainty that was known to man-
agement beforehand should generally not be the first time readers of the financial statements 
learn of the uncertainty.
FASB ASC 450-20-05-3 lists examples of loss contingencies that include the 
following:
 a.  Collectibility of receivables
 b.  Obligations related to product warranties and product defects
 c.  Risk of loss from catastrophes assumed by property and casualty insurance entities 
including reinsurance entities
 d.  Guarantees of indebtedness of others
 e.  Obligations of commercial banks under standby letters of credit
 f.  Agreements to repurchase receivables (or to repurchase the related property) that have 
been sold.
FASB ASC 450-20-05-10 lists additional examples of contingencies:
 a.  Injury or damage caused by products sold
 b.  Risk of loss or damage of property by fire, explosion, or other hazards
 c.  Actual or possible claims and assessments
 d.  Threat of expropriation of assets
 e.  Pending or threatened litigation.
A firm is required to accrue a loss contingency when that contingency is both probable 
and able to be estimated. FASB ASC 450-20-25-2 states the following:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency shall be accrued by a charge to income if both 
of the following conditions are met:
 a.  Information available before the financial statements are issued or are available 
to be issued … indicates that it is probable that an asset had been impaired or 
a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial statements. Date of the 
financial statements means the end of the most recent accounting period for 
which financial statements are being presented. It is implicit in this condition 
that it must be probable that one or more future events will occur confirming 
the fact of the loss.
 b.  The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.
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According to the FASB ASC glossary, a future event is probable if it is likely to occur. 
The following discussion principally focuses on failure to accrue a probable loss contingency. 
However, violations of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (and securities 
laws if the company files with the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]) may occur 
if the firm has a reasonably possible loss contingency, according to FASB ASC 275-10-50-8, 
but fails to make the required disclosure of that contingency in its financial statements. The 
FASB ASC glossary states that a contingency is reasonably possible if “[t]he chance of the 
future event or events occurring is more than remote but less than likely.”
Having set the ground rules, it is worthwhile to examine some specific examples in 
the following sections to see how CPAs can detect fraud related to loss contingencies. The 
discussion will focus on warranty and product claims because the issues surrounding those 
claims are complex and occur with ever-greater frequency. Collectability of receivables, 
which is another major loss contingency that may give rise to fraudulent financial statements, 
is discussed in the example scenario in chapter 2.
Warranty and Product Claims Reserves
If a manufacturer experiences postproduction problems with a certain product, it may be-
gin to experience higher-than-expected returns or, more likely, claims for reimbursement 
or repair. Those claims may arise under a specific warranty, product tort law, or consumer 
protection laws and regulations. At that point, the manufacturer must assess its overall cost 
exposure. It might be possible to estimate the extent of future claims as a percentage of pro-
duction based on past experience with other products subject to similar problems. It might 
also be possible to estimate the cost of each claim, meaning the cost of replacement or repair 
for each defective unit or product. If both an estimate of future claims and the cost of each 
claim are available, the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. FASB ASC 450-20 would 
require the booking of a loss contingency if the future claims were likely to occur. However, 
if the manufacturer is already seeing large numbers of claims before or soon after the close 
of its financial reporting period, it would be reasonable to assume that the likelihood of 
future claims is high and that a loss contingency, or reserve, as the term is used in common 
practice, should be accrued with a charge to current earnings. Actually, FASB ASC 450-20-
25-2 requires the assessment of contingencies arising from “[i]nformation available before 
the financial statements are issued or are available to be issued.” Therefore, if claims relating 
to a prior period come to the attention of management during the preparation of financial 
statements for that prior period, management should consider booking a contingency as of 
the end of that period.
However, a manufacturer under pressure to achieve increased earnings may be very 
reluctant to accrue a warranty or product claims loss contingency. Management may take 
the position that the problem does not exist or cannot be quantified; however, an alert CPA 
may detect certain red flags that indicate a problem does indeed exist and that its extent can 
be estimated. The red flags that indicate the existence of a contingency can be found in box 
10-1.
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Box 10-1: Red Flags for Contingencies
  1.  The incidence of claims before the issuance of financial statements (previously 
discussed)
  2.  Discussions with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
  3.  Internal correspondence within production and research staffs about the need to 
address a critical problem with a product already on the market
  4.  Internal correspondence among department heads of production, research and 
development (R&D), general counsel, and senior management about postproduc-
tion problems and product claims
  5.  External correspondence between the manufacturer and its customers about a 
given product concerning special price concessions or special return privileges
  6.  The incidence of special or overbudget freight charges to accommodate returns 
or the shipment of replacement products, or both
  7.  Shifting of production schedules to manufacture replacement products
  8.  Halt to manufacturing of the product in question
  9.  Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects to applications engi-
neering relating to the redesign of existing products
 10.  Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to customers on a regular 
basis over a period of weeks or months that indicate some arrangement to com-
pensate for product defects
Many of the flags in this list come from areas outside the accounting department, such as 
production, R&D, legal, and sales. The key to detection of a warranty loss contingency, or any 
other contingency for that matter, is for the CPA to take a firm-wide perspective and probe 
into departments that typically do not have much contact with accountants.
Once the existence of a loss contingency or the likelihood that it will occur has been 
established, the next step is to determine whether the potential loss can be quantified. In 
this case, if the firm itself does not have actual experience with product claims or if that ex-
perience is not relevant to the product in question, the CPA should look outside the firm. 
Industry statistics on product liability and the incidence of claims may be available from trade 
associations, government regulators, or independent research organizations. However, in the 
course of examining internal correspondence between department heads and within depart-
ments, the CPA will likely find some internal estimates of the extent of the problem. This 
becomes especially obvious if the correspondents are attempting to justify the allocation of 
additional staff and financial resources to combat the problem or to explain why production 
was shifted or halted. In short, the members of management not directly involved in manipu-
lating the financial statements may speak quite frankly about the loss contingency.
Estimation Issues
Estimating a loss contingency is rarely easy and is subject to manipulation. The following 
example, taken from an SEC rule proposal,1 illustrates the complexities involved:
1 This example is taken from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907. To 
illustrate certain aspects of financial reporting fraud, additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subsequently, the SEC-
recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illustrate how those disclosures would have increased the likeli-
hood of fraud detection. The examples, as modified for purposes of this book, reflect the opinions of the author, not the SEC. The reader 
is encouraged to read the SEC releases in their entirety, which are included in appendix A at the end of this book.
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Alphabetical Company manufactures and distributes electrical equipment used in large-
scale commercial pumping and water treatment facilities. The company’s equipment carries 
standard product warranties extending over a period of 6–10 years. If equipment covered 
under the standard warranty requires repair, the company provides labor and replacement 
parts to the customer at no cost. Historically, the costs of fulfilling warranty obligations 
have principally related to providing replacement parts, with labor costs representing the 
remainder. Over the past 3 years, the cost of copper included in replacement parts consti-
tuted approximately 35 percent to 40 percent of the total cost of warranty obligations.
Alphabetical’s accounting policies accrue a liability for the expected cost of warranty-
related claims when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability accrued reflects 
the company’s estimate of the expected future costs of honoring its obligations under the 
warranty plan. Because of the long term nature of the company’s equipment warranties, 
estimating the expected cost of such warranties requires significant judgment. Alphabeti-
cal’s CFO oversees the estimation process performed by Alphabetical’s finance group every 
calendar quarter. Alphabetical is able to hedge its exposure to copper price movements in 
the commodities markets for a period of up to 5 years; beyond that point, Alphabetical is 
exposed to price risk for the remainder of the warranty period. Also, throughout the war-
ranty period, Alphabetical is exposed to the risk that it may need to acquire more copper in 
a given year than forecast, thus exceeding the quantity that may be hedged in that year and 
forcing Alphabetical to buy copper in the cash market for the going price. In each of the last 
3 years, warranty expense represented approximately 19 percent to 22 percent of cost of 
sales, and 35 percent to 40 percent of that warranty expense represented the cost of copper 
used in replacement parts.
The forecasting model used by the finance group to estimate the company’s exposure 
to copper price movements 6–10 years out used data from historical commodities prices 
looking back 10 years and data from the commodities futures market. Historically, the price 
of copper has been quite volatile. Eight years ago, the price increased by 72 percent in 1 
year; last year, the price declined by 19 percent. Changes of that magnitude had a material 
impact on Alphabetical’s warranty costs and cost of sales.
With a recent improvement in the economy, sales were increasing in the current year 
but so was the price of copper, as well. As Alphabetical prepared to enter the final quarter 
of its fiscal year, the CFO was concerned that the rising cash market price for copper had 
already begun to affect the futures market prices, which were an important component of 
the forecasting model. In the last month alone, the futures prices for copper had jumped by 
approximately 7 percent for all delivery dates. An increase in warranty costs as a percent-
age of sales would affect the gross margin, and the CFO knew that securities analysts 
watched that margin carefully as a sign of future profitability. The CFO had hoped the re-
cent increase in sales would provide enough support for key analysts to upgrade Alphabeti-
cal’s stock, which many analysts had at a lackluster “hold” rating. Alphabetical needed to 
retire some high interest rate debt, and the CFO wanted to float a seasoned equity offering 
of stock to pay down the debt. The CFO believed that an increase in analysts’ ratings would 
increase the price of shares already outstanding, as well as the price of the new shares to 
be sold through the offering. However, a rise in warranty costs relative to sales would likely 
kill any chance of an upgrade from analysts, making any stock offering more expensive 








In addition, the CFO, as well as other members of senior management, wished to exer-
cise and sell some of their vested company stock options that had languished for over three 
years because Alphabetical’s stock price had not moved much from the time the options 
were issued (the options’ exercise price was set at the market price at the time of issue). 
Finally, with the increase in Alphabetical’s sales, senior management believed they would 
soon have their chance to cash in the options at a profit if the stock price would increase. 
The CEO had spoken with the CFO on several occasions about “finally getting the stock 
price we deserve,” so that by exercising the options, “we can finally get the compensation 
we deserve.” The CEO emphasized to the CFO that “we’re all counting on you” to convince 
the analysts to upgrade their ratings.
The copper price forecast had a dramatic impact on warranty costs because even a 
small increase in price affected all warranty work performed 6–10 years out. The rapid rise 
in futures prices recently signaled that by the end of the fourth quarter, just as analysts 
would be reassessing their ratings on Alphabetical’s stock, the copper pricing model would 
show a significant increase. The CFO believed he needed to modify the model to “compen-
sate” for the increase likely to come from rising futures prices. He instructed the finance 
group to run another version of the model using historical data for only 5 years instead of 
the 10-year look-back currently used in the model. By truncating historical data at 5 years, 
the CFO knew the model would not pick up the 72 percent price increase of 8 years ago. 
When the finance group reported the results of the modified model, the truncated historical 
data produced enough of a downward estimate to counter the upward estimate from the fu-
tures market data. The end result was no change in the copper price estimate for 6-10 years 
out and, therefore, no need to increase the warranty cost as a percentage of sales.
By the end of the fourth quarter, the modified model performed to the CFO’s expecta-
tions, and warranty costs came in at a tolerable 40 percent of cost of sales for the year. The 
auditors, who never spent much time analyzing the model and viewed it as a “black box” 
that was hopelessly difficult to understand, did not note any exception to the change in 
historical data used. When the CFO saw that he “got this past the auditors,” he decided he 
would not even “bother” with making any disclosure in the footnotes to the financial state-
ments. Soon after Alphabetical announced its fiscal year results, the CFO received phone 
calls from two analysts saying that they were upgrading their ratings, and the stock price 
moved accordingly.
The auditors did not call on the CFO to defend this change in his modeling methodology, 
but if they had, the CFO would have probably claimed he simply made a change in ac-
counting estimate that does not need to be disclosed. Indeed, U.S. GAAP would give him 
some support. Paragraphs 4–5 of FASB ASC 250-10-50 state:
The effect on income from continuing operations, net income (or other appro-
priate captions of changes in the applicable net assets or performance indica-
tor), and any related per-share amounts of the current period shall be disclosed 
for a change in estimate that affects several future periods, such as a change in
 Example Analysis
13-Chap10.indd   132 7/6/10   2:25:59 PM
Chapter 10: Loss Contingencies and Asset Impairments
133
service lives of depreciable assets. Disclosure of those effects is not necessary 
for estimates made each period in the ordinary course of accounting for items 
such as uncollectible accounts or inventory obsolescence; however, disclosure 
is required if the effect of a change in the estimate is material.… If a change in 
estimate does not have a material effect in the period of change but is rea-
sonably certain to have a material effect in later periods, a description of that 
change in estimate shall be disclosed whenever the financial statements of the 
period of change are presented. 
The disclosure provisions of this Subtopic for a change in accounting 
estimate are not required for revisions resulting from a change in a valuation 
technique or its application.
The change in methodology for warranty costs could fall under this provision, espe-
cially if the CFO successfully asserts that the change in estimate was due to a change in 
valuation technique.
One could argue that the warranty cost estimates affect several future periods and, 
thus, need to be disclosed. The debit-to-warranty cost each period credits or adds to a loss 
contingency reserve on the balance sheet. That reserve is then debited as actual warranty 
work is performed in future periods. However, an allowance for uncollectible accounts 
works essentially the same way and yet is considered by FASB ASC 250-10-50-4 to be made 
“each period in the ordinary course of accounting,” which does not require disclosure, 
though disclosure is required if the item is material.
However, the CFO may violate U.S. GAAP when he files Alphabetical’s financial state-
ments with the SEC. The filing requirements for year-end statements filed with the SEC on 
Form 10-K set a minimum of three years of comparative income statements and two years 
of balance sheets ending with the filing year. Accompanying the current year income state-
ment will be income statements for at least the previous two years. Then, when compara-
tive financial statements are presented to be comparable, according to FASB ASC 205-10-
45-3, any exceptions to comparability must be clearly disclosed. Therefore, the change 
in accounting estimate for calculating warranty costs would need to be disclosed if it is 
deemed material.
However, from the perspective of securities fraud, the provisions of Rule 10b-5 apply. 
In this tightly constructed scenario, the analysts’ opinions would have likely changed if 
they saw warranty costs increasing relative to sales because analysts tracked Alphabeti-
cal’s gross margin closely. Warranty costs, in turn, were very sensitive to changes in the 
estimate of future copper prices. Therefore, a change in the method of calculating those 
future prices very likely would be information that analysts would need to know to be sure 
that the gross margin from the current year was comparable to prior years’ margins. Recall 
from chapter 1 that Rule 10b-5 states:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, …
b.  to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading.
Thus, the omitted disclosure of the change in estimation methodology may rise to the 
level of a Rule 10b-5 violation under the facts presented in this example because the omis-
sion led analysts to think gross margins were comparable and consistently presented
(continued)




with prior years’ margins. Also, in light of the pending seasoned equity offering of stock, 
the strict liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 may apply, and the stakes are 
raised. If there is securities fraud, the purchasers of new stock may be able to recover the 
amount of any market price correction without having to prove management intended to 
deceive. In addition, existing shareholders could sue under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 provisions, and with management selling stock acquired through option exercises, 
there could be adequate motive to plead a case. However, in real-life situations, the facts 
are rarely so clear.
Of course, the auditors should test the adequacy of the warranty loss contingency and 
review management’s methodology in the process of examining the warranty accounts. 
Indeed, U.S. generally accepted auditing standards guidance relating to consideration of 
fraud in audit planning (see chapter 1) tells auditors to focus on revenues and expenses 
based on significant estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertain-
ties. Clearly, the copper estimates contained in the warranty cost would qualify.
The SEC has proposed rule changes that would address issues with critical accounting 
estimates, such as the preceding (see chapter 8). The proposals would require manage-
ment to identify key estimates and present an explanation of the range of possibilities, 
along with a discussion of the possible impact on financial statements and company opera-
tions. The critical accounting estimates would then be disclosed in the “Management Dis-
cussion and Analysis” (MD&A) section of SEC filings. For Alphabetical, the SEC-proposed 
disclosure reads as follows:
Alphabetical’s products are covered by standard product warranty plans that 
extend 6 to 10 years. A liability for the expected cost of warranty-related claims 
is established when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability 
accrued reflects our estimate of the expected future costs of honoring our ob-
ligations under the warranty plan. We believe the accounting estimate related 
to warranty costs is a “critical accounting estimate” because: changes in it 
can materially affect net income, it requires us to forecast copper prices in the 
distant future which are highly uncertain and require a large degree of judg-
ment, and copper is a significant raw material in the replacement parts used in 
warranty repairs.…
Historically, the costs of fulfilling our warranty obligations have principally 
related to replacement parts, with labor costs representing the remainder. Over 
the past 3 years, the cost of copper included in our parts constituted approxi-
mately 35% to 40% of the total cost of warranty repairs. Over that same period, 
warranty expense represented approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Over the past 10 years, the price of copper has exhibited significant volatil-
ity. For example, [eight years ago], the price of copper rose by approximately 
72%, while [last year] the price decreased by approximately 19%. Our hedging 
programs provide adequate protection against short-term volatility in copper 
prices, … but our hedging does not extend beyond 5 years. Accordingly, our 
management must make assumptions about the cost of that raw material in 
periods 6 to 10 years in the future. Management forecasts the price of copper 
for the portion of our estimated copper requirements not covered by hedging....
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Each quarter, we reevaluate our estimate of warranty obligations, including 
our assumptions about the cost of copper.… 
If, for the unhedged portion of our estimated copper requirements, we 
were to decrease our estimate of copper prices as of [the end of the current 
year] by 30%, our accrued warranty costs and cost of sales would have been 
reduced by approximately $27 million or 6% and 4%, respectively, while operat-
ing income would have increased by 9%. If we were to increase our estimate as 
of [the end of the current year] by 50%, our accrued warranty costs and cost of 
sales would have been increased by approximately $45 million or 10% and 7%, 
respectively, while our operating income would have been reduced by 23%.
A very significant increase in our estimated warranty obligation, such as 
one reflecting the increase in copper prices that occurred [eight years ago], 
could lower our earnings and increase our leverage ratio (leverage refers to the 
degree to which a company utilizes borrowed funds). That, in turn, could limit 
our ability to borrow money through our revolving credit facilities.…
Our management has discussed the development and selection of this 
critical accounting estimate with the audit committee of our board of directors 
and the audit committee has reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it in 
this MD&A.
This disclosure clearly sets out the impact on earnings when a volatile component, 
such as copper prices, changes. Readers of financial statements can then better assess the 
risks involved and value the firm or its stock accordingly.
The process of drafting this disclosure would involve the audit committee, as well as 
outside auditors, in the review of the methodology used to forecast copper prices. With 
the audit committee tasked to review these critical accounting estimates, it would be more 
likely that (1) the change in methodology would be uncovered and (2) the rationale for the 
change would be questioned. Although this disclosure would not be mandatory for private 
companies, providing similar disclosure, if only to the audit committee, would be a valu-
able addition to standard financial statement disclosures.
Asset Impairments
Physical Assets
An asset is not always worth its balance sheet carrying value. Even if an appropriate deprecia-
tion schedule is established when the asset is acquired, over time, the needs of the business 
enterprise may change. Because of rapid changes in engineering and materials applications, 
for example, manufacturing processes may need to be updated to remain economically com-
petitive. The machinery used in the old processes may become obsolete well before the 
machines themselves actually wear out and are depreciated down to salvage value. Similarly, 
changes in customer demand may force a manufacturer to discontinue a certain product line 
and render useless equipment specially designed to build that product. Firms operating in 
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highly competitive markets may lose business to a low cost competitor and be forced to idle 
production lines. Occasionally, to obtain or retain a customer relationship, a firm may even 
deliberately quote a price for its products that does not cover the cost of acquiring and oper-
ating the equipment used to produce those products. In all these cases, management should 
assess whether the equipment carrying value is impaired, especially if there are no reasonable 
prospects of finding an alternative use for the equipment. In the event an impairment loss 
should be taken, management may fraudulently postpone that charge if it causes earnings to 
fall below a managed earnings target.
To detect this fraud, the CPA must be particularly adept at seeing through management’s 
pretensions to get to the facts. The best place to begin is to review fixed assets with divisional 
or production personnel. FASB ASC 360-10-35-21 provides the following list of possible 
events that may give rise to an impairment of a single asset or a group of assets:
 a.  A significant decrease in the market price of a long-lived asset (asset group)
 b.  A significant adverse change in the extent or manner in which a long-lived asset (asset 
group) is being used or in its physical condition
 c.  A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business climate that could affect 
the value of a long-lived asset (asset group), including an adverse action or assessment 
by a regulator
 d.  An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected for 
the acquisition or construction of a long-lived asset (asset group)
 e.  A current-period operating or cash flow loss combined with a history of operating or 
cash flow losses or a projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associ-
ated with the use of a long-lived asset (asset group)
 f.  A current expectation that, more likely than not, a long-lived asset (asset group) will 
be sold or otherwise disposed of significantly before the end of its previously esti-
mated useful life.
The CPA may wish to draw questions for firm personnel from this list and look for 
evidence of changes in production and product demand to determine whether an asset is 
impaired.
Clearly, if equipment has been moved off the shop floor into storage and there are no 
plans for future use of that equipment, an impairment loss is highly likely. The more difficult 
issues arise if equipment is still in use but profitability is less certain. Profitability is at issue 
because assets may be impaired if they are not recoverable. FASB ASC 360-10-35-17 states, 
the “carrying amount of a long-lived asset (asset group) is not recoverable if it exceeds the 
sum of the undiscounted cash flows expected to result from the use and eventual disposition 
of the asset (asset group).” Therefore, the CPA must ascertain the projected net cash flows 
for a given asset or an asset group if it is not possible to forecast cash flows for a single asset. 
Under FASB ASC 360-10-35, the cash flow projections generally must extend to the end 
of an asset’s estimated useful life (which is presumably the remaining depreciable life of the 
asset). If the asset is not recoverable, the firm may need to recognize an impairment charge if 
the fair value of that asset is less than the carrying value. Fair value is frequently determined 
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by using the forecast cash flows and discounting those cash flows by an appropriate discount 
rate, so if an asset fails the recoverability test using undiscounted cash flows, it has to trigger 
an impairment charge if discounted cash flows are used to calculate fair value. For that rea-
son, fraudsters desiring to maintain the inflated value of assets on the balance sheet will strive 
to manipulate the cash flow forecast used in the recoverability test. If the fraudster can decep-
tively pass the recoverability test, the asset will not be subjected to the impairment test.
Getting a handle on cash flow forecasts is the key to halting asset impairment fraud. 
Most management information systems measure profitability by product line or customer; in 
today’s competitive environment, it is rare to find a business operating without this informa-
tion. Indeed, the activity-based costing initiatives begun in the 1980s were a direct result of 
the need for management to understand a product’s contribution to overall firm profitability. 
CPAs may not be accustomed to reviewing product line profitability reports because they 
typically work from trial balances or traditional income statements, but product line reports 
source revenues to the costs to produce them and can answer directly whether a given pro-
duction process has been historically profitable. Internal budgets and management reports 
are other good resources to use.
If the CPA can obtain forecasts directly from the personnel with line responsibility for 
production, those personnel might be inclined to render a more accurate estimate because 
they may be unaware of management’s earnings target. One should keep in mind that line 
managers may have an incentive to show as positive a picture as possible to avoid a shutdown 
of production. Also, line managers may receive hints or outright requests from management 
to produce an overly favorable forecast. However, in either case, if the forecasts are accom-
panied by written narratives, the narratives generally list all the downside possibilities to 
provide political cover for the line manager should events not turn out as planned. If there 
are no narratives, the CPA can probably obtain a list of potential downside possibilities sim-
ply by asking the line managers. Then, the CPA may be able to assess the reasonableness of 
the forecast, given the known conditions at the time and the likelihood of those downside 
possibilities.
In addition, sales personnel may prove to be a good source of information for forecast 
revenues. However, the CPA should always question how thoroughly the sales person con-
structed the forecast and the probabilities for closing sales.
Proving fraud in a forecast is difficult because a forecast is by its very nature a best guess 
(see AT section 301, Financial Forecasts and Projections [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1]). 
However, if that forecast was based on facts known to be incorrect, such as a major cus-
tomer’s known unwillingness to buy the product, the forecast was fraudulently constructed. 
A forecast may also become fraudulent if it is used at a later time to justify a management 
decision because management knows that significant facts have changed. For example, a 
forecast may accurately reflect that at the time of preparation, there was a possibility that a 
certain major customer wanted to buy the product. However, if by the balance sheet date, 
management knows the customer is not interested and there are no alternative buyers, it 
would be fraudulent to assert that the forecast is still accurate and then use it to justify not 
writing down the value of assets used to produce that product.




Another area of asset valuation that can fall victim to fraud relates to investments in the non-
publicly traded securities of companies. Such securities are difficult to value because transac-
tion prices are not publicly available. Moreover, the valuation of private company holdings 
is of growing importance as investment funds flowing to private equity and venture capital 
funds increase. Investments in private companies may take the form of common or preferred 
stock or debt with an equity feature (such as convertible debt); for purposes of this discus-
sion, all such investments will be referred to as private company securities.
General guidance for the CPA on valuation of private company securities is available 
in FASB ASC 820, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures; 825, Financial Instruments; and 320, 
Investments—Debt and Equity Securities, among others. In a fraud context, the issues relating 
to private company valuation tend to center around misleading forecasts of financial perfor-
mance because those forecasts drive valuation models. Principally, valuation of nonpublicly 
traded securities relies on two types of valuation models: discounted cash flow and peer 
company multiples. Chapter 5 discussed special valuation issues concerning the manipula-
tion of discounted cash flow models used to value closely held companies. The same ma-
nipulative techniques can be employed to fraudulently maintain or increase the value of a 
private company’s securities held by venture capitalists (VCs) and private equity providers. 
Models based upon peer company multiples essentially look to publicly traded firms 
that are comparable to the company being valued and develop metrics that tie projected per-
formance to value. For example, a valuation specialist may calculate the ratio of a comparable 
publicly traded firm’s forecast operating income to its total market capitalization. Income 
projections for public companies are generally available from research analysts. Hopefully, 
several comparable publicly traded companies exist so that several ratios can be calculated 
and averaged to obtain a peer company multiple. Then, using that multiple, the valuation 
specialist would calculate a market approach value of the private firm by multiplying the 
private firm’s forecast operating income by the peer company multiple. Unfortunately, tech-
niques used by fraudsters, discussed in chapter 5, to manipulate historical data used as inputs 
to forecast future income will affect valuations from peer company multiples by inflating 
the private company’s forecast income, and with inflated forecast income, the peer company 
multiple approach will yield an inflated valuation.
A CPA suspecting fraud in the valuation of private company securities should 
initially focus on the forecast income. To assess whether income in future periods will 
potentially decline, a useful starting point is the list of impairment indicators in FASB ASC 
320-10-35-27:
 a.  A significant deterioration in the earnings performance, credit rating, asset quality, or 
business prospects of the investee
 b.  A significant adverse change in the regulatory, economic, or technological environ-
ment of the investee
 c.  A significant adverse change in the general market condition of either the geographic 
area or the industry in which the investee operates
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 d.  A bona fide offer to purchase (whether solicited or unsolicited), an offer by the in-
vestee to sell, or a completed auction process for the same or similar security for an 
amount less than the cost of the investment
 e.  Factors that raise significant concerns about the investee’s ability to continue as a go-
ing concern, such as negative cash flows from operations, working capital deficiencies, 
or noncompliance with statutory capital requirements or debt covenants.
A fraudster will attempt to hide any of these indicators, so a CPA must have access to 
information directly from the investee private company or other third party sources, such as 
financial news media or trade sources.
If a CPA suspects an unrecognized decline in private company securities, determining 
the amount of the decline can be difficult. Without valid quoted market price inputs to 
determine the value of private company securities, the CPA might have to look at financial 
information from the investee company. The investor, if it holds a significant position in 
the investee, should have financial information on file (if not, this should be a red flag that 
something may be amiss). Those data would likely include results of operations that would 
provide historical profitability. For future profit estimates, one should look to company fore-
casts to evaluate any valuation analysis prepared by investor or investee management that 
are used to justify security values. Forecasts of future financial performance and company 
valuations are typically found in board minutes of either the investor or investee. VCs and 
private equity firms frequently have representation on the board of directors of investee 
companies; therefore, minutes of investee firms should be available to the CPA assessing 
private company securities values on the investor’s books (again, if there are no minutes, this 
is another red flag). However, the CPA should assess the validity of those forecasts based on 
known relationships, if any, between the management of the investor and investee. If there 
exists common management of both investor and investee companies, further inquiry may 
be necessary to determine the validity of any forecast.
Finally, use of one type of valuation model may serve as a useful check on another type 
of valuation model. For example, if management relies upon a discounted cash flow model, 
a peer company multiples model may serve as a validation of any value obtained using dis-
counted cash flow. From comparable public companies, the CPA may be able to establish an 
average peer company multiple of either sales or operating income to the respective market 
capitalization of each public company. With that average ratio, the CPA can then evaluate 
investor management’s calculated value of the investee private company, assuming the CPA 
is comfortable with management’s forecast income. If management’s discounted cash flow 
model used a calculated discount rate that is excessively low, thus creating an inflated valua-
tion due to the small discount of future cash flows, use of peer company multiples may detect 
the inflated value. Further inquiry by the CPA may lead to discovery of industry-wide nega-
tive issues or trends that management had failed to incorporate into the forecasts. Whether 
this failure was intentional is a matter for further investigation by the CPA.




Detection of fraud in loss contingencies, asset impairments, and private company securities 
is difficult because it is a search for a valuation that was not booked. Successful detection 
requires drilling down within and outside an organization to obtain information from
 a.  lower level accounting personnel who may have specific knowledge of facts pointing 
to the fraud without a desire (or knowledge) sufficient to cover up the fraud.
 b.  personnel in other departments, such as sales and legal, who may know relevant facts 
but may not be aware of any attempt to hide those facts.
 c.  suppliers, customers, industry publications, news articles, and other data from outside 
the firm.
From various sources, the CPA may be able to piece together that picture of a contin-
gent loss that was not recognized, an impaired asset that is carried at original cost, or a stock 
that is overvalued.
Estimates play a significant role in loss contingencies, asset impairments, and securities 
valuation and are subject to manipulation. Detecting that manipulation requires an internal 
control process that challenges the estimation assumptions, beginning with the examples 
of loss contingencies and impairment lists previously cited and continuing into all the key 
building blocks of the valuation models employed.
An audit committee that is aware of the sensitive areas most subject to valuation issues 
will, at the very least, be in a position to make inquiries that may lead to detection of frauds. 
The key to the audit committee’s success is the flow of information from management and 
internal and external auditors that point to these issues.
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Contingencies
Chapter 11 
If one company acquires another using the purchase method of accounting for the transac-
tion, as required under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 805, Business Combinations, the purchase price paid is allocated to the 
identifiable tangible and intangible assets of the acquired company based on the fair value of 
those assets. Any excess of purchase price over the fair value of acquired identifiable assets, 
net of liabilities assumed, is booked as goodwill.1
The purchase price can be paid with cash, stock of the buying company, or other as-
sets conveyed to the seller. Liabilities can also be transferred from the seller to the buyer or 
accrued in the transaction. Those liabilities assumed by the purchaser effectively decrease 
acquired net assets. The greater the liabilities assumed, the lower the amount of assets, net of 
liabilities (net assets), and because goodwill is generated when the purchase price exceeds net 
assets, increasing liabilities will likely increase goodwill.
One type of liability that managers of an acquiring company may need to book are 
acquisition-related loss contingencies, as provided under FASB ASC 805-20-25-18A, usually 
for potential problems inherited when the target company is acquired. These loss contin-
gencies (sometimes referred to as acquisition reserves) typically increase goodwill paid for the 
1 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805-30-30-1.
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acquired company. The entry establishing the loss contingency is a credit to a liability and a 
debit to goodwill. Under FASB ASC 350-20, goodwill remains on the books at its unam-
ortized carrying value unless it is impaired. However, the loss contingency on the balance 
sheet, with its credit balance, serves to absorb debits from certain expenses related to the loss 
contingency in future years (that is, as long as goodwill remains unimpaired, the loss contin-
gency expenses never get to the income statement). This makes the acquisition-related loss 
contingency a particularly useful tool for fraudsters who want to hide expenses.
FASB ASC 805-20-25-18A states that an acquisition-related contingency must meet 
the condition of being “[a]ssets acquired and liabilities assumed that would be within the 
scope of Topic 450 if not acquired or assumed in a business combination.” Such a contin-
gency arises at the time of the acquisition. Presumably, a loss contingency that existed prior 
to an acquisition should have already been recorded under FASB ASC 450, Contingencies; 
therefore, acquisition-related loss contingencies under FASB ASC 805-20-25-18A gener-
ally arise due to the acquisition itself. For example, a horizontal acquisition of a competitor 
may result in confusion or dissatisfaction among the customer base of either the acquirer 
or acquiree, so a loss contingency for cancelled sales contracts or product discounts may be 
appropriate. The example scenario in chapter 2 illustrated these contingencies. FASB ASC 
450-20-25-2 requires that a loss contingency be both probable and capable of being esti-
mated to be recognized. Acquisition-related loss contingencies have an additional feature in 
that there is a measurement period that extends the time to determine if the contingency 
will be probable and can be estimated.
Measurement Period
The measurement period begins with the acquisition and, according to FASB ASC 805-10-
25-14, ends “as soon as the acquirer receives the information it was seeking about facts and 
circumstances that existed as of the acquisition date or learns that more information is not 
obtainable. However, the measurement period shall not exceed one year from the acquisi-
tion date.”
Therefore, U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require that all ac-
quisition-related loss contingencies be identified during the measurement period. After the 
measurement period ends, any loss contingencies are run through the income statement.
The rationale for the measurement period is to allow time to adequately value the 
components of a transaction. However, fraudsters will use the measurement period to reclas-
sify postacquisition losses and expenses as acquisition-related loss contingencies. During the 
measurement period, the fraudster can peruse postacquisition expenses and recharacterize 
those of his or her choosing as acquisition-related loss contingencies by fabricating a story 
that links the expenses to fictitious contingencies at the time of the acquisition. The follow-
ing example scenario illustrates how the CFO of an insurance carrier improperly rechar-
acterized postacquisition claims losses as acquisition-related loss contingencies by taking 
advantage of the measurement period.
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An acquisition-related loss contingency can also become a “cookie jar reserve,” as for-
mer Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt used the term 
(see chapter 3). Because the contingency is created by debiting goodwill, no income state-
ment charge is taken to book the loss contingency. If the fraudster can convince others that 
goodwill is not impaired, no charge reaches the income statement in the following periods. 
However, in those following periods, if costs arise that the fraudster wishes to hide, he or she 
can debit the contingency account and keep those costs off the income statement, as well. 
In the end, acquisition-related loss contingencies appear to be a fraudster’s paradise, except 
when confronted with a CPA who is wise to the fraudster’s ways.
Acquisition-Related Loss Contingency 
Example
Fraud using contingencies may seem easy at first look, but if used to hide significant quanti-
ties of costs, this type of fraud can be quite sophisticated. The following example illustrates 
the balancing act required for a fraudster to successfully employ acquisition-related loss con-
tingencies to commit financial statement fraud:
Great Strength Life and Health Insurance Company, a publicly traded stock insurance 
company, specializes in underwriting whole life and term insurance products sold through 
independent agents throughout the United States. The fiscal year had recently closed, and 
the GAAP-basis financial statements were being prepared; the insurer’s accounting staff 
had just finished financial statements prepared according to statutory accounting practices 
to be filed with the states’ insurance commissioners.
The year had not been a good one due to recent unfavorable claims experience that 
suggested that certain products had been underpriced. However, Great Strength’s CEO, a 
former insurance salesman who rose through the ranks, paid no attention to the warnings 
from his CFO and all through the year declared that “Great Strength was on track to con-
tinue its long record of 15 percent per year increases in earnings per share.”
The company’s actuaries had steadily increased the claims reserve throughout the 
year. However, in the fourth quarter, the actuaries decided that due to a large surge in 
reported claims, incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims had to be growing, as well. With 
the increase in IBNR, came a large increase in the claims reserve in the fourth quarter. For 
each quarterly filing with the SEC, the CFO had been able to compensate for some of Great 
Strength’s problems with an increasing claims reserve by allocating some administrative 
and general marketing costs to the deferred policy acquisition costs account, a deferred ex-
pense account on the balance sheet that is amortized into expense over the life of policies 
in force. However, by the fourth quarter, the problem with claims was just too bad to cover 
so easily. The CFO tried to have a conversation with the firm’s actuaries to convince them to 
lower their estimate of IBNR claims, but he found that talking to the actuaries produced no 
reaction whatsoever; they simply said “No” and went back to crunching numbers.
(continued)
Example Scenario




Stymied, the CFO asked the controller to “reassess” the acquisition-related loss contin-
gencies set up when Great Strength acquired another insurance carrier, Old Life and Health 
Insurance Company, late in the previous year. When the controller pointed out that the 
measurement period ended after one year, the CFO responded that because they had not 
formally closed the fourth quarter, there was still time.
The controller examined the claims experience by book of business (that is, by policy 
type) and found that a significant quantity of policies with larger than expected claims were 
underwritten by Old Life, although the claims problem did not occur until this fiscal year. 
She was not sure whether the recent adverse claims experience could be linked back to 
the acquisition period, but the CFO had no doubts when he saw the analysis. “The Old Life 
underwriters,” he said, “made a mistake in not establishing a large enough claims reserve.” 
The controller brought up the fact that Great Strength had retained an outside actuarial 
consulting firm to evaluate the adequacy of the reserves when it bought Old Life, but the 
CFO simply said, “Well, they were wrong, too!”
The price paid for Old Life was in excess of its identifiable assets, net of liabilities, so 
there already was a goodwill account from the transaction. The CFO asked the controller to 
make the following entry to record a retroactive increase in the claims reserve for Old Life 
policies:
 Dr. Goodwill—Old Life $20,000,000
 Cr.  Claims reserve  $20,000,000
This entry had the effect of doubling the amount of goodwill from the Old Life transac-
tion, so the CFO knew that another challenge lay ahead: testing goodwill for impairment 
under FASB ASC 350-20-35. If the impairment test resulted in a write-down of goodwill, all 
the CFO’s scheming to keep costs off the income statement would be for naught.
Goodwill impairment was a real possibility, even before the preceding loss contingency 
entry was recorded. FASB ASC 350-20-35 required testing the Old Life goodwill by treat-
ing all the assets acquired in that transaction, including goodwill, as a reporting unit and 
then valuing the reporting unit as a whole at fair value. If the fair value of the reporting unit 
turned out to be less than the carrying amount of all the assets, all the nongoodwill assets 
of the reporting unit would then be valued, with the difference between the value of the 
individual assets and the value of the reporting unit being imputed to goodwill. If that im-
puted goodwill was less than the carrying amount of goodwill, the difference would be the 
amount of the write-down charged to current earnings. For Old Life, its value as a reporting 
unit was declining rapidly as the claims reserves were increased. Effectively, the Old Life 
policies were not as valuable as when Old Life was purchased, and Great Strength over-
paid. An impairment of the original goodwill booked in the transaction was possible; with 
goodwill doubled by the acquisition-related loss contingency adjustment, a write-down was 
almost certain.
However, the CFO was not going to give up. Out of the CFO’s fertile mind sprang more 
ideas. Like Great Strength, Old Life was an underwriter of whole life insurance policies, 
but Old Life’s policyholders tended to be higher risk due to past medical conditions, which 
probably contributed to the higher than expected claims. Great Strength also had policies 
targeted to high risk groups, except Great Strength’s policies were appropriately priced and 
very profitable. When Great Strength tested its lines of business for premium deficiencies, 
in accordance with FASB ASC 944-60-25, it combined the Old Life and Great Strength
14-Chap11.indd   144 7/6/10   2:26:43 PM
Chapter 11: Manipulation of Acquisition Contingencies
145
high risk policies into one line of business because they were similar products. Indeed, 
for previous quarters, the combination of the unprofitable Old Life policies and the profit-
able Great Strength policies allowed the CFO to increase deferred policy acquisition costs, 
a component in the test, without taking a premium deficiency charge. The CFO did some 
quick calculations and decided that the combined high risk products would show a profit 
healthy enough to carry the newly enlarged amount of goodwill. So he asked the control-
ler to prepare a FASB ASC 350-20-35 goodwill impairment test including the Great Strength 
high risk products. When the controller voiced concern about including the Great Strength 
products in the Old Life goodwill impairment test, the CFO responded that because the 
Great Strength and Old Life high risk products were combined for purposes of premium 
deficiency testing, it was appropriate to include the Great Strength high risk products in the 
reporting unit for goodwill impairment because the company considered all products to be 
part of the same operating segment.
The controller prepared the goodwill impairment test as instructed. The sum of the dis-
counted cash flows for the redefined reporting unit exceeded the carrying value, thanks to 
the inclusion of the Great Strength policies. The CFO was quite pleased when the controller 
gave him the analysis.
The CFO also instituted a policy renumbering process that, officially, was designed to 
“bring the Old Life policy numbering system into conformity with Great Strength’s.” The 
Great Strength numbering system used the suffix “HR” for policies issued under its high 
risk underwriting; effectively all of Old Life’s policies were recoded with the same number 
of digits in the prefix and the same “HR” suffix as the Great Strength policies in that risk 
group. The effect was that policies obtained from the Old Life acquisition became much 
harder to distinguish from those of Great Strength.
During the year-end audit, the audit manager questioned the increase in goodwill from 
the Old Life acquisition. When the CFO showed him the goodwill impairment analysis pre-
pared by the controller, the audit manager asked an audit senior to verify the calculations. 
The audit senior then requested a listing of policies that supported the calculations, and the 
controller provided a listing of all policies with the “HR” designation without mentioning 
the inclusion of Great Strength’s products.
By diverting the unanticipated additional claims cost to the goodwill account, the CFO 
kept reported claims expense within budget, and Great Strength hit its earnings per share 
target.
This example illustrated a number of fraud schemes. First, the CFO engaged in a simple 
diversion of costs from the income statement to the balance sheet by reclassifying ad-
ministrative and general marketing expenses as deferred (policy) acquisition costs (DAC). 
According to FASB ASC 944-30, DAC should include only those costs that vary with, and 
are primarily related to, the selling or acquisition of the policies, such as insurance sales 
commissions and underwriting costs. Most administrative and general marketing expenses 
do not vary with, and are too remote from, the acquisition process and, therefore, are not 
eligible for DAC treatment.2
However, the simple cost-shifting scheme does not solve the entire problem of higher 
claims, so the CFO has to employ other schemes. The CFO devises a plan to use acquisi-
tion-related loss contingencies related to the Old Life acquisition, but the plan
(continued)
 Example Analysis
2 FASB ASC 944-30-25-2.




calls for a doubling of goodwill booked from that transaction. That increase in goodwill 
causes another problem in that it might trigger an impairment. Thus, the CFO has to bal-
ance how far he can go with this scheme; if he gets too greedy in creating or adding to 
goodwill, he may see his efforts unraveled when goodwill is tested for impairment.
So the CFO creates cover by finding an excuse to include more profitable policies from 
Great Strength’s book of business in the impairment test for Old Life’s goodwill. To bring 
the more profitable policies into the impairment test, the CFO improperly recharacterizes 
the reporting unit based upon the presumably legitimate procedure for running the premi-
um deficiency test. His thinking runs along the lines of “if the Great Strength policies were 
appropriately included in the premium deficiency test, then they should be included in the 
goodwill impairment test, as well.” Although flawed, the logic is simple and convinces the 
controller.
Improper practices, such as the blurring of boundaries for the purposes of running 
different tests, often become institutionalized over time, leading to years of misstatements. 
In this scenario, there was an identified culprit, in the person of the CFO, who started the 
improper practice, but many times, no one can point to how an improper practice began. 
CPAs need to question practices that appear to lack proper support, even if those practices 
have been in operation for a long period of time.
The doctored impairment analysis is successful only if the inclusion of Great Strength’s 
policies goes undetected. To hide this deception, the CFO initiates the policy renumbering 
process that blurs the distinction between an Old Life policy and a Great Strength policy. 
His success in carrying out this scheme depends on how much attention auditors have paid 
to the Old Life acquisition in the past to see if the data used in his most recent goodwill 
impairment analysis conformed to the quantity of policies originally acquired.
However, the auditors stopped short of asking the more important question regarding 
the propriety of the entire acquisition-related contingency. The auditors and the controller 
appeared to accept the concept that there is generally a one-year measurement period to 
identify and book acquisition-related contingencies. In this case, though, Great Strength 
hired outside actuaries to assess the adequacy of claims reserves, and according to FASB 
ASC 805-10-25-14, the “measurement period ends as soon as the acquirer receives the 
information it was seeking about facts and circumstances that existed as of the acquisition 
date or learns that more information is not obtainable.” Therefore, the rendering of the ac-
tuaries’ opinion should have fulfilled the requirements for closing the measurement period, 
with regard to claims reserves. Any change to loss contingencies subsequent to closing the 
measurement period should have been recognized in the income statement. Consequently, 
by not following up on the rationale for the acquisition-related loss contingency, the audit 
manager lets the fraud slip by.
Conclusion
Use of acquisition-related loss contingencies to commit fraud is complex and difficult to pull 
off, but this type of fraud is also very lucrative for fraudsters and, unfortunately, worth the 
effort if they are successful. With a fraudulently constructed acquisition-related loss contin-
gency, fraudsters can hide or divert significant quantities of current expenses, such as higher 
claims costs in the preceding example, to create or maintain the appearance of profitability.
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Without restrictions on the booking of loss contingencies after an acquisition, the man-
agement of an acquiring company could constantly (and conveniently) create reserves to 
absorb current losses from an acquired company simply by increasing goodwill. However, at 
some point, current management must take responsibility for current period results. CPAs 
should carefully review the measurement period cutoff, as provided in FASB ASC 805-10-
25-13, to make sure that it is not abused. Management crosses the line into fraud when its 
only justification for extending the measurement period is to create unmerited cookie jar 
reserves in the form of loss contingencies.
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Chapter 12 
Chapter 11 discusses the methods fraudsters use to move costs from the income statement to 
acquisition-related loss contingency accounts on the balance sheet. This chapter explores the 
techniques used to move costs and debts from a company’s financial statements to the finan-
cial statements of another, probably related, entity. The process of illicitly moving costs and 
debts to another entity is tricky because it frequently involves legal and financial issues, such 
as setting up a separate entity and convincing third parties (suppliers, investors, and lenders) 
that the separate entity is creditworthy. However, with the greater challenges come greater 
rewards for the fraudster in that, if successful, costs and debts do not appear anywhere in the 
company financial statements, making them very difficult for auditors and others to locate.
Cost Shift to Related Entity
Sometimes fraudsters can deceive by moving costs from one entity to another under com-
mon control. This technique is most often found in industries that customarily use joint 
ventures and partnerships to accomplish specific objectives. For instance, due to the high 
risks associated with locating and extracting oil and gas, exploration and production firms 
typically establish joint ventures with other parties to share the risk. If these other parties 
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consist of passive investors, a fraudster may wish to take advantage of the lack of oversight 
and allocate costs that should be sourced to other ventures or the fraudster’s company over 
to that joint venture. Other industries, such as real estate development, operate in a similar 
fashion using multiple limited partnerships, and those partnerships may also be tempting 
targets for fraudsters.
Cost Shifting at Livent, Inc.
The entertainment industry also provides an example of cost shifting in the Livent, Inc., case.1 
Livent was a Canadian theater company that produced a number of successful Broadway 
shows, including Phantom of the Opera, Show Boat, and Ragtime. In January 1999, the SEC 
concluded an enforcement proceeding against nine former employees of Livent alleging
a multi-million dollar kick-back scheme designed to misappropriate funds for their own 
use; the improper shifting of preproduction costs, such as advertising for Ragtime, to fixed 
assets, such as the construction of theaters in Chicago and New York; and the improper 
recording of revenue for transactions that contained side agreements purposefully con-
cealed from Livent’s independent auditors.
This scheme operated from 1990–98. It inflated net income over that period by CAD$98 
million, causing the share price of Livent’s stock to fall 95 percent when the fraud was re-
vealed, wiping out more than US$100 million of market capitalization.
Of the many fraud schemes used at Livent, the one called the “amortization roll” was 
most interesting. Under Livent’s accounting policies, production costs, such as advertising, 
sets, and costumes, that were incurred before the opening of a show were capitalized. When 
the show commenced, the capitalized production costs were to be amortized over the ex-
pected life of the show (up to a maximum of five years). Under the amortization roll scheme, 
though, production costs for a show currently running would be transferred to a show that 
had yet to open or to a show with a longer amortization period remaining. The effect of the 
transfer was to delay the commencement of amortization, to lengthen amortization beyond 
periods stated in Livent’s financial statements, and to make current shows appear to be more 
profitable.
As was the custom in this industry, shows produced by Livent had many different rights 
owners who were to receive profit participations in certain shows run in specific geographic 
areas. Therefore, as was the case with oil and gas and real estate ventures, Livent had to 
maintain separate accounts for each show, such as Ragtime or Show Boat, and perhaps even 
separate accounts for shows running in certain locations. The amortization roll, then, had 
the effect of sending costs of an earlier show cascading down through the accounts of later 
shows or later productions of the same show running in different locations. The SEC stated 
that for 1996 and 1997, “approximately $12 million relating to seven different shows and 
twenty-seven different locations was transferred to the accounts of approximately thirty-one 
different future locations and ten other shows then in process.” From a fraudster’s point of 
view, this scheme must have appeared to be a masterful display of both cunning and brazen 
manipulation.
1 Securities and Exchange Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1095 (January 13, 1999).
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With so much cost shifting and other schemes going on, management had to maintain 
separate books to keep track of the true state of affairs. The IT manager also managed to 
devise ways to electronically hide the movement of expenses. When costs were first incurred, 
they were recorded on the accounts of a certain production. When those costs were shifted, 
the IT manager overrode the accounting software’s audit trail such that when those shifted 
costs arrived on the books of another show, they appeared to be original entries. The altered 
accounting system also secretly kept track of the net effect of the amortization roll and other 
schemes, so management could translate fraudulent financial statements into accurate ones. 
These fraudsters were no dummies.
Fraud Detection at Livent
There were clues, though, that could have tipped off the frauds. The financing of Show 
Boat and Ragtime provides an insight. In 1996–97, Livent sold the rights for various North 
American show locations to Pace Theatrical Group, Inc., for fees totaling US$11.2 million. 
In return, the sale contract gave Pace the right to reimbursement of theater production costs 
and, according to the SEC, “a limited percentage of adjusted gross ticket sales as profit par-
ticipation.” Moreover, the fee Pace paid was nonrefundable, and Livent was not required to 
actually run the shows in North America. Under these facts as presented, Livent convinced 
its auditors to allow it to book the rights transaction as sales revenue.
Unknown to the auditors were side letters that allowed Pace to recoup its fees and 
earn additional profit as the shows were performed. From a financial perspective, the Pace 
transactions made little sense without the side letters. According to the agreements shown 
to the auditors, for significant, presumably nonrefundable fees, Pace would essentially receive 
a small profit participation. The side letters, which auditors did not see, provided downside 
protection and a more reasonable profit interest. Clearly, the poor economics of the transac-
tion, as presented to the auditors, could have signaled a problem.
In the auditors’ defense, they did ask for and receive confirmations from Pace that there 
were no agreements other than those known to the auditors because Livent’s management 
told Pace that the auditors already had the side letters. Pace responded without raising any 
red flags. Therefore, to catch such a scheme, in the future, CPAs will have to go further by 
specifically asking whether any side letters exist and insist on seeing those letters. Moreover, 
the line of inquiry with outside parties needs to probe into the rationale of the transaction 
to ask, essentially, “What do you get out of this?” If the answer does not make sense on the 
surface, the CPA may need to investigate further, looking, for instance, for related party 
connections or undisclosed agreements. Many times, the third party does not have as much 
interest in hiding the fraud as the fraudster and may explain everything to avoid the possibil-
ity of being linked to the fraud.
Other Fraud Detection Steps
To say that this fraud was difficult to catch would be an understatement. In 1998, new man-
agement at Livent, which was not aware of the schemes, discovered one of the side letters 
with the profit participant that had rights to Ragtime and Show Boat in the United Kingdom. 
This discovery led to an internal investigation that brought down the entire house of cards. 
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Without that discovery, many of the schemes could have continued for some time. The 
amortization roll could have continued until either:
 1.  a disgruntled rights owner insisted on an audit of specific show expenses or
 2.  Livent ran out of funding for new shows to keep the roll going.
When adequate audit trails exist, CPAs would be well served to look for credits appear-
ing in expense accounts to detect cost shifting. Such credits may indicate that the entity in-
curring the cost accrued the expenses on its books as debits and then transferred the expenses 
out with offsetting credits. However, it is not safe to assume that the subsidiary incurring the 
expense initially recorded it as such. There may be a special contingency or liability account 
on the balance sheet set up to record the initial debits, with the transfer credits appearing 
later. As the expenses are being booked, significant debit balances in the liability account will 
grow until the transfer is made. Such debit balances in a liability account should stand out. 
Also, if the transfers take place over time, some correspondence spelling out the procedures 
is likely, especially if the initial debit is to an unusual account, such as a loss contingency.
With Livent, internal controls that were compromised by extensive collusion made de-
tection of the amortization roll difficult because shifted expenses had the appearance of an 
original entry. Nevertheless, sourcing the expenses of a given show to the accounts for that 
show may have revealed a difference as some of those costs were shifted to later shows. For 
the occurrence of one of the events previously described, the only person standing in the 
way of fraudsters running such a cost shifting scheme is a CPA who insists on looking at the 
source documents.
“Hidden” Debts and Transferred  
Financial Assets
The collapse of Enron Corp. in 2001 brought extensive attention to the role of off-balance 
sheet financing vehicles, then known as special purpose entities (SPEs). Critics alleged that 
Enron’s SPEs were used to “hide” debts by moving them from Enron’s balance sheet to the 
SPEs’ balance sheets.
Enron was not the first company to use SPEs. SPEs (or, more broadly, securitization en-
tities) had long been in use. For many years, financial institutions had used securitization en-
tities to securitize loans. The securitization process used by a bank was fairly straightforward. 
The bank would package a group of loans, such as credit card debt, and have one of the bond 
rating agencies assess the portfolio of loans and the structure of the SPE for creditworthi-
ness. The bank would fund the securitization entity with a small amount of capital provided 
by outsiders and then cause the securitization entity to issue bonds in sufficient quantity to 
purchase the loan portfolio. The bonds would fall into different tiers, or tranches, based upon 
the amount of repayment security, with the first tranch entitled to cash flows before the 
second and successive tranches. Consequently, the rating agency would award a higher safety 
rating to the first tranch bonds, usually an investment grade rating. The second and other 
tranches may also qualify for investment-grade ratings, depending upon the quality of loan 
assets in the securitization entity. Those bonds that received investment-grade ratings would 
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be marketable to institutional investors, such as pension plans and retirement funds. With the 
proceeds of the bond sale, the securitization entity would purchase the loans from the bank. 
After the transaction, the bank had additional capital with which to go out and make more 
loans. Indeed, many borrowers today have securitization entities to thank for providing a 
mechanism for banks to extend them credit.
Fraudsters “Hide” Continuing Involvement
Were the bonds issued by the securitization entity and used to acquire the loans “hidden” 
from the bank’s balance sheet? The securitization entity holds the debt, along with the loan 
assets the bank transferred. As long as there was a legitimate sale of assets between the bank 
and securitization entity, for financial reporting purposes, U.S. generally accepted accounting 
principles (U.S. GAAP) do not require the bank to show the securitization entity’s bonds 
on its balance sheet. Whether a sale occurs is the key U.S. GAAP criterion that determines 
whether debts are to be shown on or off the balance sheet. A sale does not occur if there is 
continuing involvement, defined in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Account-
ing Standards Codification (ASC) glossary as “[a]ny involvement with the transferred financial 
assets that permits the transferor to receive cash flows or other benefits that arise from the 
transferred financial assets or that obligates the transferor to provide additional cash flows or 
other assets to any party related to the transfer.”
For example, during the credit crisis of 2008, some banks that had securitized mortgage 
loans through securitization entities, which, in turn, placed bonds with major bank custom-
ers, were pressured by those customers to reacquire the securitized mortgages as defaults rose; 
the banks complied to avoid a loss of business from the major customers in other areas. Was 
there a continuing interest of the bank in the securitization entity because the bank’s major 
customers held the entity’s bonds and perhaps there was an implied repurchase agreement 
should the loans turn sour? If so, then there may not have been a true sale.
Fraudsters trying to “hide” debt will attempt to fabricate a sale when the quality of the 
assets or the sale price is such that the fraudster-transferor needs to provide additional guar-
antees that are “hidden” to create the appearance of a sale. Those additional guarantees are 
elements of continuing involvement and, if discovered, will negate the sale.
U.S. accounting literature provides a list of elements of asset transfers (see “Pending 
Content” in FASB ASC 860-10-05-4) that may indicate that there is continuing involve-
ment on the part of the transferor:
Accounting for transfers in which the transferor has no continuing involvement with 
the transferred financial assets or with the transferee has not been controversial. How-
ever, transfers of financial assets often occur in which the transferor has some continu-
ing involvement either with the assets transferred or with the transferee. Examples of 
continuing involvement with the transferred financial assets include, but are not limited 
to, any of the following:
 a.  Servicing arrangements
 aa.  Recourse arrangements
 aaa.  Guarantee arrangements …
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 c.  Agreements to purchase or redeem transferred financial assets
 d.  Options written or held
 dd.  Derivative financial instruments that are entered into contemporaneously 
with, or in contemplation of, the transfer
 ddd.  Arrangements to provide financial support
 e.  Pledges of collateral 
 f.  The transferor’s beneficial interests in the transferred financial assets.
Transfers of financial assets with continuing involvement raise issues about the circum-
stances under which the transfers should be considered as sales of all or part of the assets 
or as secured borrowings and about how transferors and transferees should account for 
sales and secured borrowings.
Assessing whether continuing involvement is sufficiently material to prohibit sale treat-
ment of the transfer is a matter of professional judgment, and the CPA should “consider all 
arrangements or agreements made contemporaneously with, or in contemplation of, the 
transfer, even if they were not entered into at the time of the transfer.”2
In addition, U.S. GAAP forbids a transferor from exercising effective control over the 
assets that are transferred. “Pending Content” in FASB ASC 860-10-40-5(c) states that
A transferor’s effective control over the transferred financial assets includes, but is not 
limited to, any of the following:
 1.  An agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or 
redeem them before their maturity (see paragraphs 860-10-40-23 through 
40-27)
 2.  An agreement, other than through a cleanup call (see paragraphs 860-10-40-28 
through 40-39), that provides the transferor with both of the following:
  i.  The unilateral ability to cause the holder to return specific financial assets
  ii.  A more-than-trivial-benefit attributable to that ability.
 3.  An agreement that permits the transferee to require the transferor to repurchase 
the transferred financial assets at a price that is so favorable to the transferee that 
it is probable that the transferee will require the transferor to repurchase them 
(see paragraph 860-10-55-42D).
That said, a securitization entity can be manipulated by fraudsters to make it appear to 
be effectively controlled by the transferee when, in fact, it is not.
Asset Quality
To continue the bank example, the bank benefited by moving the loan assets from its balance 
sheet because the securitization turned the loans into cash. With more cash, the bank could 
originate new loans. In a sense, the bonds used by the securitization entity to finance the 
purchase of the credit card loan assets could be called the “hidden” debt of the bank because 
the bonds did not show up on the bank’s balance sheet. What critics of securitization enti-
ties often fail to clearly state is that there are “hidden” assets (the loans in this example) that 
2 Financial Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification 860-10-40-4.
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move off the balance sheet, as well. Their criticism of securitization entities has merit, to the 
extent that the assets transferred to the securitization entity are not worth the amount of the 
debt issued against them. Intentionally selling assets that are worth less than the amount paid 
is not only a contractual fraud but is also an accounting fraud when the transfer is recorded 
as a sale at fair value equal to the amount paid. The quality of those assets becomes another 
issue in assessing whether the transfer of assets was a sale.
Fraud Methodology
Fraudsters attempt to exploit weaknesses in both continuing involvement and asset fair value 
standards of U.S. GAAP. Fraudsters manipulate both when they use the vehicle of a secu-
ritization entity to move debts off the balance sheet. The methods fraudsters use essentially 
break down into three steps:
 1.  Fraudsters attempt to locate assets on or off the company balance sheet that present 
difficulties in valuation, such as complex financial instruments, real estate, or other as-
sets that are not publicly traded, to place in the securitization entity at inflated values. 
Fictitious assets, such as illusory accounts receivable, also work if fraudsters can manu-
facture them.
 2.  By inflating the value of these nonpublicly traded assets, the fraudsters can then move 
large quantities of debt equal to the inflated asset values from the company balance 
sheet to the securitization entity when the securitization entity issues its own debt and 
remits the proceeds back to the fraudster company.
 3.  Because bondholders for the securitization entity may be skittish because assets of 
dubious value are collateralizing their bonds, they will likely require some financial 
pledge from the fraudster-transferor to keep them happy. That pledge could be a com-
mitment to repurchase bad assets at inflated prices or a commitment to simply make 
up any shortfalls on payments due from the securitization entity to the bondholders. 
The pledge to repurchase a bad asset is an element of effective control; a guarantee 
against cash shortfalls is an element of continuing involvement.
Importance of the Source of Capital
A fraudster may be able to obviate the need for financial guarantees in the preceding scheme 
by providing investment capital to the securitization entity through a related party bond-
holder or a fronting organization. If there is no outside capital in the securitization entity, the 
assets and liabilities must be consolidated with the transferor firm that set up the securitiza-
tion entity. In effect, the assets and liabilities that the firm tried to move off its balance sheet 
come right back on if there is no outside investment.
The fraudster tries to create the appearance of outside investment in the securitization 
entity containing assets of dubious value. Moving funds through a related party may be too 
obvious, so a fraudster may employ a fronting organization using a scheme popular during 
the savings and loan (S&L) scandals that provided down payments for real estate loans made 
to straw-man borrowers. Under the old S&L scam, the lender would front funds to the 
borrower for the down payment on a real estate purchase through another borrower. That 
second borrower would then make an “investment” in the straw-man borrower equal to the 
15-Chap12.indd   155 7/6/10   2:27:24 PM
156
Financial Reporting Fraud
funds needed for the down payment, and the S&L would provide the rest of the funds to 
the straw-man borrower needed to complete the purchase. A securitization entity fraud may 
work the same way, with funds coming from the firm that is trying to unload the assets and 
debts transferred to the securitization entity by using intermediaries to cover the movement 
of firm funds to the straw-man investor.
The source of the capital invested in the securitization entity is a key element in un-
covering fraud. If real outside capital is at risk, a legitimate investor generally makes sure that 
the assets are valued at fair value. If asset values appear to be insufficient and a legitimate 
investor insists on guarantees, that investor is usually quite willing to reveal the existence of 
those guarantees because the investor may, at some future date, need to assert claims based 
on those guarantees.
Conclusion
Cost and debt shifting pose serious challenges to CPAs. However, the schemes are usually 
revealed when CPAs ask seemingly obvious questions about the vigilance exercised by the 
outside parties that enter into transactions with the fraudsters. In the case of cost shifting, if 
the outside parties, such as joint venturers or limited partners, did not insist on, and failed to 
exercise, the right to audit the financial statements of the joint venture or limited partnership, 
the potential exists for fraudsters to move costs from one project to another. Similarly, should 
fraudsters attempt to hide debts using a securitization entity, if the putative outside investor 
did not insist on an appraisal of hard-to-value assets sold to the securitization entity by the 
fraudsters and did not insist on periodic audits of operations, then it is possible that the inves-
tor is not independent or is a straw-man. In short, the behavior of third parties provides the 
best clues to identifying this type of fraud. The CPA needs to look beyond the operations of 
the firm and delve into the activities of business partners to find these clues.




In 1999, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) sponsored research published 
under the title Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies 
(the 1999 research report), which found that one-half of the financial reporting frauds in 
the period 1987–97 were attributable to overstating revenue. In 2010, COSO’s subsequent 
study of the 1988-2007 period, titled Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, An Analysis 
of U.S. Public Companies (the 2010 research report) found that revenue recognition fraud had 
increased to 61 percent. Of those companies overstating revenue, both the 1999  and 2010 
research reports found that recording fictitious revenues and recording revenues prematurely 
were the primary sources of fraud.
By 2002, findings such as these led the Auditing Standards Board to conclude in para-
graph .41 of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,  AU sec. 316), that there is a presump-
tion of fraud relating to revenue recognition when planning an audit:
Material misstatements due to fraudulent financial reporting often result from an over-
statement of revenues (for example, through premature revenue recognition or recording 
fictitious revenues) or an understatement of revenues (for example, through improperly 
shifting revenues to a later period). Therefore, the auditor should ordinarily presume that 
there is a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relating to revenue recognition.
16-Chap13.indd   157 7/6/10   2:28:05 PM
158
Financial Reporting Fraud
Revenue recognition issues have occupied the accounting profession for many years. In 
1984, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FASB Concepts Statement 
No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises. Paragraph 83 
of that statement sets out the following two basic requirements for recognizing revenue:
 a.  Realized or realizable. Revenues and gains generally are not recognized until realized or 
realizable. [footnote omitted] Revenues and gains are realized when products (goods 
or services), merchandise, or other assets are exchanged for cash or claims to cash. 
Revenues and gains are realizable when related assets received or held are readily con-
vertible to known amounts of cash or claims to cash. Readily convertible assets have 
(i) interchangeable (fungible) units and (ii) quoted prices available in an active market 
that can rapidly absorb the quantity held by the entity without significantly affecting 
the price.
 b.  Earned. Revenues are not recognized until earned. An entity’s revenue-earning activi-
ties involve delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or other activities that 
constitute its ongoing major or central operations, [footnote omitted] and revenues 
are considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially accomplished 
what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues.
More recently, with complexities in the sale of software and with products that involve 
support after the sale (postcontract customer support), accounting standard setters developed 
Statement of Position 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition (AICPA, Technical Practice Aids, ACC 
sec. 10,700), now codified under the same heading in FASB Accounting Standards Codification 
(ASC) 985-605, as well as Emerging Issues Task Force Issue 00-21, “Revenue Arrangements 
with Multiple Deliverables,” now codified in FASB ASC 605-25.
In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff set out its interpretation 
of accounting literature regarding revenue recognition in Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 
No. 104, Revenue Recognition, and concluded the following:
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned when all of 





With regard to a fixed or determinable selling price, the SEC staff amplified its position 
by stating a fixed fee is a “fee required to be paid at a set amount that is not subject to refund 
or adjustment.” If the buyer retains a right to a refund of the purchase price, collectability 
cannot be assured. Indeed, it would be difficult to meet the FASB Concepts Statement No. 
5 realization test if the cash or other payment tendered was subject to refund at the buyer’s 
discretion. Yet, refund arrangements are a common area for revenue recognition fraud. If 
company management wishes to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, in all likelihood, 
one or more of the SEC’s conditions will have been violated. These conditions are described 
in the following sections.
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Lack of an Agreement When Booking Sales
As the reporting quarter draws to an end, companies straining to achieve a revenue target 
face pressure to close sales by the last day. That pressure may lead to the fraudulent booking 
of premature or nonexistent sales. In the rush to close transactions by a certain date, sales 
personnel may represent to management that there is an oral agreement with a customer 
when, in fact, there is none.
Persuasive Evidence
Because of pressures and possible misrepresentations, the SEC standard requires persuasive 
evidence, which generally means some written documentation from either the buyer or a 
third party, such as a purchasing agent. For example, assume that Selling Company’s salesper-
son has obtained verbal approval from Customer Company’s management about the terms 
of a sale. Further, assume that Customer Company’s management must obtain approval of 
the sale’s terms from Customer Company’s legal department, and the agreement is held up 
at the end of the quarter due to legal department review. Without a requirement for written 
documentation of the sale, Selling Company’s salesperson may represent (perhaps accurately) 
that Customer Company’s purchasing decision maker has signed off on the sale but misrep-
resent that all conditions for revenue recognition are met. However, with the requirement 
for a signed contract, recognition of the sale would not occur at quarter-end and for good 
reason: Customer Company has not agreed to the terms until the legal department review 
is complete. Such a policy is put in place to ensure the company conforms to U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP). Violating that policy causes a violation of U.S. 
GAAP if, in the footnotes to the financial statements or elsewhere, management represents 
that sales are not recognized without a written agreement.
Actually, the SEC looked beyond company policies in SAB No. 104. A hypothetical 
posed in the bulletin stated the normal and customary business practice was to obtain writ-
ten agreements and did not mention the existence of a company policy to obtain written 
agreements. The staff ’s position was that companies could not book sales lacking written 
agreements as revenue, regardless of company accounting policies, when the normal and 
customary business practice for the industry was to obtain written agreements.
Detecting Fake Agreements
Good sales cutoff procedures can generally detect lack of proper agreements, but if writ-
ten agreements are fabricated, detection is much more difficult. Random sampling of or-
ders booked as revenue near the end of a quarter should provide a list of customers to call 
to verify that documents are authentic. However, for a document fabrication scheme to 
succeed over several quarters or years, the fabricated agreements must be replaced by au-
thentic agreements and real sales or there will be significant reversals of prior period sales. 
Therefore, CPAs can compare, perhaps on a random basis, contracts on file at the end of a 
given reporting period with contracts on file for the same transaction at a later period of 
time. If the original (fake) contract has been switched, there probably was an attempt at 
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fabrication. Conversely, if the authentic document does not appear, the sale may never have 
been completed, in which case there would be a reversal in the subsequent period. Numer-
ous instances of such reversals would point to internal control problems.
Nondelivery
What constitutes delivery varies from industry to industry but generally occurs when title 
and risk of loss pass to the buyer. Delivery of some products requires shipping documents 
that provide a paper trail that can be audited. Delivery of products such as software may oc-
cur over the Internet at near instantaneous speed with lagging paper documentation or none 
at all. Nevertheless, there should be some follow-up hard copy documentation or electronic 
receipt verification.
Attempts at achieving fraudulent deliveries usually involve some person or entity willing 
to hold the product until such time as its sale can be arranged. As part of the fraud scheme, 
the recipient executes documents or e-mails that appear to confirm delivery to an entity 
that appears to be the ultimate customer. This recipient is sometimes part of the scheme or 
can be a customer who inadvertently accepts delivery before consummating the sale. The 
inadvertent error may be easier to detect because customers receiving products before they 
are wanted tend to complain to company management.
Third party recipients who park goods temporarily may be harder to detect but usually 
require some payment for their services. Payment may come in the form of above-average 
discounts if the third parties resell the products over future periods, or there may be special 
terms allowing for product returns. An analysis of average product selling prices may point 
to one customer who stands out from the rest by receiving better deals.
If returns from a given customer are abnormally high, that fact may also indicate special 
arrangements, especially if the returns occur in a later reporting period. If one customer 
receives such favorable treatment, the CPA should make additional inquiries. In addition, 
delivery schemes involving resellers typically become more apparent if other resellers can-
not sell the product as expected because of a change in market conditions. If a reseller is still 
taking substantial deliveries of a product after many others are experiencing sales declines, 
the CPA should attempt to understand why that reseller’s channels of distribution are clear 
but others are blocked.
No Fixed Price
A price may not be fixed due to design or deceit. A price not fixed due to design may arise 
from a sales price being a function of royalty percentages, sliding scales, or other features that 
depend on future events before the price becomes fixed and determinable. A price not fixed 
by deceit usually consists of hidden agreements that allow the buyer to pay less than the 
stated, presumably fixed, sales price.
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Royalties
Sometimes, prices are difficult to determine, particularly if the product is to be combined 
with other products before being sold to an end user. Such sales may involve a royalty pay-
ment that is a function of the selling price. It would be inappropriate to book anticipated 
future royalties as current revenues until the amount of those royalties becomes fixed upon 
ultimate sale. However, minimum royalties may be booked when they become due. Fraud 
occurs when royalties are recognized on fictitious or anticipated ultimate sales. Such royalty 
arrangements typically require the royalty payor to report to the royalty recipient the quan-
tity of ultimate sales on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. This permits an accounting of the 
final sales that can be used to verify reported royalty income.
Side Agreements
The more deceptive form of fraud used to circumvent the fixed price requirement is the 
clandestine use of side letters or arrangements that allow for refunds or discounts at the 
buyer’s option or in certain circumstances. Under tight market conditions, or perhaps be-
cause the product is new and untested, it may be necessary to use these side letters to make 
a sale. The use of side letters is legitimate as long as any price discounts or return privileges 
are properly reflected in the accounting records, generally deferring revenue recognition 
until the price becomes fixed or the return period ends. Side letters become tools of fraud 
when they are hidden from accounting personnel or are not recorded properly in the firm’s 
books and records.
The most likely perpetrators of side letter fraud are sales personnel with some discre-
tion and authority, such as divisional managers and above. Implementation of such a scheme 
requires their authority to alter records or invent excuses should the buyer exercise his or 
her rights under the side agreement. As a general rule, fraudulent side letters are the result 
of some type of internal control failure when the divisional manager is both able to affect 
economic outcomes and alter accounting records.
Side letters are quite hard to detect because the buyer usually realizes he or she is receiv-
ing a special deal and does not want to publicize it. Of course, the fraudsters in the selling 
company will attempt to keep such agreements secret. These schemes usually come to the 
surface if the buyer exercises his or her rights under the agreement. A more senior member 
of management may be involved to cover up the refund with a fabricated reason or another 
transaction. Nevertheless, typically some documentation of the refund exists if corporate 
controls are in place. The CPA who suspects the existence of side letters can certainly look 
for refunds and discounts that are out of the ordinary, such as outsized refunds or discounts 
going to one customer or multiple refunds to one customer stretching over different report-
ing periods.
The CPA should keep in mind that the customer probably demanded the right to ob-
tain a refund or discount in the course of negotiations for the sale. To catch the existence 
of side letters before refund demands are made, a suspicious CPA may review sales files for 
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correspondence, notes, or other evidence of such demands from the prospective customer. 
Further, if the products involved require personnel, such as engineers, to install or service 
the products, those personnel not directly reporting to the fraudsters may know details of 
the side agreement. An inquiry from the CPA to the service personnel may unearth signifi-
cant information about the sales transaction relating to customer demands and how those 
demands were handled. It is also likely that if fraudsters used side letters with one customer, 
there might be side letters with other customers, as well.
AICPA Professional Issues Task Force Practice Alert 03-1, Audit Confirmations, provides 
some useful warning signs that may indicate the presence of side agreements or, at the least, 

















perception of the payment terms (for example, payments not due until resale to end 
users).
	 •	 	Aggressive	accounting	policies	or	practices	(for	example,	tone	at	the	top	regarding	
pressures for revenue and earnings).
It is interesting that several of these points in the practice alert mention sales to distribu-
tors. Distributors and other intermediaries make good targets for fraudsters because
 a.  the intermediaries typically handle large volumes of products, so the impact of the 
fraud on revenue recognition is significant.
 b.  fewer people are involved in the fraud scheme, as compared with the fraudster trying 
to recruit a large number of retailers to have the same economic impact, and the fewer 
the conspirators, the lower the chance of detection.
Side agreements with intermediaries, whether written or oral, provide the mechanism 
to implement the fraud and typically allow the intermediary to return a purchased product 
or delay or avoid payment until the product is sold to the ultimate user or retailer.
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Receivables Are Not Collectible
Financially weak firms may not pay their bills. To prevent sales to firms in poor financial 
condition, some type of customer approval process independent of the sales function needs 
to be in place to assess customer health, especially if the customer is placing large orders. 
This review function should be integrated with the approval process for customer refunds 
and discounts to prevent the implementation of fraudulent side letters, which also affect col-
lectability, as previously discussed. From a CPA’s point of view, an unusual concentration of 
orders from small or distressed customers, particularly near the end of a reporting period or 
sales campaign, should raise concerns.
Fraudsters attempt to hide the customers’ poor financial condition by fabricating finan-
cial statements, misrepresenting the buyer’s financial condition, or falsely representing that 
there are adequate financial guarantees. Typically, to accommodate these misrepresentations, 
the fraudsters extend credit and payment terms so that when the seller’s financial statements 
are prepared, the financially weak customer’s lack of payment is not an immediate red flag. 
The CPA may be able to detect such a scheme by combining analysis of changes in credit 
policies with analysis of new customers. New customers buying significant quantities of 
product near period-end under relaxed credit terms should be carefully reviewed. If the new 
customers do not publish or provide audited financial statements and lack other means of 
verification, they may be potential fraud vehicles.
The following scenario is drawn from SEC corporate governance proposals setting out 
a disclosure mechanism for critical accounting estimates.1 It illustrates the issues involved in 
revenue recognition, set in foreign countries:
MQB Corp., based in San Diego, CA, is a developer and marketer of desktop publishing 
software. MQB’s customers consist of third party distributors, resellers, and retailers, and 
collectively, they comprise MQB’s channels of distribution. MQB also sold directly to large 
corporate customers through its corporate sales group. MQB’s products are sold in a highly 
competitive market, and to accommodate its customers, MQB has a liberal product return 
policy that has historically accepted significant product returns. MQB permits its customers 
to return software titles published and distributed by the company within 120 days of pur-
chase. This policy allows the customers to return products to MQB should a competitor’s 
product or weakened economic conditions affect sales.
(continued)
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1 This example is taken from examples contained in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907. To 
illustrate certain aspects of financial reporting fraud, additional assumptions are added to the SEC examples. Subsequently, the SEC-
recommended disclosures to the audit committee are presented to illustrate how those disclosures would have increased the likeli-
hood of fraud detection. The examples, as modified for purposes of this book, reflect the opinions of the author, not the SEC. The reader 
is encouraged to read the SEC releases in their entirety, which are included in appendix A at the end of this book




MQB recognized revenues under FASB ASC 905-685 (for simplicity, assume there are 
no postcontract customer support or other multiple element arrangement issues). MQB rec-
ognizes revenue upon shipment of its software products, provided that payment collection 
is determined to be probable and no significant obligations on MQB’s part remain. At the 
time revenue is recorded, MQB accounts for estimated future returns by reducing sales by 
its estimate of future returns and reducing accounts receivable by the same amount. For
example, MQB reduced its gross sales and accounts receivable by 12 percent for its current 
fiscal year to reflect estimated product returns. In the last 3 years, the range in which the 
company has reduced its gross sales and accounts receivable to reflect product returns has 
been between 11 percent and 13 percent.
MQB had recently expanded into Europe and established a separate division for its 
European operations based outside Paris. The European division head had been heavily 
recruited, and when he came on board six months ago, he insisted on complete autonomy 
to design and implement his marketing plan. “After all,” the division head stated, “the 
European market is quite different from the U.S. market and requires a completely different 
approach.” That autonomy extended to financial and marketing operations management 
in Europe, but the European controller had a “dotted line,” or secondary reporting require-
ment, to the corporate controller in the United States. The European division head hired all 
personnel, drawing upon French colleagues he had worked with at previous firms. With the 
exception of a few software technicians who had to come from the United States because 
no one in Europe was yet trained, he declined to take on any other American personnel. 
“French laws are very restrictive,” he said, “and impose onerous taxes on foreign work-
ers.” The software technicians were on call to help with potential integration problems with 
MQB’s larger corporate customers.
Although the division head commanded a sizeable compensation package, MQB senior 
management had insisted on setting performance goals that, if met, would constitute a sub-
stantial part of the cash and company stock he was to receive. Overall, the company was 
straining to meet the forecast financial results published by securities analysts and could 
not afford to carry an unprofitable division any longer; by this point in time, the European 
division had to show profitability in the current quarter or the company would miss the con-
sensus earnings target set by analysts. The division manager’s compensation was also tied 
to achieving profitability in the current quarter.
When he came on board six months earlier, the European division head initiated a 
three-prong strategy that targeted the following:
1.  Direct sales to large corporate customers
2.  Sales to the rapidly growing number of resellers that were achieving significant mar-
ket penetration among small businesses in both Great Britain and on the continent
3.  Sales to retailers that were opening new stores in areas with well-educated and tech-
nically savvy populations, such as Germany
For the current quarter, the sales goal needed to achieve breakeven operating income 
was, in euros, €32,000,000 (or about US$44 million at an exchange rate of €1 to $1.38).
The marketing efforts progressed adequately, but toward the end of the current quar-
ter, the division was behind its sales goal by €1,700,000 and was headed toward reporting 
another operating loss. Sales to major accounts had slowed because a weakened European 
economy had stalled corporate buyers. Sales to resellers were also beginning to decline 
because qualified resellers were becoming more difficult to identify as financial conditions 
deteriorated, and retailers were now reporting that their inventory stocks were high and 
that they did not need more product.
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One week before the end of the quarter, the situation was critical. The division head 
met with his marketing director to discuss plans they had developed earlier in case sales 
were short of their goal. The marketing director then contacted two potential customers 
that were retailers with multiple store locations throughout Germany (ComputerWerken 
AG in Düsseldorf and UberComputer AG in Bonn) to see if they could make their purchase 
decisions before the quarter ended. On another front, the division head contacted Com-
pagnie des Machines Française SA in Tours, a large integrated computer manufacturer and 
distributor, to see if that firm could proceed with its purchase.
All the last minute efforts met with apparent success because large purchase orders 
were faxed in to the Paris office. The two German retailers had ordered €362,000 of product 
each, and the French distributor ordered €1,500,000. The software was packed and shipped 
over the last few days remaining in the quarter, and with those sales, the European division 
was set to report better than breakeven sales for the quarter of €32,524,000.
When the sales contracts were faxed to San Diego, the corporate controller contacted 
the European division head with some questions. First, with regard to the German firms, 
the terms of the sale did not require payment until 120 days after the sale; MQB’s standard 
policy was for payment to be received within 30 days. The division head responded that a 
provision of German law, the Ladenschlussgesetz, requires that German retailers purchas-
ing products originating outside the European Union be allowed extra time to pay to effect 
currency conversion and transfer of funds. When asked why this provision was not stated 
in sales agreements with other German retailers, the division head responded that with 
the prior sales agreements, “we were technically violating the law, but I wanted to get into 
compliance as quickly as possible.”
The corporate controller then asked if the European sales group had complied with 
company policies to obtain and review the financial statements of firms purchasing more 
than US$100,000 (roughly €72,000), and the division head replied, “Certainly!” In actuality, 
for the German firms, the division head had only an unaudited German-language income 
statement and balance sheet for each, with little footnote commentary. These financial 
statements did satisfy MQB’s credit requirements, though, because the credit policies did 
not require audited financial statements from customers unless orders for a given quarter 
exceeded US$500,000. Because the orders from each of the German firms were €362,000, 
which translated to about US$499,560, audited financial statements were not required. 
Because Compagnie des Machines Française SA was publicly traded, it did have audited fi-
nancial statements prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRSs). The IFRSs financial statements satisfied the credit requirements for the French 
distributor’s €1,500,000 order because when MQB opened its European office, it made al-
lowances in its credit policy for firms reporting on standards other than U.S. GAAP.
When the corporate controller received the financial data, she saw that both German 
firms appeared to have substantial assets in excess of liabilities, but most of the assets con-
sisted of goodwill. The corporate controller readily saw that her ability to understand the 
financial data, particularly the income statement, was limited and called the European con-
troller, who confirmed that the firms indeed did have substantial historical earnings. One 
oddity that the U.S. corporate controller noticed were statements in the otherwise scarce 
footnotes that both companies had Dutch shareholders with Netherlands Antilles charters, 
but she did not think to pursue that issue because it seemed irrelevant.
(continued)




As for the sale to the French firm, the corporate controller had only one question about 
a condition in the sales agreement referencing “l’action du Ministère d’Etat Provencial.”She 
asked what that meant, and the division head said, “Don’t worry about that; all contracts 
with companies that are owned by the government have that clause.”
“I didn’t realize we were selling to the French government,” replied the corporate con-
troller, and the division head responded, “Oh, not really, Compagnie des Machines Fran-
çaise SA is publicly held and traded on the Paris Bourse; it’s just that the government is the 
majority shareholder.” According to the division head, the clause meant that the contract 
was subject to government review, which he insisted was perfunctory.
Because the explanations seemed plausible and because all members of MQB senior 
management desperately wanted the European division to begin reporting operating prof-
its, the corporate controller decided to recognize these last-minute revenues. MQB reported 
earnings for the quarter that fell within the range of analysts’ estimates, and the stock price 
continued its climb that had run for several quarters in a row. 
Pursuant to company practice, the controller’s staff prepared an estimate of sales 
returns under MQB’s 120-day return policy. However, the company’s sales history in Europe 
was limited, so the staff based their estimates for European sales on the company’s sales 
return experience in the United States. The company’s overall sales return estimate was 12 
percent, so the staff set European returns at €3,902,880 for the quarter that just ended.
As the following quarter’s European results were reported to San Diego, the corporate 
controller noticed additional large sales to the German and French firms. The corporate 
controller, not entirely comfortable with the large concentrations of sales to a few firms, 
carefully analyzed accounts receivable agings on a monthly basis. She was satisfied to see 
that although the large firms’ balances owed to MQB grew, intermittent payments were 
also being recorded.
Pursuant to the company’s internal control policies, the corporate controller dispatched 
an internal auditor to review the sales, returns, and receivables records of the European di-
vision (external auditors did not see European operations to be sufficiently material to merit 
on-site visits). The auditor spent much of his time verifying receivables and tying those 
receivables to cash remittances. He noticed that the software engineers never seemed to 
be very busy, but the European controller stated that “there just were not many calls for 
assistance” from their large corporate customers.
Then, suddenly, without explanation, the European division head departed to take a 
position with Compagnie des Machines Française SA. The corporate controller decided she 
would make a trip to Paris to take a look at the financial records before a new division head 
was appointed. When she arrived, she uncovered a number of disturbing facts:
•   The German firms were both experiencing financial difficulty and collectability of the 
outstanding balances was highly uncertain. When the corporate controller asked the 
European controller why the firms were in such poor financial condition when the 
income statements they tendered looked so strong, her European counterpart re-
sponded that the German economy must have turned down “very suddenly.” When 
the corporate controller asked how many retail locations each firm had running, she 
was surprised to hear that there were no more than 5 between the 2 firms. The U.S. 
internal auditor did not address this issue because at the time of his visit, most of the 
sales were within the 120-day payment period and were not past due.
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•   The corporate controller discovered that the French customer, under instruction of 
the Ministère d’Etat Provencial, had actually rejected the software shipments under 
provisions of a domestic content law: government-controlled firms were supposed 
to purchase certain products only from French firms. Because the software had been 
developed in the United States and French alternatives were available, the company 
was required to purchase from the French competitor, even though its software reli-
ability, scalability, and technical support were inferior.
•   Payments had been “inadvertently” posted to the account of Compagnie des Ma-
chines Française SA, according to the European controller, presenting the appearance 
that the customer had accepted delivery and was paying. The U.S. auditor had not 
picked up on this issue. The incorrectly posted payments were made by wire trans-
fers, and when he examined the wire records, he was not able to trace them beyond 
the originating bank. Figuring that other customers would complain if the payments 
had been misapplied, he passed on attempting to source the wire transfers further.
•   When asked why more licenses and product were sold to Compagnie des Machines 
Française SA after the large initial sale, the European controller had no explanation 
other than “it must have taken some time for the government ministry to act.”
The following day, the European controller and the sales manager resigned and both 
went to work for Compagnie des Machines Française SA. The corporate controller spent the 
day on the phone explaining to the CFO that MQB was faced with having to take a charge 
for previous quarter sales to these companies in the range of £1.5 million (net of allowance 
for returns) and that current quarter sales were also much lower than previously reported.
This scenario illustrates the “dumb American” theme repeated so many times when U.S. 
companies naïvely forge into foreign markets. It also illustrates the difficulty in catching 
revenue recognition fraud in the short run.
The situation was worse than the corporate controller detected in that the fraud was 
much more devious; all the controller saw were the consequences of the fraud. First, 
though, for the record, the French and German companies in the scenario are fictitious, as 
is the French ministry. To some extent, the French domestic content law and the Nether-
lands Antilles restrictions are fabrications, but such laws are common and can snag or fool 
the unwary. However, the German Ladenschlussgesetz is quite real and does apply to retail 
stores, but the law sets out the hours of operations for those stores, not the terms under 
which stores make payments on bills.
The warning flags were numerous, but it would have required a controller experienced 
in European operations to catch most of them. Beginning with the German companies, the 
accountants who prepared the unaudited financial statements nevertheless found it impor-
tant to mention the Netherlands Antilles charters for a reason: under certain provisions, 
Dutch law restricts the disclosure of the identities of shareholders when a company is 
chartered in the Dutch protectorate. Certainly, firms that are chartered in known tax havens 
should merit extra scrutiny.
In this case, the retail store chains were probably related, and although definitively de-
termining common ownership could have been quite difficult given Dutch legal constraints, 
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a related party red flag should have gone up, based on other facts. First, aside from tax 
reasons, one should wonder why firms operating in Germany need Netherlands Antilles 
charters unless they are availing themselves of the Dutch secrecy provisions. Second, the 
large sales to the two chains were split evenly between two firms in the same geographic 
market and with the same peculiar ownership structure, and the split sales were just under 
amounts that would have triggered MQB’s more stringent credit screening standards 
requiring audited financial statements. Assuming the unaudited financial statements were 
not complete fabrications, they were likely prepared under standards that would defer 
impairment of the large amounts of goodwill carried on their balance sheets. Had goodwill 
been subject to impairment testing, its write-down would have signaled decreased (or no) 
expected future profitability.
Another troubling fact is that both chains were relatively small (each chain consisting 
of at most three stores) and yet those stores were ordering large quantities of product, 
making only occasional payments. The corporate controller also overlooked important 
industry indicators that were signaling that other retailers throughout  
Europe had a glut of product and were cutting back on new orders. The controller should 
have asked, what makes their stores different? A side agreement allowing the chains to 
return excess inventory was highly likely.
Finally, in spite of the fact that the U.S. corporate controller was bamboozled by the 
European division head’s mischaracterization of the Ladenschlussgesetz, she should have 
recognized that the extension of payment terms to 120 days, combined with the 120-day 
return policy, meant that the products were effectively sold on consignment. No payment 
would be made until the customer’s return privilege expired; therefore, the customer had 
nothing invested in the purchase until that point in time. Given the lack of history with 
these customers, these terms should have caused MQB to defer revenue recognition until 
after the return period expired.
As for the French firm, it is clear that the corporate controller should have gained a 
better understanding of local laws and procedures, especially when dealing with a dif-
ferent, in this case socialist, government system. However, there were other clues that 
something was not right. The internal auditor noticed, but failed to report, that the software 
technicians were mostly idle. If he had talked with them, they may have told him that they 
thought it odd that after a major corporate account, such as Companie des Machines Fran-
çaise SA, purchased a significant amount of software, there were no requests for help with 
integration issues.
Further, because the technicians were not a part of the team hired by the European 
division head, they may have been more forthcoming. The division head succeeded in 
defrauding MQB largely with the help of the European controller and the marketing direc-
tor, who were both rewarded later with jobs at the firm that subsequently hired the division 
head. It is doubtful that the division head would have attempted to bring the technicians 
into his scheme because he did not know them as well as he knew the others he had hired. 
The division head was able to gather all the conspirators he needed because he had com-
plete hiring autonomy; the technicians were the weak link in his scheme that the internal 
auditor overlooked.
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Overall, the returns allowance was quite insufficient, not just because the corporate 
controller missed the warnings already discussed. Applying returns data from the United 
States to Europe was not supportable. A more reasonable estimate should have come from 
the returns experience of other firms in Europe, or if those data were not available, MQB 
should have used a significantly larger estimate reflecting the weakened European econo-
my relative to the United States. Monitoring the inventory levels of its customers in Europe 
would also have signaled that higher returns were likely.
Clearly, one can see that the returns allowance was a critical accounting estimate 
for MQB. In this example, had the allowance been under audit committee review (as it 
should have), the likelihood is greater that committee members would have asked some 
probing questions—questions that management was not so eager to ask given the need 
to hit analysts’ consensus estimates. Those questions likely would have started with why 
the European returns estimate was not more carefully researched. Then, there may have 
been questions about the large sales to three European firms that were not known to U.S. 
managers. Those questions may have caused the corporate controller to make her visit to 
Europe earlier to meet with the customers personally. With an active and engaged audit 
committee, issues that get glossed over by management eager to achieve financial targets 
may be brought under more intense scrutiny at an earlier date.
If MQB management were required to present its critical accounting estimates to the 
audit committee for review, the SEC staff suggested the following disclosure:
Our recognition of revenue from sales to distributors and retailers (the “distribution 
channel”) is impacted by agreements we have giving them rights to return our software 
titles within 120 days after purchase. At the time we recognize revenue, upon shipment 
of our software products, we reduce our measurements of those sales by our estimate of 
future returns and we also reduce our measurements of accounts receivable by the same 
amount.
For our products, a historical correlation exists between the amount of distribution 
channel inventory and the amount of returns that actually occur. The greater the distribu-
tion channel inventory, the more product returns we expect. For each of our products, 
we monitor levels of product sales and inventory at our distributors’ warehouses and 
at retailers as part of our effort to reach an appropriate accounting estimate for returns. 
In estimating returns, we analyze historical returns, current inventory in the distribution 
channel, current economic trends, changes in consumer demand, introduction of new 
competing software and acceptance of our products.
Of course, in this example, MQB management failed to monitor and report on product 
inventory for the European customers. The audit committee could have used this state-
ment as the policy by which to judge the adequacy of the methodology used to estimate 
the European returns allowance, and if European management had failed to provide proper 
support for its return estimates, then the audit committee should have initiated its own 
investigation.




Frequently, revenue recognition fraud is difficult to detect in the short run. The schemes 
usually depend on improving sales in future quarters to provide cover for the fraudsters. 
The fraudsters hope that improved sales in future periods will allow them to charge off the 
phony sales they booked earlier without anyone noticing or minding. If future sales do not 
improve, the fraud schemes become more difficult to cover up. Customers who did not or-
der products begin to complain, deadbeats who will not pay come to light, and buyers with 
side agreements begin to exercise their right to return products. These developments usually 
reveal the fraud scheme.
The best chance the CPA has to catch this kind of fraud early is to throw a broad net 
when asking questions. The CPA should always strive to determine the economic justifica-
tion of a transaction, particularly if one customer is buying product in quantities that are 
unusually high relative to other firms in that industry. The CPA should spend some time 
talking with people outside the accounting function of a firm; those employees in service, 
shipping, and sales may possess knowledge that clearly points to fraud. Finally, as the example 
illustrates, the CPA should be especially wary of grants of autonomy to division or subsidiary 
heads because the autonomy allows them to override controls or form conspiracies to imple-
ment their fraud schemes.
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Chapter 14 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
Have Come to the United States
To aid the flow of capital between different countries, a need exists for a high quality set of 
accounting and financial reporting standards that can be implemented worldwide to provide 
equity and debt capital providers with the tools to compare and evaluate the performance of 
firms located in different countries. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
has attempted to fulfill that need with the development of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs). For the most part, those standards were implemented in the European 
Union in 2005, and they have spread to over 100 countries since then.
In the United States, certain foreign companies with securities listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges (foreign private issuers) are permitted to file their financial statements with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under IFRSs without having to reconcile those 
financial statements to U.S. generally accepted accounting standards (U.S. GAAP). The SEC 
has tentatively adopted a process that would lead to broader use of IFRSs among U.S. com-
panies by 2015, and because the SEC requires at least two prior years of comparative finan-
cial statements to be presented with each annual filing, U.S. companies moving to IFRSs will 
17-Chap14.indd   171 7/6/10   2:28:49 PM
172
Financial Reporting Fraud
likely need to begin implementing IFRSs in parallel to their U.S. GAAP reporting systems 
in 2013. In addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the IASB, the 
standard setters for U.S. GAAP and IFRSs, respectively, have agreed to a timetable to con-
verge the two standards as best as possible by 2011. Therefore, whether through adoption of 
IFRSs or convergence of standards, for both SEC registrants (public companies) and non-
SEC registrants (private companies), accounting standards in the United States likely will be 
moving closer to IFRSs over the next several years.
IFRSs and Financial Reporting Fraud
From the aspect of financial reporting fraud, IFRSs present new issues for the CPA. The 
common wisdom is that IFRSs are more principles based than the presumably more rules 
based U.S. GAAP, allowing for more flexibility for financial statement preparers under IF-
RSs. Indeed, the printed codification of U.S. GAAP consists of over 7000 pages contained 
in 4 volumes; the printed IFRSs, including applicable International Accounting Standards 
promulgated by a predecessor to the IASB, number just under 1200 pages in 1 volume, with 
another 1800 pages of accompanying documents, such as the bases for conclusions, in an-
other volume. Clearly, IFRSs could not be as specific in its guidance as U.S. GAAP because 
IFRSs uses fewer words. However, whether fewer words makes IFRSs more principles-based 
than U.S. GAAP is not a conclusion that one can reach simply by comparing word counts; 
it is necessary to examine each standard, and even elements of each standard, to make a 
proper comparison, and as will be demonstrated in the following example, the findings may 
be surprising.
A corollary of the common wisdom that IFRSs are more principles-based is that a prin-
ciples-based standard is more flexible, making IFRSs more susceptible to financial reporting 
fraud. It is far from clear whether the corollary is true, and the common wisdom, as discussed 
subsequently, does not always hold, as well.
Need for Transparency Under Principles-
Based Standards
A key component to restraining financial reporting fraud under a principles-based system 
is disclosure. For example, if a company is adopting a revenue recognition policy that ac-
celerates revenue under IFRSs that would otherwise have been deferred under U.S. GAAP, 
a footnote describing the policy and quantifying its impact on the financial statements may 
provide sufficient detail to allow users of the financial statements to adjust the revenues, if 
necessary, to allow for comparisons with peer companies in the same industry or for other 
reasons. Indeed, securities analysts reviewing the filings of public companies will likely de-
mand such disclosure precisely for comparisons with peer companies. With comprehensive 
disclosure, fraud becomes more difficult.
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Financial reporting transparency is already a part of U.S. securities laws, contained in 
U.S. GAAP and expanded for public companies in SEC Regulation S-X, with additional 
disclosures in SEC Regulation S-K relating to critical accounting policies as part of manage-
ment’s discussion and analysis. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the Supreme Court (in 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.) ruled that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likeli-
hood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Continuing with the preceding 
revenue recognition hypothetical, if a firm reporting under IFRSs recognizes revenue more 
rapidly than its peers reporting under U.S. GAAP, then without adequate disclosure, the IF-
RSs firm may appear to have outperformed its peers when, using a comparable standard such 
as U.S. GAAP, it had not. On the other hand, if the IFRSs firm had disclosed its revenues 
on a basis comparable with its U.S. GAAP peers, then that disclosure may have significantly 
altered the “total mix” of information made available to investors. With disclosure, investors 
are less likely to be misled.
Fraud Under U.S. GAAP Versus IFRSs: An 
Insurance Accounting Example
That said, there are areas to which the CPA should pay closer attention as IFRSs become 
more widely used in the United States. Definitions will change, and applications of the new 
(to U.S. users) IFRSs accounting terms may open the door to more creative fraud. Insurance 
accounting provides a good example.
Under U.S. GAAP, as well as IFRSs, insurance contracts must transfer a sufficient amount 
of risk in order to qualify for insurance accounting. With risk transfer, the insurance company, 
often referred to as a carrier, takes in periodic payments (called premiums) from the insured and 
assumes, or carries, a risk of having to pay a significant amount back to the insured if a certain 
event occurs (such as death for a life insurance contract or a natural disaster for a property 
insurance contract). The premium is considered revenue to the insurance company when 
earned. Without risk transfer, the purported insurance contract may be nothing more than 
a deposit arrangement whereby the insurance company takes in money over time and then 
pays it back, perhaps with interest, on a later date (that is, little risk is assumed by the insur-
ance company, and the cash flows coming in and going out are rather certain). The periodic 
cash inflows to the company under a deposit arrangement are not revenues but are recorded 
as deposit liabilities on the insurance company’s balance sheet, similar to a bank deposit. The 
presence or absence of risk transfer determines whether the insurance company recognizes 
income from a contract, and the impact on earnings can be significant.
Risks can be transferred from one insurance company to another through reinsurance, 
and some carriers prefer to retain some risk while transferring other risk. For example, a 
property and casualty carrier may be willing to carry the first $100,000 of risk on a given 
type of policy while transferring, or ceding, any claims risk over $100,000 to reinsurers (the 
assuming carriers). If the policy limit on claims is $1,000,000, then the carrier issuing the 
policy retains $100,000 of risk and reinsures $900,000. Several reinsurers may assume the 
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$900,000 of risk transferred, with one, perhaps, assuming a “layer” of risk from $100,001 to 
$500,000 in claims and another assuming risk from $500,001 to $1,000,000 in claims. The 
assumption of risk by a reinsurer is accomplished by a contract known as a reinsurance treaty. 
Because risks are defined and limited for each of the reinsurers in this example, the contracts 
for each of the reinsurers are called finite risk reinsurance. The issuing carrier will have to pay 
some of the premium it receives to the reinsurers to compensate the reinsurers for the finite 
risks they assume.
Finite risk reinsurance became the focus of regulatory investigations in the early 2000s 
when certain insurers and reinsurers transferring risks to others in outbound treaties made 
promises to make whole other reinsurers that assumed those risks. Such a promise would 
negate risk transfer from the ceding carrier because if the assuming reinsurer suffered a loss 
under its inbound treaties, the ceding carrier would be obligated to reimburse the assuming 
reinsurer. The make whole promises typically came in the form of side letters or e-mails that 
were outside the reinsurance contracts and were thus harder to detect.
The following example scenario demonstrates the fraud incentive to the ceding carri-
ers to enter into side agreements to make whole the assuming carriers related to expected 
claims. The scenario will first set out the assumed facts and then examine the possibility of 
fraud under both U.S. GAAP and IFRSs:
P&C Insurance Company is a publicly traded worldwide property and casualty insurance 
carrier insuring homes and businesses in the United States and Europe for a variety of 
risks, including windstorms, floods, and earthquakes, with policy limits up to $10,000,000 
per occurrence. Competition had prevented P&C from raising its premiums relative to its 
exposure to risks. The chief actuary at P&C was concerned that a major loss, known in the 
industry as a catastrophe, or cat loss for short, would not only affect earnings in the current 
year but also make clear to securities analysts and investors what the chief actuary already 
knew: that premiums were not keeping up with the potential losses from the risks P&C 
insured. Such a revelation would likely cause analysts to adjust their profitability forecasts 
for P&C and lower their target stock prices.
Eventually, what the chief actuary feared came to pass: news reports stated that a 
windstorm swept through areas of Europe where P&C had extensive exposure to risk. The 
chief actuary immediately went to the CFO and relayed the bad news that major claims 
were on their way. However, the CFO had an idea that may avert a charge to earnings by 
using reinsurance. The CFO had avoided entering into reinsurance agreements in the past 
because they were expensive, and P&C had a hard enough time achieving profitability 
without paying reinsurance premiums to a reinsurer. However, for this identified windstorm 
risk, the time was right, so the CFO thought, to call in a favor. He knew the CEO of P&C 
was friends with the CEO of Reinsurance Re (ReRe), a reinsurer that specialized in prop-
erty coverage, and ReRe would have the capital available to assume a large portion of the 
windstorm risk. The CEO, upon hearing the bad news and the possible solution, went to 
his friend and negotiations commenced. The actuaries at ReRe were no dummies, though, 
and they quickly determined that a catastrophe loss was emerging. However, ReRe’s CEO 
wanted to develop a stronger business relationship with P&C and told his actuaries to find 
a solution.
Example Scenario
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There was a dilemma in that if ReRe charged P&C a premium large enough to cover 
the expected loss from windstorms, it would be about the same size as the expected claim 
expense and would serve no purpose. The CEO of P&C met privately with the CEO of ReRe 
and agreed to a solution that would allow P&C to get some relief from expected claims now 
and then pay ReRe in later periods as the claims emerged. The two CEOs memorialized this 
agreement in a side letter that guaranteed that P&C would make ReRe whole some time af-
ter ReRe paid claims under a reinsurance agreement between the two companies. The side 
letter, which contained specific dates and terms of payment, would not be referenced in the 
reinsurance agreement, and the reinsurance premium would be set at a standard for the 
industry—as if there were no emerging claims exposure—so as not to raise any suspicion. 
The reinsurance contract would begin, or incept, nine months prior to the current date to 
further allay concern that it was entered into with knowledge of the expected windstorm 
losses.
Much to the delight of P&C’s CFO, ReRe agreed to assume most of the risk from P&C 
relating to windstorm risks, and when the claims materialized as expected, P&C was able to 
offset the claims expense with a reimbursement due from ReRe. The net impact on P&C’s 
financial statements was minimal, and securities analysts did not see a need to revise their 
earnings estimates downward.
The windstorm cat loss was mitigated, but P&C’s CEO was concerned that another cat 
loss would be more difficult to hide, so he visited ReRe’s CEO again with the idea to share 
a broad range of risks between multiple reinsurers, with the risk returning to P&C eventu-
ally so that P&C did not suffer a significant net loss of premium. ReRe’s CEO, who resided 
in Hamilton, Bermuda, lived next door to Second Chance Re’s CEO and knew him well. 
Together, the three of them worked out a series of reinsurance treaties that would shift risk 

















Premium would follow risk with each step, with a “haircut” going to each reinsurer as a 
convenience fee. Also, the contracts would not be signed simultaneously but would incept 
on different dates over approximately three month’s time. Through a side letter, the timing 
of payment on any claims made by Second Chance Re on P&C would be delayed for five 
years, with an interest rate charged for the delay. The side letter pushed claims recognition 
by P&C down the road should any covered cat loss emerge. With the side letter kept secret, 
P&C could currently recognize premiums from Second Chance Re while delaying recog-
nition of any claims made under the Second Chance Re treaty until later years. Because 
claims in the insurance business typically take several years to settle, the delay would not 
likely arouse suspicion.
When auditors for P&C reviewed the carrier’s reinsurance, they saw an outbound treaty 
transferring certain risks to ReRe and an inbound treaty from Second Chance Re transfer-
ring certain risks into P&C. However, due to the use of different definitions and risk descrip-
tions in each treaty and different inception dates, the treaties appeared to be separate and 
unrelated. Moreover, without knowledge of the side letter, the inbound Second Chance Re 
treaty appeared to transfer risk to P&C, allowing P&C to recognize as revenue the annual 
payments from Second Chance Re under the treaty terms. Therefore, P&C got a five-year 
delay on claims payments should certain cat losses emerge, whereby management could 
tout to analysts and investors their superior reinsurance program while pushing the claims 
far into the future. P&C’s earnings were more consistent, regardless of the occurrence of 
natural disasters, and the securities markets rewarded the company’s stock with a lower 
cost of capital and a higher price/earnings ratio. Executive bonuses were also plentiful.
Make Whole Provision
Under either U.S. GAAP or IFRSs, the make whole side letter for the windstorm coverage 
in the first ReRe treaty negates risk transfer, and when P&C books a claims reimbursement 
receivable from ReRe due to the windstorms in Europe, it commits fraud when it fails to 
record a charge for its promise to repay ReRe. That said, an accepted practice exists in the 
insurance industry to make a nonbinding pledge to do business with a reinsurer over long 
periods of time so that should the reinsurer suffer from a major claim, that reinsurer can 
recoup some or all of its loss with premiums in future years, assuming another major loss 
does not occur. Under this practice, a carrier could pledge to make whole a reinsurer, but 
no guarantee exists that another significant loss will occur or that the carrier will continue 
to do business with the reinsurer. The side letter in this example scenario went well be-
yond a pledge in that it was a guarantee with specific terms that presumably would make it 
legally binding.
The CEOs of P&C and ReRe attempted to hide their make whole agreement by deliber-
ately omitting reference to the side letter in the reinsurance treaty and attempting to keep 
the reinsurance premium within normal limits for treaties covering that type of risk. They 
also backdated the treaty in an attempt to deceive others into thinking that the terms were 
agreed to nine months before the windstorms arrived. In the United States, where insur- 
ers file financial reports with state insurance commissioners under statutory accounting 
 Example Analysis
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principles (SAP), backdating a reinsurance agreement is allowed under certain circum-
stances. Paragraph 24 of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Statement 
of Statutory Accounting Principles (SSAP) No. 62R, Property and Casualty Reinsurance, 
states
[i]t is not uncommon for a reinsurance arrangement to be initiated before the beginning 
of a policy period but not finalized until after the policy period begins. Whether there was 
agreement in principle at the beginning of the policy period and, therefore, the agreement 
is substantively prospective shall be determined based on the facts and circumstances. 
However, ... if an agreement entered into, renewed or amended on or after January 1, 
1994 has not been finalized, reduced to a written form and signed by the parties within 
nine months after the commencement of the policy period covered by the reinsurance 
arrangement, then the arrangement is presumed to be retroactive and shall be accounted 
for as a retroactive reinsurance agreement.
SSAP No. 62R reflects the industry practice in which two companies may reach agree-
ment on risk coverage but not document the agreement until a later date, but there must 
be an agreement in principle at the beginning of the policy period. In this example, nine 
months prior to the signing of the ReRe windstorm treaty, the two CEOs had not even dis-
cussed the issue, much less reached an agreement on coverage, because the windstorms 
had not occurred. Therefore, the nine month backdating was another attempt to make the 
treaty appear to incept well before the loss event while taking advantage of the leeway af-
forded in SAP.
For the CPA, this example illustrates that specialized knowledge of the industry is es-
sential. Knowing when a make whole pledge crosses the line from an expression of intent 
to continue to do business to a legally enforceable promise to negate risk is critical. The 
CPA must watch out for attempts to abuse industry practices, such as the nine months pro-
visions of SSAP No. 62R. The sudden appearance of reinsurance just before large claims 
arise is suspicious and bears investigation. There should be some evidence of discussions 
near or on the inception date, and that date should be independent of loss events. Evidence 
of earlier discussions should be found in discussions with those employees who typically 
handle risk exposure and those who monitor the status of outstanding reinsurance trea-
ties. Also, actuaries are typically involved to assess the adequacy of risk transfer, and their 
absence may be another red flag.
Roundtrip Treaties
In regard to the roundtrip treaties between P&C, ReRe, and Second Chance Re, U.S. GAAP 
and IFRSs take different paths. At issue is the definition of an insurance contract: in this 
example, if the treaty that shifts risk from P&C to ReRe can be defined to include the treaty 
that shifts essentially the same risk from Second Chance Re back to P&C, then there is 
clearly no risk transfer; if the contracts stand alone, there may be risk transfer depending 
on other factors. For U.S. GAAP, the definition of an insurance contract is quite broad. Ac-
cording to FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 944-20-15-40
[d]etermining ... whether a contract with a reinsurer provides indemnification against loss 
or liability relating to insurance risk requires a complete understanding of that contract 
and other contracts or agreements between the ceding entity and related reinsurers. A 
complete understanding includes an evaluation of all contractual features that do either of 
the following:
(continued)




a.  Limit the amount of insurance risk to which the reinsurer is subject (such as 
through experience refunds, cancellation provisions, adjustable features, or addi-
tions of profitable lines of business to the reinsurance contract)
b.  Delay the timely reimbursement of claims by the reinsurer (such as through pay-
ment schedules or accumulating retentions from multiple years).
This risk transfer assessment shall be made at contract inception, based on facts and 
circumstances known at the time.
A complete understanding requires the CPA to look for and incorporate other contracts 
and agreements between the ceding entity and related reinsurers. For P&C (the ceding en-
tity in the example), the outbound treaty with ReRe would be combined with the inbound 
treaty from Second Chance Re, and it would be obvious, except for the clever attempts to 
hide similarities using obfuscatory language in the treaties, that there was no risk transfer. 
From the example, it is clear, if discovered, that ReRe and Second Chance Re were “re-
lated” in that there was a treaty between them. For a CPA at P&C, finding out about the 
existence of that treaty may be a difficult forensic exercise if the parties were intent on hid-
ing it. Even without knowledge of the ReRe-Second Chance Re treaty, one could argue that 
because the outbound and inbound treaties at P&C ceded and then reassumed the same 
risk, the two reinsurers would be related. At the very least, properly implementing FASB 
ASC 944-20-15-40 typically requires the CPA to review and analyze the ceding and assump-
tion of various types of risk and can be quite detailed and complicated. Even if reinsurance 
contracts were executed at different times under different market conditions and even if 
any roundtriping of risk were accidental, the CPA would need to aggregate all the contracts 
and assess whether there was, on net, significant risk retained by the carrier to allow it to 
use insurance accounting and recognize premium receipts as revenues.
IFRSs utilize a simpler definition of an insurance contract for risk assessment. Accord-
ing to paragraph B25 of IFRS 4, Insurance Contracts
An insurer shall assess the significance of insurance risk contract by contract, 
rather than by reference to materiality to the financial statements.* Thus, 
insurance risk may be significant even if there is minimal probability of mate-
rial losses for a whole book of contracts. This contract-by-contract assessment 
makes it easier to classify a contract as an insurance contract.
The IFRS 4 approach is more specific in that risk is assessed contract by contract, and 
risk may be deemed significant even if other contracts reduce risk so that there is a mini-
mal probability of material losses for a whole book of contacts. The footnote is important 
in that the CPA is instructed to look outside the four corners of the insurance contract if, 
and only if, there are other contracts that were “entered into simultaneously with a single 
counterparty (or ... are otherwise interdependent)” and then incorporate any such contracts 
into the contract under review. In the example scenario, there was an attempt to disguise 
the simultaneous timing of the roundtrip contracts by using different inception dates, but 
the fact that the contracts were indeed simultaneous would trigger the footnote provision 
under IFRS 4 and collapse the contracts into one, thereby negating all risk in the example. 
If there were some net risk exposure left after P&C The IFRS 4 approach is more specific in
*
* For this purpose, contracts entered into simultaneously with a single counterparty (or contracts that are otherwise interdependent) 
form a single contract.
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that risk is assessed contract by contract, and risk may be deemed significant even if other 
contracts reduce risk so that there is a minimal probability of material losses for a whole 
book of contacts. The footnote is important in that the CPA is instructed to look outside the 
four corners of the insurance contract if, and only if, there are other contracts that were 
“entered into simultaneously with a single counterparty (or ... are otherwise interdepen-
dent)” and then incorporate any such contracts into the contract under review. In the ex-
ample scenario, there was an attempt to disguise the simultaneous timing of the roundtrip 
contracts by using different inception dates, but the fact that the contracts were indeed 
simultaneous would trigger the footnote provision under IFRS 4 and collapse the contracts 
into one, thereby negating all risk in the example. If there were some net risk exposure left 
after P&C ceded risk to ReRe and then assumed risk from Second Chance Re, such that 
there was a minimal probability of material losses for a whole book of contracts, then P&C 
may have a better argument for insurance, rather than deposit, accounting under IFRSs 
than under U.S. GAAP (in contrast, FASB ASC 944-20-15-41 requires significant insurance 
risk rather than the lower standard in IFRS 4 of minimal probability).
U.S. GAAP and IFRSs Differences
Assume that the roundtrip contracts were not entered into simultaneously, as set out in the 
example, but were the product of separate and unrelated negotiations over different periods 
of time, and by coincidence, they covered the same underlying insurance contracts and risks 
in overlapping periods. Such an outcome is not uncommon for major risks that are first 
insured, then reinsured, then reinsured again (retroceded), and then perhaps reassumed by 
one of the ceding carriers under another treaty that covers a wide range of risks and happens 
to include risks that were earlier ceded away. U.S. GAAP, under FASB ASC 944-20-15-40, 
would apply the principle of looking to all other contracts and collapse the risk exposure; 
IFRSs would apply the contract-by-contract rule and, lacking simultaneity, would assess risk 
for each contract separately. Collapsed risk would likely lead to deposit accounting with no 
revenue recognition of receipts; separate risk assessments would likely lead to insurance ac-
counting with revenue recognition of receipts. Radically different outcomes result from the 
same set of facts, depending on the accounting standards used.
Which set of standards cited in this discussion were principles based and which were 
rules based? Contrary to popular belief, U.S. GAAP was more principles based, and IFRSs 
were more rules based. Perhaps a better generalization of IFRSs is that IFRSs are simpler. 
IFRSs’ simplicity may result in fewer rules such that some IFRSs standards rely more on 
principles than their U.S. GAAP counterparts; however, for other standards, IFRSs’ simplicity 
may result in reducing some complex U.S. GAAP to more basic rules under IFRSs, as in the 
case with the definition of insurance contracts.
IFRSs Impact on Fraud and Regulation
What do simpler IFRSs standards imply for fraud detection and regulatory enforcement? For 
the CPA, simpler standards allow for more straightforward and, hopefully, clearer directives to 
apply. Consider the CPA working for a major international insurance carrier with multiple 
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reinsurance agreements. Under U.S. GAAP, the CPA must thoroughly examine how reinsur-
ance treaties may interrelate to assess risk retention. In doing so, the CPA most likely would 
have to drill down to the underlying insurance contracts under each treaty, become familiar 
with the extent of risk ceded or assumed relating to those underlying contracts, and assess 
interrelationships. Under IFRSs, the CPA would have greater certainty that the relevant 
contract is the one in his or her hands and does not include others that may reside in other 
divisions or subsidiaries of the same company or other treaties that have yet to be written. 
Under IFRSs, the CPA may still have to search for evidence of other simultaneous contracts, 
which would include a review of correspondence and other agreements executed in close 
proximity, but an analysis of previous treaties would likely not be as comprehensive.
Under IFRSs, regulators can focus on important and clearer violations, such as the 
CEOs in the example scenario who entered into treaties simultaneously while plotting to 
hide the fact. It should be less likely that regulators would snare someone who inadvertently 
violates an IFRS standard if the standard is simpler. If an insurance company CPA applying 
U.S. GAAP fails to detect an old treaty that negates risk transfer, he or she has exposure to 
regulatory punishment; if that same CPA is applying IFRSs, he or she may likely not be held 
accountable for the old treaties at all when deciding whether to use insurance or deposit 
accounting.
However, the CPA using IFRSs does not get a free pass when it comes to disclosure. 
Because IFRS standards are simpler (that is, fewer words), transparency of financial reporting 
rises in importance to better explain decisions made by management when implementing 
IFRSs. For insurance contracts, paragraphs 38–39 of IFRS 4 state
[a]n insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to 
evaluate the nature and extent of risks arising from insurance contracts.
To comply with paragraph 38, an insurer shall disclose:
(a)  its objectives, policies and processes for managing risks arising from insurance con-
tracts and the methods used to manage those risks. ...
(c)  information about insurance risk (both before and after risk mitigation by reinsur-
ance), including information about:
 (i)  sensitivity to insurance risk [reference omitted].
 (ii)  concentrations of insurance risk, including a description of how management 
determines concentrations and a description of the shared characteristic that 
identifies each concentration (eg type of insured event, geographical area, or 
currency).
 (iii)  actual claims compared with previous estimates (ie claims development). The 
disclosure about claims development shall go back to the period when the ear-
liest material claim arose for which there is still uncertainty about the amount 
and timing of the claims payments, but need not go back more than ten years. 
An insurer need not disclose this information for claims for which uncertainty 
about the amount and timing of claims payments is typically resolved within 
one year.
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Paragraph 39(c) requires disclosure of “information about insurance risk (both before and 
after risk mitigation by reinsurance)” that would reveal the impact of offsetting treaties, as 
well as risks ceded and assumed. If management, following IFRSs, decided to use insurance 
accounting for otherwise risk-canceling material, inbound and outbound treaties, the net 
exposure (zero) would have to be explained in footnotes to the financial statements, and 
users of those financial statements, such as securities analysts, would then know to inquire 
about the premium revenue impact of those offsetting treaties. With knowledge of the rev-
enue impact, analysts could adjust the insurance carrier’s premiums, removing the revenue 
impact of the inbound treaty if necessary, to better evaluate the carrier’s performance relative 
to its peers on a more consistent and comparable basis.
Conclusion
Disclosure will be front and center on the CPA’s fraud battleground of the future. Disclosure 
has always been important, but simpler standards, such as IFRSs, will place greater emphasis 
on adequacy of disclosure within the total mix context of U.S. securities laws. The total mix 
will likely take into account the accounting policies implemented within an industry by and 
among members of a peer group of firms. If a given firm, utilizing the flexibility afforded by 
IFRSs, adopts a policy that is different from the peer group without disclosing the departure, 
that difference may be material if its disclosure would affect the total mix of information 
evaluated by investors in making buy and sell decisions. Without disclosure, the investor 
may assume the firm implements accounting policies similar to those of its peers when, in 
reality, it does not. In the IFRSs environment, the CPA will probably have to evaluate the 
adequacy of disclosure in the context of disclosures and policies adopted by peer firms. With 
the coming of IFRSs, disclosure (actually comprehensive disclosure) will be of paramount 
importance.
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PROPOSED RULE: DISCLOSURE IN
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION
AND ANALYSIS ABOUT THE
APPLICATION OF CRITICAL
ACCOUNTING POLICIES*
[Author’s Note: Even prior to the bankruptcy of Enron, the Securities and
Exchange Commission staff had discussed the concept of companies making
disclosure of critical accounting policies and estimates. In May of 2002, the
SEC proposed this rule to better define the disclosure concept. When the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was enacted in June 2002, Section 204 of the
Act required auditors to discuss critical accounting policies in reports made
to audit committees. The Act also incorporated other concepts discussed in
the proposed rule. This book expands upon the examples given in this
proposed rule.
Appendix A reproduces relevant portions of the rule for this book’s discussion
only. The complete rule is available on the SEC’s Web site.]
Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and
Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Securities and Exchange Commission
17 CFR Parts 228, 229 and 249
*Source: The complete proposed rule can be found at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8098.htm.
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[Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907
International Series Release No. 1258
File No. S7-16-02]
RIN 3235-AI44
Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about the Appli-
cation of Critical Accounting Policies
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’)
Action: Notice of proposed rulemaking
Summary: As an initial step in improving the transparency of companies’
financial disclosure, the Commission is proposing disclosure requirements
that would enhance investors’ understanding of the application of companies’
critical accounting policies. The proposals would encompass disclosure in
two areas: accounting estimates a company makes in applying its accounting
policies and the initial adoption by a company of an accounting policy that
has a material impact on its financial presentation. Under the first part of
the proposals, a company would have to identify the accounting estimates
reflected in its financial statements that required it to make assumptions
about matters that were highly uncertain at the time of estimation. Disclosure
about those estimates would then be required if different estimates that the
company reasonably could have used in the current period, or changes in
the accounting estimate that are reasonably likely to occur from period to
period, would have a material impact on the presentation of the company’s
financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of operations. A
company’s disclosure about these critical accounting estimates would include
a discussion of: the methodology and assumptions underlying them; the
effect the accounting estimates have on the company’s financial presentation;
and the effect of changes in the estimates. Under the second part of the
proposals, a company that has initially adopted an accounting policy with a
material impact would have to disclose information that includes: what gave
rise to the initial adoption; the impact of the adoption; the accounting principle
adopted and method of applying it; and the choices it had among accounting
principles. Companies would place all of the new disclosure in the ‘‘Manage-
ment’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions’’ section (commonly referred to as ‘‘MD&A’’) of their annual reports,
registration statements and proxy and information statements. In addition,
in the MD&A section of their quarterly reports, U.S. companies would have
to update the information regarding their critical accounting estimates to
disclose material changes.
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Dates: Comments should be received on or before July 19, 2002.
Addresses: You should send three copies of your comments to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-0609. You also may submit your com-
ments electronically to the following address: rule-comments@sec.gov. All
comment letters should refer to File No. S7-16-02; this file number should
be included in the subject line if you use electronic mail. Comment letters
will be available for public inspection and copying at the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-0102. We
will post electronically-submitted comment letters on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov). We do not edit personal identifying
information, such as names or electronic mail addresses, from electronic
submissions. Submit only information you wish to make publicly available.
For Further Information Contact: Questions about this release should be
referred to Anita Klein or Andrew Thorpe, Division of Corporation Finance
(202-942-2980) or Jackson Day or Jenifer Minke-Girard, Office of the Chief
Accountant (202-942-4400), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549.
Supplementary Information:
We are proposing amendments to Item 3031 of Regulation S-K,2 Item 3033
of Regulation S-B4 and Item 5 of Form 20-F5 under the Securities Exchange




A. Current MD&A Disclosure
B. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Accounting Esti-
mates
C. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Initial Adoption of
Accounting Policies
III. Proposed Rules
A. Objectives of the Current Proposals
B. Scope of the Proposals
C. Proposed Disclosure about Critical Accounting Estimates
1. Accounting estimates covered under the proposals
2. Identification and description of the accounting estimate, the
methodology used, certain assumptions and reasonably likely
changes
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3. Impact of the estimate on financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operations
4. Quantitative disclosures
a. Quantitative disclosures to demonstrate sensitivity
b. Quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning past
changes in the estimate
5. Senior management’s discussions with the audit committee
6. Disclosure relating to segments





E. Auditor Examination of MD&A Disclosure Relating to Critical
Accounting Estimates
F. Quarterly Updates
G. Proposed Disclosure about Initial Adoption of Accounting Policies
H. Disclosure Presentation
I. Application to Foreign Private Issuers
J. Application to Small Business Issuers
K. Application of Safe Harbors for Forward-looking Information
IV. General Request For Comment
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
VI. Cost-Benefit Analysis
VII. Effects On Efficiency, Competition And Capital Formation
VIII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
IX. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
X. Codification Update
Statutory Bases and Text of Proposed Amendments
I. Executive Summary
One important challenge facing our capital markets today is the need to
improve the quality and transparency of corporate disclosure. Our capital
markets could reach a higher level of efficiency and investor confidence if
companies were to provide higher-quality, more insightful financial informa-
tion. To serve that purpose, we issued cautionary advice in December 2001
regarding MD&A disclosure.7 In that release, we recognized the need for
disclosure that allows investors to understand more completely the manner
in which, and degree to which, a company’s reported operating results,
financial condition and changes in financial condition depend on estimates
involved in applying accounting policies that entail uncertainties and subjec-
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tivity. We also asked companies to begin better addressing investors’ need
for this disclosure.
As contemplated in that release, we are now proposing to amend the
MD&A requirements8 to mandate improved disclosure in a new ‘‘Application
of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section in companies’ filed annual reports,
annual reports to shareholders, registration statements and proxy and infor-
mation statements.9 The new section would encompass disclosure both about
accounting estimates resulting from the application of critical accounting
policies and the initial adoption of accounting policies that have a material
impact on a company’s financial presentation. The proposed disclosure
requirements would apply to all companies except small business issuers
that have not had revenues from operations during the last two fiscal years.
The proposed MD&A disclosure requirements would cover the most recent
fiscal year and any subsequent interim period for which financial statements
are required to be presented.
To determine whether an accounting estimate10 involved in applying the
company’s accounting policies would entail disclosure under the proposals,
a company would have to answer two questions:
1. Did the accounting estimate require us to make assumptions about matters
that were highly uncertain at the time the accounting estimate was made?
2. Would different estimates that we reasonably could have used in the
current period, or changes in the accounting estimate that are reasonably
likely to occur from period to period, have a material impact on the presenta-
tion of our financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of
operations?
If the answers to both questions are ‘‘yes,’’ the accounting estimate would
be a ‘‘critical accounting estimate,’’ and disclosure would be required in the
new ‘‘Application of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section.
The proposed disclosure about these accounting estimates would involve
three basic elements.11 The first element would be the basic disclosures
needed to understand the accounting estimates. A company would have to
describe them, identify where and how they affect the company’s reported
financial results, financial condition and changes in financial condition, and,
where material, identify the affected line items. It would have to describe the
methodology underlying each critical accounting estimate, the assumptions
that are about highly uncertain matters and other assumptions that are
material. If applicable, a company would have to discuss why it could have
chosen in the current period estimates that would have had a materially
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different impact on the company’s financial presentation. Similarly, a com-
pany would have to discuss, if applicable, why the accounting estimate is
reasonably likely to change in future periods with a material impact on the
company’s financial presentation.12
A company would have to identify the segments13 of its business that a
critical accounting estimate affects. A company also would have to provide
appropriate parts of the proposed disclosure for affected segments where a
failure to present that information would result in an omission that renders
the disclosure materially misleading.
The second element of the proposed disclosure about critical accounting
estimates would give investors a better understanding of the sensitivity of
the reported operating results and financial condition to changes in those
estimates or their underlying assumption(s). For each critical accounting
estimate, a company would discuss changes that would result either from:
(i) making reasonably possible, near-term changes in the most material
assumption(s) underlying the estimate; or (ii) using in place of the recorded
estimate the ends of the range of reasonably possible amounts which the
company likely determined when formulating its recorded estimate. The com-
pany would describe the impact of those changes on the company’s overall
financial performance and, to the extent material, on the line items in the
company’s financial statements. In addition, the proposals would require a
quantitative and qualitative discussion of management’s history of changing
its critical accounting estimates in recent years.
The third element of the proposed disclosure about critical accounting esti-
mates would require a company to state whether or not senior management
discussed the development, selection and disclosure of those estimates with
the company’s audit committee. This part of the proposals is designed to
inform investors about whether there is oversight of critical accounting esti-
mates by audit committee members and may incidentally encourage such
oversight and increase reliability of the proposed MD&A disclosure about
critical accounting estimates.
Our proposals also address MD&A disclosure regarding initial adoption of
an accounting policy. If an accounting policy initially adopted by a company
had a material impact on the company’s financial presentation, the company
would provide certain disclosures about that initial adoption unless it resulted
solely from new accounting literature issued by a recognized accounting
standard setter. The initial adoption of an accounting policy may occur in
situations such as when events or transactions affecting the company occur
for the first time, or were previously immaterial in their effect but become
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material, or events or transactions occur that are clearly different in substance
from previous ones.
The proposed MD&A disclosure about the initial adoption of accounting
policies seeks more qualitative information from companies about those types
of situations. The disclosures we are proposing would include a description of:
• The events or transactions that gave rise to the initial adoption;
• The accounting principle adopted and the method of applying that principle;
and
• The impact, discussed qualitatively, on the company’s financial presenta-
tion.
In addition, if upon initial adoption the company had a choice between accept-
able accounting principles under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), the company would disclose that it made a choice, explain the
alternatives and state why it made the choice that it did. Further, if no
accounting literature governed the accounting upon initial adoption, the com-
pany would have to explain which accounting principle and method of applica-
tion it decided to use and how it made its decision.
All of the proposed MD&A disclosure regarding the application of critical
accounting policies would have to be presented in language and a format
that is clear, concise and understandable to the average investor. Boilerplate
disclosures, or disclosures written in overly technical accounting terminology,
would not satisfy the proposed requirements.
Our proposals do not attempt to address all circumstances where a company
may exercise discretion in its accounting under GAAP. We focus our propos-
als on two areas involving the application of critical accounting policies in
which there is a clear need for improved disclosure—critical accounting
estimates and the initial adoption of accounting policies that have a material
impact. As discussed below, disclosure in many other areas of accounting
judgment is provided by existing MD&A requirements, materiality standards
and financial statement disclosure requirements.
II. Background
A. Current MD&A Disclosure
For decades, the regulations governing disclosure in registration statements
under the Securities Act of 1933 (‘‘Securities Act’’) and the Exchange Act,
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as well as annual and quarterly reports and proxy and information statements
by public companies under the Exchange Act, have mandated MD&A disclo-
sure.14 MD&A disclosure should satisfy three related objectives:
1. to provide a narrative explanation of companies’ financial statements that
enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management;
2. to improve overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which
financial statements should be analyzed; and
3. to provide information about the quality of, and potential variability of, a
company’s earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the
likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance.15
In MD&A, a company must discuss its results of operations, liquidity and
capital resources and other information necessary to an understanding of
the company’s financial condition or changes in financial condition. A well-
prepared MD&A discussion focuses on explaining a company’s financial
results and condition by identifying key elements of the business model and
the drivers and dynamics of the business, and also addressing key variables.
A company currently must disclose known trends, demands, commitments,
events and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to occur and have material
effects.16
In addition to these general subjects, a company must include in MD&A
historical and prospective analysis of its financial statements, and identify
the cause of material changes from prior periods in the line items of the
financial statements where those changes are reflected. A company must
analyze significant components of revenues or expenses needed to under-
stand the results of operations. It also must discuss significant or unusual
economic events or transactions that materially affected results of operations.
Finally, a company also must discuss its ability to generate adequate amounts
of cash to meet its short-term and long-term needs for capital and identify
the anticipated sources of funds necessary to fulfill its commitments.
These requirements do not call for, and indeed we have discouraged and
continue to discourage companies from providing, rote calculations of per-
centage changes in figures in the financial statements combined with boiler-
plate recitations of a surfeit of inadequately differentiated material and
immaterial factors related to such changes. Rather, companies should
emphasize material factors and their underlying reasons and preferably omit,
or at least differentiate, immaterial information.
Recognizing the paramount importance of MD&A information to investors,
in addition to today’s proposal, we intend to continue to focus on improving
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disclosure in this area. In particular, we are considering MD&A proposals
that will focus discussion on the three key objectives of MD&A noted above.
We are considering a more explicit requirement for a summary of the
MD&A section that would, in relatively short form, identify what management
considers the most important factors in determining its financial results and
condition, including the principal factors driving them, the principal trends on
which management focuses and the principal risks to the business. We also
are considering how to adjust the relative attention devoted in MD&A towards
a more general discussion of material matters and away from a detailed
description of business results that too often recites information that is other-
wise available or is not material to investors.
In addition, we are continuing our consideration of subjects as to which
we believe MD&A disclosure is particularly important, including the topics
discussed in our January 22, 2002 release regarding MD&A.17 For example,
investors have become increasingly concerned about the sufficiency of dis-
closure regarding structured finance transactions, including those consum-
mated using special purpose entities. A company’s relationships with those
types of entities may facilitate its transfer of, or access to, assets. Investors
need to know more about the liquidity risk, market price risks and effects of
‘‘off-balance sheet’’ transaction structures and obligations. Another item of
concern is a lack of transparent disclosure about transactions where that
information appeared necessary to understand how significant aspects of
the business were conducted. Investors would better understand financial
statements in many circumstances if MD&A included descriptions of all mate-
rial transactions involving related persons or entities, with a clear discussion
of terms that differ from those which would likely be negotiated with clearly
independent parties. Investors should understand these transactions’ busi-
ness purpose and economic substance, their effects on the financial state-
ments, and any special risks or contingencies arising from them.
Finally, we are considering improvements to MD&A disclosures relating to
trend information. We believe that investors may be better able to see the
company through management’s eyes if MD&A includes information about
the trends that a company’s management follows and evaluates in making
decisions about how to guide the company’s business. As with today’s pro-
posal, that disclosure would naturally entail a certain degree of forward-
looking information.
B. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Accounting
Estimates
Currently, GAAP and generally accepted auditing standards acknowledge
that there are numerous circumstances in which companies, in applying
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accounting policies, exercise judgment and make estimates for purposes of
the financial statements. For example, they call for companies to communi-
cate in a number of circumstances about the use of estimates in the prepara-
tion of financial information. The use of estimates results in the presentation
of many amounts that are in fact approximate rather than exact.18 For exam-
ple, APB No. 20 notes that ‘‘changes in estimates used in accounting are
necessary consequences of periodic presentation of financial statements’’
because preparing financial statements requires estimating the effects of
future events, and future events and their effects cannot be perceived with
certainty.19 Estimating the impact of those events therefore requires the
exercise of judgment. Because the preparation of financial statements
requires estimates that are likely to change over time, APB No. 20 requires
disclosure about changes in estimates that are expected to affect several
future reporting periods and that are not made each period in the ordinary
course of accounting. It recommends disclosure if the effects of other changes
in the estimate are material.20
In addition, AICPA Statement of Position No. 94-621requires general disclo-
sure in notes to financial statements that the preparation of financial state-
ments requires the use of estimates in the determination of the carrying
amounts of assets or liabilities, including gain or loss contingencies.22 That
Statement also requires note disclosure regarding those specific estimates
when known information indicates that it is at least reasonably possible23
that the estimate will change in the near term and the effect would be material
to the financial statements.24 A company must disclose the nature of the
uncertainty, in addition to stating that a change in the estimate in the near
term is at least reasonably possible. SOP 94-6, encourages, but does not
require, disclosure of the factors that cause an estimate to be susceptible
to change from period to period.25
SOP 94-6 references SFAS No. 5, which itself requires certain disclosures
about accounting estimates -- specifically, estimated losses that arise from
loss contingencies. A company is required to accrue (by a charge to income)
an estimated loss from a loss contingency if certain criteria are met.26 If an
estimated loss does not meet the criteria for accrual, but there is at least a
reasonable possibility that a loss may have been incurred, the company is
required to disclose the nature of the contingency and an estimate of the
possible loss or range of loss, or state that an estimate of the loss cannot be
made. Although SFAS No. 5 elicits useful disclosure about certain accounting
estimates, not all uncertainties inherent in the accounting process give rise
to loss contingencies as that term is used in SFAS No. 5, and therefore that
Statement does not apply to all estimates in the financial statements.27
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Further, while not specifically requiring disclosure about estimates, APB
Opinion No. 22 requires disclosure about the application of accounting poli-
cies which may entail generalized disclosure about estimation techniques.28
APB No. 22 notes that a company’s accounting principles, and their method
of application, can affect significantly the presentation of its financial position,
results of operations and cash flows,29 and accordingly, requires disclosure
that describes those accounting principles and the company’s methods of
applying them.30 In particular, APB No. 22 indicates that a company should
provide disclosure when:
• unusual or innovative applications of accounting principles materially affect
the determination of financial position, results of operations or cash flows
(such as the recognition of revenue);
• a selection is made among alternative permissible policies; or
• policies are unique to the industry of the reporting company.31
Under APB No. 22, a company’s disclosure also should encompass important
judgments as to appropriateness of principles relating to revenue recognition
and allocation of asset costs to current and future periods. Although the
particular format or location of these APB No. 22 disclosures in financial
statements is not prescribed by GAAP, a summary of these significant
accounting policies is customarily the first note to the financial statements.
Finally, some accounting standards currently prescribe specific disclosures
about accounting estimates or the underlying methodologies and assump-
tions.32 For example, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 132
requires specific disclosures of the assumptions used in accounting for pen-
sions and other post-retirement benefits.33 Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 140 requires disclosure regarding the measurement of
retained interests in securitized financial assets, including the methodology,
assumptions and sensitivity of the assumptions used in determining their fair
value.34
C. Current Disclosure in Financial Statements about Initial Adoption
of Accounting Policies
Certain general requirements under GAAP may elicit information about the
initial adoption of an accounting policy by a company. When companies
present comparative financial statements, any exceptions to comparability
between the most recent period and prior periods must be clearly presented.35
In addition, if a company initially adopts an accounting policy and considers
that policy to be a significant accounting policy, the company would provide
certain disclosures about that policy as required by APB No. 22.36
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APB No. 20 provides financial statement disclosure requirements for account-
ing changes, which include changes in an accounting principle, an accounting
estimate and the reporting entity.37 Neither ‘‘(a) the initial adoption of an
accounting principle in recognition of events or transactions occurring for the
first time or that previously were immaterial in their effect nor (b) adoption
or modification of an accounting principle necessitated by transactions or
events that are clearly different in substance from those previously occurring’’
are considered, however, to be ‘‘accounting changes’’ under GAAP.38As
discussed below, our proposals about initial adoption of accounting policies
address these circumstances that are not accounting changes under GAAP
if they have a material impact on a company’s financial presentation.
III. PROPOSED RULES
A. Objectives of the Current Proposals
Our proposals would promote greater investor understanding of a company’s
important accounting estimates that reflect significant management judgment
and uncertainty, and of a company’s initial adoption of accounting policies
that may reflect such judgment and uncertainty. Our primary objectives are:
• to enhance investors’ understanding of the existence of, and necessity
for, estimation in a company’s financial statements;
• to focus investors on the important estimates that are particularly difficult
for management to determine and where management therefore exercises
significant judgment;
• to give investors an understanding of the impact those estimates have
on the presentation of a company’s financial condition, changes in financial
condition or results of operations;
• to give investors an appreciation for how sensitive those estimates are;
and
• to give investors an understanding of new material accounting policies as
they arise and affect a company’s financial results.
Our aim is to increase the transparency of the application of those accounting
policies where management is the most prone to use judgment, generally
because objective data and methodologies do not exist for the estimates or
management is given initial policy choices under GAAP. We believe that it
is these accounting policies that are least understood by investors and that
mandated disclosure regarding areas of the application of them would provide
meaningful insight into the importance of estimates and adoption of policies
to a company’s financial presentation. With a greater understanding of the
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application of critical accounting policies, we believe that investors would be
in a better position to assess the quality of, and potential variability of, a
company’s earnings.
We propose to mandate enhanced disclosure of critical accounting estimates
and initial adoption of material policies by specifically linking them to the
objectives of MD&A, and the type of disclosure presented in MD&A. A focused
discussion of these areas is well-suited to MD&A because it would further
explain to investors the company’s financial condition ‘‘through manage-
ment’s eyes.’’ Moreover, MD&A’s emphasis on disclosure of significant uncer-
tainties and favorable or unfavorable trends naturally dovetails with disclosure
of the more subjective aspects used in arriving at critical accounting estimates
or selecting which accounting policies to adopt initially. Finally, as we have
noted previously, the less technical language customarily used outside the
financial statements may be conducive to a clearer explanation to investors
of the effects of estimates, assumptions, methodologies and initial accounting
policy adoption on a company’s financial reporting.39
B. Scope of the Proposals
Our proposals address estimates that a company makes in preparing financial
statements using accounting policies under GAAP and the initial adoption
by a company of an accounting policy under GAAP that has a material impact
on its financial presentation.40 We believe the proposals address directly and
clearly two areas where there is a need for improved disclosure. While
certain elements of our proposed critical accounting estimates disclosure
are subsumed in existing general MD&A requirements, we believe more direct
and complete requirements in our rules would lead to improved disclosure. In
addition, while there are financial statement disclosure requirements that
would elicit certain information about initially adopted accounting policies in
some cases, our proposals are designed to provide additional MD&A disclo-
sure that would assist investors to understand better a company’s new
accounting policies.
We are leaving disclosure about other circumstances where a company
may exercise discretion over its accounting under GAAP to existing MD&A
disclosure requirements, materiality standards and existing financial state-
ment disclosure requirements. Our proposals do not, for example, alter disclo-
sure requirements regarding a company’s change from an accounting policy
it has been using to another policy acceptable under GAAP.41 The proposals
also do not require disclosure of a company’s adoption of a new accounting
pronouncement where the company must make its best judgment as to how
to apply the new accounting pronouncement in the absence of interpretive
guidance.
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Discipline surrounding a company’s changes in accounting policies is pro-
vided under GAAP and the federal securities laws. When a company changes
an accounting policy, the company must determine that the alternative princi-
ple is preferable under the circumstances.42 We require that the company
file a letter from its independent public accountant confirming its opinion to
that effect.43 In addition, a company is required to make certain disclosures
in the financial statements about the accounting change, including the nature
and justification for the change and its effect on income when the change
is made.44 In its justification for the change, the company is required to explain
clearly why the newly adopted accounting principle is preferable.45
In addition to the existing disclosure requirements in the financial statements,
scrutiny over management’s discretion and judgment in applying accounting
policies occurs on a number of different levels. Auditors are required to inform
audit committees about management’s ‘‘initial selection of and changes in
significant accounting policies or their application’’ and about management’s
judgments and estimates.46 We have encouraged companies, management,
audit committees and auditors to consult with our accounting staff if they are
uncertain about the application of GAAP.47 We also have committed to provide
assistance to companies in a timely fashion to address problems before they
happen.
We recognize that the circumstances where a company may exercise discre-
tion over its accounting policies under GAAP could yield significantly different
financial results. Given the existing disclosure regime, we are not currently
proposing additional MD&A disclosure to address all of these cases. Compa-
nies should provide complete, transparent disclosure under the applicable
requirements. While we believe the proposed disclosure may be sufficient to
achieve our currently stated objective, we may revisit the other circumstances
where a company may exercise discretion over its accounting policies under
GAAP at a later date.
We solicit comment with regard to broadening the scope of our
proposals to achieve a more expansive objective.
• Should we require additional MD&A disclosure specifically regarding the
effects of a change by a company from one accounting policy to another
acceptable (and preferable) accounting policy under GAAP?
• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of the impact that alternative
accounting policies acceptable under GAAP would have had on a com-
pany’s financial statements even when a company did not choose to apply
the alternatives?
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• What costs would companies incur if they had to prepare disclosure about
the effects of alternative accounting policies that could have been chosen
but were not?
• Beyond a company’s initial adoption of those policies, should we require
disclosure in MD&A regarding a company’s reasons for choosing, and
the effects of applying, accounting policies used for unusual or innovative
transactions or in emerging areas? Similarly, should we require companies
to disclose in MD&A the effects of accounting policies that a company could
have adopted, but did not adopt, for unusual or innovative transactions or
in emerging areas?
• Should we require more disclosure by companies about their process of
making estimates, or in other areas of discretion relating to recognition
and measurement in financial statements? If so, please describe in detail.
• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of the impact of a company’s
choice among accounting methods under GAAP that are used in the
company’s industry (for example, the completed contract and the percent-
age of completion methods of accounting for construction-type con-
tracts48)? Should we require that type of disclosure only where a company
uses a method under GAAP that is not generally used by other companies
in the industry?
C. Proposed Disclosure about Critical Accounting Estimates
To inform investors of each critical accounting estimate and to place it in the
context of the company’s financial presentation, we would require the follow-
ing information in the MD&A section:49
• A discussion that identifies and describes:
• the critical accounting estimate;
• the methodology used in determining the critical accounting estimate;
• any underlying assumption that is about highly uncertain matters and
any other underlying assumption that is material;
• any known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that
are reasonably likely to occur and materially affect the methodology or
the assumptions described;
• if applicable, why different estimates that would have had a material
impact on the company’s financial presentation could have been used
in the current period; and
• if applicable, why the accounting estimate is reasonably likely to change
from period to period with a material impact on the financial presenta-
tion;
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• An explanation of the significance of the accounting estimate to the com-
pany’s financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of
operations and, where material, an identification of the line items in the
company’s financial statements affected by the accounting estimate;
• A quantitative discussion of changes in overall financial performance and,
to the extent material, line items in the financial statements if the company
were to assume that the accounting estimate were changed, either by
using reasonably possible near-term changes in the most material
assumption(s) underlying the accounting estimate or by using the reason-
ably possible range of the accounting estimate; 50
• A quantitative and qualitative discussion of any material changes made
to the accounting estimate in the past three years, the reasons for the
changes, and the effect on line items in the financial statements and
overall financial performance;51
• A statement of whether or not the company’s senior management has
discussed the development and selection of the accounting estimate,
and the MD&A disclosure regarding it, with the audit committee of the
company’s board of directors;
• If the company operates in more than one segment, an identification of
the segments of the company’s business the accounting estimate affects;
and
• A discussion of the accounting estimate on a segment basis, to the extent
that a failure to present that information would result in an omission that
renders the disclosure materially misleading.
Unless otherwise stated, the discussion would cover the financial statements
for the most recent fiscal year and any subsequent period for which interim
period financial statements are required to be included.52
1. Accounting estimates covered under the proposals
A number of circumstances can require a company to make accounting
estimates. For example, a company typically will estimate the net realizable
value of its accounts receivable and of its inventory.53 Not all accounting
estimates in a company’s financial statements, however, will necessarily be
critical accounting estimates to which the proposed disclosure relates. An
accounting estimate would be a critical accounting estimate for purposes of
the proposed disclosure only if it meets two criteria. First, the accounting
estimate must require a company to make assumptions about matters that
are highly uncertain at the time the accounting estimate is made. Second,
it must be the case that different estimates that the company reasonably
could have used for the accounting estimate in the current period, or changes
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in the accounting estimate that are reasonably likely to occur from period to
period, would have a material impact on the presentation of the company’s
financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of operations.54
For purposes of the first criterion, a matter involves a high degree of uncer-
tainty if it is dependent on events remote in time that may or may not
occur, or it is not capable of being readily calculated from generally accepted
methodologies or derived with some degree of precision from available data.
Accordingly, a matter that is highly uncertain requires management to use
significant judgment in making assumptions about that matter. The applica-
tion of management’s judgment in those circumstances typically results in
management developing a range within which it believes the accounting
estimate should fall.
The second criterion focuses the proposals further on two types of accounting
estimates involved in the application of accounting policies. First, it includes
accounting estimates for which a company in the current period could reason-
ably have recorded in the financial statements an amount sufficiently different
such that it would have had a material impact on the company’s financial
presentation. Second, it includes any accounting estimate that is reasonably
likely to change from period to period to the extent that the change would have
a material impact on the company’s financial presentation. Thus, whether
management’s judgment has an impact primarily in the current period or on
an ongoing basis (or both), the estimate would qualify.
Under the proposals, a company would discuss any accounting estimate
that it determines to be critical. We believe that few of a company’s accounting
estimates generally would meet those thresholds. We do not currently pro-
pose an outside limit to the number of accounting estimates that a company
must discuss under the proposals. As the term ‘‘critical accounting estimate’’
implies, however, the disclosure should not encompass a long list of account-
ing estimates resulting from the application of accounting policies which
cover a substantial number of line items in the company’s financial state-
ments.55 While the number of critical accounting estimates will vary by com-
pany, we would expect a very few companies to have none at all and the
vast majority of companies to have somewhere in the range of three to five
critical accounting estimates. The number could be at the high end of the
range, or be slightly higher, for companies that conclude that one or more
critical accounting estimates must be identified and discussed primarily
because of particular segments. Investors, however, will not benefit from a
lengthy discussion of a multitude of accounting estimates in which the truly
critical ones are obscured. If we adopt the proposals without a maximum
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number, we may monitor disclosure to determine whether disclosure would
be improved if a maximum number were set.
We seek comment on the proposed definition of critical accounting
estimates.
• Is the definition appropriately tailored?
• Does the definition capture the appropriate type and scope of accounting
estimates?
• Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates
that require management to use significant judgment or that are the most
uncertain? If not, what other aspects descriptive of that type of estimate
should be included?
• Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates
involving a high potential to result in a material impact on the company’s
financial presentation?
• Would it be difficult for a company to discern which of its accounting
estimates require assumptions about highly uncertain matters? If so, how
could the proposal better target them?
• Should we consider setting a minimum percentage impact on results
of operations in the second criterion of the definition, or would that be
unnecessary because the proposed definition would not capture changes
that have an insignificant impact?
• How many accounting estimates would a company typically identify as
critical accounting estimates under the proposed definition?
• Would a company with multiple segments have a greater number of critical
accounting estimates than a company without multiple segments? If so,
please provide an explanation.
• Should we establish a maximum number of accounting estimates that
may be discussed as critical accounting estimates (e.g., seven)? If so,
what should the maximum number be and what criteria should be applied
to set the number so as to strike the appropriate balance between informa-
tion truly useful to investors and overly extensive disclosure of marginal
use? If a maximum were set, should the number of segments a company
has be considered?
• Should we expand the definition to include MD&A disclosure of volatile
accounting estimates that use complex methodologies but do not involve
significant management judgment? Should we do so only when the under-
lying assumptions or methodologies of those estimates are not commonly
used and therefore not understood by investors?
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2. Identification and description of the accounting estimate, the methodology
used, certain assumptions and reasonably likely changes
A company first would have to identify and describe each critical accounting
estimate in such a way that it gives the appropriate context for investors
reading that section and reflects management’s view of the importance of
the critical accounting estimate.56 A company would have to disclose the
methodology it used in determining the estimate. It also would have to
disclose the assumptions underlying the accounting estimate that reflect
matters highly uncertain at the time the estimate was made as well as other
assumptions underlying the estimate that are material. We recognize that a
critical accounting estimate may involve multiple assumptions. The proposed
disclosure would focus in the first instance on those that are about highly
uncertain matters because they have the greatest potential to make the
accounting estimate highly susceptible to change.
If applicable, the company would have to describe why different estimates
could have been used in the current period and why the accounting estimate
is reasonably likely to change from period to period in the financial statements.
For example, a critical accounting estimate related to a significant portfolio
of over-the-counter derivative contracts may require that a company estimate
the fair value of such contracts using a model or other valuation method. In
that case, the company would disclose the methods it employs to estimate
fair value, e.g., the types of valuation models used such as the present value
of estimated future cash flows, and assumptions such as an estimated price
in the absence of a quoted market price.57
A company also would have to explain known trends, demands, commit-
ments, events or uncertainties that are reasonably likely to occur and materi-
ally affect the assumptions made or the methodology used. Like the
requirements elsewhere in MD&A, disclosure would be required if the trend,
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is currently known, it is reasonably
likely to occur and it is reasonably likely to have a material impact. Disclosure
would not be required if management could affirmatively conclude that the
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is not reasonably likely to
come to fruition or that a material effect is not reasonably likely to occur.58
3. Impact of the estimate on financial condition, changes in financial condition
and results of operations
For each critical accounting estimate, a company would have to explain
its significance to the company’s financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operations and, where material, identify its effect
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on the line items in the company’s financial statements.59 Because not all
estimates themselves are line items in the financial statements,60 their exis-
tence and their effect may not be readily apparent. Thus, this disclosure
would provide additional information and clarity for investors.
4. Quantitative disclosures
There are two areas of the proposed MD&A disclosure relating to critical
accounting estimates in which we explicitly would require a presentation of
quantitative information.61 First, the proposals would require disclosure that
demonstrates the sensitivity of financial results to changes made in connec-
tion with each critical accounting estimate. Second, the proposals would
require quantitative disclosure relating to historical changes in a company’s
critical accounting estimates in the past three years.
a. Quantitative disclosures to demonstrate sensitivity
We propose to require that a company present quantitative information about
changes in its overall financial performance and, to the extent material, line
items in the financial statements that would result if certain changes relating
to a critical accounting estimate were assumed to occur. The company would
identify the change being assumed and discuss quantitatively its impact on
the company. Because the point of the disclosure is to demonstrate the
degree of sensitivity, the impact on overall financial performance would be
discussed regardless of how large that is.
As proposed, a company would have two possible choices of changes it
would assume for purposes of the sensitivity analysis. First, the company
could choose to assume that it changed the most material assumption or
assumptions underlying the critical accounting estimate and discuss the
results of those changes. Second, the company could choose to assume
that the critical accounting estimate itself changes. In addition to providing
two choices of methods to demonstrate sensitivity, we allow a company to
determine the amount of the change that it assumes for this analysis rather
than attempting to standardize those amounts. Under the first choice, a
company could select the alternative material assumption or assumptions
to use as long as the alternative represents a change that is reasonably
possible in the near term. ‘‘Reasonably possible’’ means the chance of a
future transaction or event occurring is more than remote but less than likely.62
‘‘Near-term’’ means a period of time going forward up to one year from the
date of the financial statements.63 Under the second choice, the company
would use the upper and the lower ends of the range of reasonably possible
estimates which it likely determined in formulating its recorded critical
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accounting estimate. It would substitute the upper end of the range for the
recorded estimate and discuss the results. It would do the same for the lower
end of the range.
We believe the most informative disclosure about sensitivity would result if
we allow companies significant flexibility to customize these analyses. Our
approach would accommodate different types of companies, different critical
accounting estimates and different types of underlying assumptions. The
parameters selected for the sensitivity analysis must, however, be realistic
and meaningful measures of change.64 For purposes of the sensitivity analy-
sis, a company should disclose, if known or available, the likelihood of occur-
rence of the changes it selects, such as estimated probabilities of occurrence
or standard deviations where applicable.
Under the first choice for demonstrating sensitivity, we would provide that a
company choose its most material assumption underlying the critical account-
ing estimate and alter it at least twice65 to reflect reasonably possible, near-
term changes.66 A company would have to complete the analysis assuming
a positive change in the assumption. It would also have to complete the
analysis assuming a negative change. In some cases, a company may not
be able to select a single most material assumption to use for purposes of
these analyses, or it may believe that using a single assumption would not
provide meaningful sensitivity information for investors. If that were to occur,
a company either could select the second choice for analyzing sensitivity
(i.e., using the ends of the range) or it could demonstrate the effects of near-
term reasonably possible changes in more than one material assumption
underlying the critical accounting estimate. If the company chooses the latter
course of action, it also would have to disclose clearly the separate effect
of each changed assumption.
In general, we believe the impact of a positive change and the impact of a
negative change would both have to be disclosed where a company is
assuming changes in its most material assumption (or assumptions). There
may be cases, however, where both types of changes would not be applica-
ble. In some instances, an increase in an assumption, but not a decrease
in an assumption, or vice versa, would have no effect on the line items or
the overall financial performance and therefore would not have to be dis-
cussed other than noting that fact.67 It is conceivable that in other cases
either a decrease or an increase would not be reasonably possible and
therefore would not have to be discussed other than noting that fact.
With the proposed analysis, a company would demonstrate sensitivity of
reported results to changes that affect its critical accounting estimates. Inves-
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tors would have a better understanding of the extent to which there is a
correlation between management’s key assumptions and the company’s
overall financial performance. Investors also would understand better which
particular line items in reported results would be materially affected and how
much. In addition, a company would be required to state whether those
assumed changes could have a material effect on the company’s liquidity
or capital resources. If they could have such an effect, the company would
have to explain how, as a company currently is required to explain in
MD&A when factors affecting liquidity or capital resources are present.68
From the proposed disclosure, the average investor should be able to ascer-
tain the general degree to which the company’s results of operations, liquidity
and capital resources are susceptible to changes in management’s views
relating to critical accounting estimates. Along with the other provisions in
the proposal, this quantitative and qualitative disclosure conveys information
about the impact of management’s subjective assumptions on current and
future financial results.
We request comment on the proposed identification and analysis
of changes.
• Are there some types of critical accounting estimates or some circum-
stances where the proposed disclosure relating to sensitivity would not
be meaningful or otherwise helpful to investors? If so, which estimates or
what circumstances?
• In addition to the two choices we propose for assuming changes relating
to the critical accounting estimates to analyze sensitivity, are there others
that we should permit? Should we require instead that all companies use
the same method? If so, which one?
• Should we require a company to use whichever of the two proposed
choices demonstrates the greatest impact on the company’s financial
presentation?
• Are there circumstances under which a company should be required to
demonstrate sensitivity using both of the proposed choices?
• Are there any critical accounting estimates for which neither of the two
choices for selecting the assumed changes would be appropriate?
• Will companies be able to select appropriate changes in their most material
assumption or assumptions, or should we provide further guidance?
• To enhance an investors’ ability to compare the sensitivity of various
companies’ financial statements to changes relating to a particular type
of accounting estimate, should we standardize the changes that compa-
nies must assume for various types of estimates? If so, what should they
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be and why? For example, should we set a specified percentage increase
and decrease to assume (e.g., a 10% increase and decrease), or a pre-
sumptive increase and decrease, provided that degree of change is rea-
sonably possible in the near term?
• Conversely, would any changes we standardize not be equally meaningful
to measure sensitivity, or equally probable, for various accounting esti-
mates, industries and companies, and thus reduce the value of any disclo-
sure about sensitivity?
b. Quantitative and qualitative disclosures concerning past changes in the
estimate
We recognize that a company will change its accounting estimates over
time as new events occur or as management acquires more experience or
additional information. Existing MD&A disclosure rules would call for discus-
sion of the effects of changes in accounting estimates where those changes
are material to an investor’s understanding of financial position or results of
operations. For example, MD&A currently requires companies to disclose:
• information necessary for an understanding of financial condition, changes
in financial condition and results of operations;69
• significant components of revenues or expenses that should, in the com-
pany’s judgment, be described in order to understand results of opera-
tions;70
• a material change in the relationship between costs and revenues resulting
from a known event;71
• matters that will have an impact on future operations and have not had
an impact in the past;72 and
• matters that have had an impact on reported operations and are not
expected to have an impact upon future operations.73
Notwithstanding the existing MD&A disclosure requirements, we believe it
would be appropriate to require specific disclosure regarding past changes
in critical accounting estimates. This type of information required under the
proposal would give investors a clear understanding of a company’s recent
history of those changes. A company other than a small business issuer
would have to include the proposed quantitative and qualitative discussion
of any material changes in those accounting estimates under the proposals
during the past three fiscal years.74 A small business issuer would discuss
material changes in its critical accounting estimates during the past two
years.75 Companies would have to identify how the material changes affected
measurements in the financial statements and their overall financial perfor-
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mance.76 This would enable investors to evaluate management’s formulation
of critical accounting estimates over time.
Companies also would be required to describe the reasons for those changes.
If no material changes in the critical accounting estimates were made in the
prescribed time period, or if a company did not make that estimate during
any part of that period, a company would only be required to disclose that
fact.
Although the period covered for the proposed disclosure of past changes in
critical accounting estimates would be two years for small business issuers
and three years for other companies, our proposed requirement relating to
past changes would be put into effect in stages. Thus, when a small business
issuer or other company files its first covered report, registration statement
or proxy or information statement following adoption of the proposed rules,
the rules would require it to provide the proposed specific past changes
disclosure only for the past one or two years respectively. For example, if
the first report were an annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2002, the company would include that information in the
‘‘Application of Critical Accounting Policies’’ section of MD&A about changes
in 2001 and 2002 (and a small business issuer would include it only for
2002). In the first annual report, registration statement or proxy or information
statement filed by a company more than one year following the effective
date of the rules, it would have to provide that information for the past three
years (two years for a small business issuer). 77
We solicit comment on the proposed disclosure of past material
changes in critical accounting estimates.
• Is sufficient disclosure of these changes already required under current
MD&A requirements?
• Is a three-year period the most appropriate period of time over which
investors should consider changes? If not, why would a shorter or longer
period be more appropriate?
• Would requiring disclosure over a longer period, such as five years, make
it easier for investors to identify trends? If so, over how many years should
we phase in a longer period requirement?
• Should we mandate a standardized format for quantitative disclosure
about past changes in critical accounting estimates (e.g., a chart illustrating
the dollar value of the change from the prior year for each year showing
the impacted line items and other effects in each year)?
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5. Senior management’s discussions with the audit committee
Independent auditors discuss accounting estimates with management in
order to conduct an audit, and the auditors may discuss them with the audit
committee. In 1999, following the recommendations in the Report of the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit
Committees, we adopted a rule that would require an audit committee report
in proxy or information statements connected to board of director elections.78
Among other items, the audit committee report must state whether the audit
committee has discussed with the independent auditors the matters required
to be discussed by Statement on Auditing Standards (‘‘SAS’’) No. 61 (codified
in AU §380), as may be modified or supplemented.79 SAS 61 requires inde-
pendent auditors to communicate certain matters related to the conduct of
an audit to those who have responsibility for oversight of the financial reporting
process, specifically the audit committee. With respect to accounting esti-
mates, SAS 61 states, ‘‘[t]he auditor should determine that the audit commit-
tee is informed about the process used by management in formulating
particularly sensitive accounting estimates and about the basis for the audi-
tor’s conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those estimates.’’80 In
addition, in connection with each SEC engagement, the auditor should dis-
cuss with the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the quality of
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. The
discussion should include items that have a significant impact on the financial
statements (for example, estimates, judgments and uncertainties, among
other items).81
In addition to the disclosure relating to SAS 61 (as amended), the audit
committee report must state whether the audit committee has reviewed and
discussed the audited financial statements with management.82 Because that
item relates to the financial statements generally, a focused discussion on
critical accounting estimates may or may not result from it. Moreover, the
newly required disclosure in MD&A would not be a part of the financial
statements, and therefore would not necessarily be covered by that proxy
statement disclosure requirement.
The existing audit committee report also requires audit committees to state
whether, based on discussions with management and the auditors, the com-
mittee recommended to the board of directors that the audited financial
statements be included in the company’s Form 10-K or 10-KSB for the
last fiscal year.83 This disclosure requirement conveys whether the audit
committee review of the financial statements and discussions with manage-
ment and the auditors have provided a basis for recommending to the board
that the audited financial statements be filed with the Commission. This item
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too does not require any specific discourse between management and the
audit committee about critical accounting estimates.
We believe that senior management should discuss the company’s critical
accounting estimates with the audit committee of its board of directors.84
If specific discussions between senior management and audit committees
regarding the development, selection and disclosure of the critical accounting
estimates were to take place, the audit committee may seek to understand
the company’s critical accounting estimates, the underlying assumptions
and methodologies, the appropriateness of management’s procedures and
conclusions, and the disclosure about those accounting estimates. This type
of oversight would have the potential to improve the quality and the transpar-
ency of disclosure.
Requiring a company to disclose in MD&A whether or not senior management
has engaged in discussions with the audit committee about the critical
accounting estimates would give investors a better understanding of whether
such oversight by those responsible for the general oversight of the financial
reporting process was applied to those accounting estimates and the disclo-
sure about those accounting estimates. We therefore are proposing to require
such disclosure.85 When senior management and the audit committee have
not had those discussions, we would require disclosure that they have not,
and an explanation of the reasons why they have not.86 If the company does
not have an audit committee, then the proposed disclosure would address
discussions with the board committee that performs equivalent functions to
those of an audit committee or, if no such committee exists, the entire board
of directors.87 Unlike the audit committee report, our proposed disclosure of
discussions between the audit committee and senior management would
not be limited to proxy and information statements that involve the election
of directors.88
We do not propose to require disclosure of the substance of the discussions
between senior management and the audit committee. We believe that such
a requirement could deter the type of open discourse that we expect to take
place in those discussions.
We request comment on the proposed disclosure about discussions
between senior management and the audit committee regarding the
development, selection and disclosure of critical accounting
estimates.
• To what extent does senior management currently discuss critical account-
ing estimates with the audit committee of the board of directors and the
company’s auditors?
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• Would the proposed requirement provide useful information to investors?
• Would the proposed disclosure be a catalyst for discussion between audit
committees and senior management? Could it chill discussions?
• Is there other related disclosure that should be required for the benefit of
investors?
• Should we require that companies disclose any unresolved concerns of
the audit committee about the critical accounting estimates or the related
MD&A disclosure?
• Should we require disclosure of any specific procedures employed by the
audit committee to ensure that the company’s response to the proposed
disclosure requirements is complete and fair?
• Should we consider requiring disclosure of whether the audit committee
recommends the disclosure be included in the MD&A, which is akin to
the disclosure required in the Item 306 audit committee report?
• Instead of the proposed disclosure, should we amend Item 306 of Regula-
tion S-K and Regulation S-B to require that the audit committee report
disclose whether the audit committee has reviewed and discussed with
senior management the development, selection and disclosure regarding
critical accounting estimates?
• If we were to amend Items 306 in this manner, should we also expand
them to include the discussions about critical accounting estimates
between senior management and the audit committee as one of the bases
for the audit committee’s recommendation to include the financial state-
ments in the annual report?
• Should we expand Items 306 to require disclosure of whether, based on
an audit committee’s review of and discussions about the MD&A, the audit
committee recommended to the board of directors that the MD&A be
included in the company’s annual report?
• Should we expand Items 306 to require disclosure of whether the audit
committee has reviewed and discussed the entire MD&A disclosure (cur-
rent and proposed) with management and/or the auditors?
• If any of a company’s accounting policies diverge, to its knowledge, from
the policies predominately applied by other companies in the same indus-
try, should we require that the company disclose, possibly in connection
with the audit committee report, whether the audit committee has had
discussions with senior management about the appropriateness of the
accounting policies being used? When such discussions have taken place,
should we require that the company disclose the audit committee’s unre-
solved concerns about the divergent accounting policies being applied?
Prior to the adoption of our proposals, to what extent would a company
know that its accounting policies diverge from those of other companies
in its industry?
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6. Disclosure relating to segments
Current MD&A disclosure requirements provide companies with the discre-
tion to include a discussion of segment information where, in the company’s
judgment, such a discussion would be appropriate to an understanding of
the company.89 In 1989, we stated in an interpretive release, ‘‘[t]o the extent
any segment contributes in a materially disproportionate way to [revenues,
profitability, and cash needs], or where discussion on a consolidated basis
would present an incomplete and misleading picture of the enterprise, seg-
ment disclosure should be included.’’90 In accordance with this interpretation,
we are proposing disclosure regarding the impact of critical accounting esti-
mates on segments of a company’s business.91 Where applicable, we believe
that this disclosure would be important for investors because it would enable
them to determine which reported segments’ results are dependent on man-
agement’s subjective estimates, and material information would be provided
on a segment basis.
Under the proposals, if a company operates in more than one segment92
and a critical accounting estimate affects fewer than all of the segments, the
company would have to identify the segments it affects. A company also
would have to determine whether it must include, in addition to the disclosure
on a company-wide basis, a separate discussion of the critical accounting
estimates for each identified segment about which disclosure is otherwise
required.93 That determination would follow an analysis similar to that in the
1989 guidance. A company would have to provide a discussion on a segment
basis to the extent that discussion only on a company-wide basis would
result in an omission that renders the disclosure materially misleading.94 We
would not mandate repetition on a segment basis of all matters discussed
on a company-wide basis. Rather, a company would have to disclose only
that information necessary to avoid an incomplete or misleading picture.
We request comment regarding identification of the segments
affected and the proposed additional disclosure of the critical
accounting estimates on a segment basis.
• Should we provide more guidance for determining the circumstances that
warrant segment disclosure?
• Should we require the additional segment discussion only when more
than one segment is affected?
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D. Examples of Proposed Disclosure about Critical Accounting
Estimates
To assist in understanding the scope of the MD&A disclosure that is proposed,
we have developed three examples. Each example examines how a fictional
public company that has identified a critical accounting estimate could draft
MD&A disclosure to satisfy the proposal. The examples are illustrative only.
In addition, our January 22, 2002 release provides an example of disclosure
that companies should consider when discussing in MD&A trading activities
involving contracts that are accounted for at fair value where a lack of market
price quotations necessitates the use of fair value estimation techniques.95
Example 1
Background
Alphabetical Company manufactures and distributes electrical equipment
used in large-scale commercial pumping and water treatment facilities. The
company operates in four business segments. The company’s equipment
carries standard product warranties extending over a period of 6 to 10 years. If
equipment covered under the standard warranty requires repair, the company
provides labor and replacement parts to the customer at no cost. Historically,
the costs of fulfilling warranty obligations have principally related to providing
replacement parts, with labor costs representing the remainder. Over the
past 3 years, the cost of copper included in replacement parts constituted
approximately 35% to 40% of the total cost of warranty obligations.
A liability for the expected cost of warranty-related claims is established
when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability accrued reflects
the company’s estimate of the expected future costs of honoring its obliga-
tions under the warranty plan. Because of the long-term nature of the com-
pany’s equipment warranties, estimating the expected cost of such warranties
requires significant judgment. Based on management’s evaluation of ana-
lysts’ forecasts for copper prices, management believes a 30% decrease in
copper prices or a 50% increase in copper prices is reasonably possible in
the near term. In each of the last three years, warranty expense represented
approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Alphabetical’s products are covered by standard product warranty plans that extend
6 to 10 years. A liability for the expected cost of warranty-related claims is estab-
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lished when equipment is sold. The amount of the warranty liability accrued reflects
our estimate of the expected future costs of honoring our obligations under the
warranty plan. We believe the accounting estimate related to warranty costs is a
‘‘critical accounting estimate’’ because: changes in it can materially affect net
income, it requires us to forecast copper prices in the distant future which are
highly uncertain and require a large degree of judgment, and copper is a significant
raw material in the replacement parts used in warranty repairs. The estimate for
warranty obligations is a critical accounting estimate for all of our four segments.
Historically, the costs of fulfilling our warranty obligations have principally related
to replacement parts, with labor costs representing the remainder. Over the past
3 years, the cost of copper included in our parts constituted approximately 35%
to 40% of the total cost of warranty repairs. Over that same period, warranty
expense represented approximately 19% to 22% of cost of sales.
Over the past 10 years, the price of copper has exhibited significant volatility. For
example, during 1994, the price of copper rose by approximately 72%, while in
2001 the price decreased by approximately 19%. Our hedging programs provide
adequate protection against short-term volatility in copper prices, as described in
‘‘Risk Management,’’ but our hedging does not extend beyond 5 years. Accordingly,
our management must make assumptions about the cost of that raw material in
periods 6 to 10 years in the future. Management forecasts the price of copper for
the portion of our estimated copper requirements not covered by hedging. Our
forecasts are based principally on long-range price forecasts for copper which are
published by private research companies specializing in the copper markets.
Each quarter, we reevaluate our estimate of warranty obligations, including our
assumptions about the cost of copper. During 2001, we decreased our estimated
cost of unhedged copper purchases over the next 10 years by 15%, reflecting a
growing excess of supply over forecasted demand, which reduced our accrued
warranty costs and our cost of sales (and, accordingly, increased operating income)
by $15 million. In contrast, during 2000, long-term price forecasts were essentially
unchanged, so we made no adjustments to our estimated cost of unhedged copper
purchases over the next 10 years. During 1999, copper prices increased by approxi-
mately 28% over the prior year. Long-term prices also reflected increases in prices
over those projected in 1998. Thus, in 1999, we increased our estimated cost of
unhedged copper purchases over the next 10 years (through 2009) by 15%. That
increase in our estimate resulted in an $18 million addition to our accrued warranty
cost and our cost of sales, and an equal reduction in our operating income.
If, for the unhedged portion of our estimated copper requirements, we were to
decrease our estimate of copper prices as of December 31, 2001 by 30%, our
accrued warranty costs and cost of sales would have been reduced by approxi-
mately $27 million or 6% and 4%, respectively, while operating income would have
increased by 9%. If we were to increase our estimate as of December 31, 2001
by 50%, our accrued warranty costs and cost of sales would have been increased
by approximately $45 million or 10% and 7%, respectively, while our operating
income would have been reduced by 23%.
A very significant increase in our estimated warranty obligation, such as one
reflecting the increase in copper prices that occurred in 1994, could lower our
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earnings and increase our leverage ratio (leverage refers to the degree to which
a company utilizes borrowed funds). That, in turn, could limit our ability to borrow
money through our revolving credit facilities described in ‘‘Liquidity and Capital
Resources.’’
Our management has discussed the development and selection of this critical ac-
counting estimate with the audit committee of our board of directors and the audit
committee has reviewed the company’s disclosure relating to it in this MD&A.
Example 2
Background
MQB Corp. is a developer and publisher of desktop publishing software that
operates in two segments. MQB distributes its products primarily through
third-party distributors, resellers, and retailers (customers). Like many com-
panies in the software industry, MQB has a product return policy and has
historically accepted significant product returns. MQB permits its customers
to return software titles published and distributed by the company within 120
days of purchase.
MQB recognizes revenues under SOP 97-2, ‘‘Software Revenue Recogni-
tion.’’ The company ships its products FOB (Free on Board) shipping point.
Therefore, legal title to the products passes to the customers upon shipment,
and the company has no legal obligation for product damage in transit.
Accordingly, MQB recognizes revenue upon shipment of its software prod-
ucts, provided that collection of payment is determined to be probable and
no significant obligations on MQB’s part remain. Payment is due from custom-
ers 30 days after shipment. At the time revenue is recorded, MQB accounts
for estimated future returns by reducing sales by its estimate of future returns
and by reducing accounts receivable by the same amount. For example,
MQB reduced its gross sales and accounts receivable by 12% for its fiscal
year ended December 31, 2001 to reflect estimated product returns. In the
last three years, the range in which the company has reduced its gross sales
and accounts receivable to reflect product returns has been between 11%
and 13%.
MQB receives weekly reports from distributors and retailers regarding the
amount of MQB products in their inventory. A historical correlation exists
between levels of inventory held by distributors and retailers (together, the
distribution channel) and the amount of returns that actually occur. The
weekly reports from distributors and retailers provide the company with visibil-
ity into the distribution channel such that MQB has the ability to estimate
future returns. In each of the past few years, actual returns have varied from
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period to period, although they have not exceeded the estimated amounts
by more than 5%. The company’s products are, however, subject to intense
marketplace competition, including several recently introduced competing
products. If actual returns significantly exceed the previously estimated
amounts, it would result in materially lower sales and net income before
taxes in one or more future periods.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
Our recognition of revenue from sales to distributors and retailers (the ‘‘distribution
channel’’) is impacted by agreements we have giving them rights to return our
software titles within 120 days after purchase. At the time we recognize revenue,
upon shipment of our software products, we reduce our measurements of those
sales by our estimate of future returns and we also reduce our measurements of
accounts receivable by the same amount.
For our products, a historical correlation exists between the amount of distribution
channel inventory and the amount of returns that actually occur. The greater the
distribution channel inventory, the more product returns we expect. For each of
our products, we monitor levels of product sales and inventory at our distributors’
warehouses and at retailers as part of our effort to reach an appropriate accounting
estimate for returns. In estimating returns, we analyze historical returns, current
inventory in the distribution channel, current economic trends, changes in consumer
demand, introduction of new competing software and acceptance of our products.
In recent years, as a result of a combination of the factors described above, we
have materially reduced our gross sales to reflect our estimated amount of returns.
It is also possible that returns could increase rapidly and significantly in the future.
Accordingly, estimating product returns requires significant management judgment.
In addition, different return estimates that we reasonably could have used would
have had a material impact on our reported sales and thus have had a material
impact on the presentation of the results of operations. For those reasons, we
believe that the accounting estimate related to product returns is a ‘‘critical account-
ing estimate.’’ Our estimate of product returns is a critical accounting estimate for
both of our segments. Management of the company has discussed the develop-
ment and selection of this critical accounting estimate with the audit committee of
our board of directors and the audit committee has reviewed the company’s disclo-
sure relating to it in this MD&A.
We are aware of several recently introduced products that compete with several of
our significant products. These new competitive factors have not, to date, materially
impacted returns; therefore, we have made no adjustment as a result of these
factors in our estimated returns for 2001. In our highly competitive marketplace,
these factors have some potential to increase our estimates of returns in the future.
The introduction of new competing products has impacted our estimate of returns
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in the past. In 1999, we increased our estimate of returns over the previous year
by 1%, as a percentage of gross sales, because of increased inventory in the
distribution channel due to new products introduced by two of our competitors.
In preparing our financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2001, we
estimated future product returns for all of our products to be $145 million, and we
reduced our gross sales by that amount. Our 2001 estimate for returns was $20
million greater than our estimate in 2000 and $15 million greater than our estimate
in 1999. From 1999 to 2000, products introduced by two of our competitors in
1998 lost market share to our products and our sales increased. Due to our
increased sales in 2000, the distribution channel inventory declined over levels in
1999, which also resulted in a 2% decline in the estimated amount of returns, as
a percentage of gross sales. In 2001, with the slow down in consumer spending
over the prior period, distribution channel inventory grew faster than sales, necessi-
tating an increase in the estimated returns equal to 1% of gross sales. The estimates
for returns represented approximately 12%, 11% and 13% of our gross sales for
2001, 2000 and 1999, respectively.
If we were to assume that our estimate of future product returns for all of our
products was changed to the upper end or lower end of the range we developed
in the course of formulating our estimate, the estimate for future returns as of
December 31, 2001 would range from $130 million to $160 million. Accordingly,
the amounts by which we would reduce gross sales and operating income also
would range from $130 million to $160 million as compared to the recorded amount
of $145 million. In each of the years in the three-year period ended 2001, our
actual returns have not deviated from our estimates by more than 5%. Our actual
returns for 2000 and 1999 were $129 million and $134 million, respectively. If we
were to change our estimate of future product returns to the high end of the range,
there would be no material impact on our liquidity or capital resources.
Example 3
Background
Betascott Company manufactures and sells data storage devices including
computer hard drives. The hard drive industry is subject to intense competition
and significant shifts in market share amongst the competitors. In the last
three years, Betascott has reported falling sales and market share, which
has contributed to a fiscal year 2001 loss from operations in the hard drive
segment. (This trend is separately discussed in MD&A.)
As of December 31, 2001, the company had $200 million in property, plant
and equipment (‘‘PP&E’’) used in producing hard drives. The company’s
accounting policies require that it test long-lived assets for impairment when-
ever indicators of impairment exist. The 2001 fiscal year loss from operations
in that segment, coupled with the company’s falling sales and market share,
are indicators of a potential impairment of the hard drive-related PP&E.
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The company follows the provisions of FASB SFAS No. 121, Accounting for
the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Dis-
posed Of.96 That accounting standard requires that if the sum of the future
cash flows expected to result from the assets, undiscounted and without
interest charges, is less than a company’s reported value of the assets, then
the asset is not recoverable and the company must recognize an impairment.
The amount of impairment to be recognized is the excess of the reported
value of the assets over the fair value of those assets.
The hard drive-related PP&E accounts for approximately 67% of Betascott’s
PP&E. The sum of Betascott’s current estimate of expected future cash flows
from its hard drive-related PP&E, undiscounted and without interest charges,
is near the reported value of that PP&E. In the year ended December 31,
2001, Betascott would have been required to recognize an impairment loss
of approximately $30 million if its estimate of those future cash flows had
been 10% lower.
Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal
Application of Critical Accounting Policies
We evaluate our property, plant and equipment (‘‘PP&E’’) for impairment whenever
indicators of impairment exist. Accounting standards require that if the sum of the
future cash flows expected to result from a company’s asset, undiscounted and
without interest charges, is less than the reported value of the asset, an asset
impairment must be recognized in the financial statements. The amount of impair-
ment to recognize is calculated by subtracting the fair value of the asset from the
reported value of the asset.
As we discuss in the notes to the financial statements, we operate in four segments,
one of which is the hard drive segment. In our hard drive segment, we reviewed
our hard drive-related PP&E for impairment as of December 31, 2001, due to a
trend of declining sales and market share. We determined that the undiscounted
sum of the expected future cash flows from the assets related to the hard drive
segment exceeded the recorded value of those assets, so we did not recognize
an impairment in accordance with GAAP. The PP&E in our hard-drive segment
represents approximately two-thirds of our total PP&E.
We believe that the accounting estimate related to asset impairment is a ‘‘critical
accounting estimate’’ because: (1) it is highly susceptible to change from period
to period because it requires company management to make assumptions about
future sales and cost of sales over the life of the hard drive-related PP&E (generally
seven years); and (2) the impact that recognizing an impairment would have on
the assets reported on our balance sheet as well as our net loss would be material.
Management’s assumptions about future sales prices and future sales volumes
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even with the impairment loss, we would have been within the terms of the tangible
net-worth covenant in our long-term debt agreement discussed in note 5 to the
financial statements.
E. Auditor Examination of MD&A Disclosure Relating to Critical
Accounting Estimates
A company’s management bears primary responsibility for its accounting
estimates. Auditors also have important responsibilities regarding a com-
pany’s accounting estimates. A company’s auditor currently is responsible
for evaluating the reasonableness of the accounting estimates made by
management in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole.97
When a company’s audited financial statements are included in an annual
report filed with the Commission, the independent auditor is required to read
the information in the entire filed document, including the MD&A, and consider
whether such information, or the manner of its presentation, is materially
inconsistent with information, or the manner of its presentation, appearing
in the financial statements.98
Despite the current auditing standards, and the auditor’s consideration of
the proposed MD&A disclosure that may take place by virtue of them, we
are considering whether to take additional steps with a view to ensuring the
accuracy and reliability of the proposed disclosure. Subjecting the MD&A
disclosure to the auditing process itself would require the imposition of
auditing standards, including examination of the disclosure itself, application
of auditing processes regarding internal controls, coverage in management
representations of material relevant to the disclosure and other procedures.
One possible approach would be to adopt a requirement that an independent
auditor must examine, in accordance with Attestation Standards,99 the new
MD&A disclosure relating to critical accounting estimates.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has established stan-
dards and procedures when an auditor is engaged by a company to examine
and render an opinion that the disclosure in a company’s MD&A satisfies
applicable Commission requirements.100 An auditor’s objective in an examina-
tion is to express an opinion on:
• whether the MD&A presentation includes in all material respects the
required elements of the disclosure mandated by the Commission;
• whether the historical financial amounts have been accurately derived, in
all material respects, from the company’s financial statements; and
• whether the underlying information, determinations, estimates and
assumptions of the company provide a reasonable basis for the disclo-
sures contained in the MD&A.101
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To complete an examination, an auditor must examine documents and
records and accumulate sufficient evidence in support of the disclosures and
assumptions and take other steps to get reasonable assurance of detecting
both intentional and unintentional misstatements that are material to the
MD&A presentation.102 To accept an examination engagement, an auditor
must have sufficient knowledge about the company and its operations. AT
§701 therefore requires that an auditor must have at least audited the com-
pany’s financial statements for the most recent period covered by the
MD&A, and the other periods covered by the MD&A must have been audited
by it or another auditor.103
Auditor examinations of MD&A disclosure are, we believe, undertaken on
few occasions. Some companies have engaged independent auditors to
conduct an examination of their MD&A disclosures either in connection with
their initial public offering or after a major restructuring or acquisition when
the company disclosure is being presented on a pro forma basis.104 In one
case, an auditor examination of MD&A was undertaken pursuant to a settle-
ment with the Commission of an enforcement action alleging material defi-
ciencies in the company’s past MD&A disclosure.105
We solicit comment with respect to independent auditor
examinations of the proposed MD&A disclosure regarding
critical accounting estimates.
• Should we require that the critical accounting estimates disclosure in the
MD&A undergo an auditor examination comparable to that enumerated
in AT §701?
• Would these engagements significantly improve the disclosure provided
in MD&A?
• In practice, when companies engage auditors to examine the MD&A pursu-
ant to AT §701, does it elicit a higher quality of disclosure than when
auditors consider only, as currently required, whether an MD&A is materi-
ally inconsistent with the financial statements?
• If we were to require examinations by auditors of part or all of MD&A
disclosures, should we also require that a company file, or disclose the
results of, the auditor’s reports?
• If we do not require auditors’ examinations of MD&A disclosure but an
auditor nonetheless examines MD&A disclosure on critical accounting
estimates, should we require that the auditor’s report be filed or the results
be disclosed?
• What would be the relative benefits and costs of a requirement for an
auditor examination with respect to the critical accounting estimates por-
tion of the MD&A?
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• Should we require an auditor ‘‘review’’ under standards comparable to
AT §701,106 as opposed to an auditor ‘‘examination’’ of the critical account-
ing estimates MD&A disclosure?
• Do current requirements relating to what an auditor must consider make an
examination or review of the proposed MD&A disclosure under standards
comparable to AT §701 unnecessary?
• If we do not require auditor examination or review, are there other steps
we should take to help ensure the quality of disclosure in this proposed
section of MD&A?
F. Quarterly Updates
Material changes relating to critical accounting estimates may occur from
fiscal period to fiscal period. For example, management could materially
change an accounting estimate previously disclosed as a critical accounting
estimate because it changes the methodology for computing it. A company
could determine that an additional accounting estimate met the standards
and is a critical accounting estimate for the period subsequent to its most
recent annual or quarterly report. A company also could materially change
one of the important assumptions underlying an existing critical accounting
estimate (which may or may not result in a change to the critical accounting
estimate depending on what changes in other assumptions underlying the
estimate are made). Any of those changes could have a material effect on
the company’s financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of
operations. We expect that U.S. companies would be evaluating accounting
estimates and the underlying assumptions and methodologies on at least a
quarterly basis107 and therefore we believe that quarterly updates to reflect
material developments would be appropriate. Disclosure of material develop-
ments made only at the end of each fiscal year also may not identify changes
quickly enough to inform investors adequately.
In quarterly reports on Form 10-Q or Form 10-QSB, companies would be
required to provide an update to the MD&A information related to critical
accounting estimates discussed in the company’s last filed annual or quarterly
report under the Exchange Act.108 Newly identified critical accounting esti-
mates would be disclosed in the same manner as in an annual report. If other
material changes have occurred that would render the critical accounting
estimates disclosure in the company’s latest report materially out of date or
otherwise materially misleading, we propose that those changes and their
effect be described in the quarterly report. The proposed rules would not,
however, require quarterly updates with regard to the proposed quantitative
and qualitative discussion concerning past material changes in critical
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accounting estimates in annual reports, registration statements and proxy
and information statements.
We solicit comment on the quarterly updating requirement for U.S.
companies.
• Are there some accounting estimates or material assumptions or method-
ologies that would normally be considered by companies only on a less
frequent basis than quarterly? If so, which ones? Should they be omitted
from the quarterly updating requirement on that basis?
• Is the scope of the disclosure required in a quarterly update appropriate?
If not, what should be added or omitted?
G. Proposed Disclosure about Initial Adoption of Accounting
Policies
A company initially adopts an accounting policy when events or transactions
that affect the company occur for the first time, when events or transactions
that were previously immaterial in their effect become material, or when
events or transactions occur that are clearly different in substance from
previous events or transactions. For example, a company may for the first
time enter into transactions involving derivative instruments, such as interest
rate swaps, or may begin selling a new type of product that has delivery terms
and conditions that are different from those associated with the products the
company has previously been selling.
If an initially adopted accounting policy has a material impact on the com-
pany’s financial condition, changes in financial condition or results of opera-
tions, that impact will likely be of interest to investors, to financial analysts
and others. If a company considers an accounting policy that it has initially
adopted to be a significant accounting policy, the company would provide
certain disclosures about that accounting policy as required by APB No. 22.
Those disclosures are typically in the first note to the financial statements.109
The disclosure provided in the notes to the financial statements, however,
may not adequately describe, in a qualitative manner, the impact of the
initially adopted accounting policy or policies on the company’s financial
presentation. We are therefore proposing additional MD&A disclosure to
further describe, where a material impact exists, the initial adoption of
accounting policies.110 The proposed MD&A disclosure would be provided in
companies’ filed annual reports, annual reports to shareholders, registration
statements and proxy and information statements and would include descrip-
tion of:
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• The events or transactions that gave rise to the initial adoption of an
accounting policy;
• The accounting principle that has been adopted and the method of applying
that principle; and
• The impact (discussed qualitatively) resulting from the initial adoption of
the accounting policy on the company’s financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations.
If, upon initial adoption of one of those accounting policies, a company is
permitted a choice among acceptable accounting principles,111 the company
also would be required to explain in MD&A that it had made a choice among
acceptable alternatives, identify the alternatives, and describe why it made
the choice that it did. In addition, where material, the company would have
to provide a qualitative discussion of the impact on the company’s financial
condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations that the
alternatives would have had. Finally, if no accounting literature exists that
governs the accounting for the events or transactions giving rise to the initial
adoption of a material accounting policy (e.g., the events or transactions are
unusual or novel or otherwise have not been contemplated in past standard-
setting projects), the company would be required to explain its decision
regarding which accounting principle to use and which method of applying
that principle to use.
We seek comment on the proposed disclosures related to initial
adoption of accounting policies.
• Would the proposed disclosures about initial adoption of accounting poli-
cies provide useful information to investors and other readers of financial
reports?
• Are there particular situations involving the initial adoption of a material
accounting policy for which we should require additional disclosure? If
so, what are those situations and what additional disclosure should we
require?
• Should we require companies to disclose, in MD&A or in the financial
statements, the estimated effect of adopting accounting policies that they
could have adopted, but did not adopt, upon initial accounting for unusual
or novel transactions?
• What would be the costs for companies to prepare disclosure about the
effects of alternative accounting policies that could have been chosen but
were not?
• Would investors be confused if companies presented disclosure of the
effects of acceptable alternative policies that were not chosen?
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• Should we require in MD&A a discussion of whether the accounting policies
followed by a company upon initial adoption differ from the accounting
policies applied, in similar circumstances, by other companies in its indus-
try, and the reasons for those differences? Please explain. If such a
discussion should be required, please identify the specific disclosures
companies should make.
• Would a company know the policies applied in similar circumstances by
other companies in its industry? If not, would auditing firms or other finan-
cial advisors be able to assist companies in determining whether their
accounting policies generally diverge from industry practices?
H. Disclosure Presentation
The proposals would require that a company present the required information
in a separate section of MD&A. While the proposed disclosure may relate
to other aspects of the discussion in MD&A, such as the results of operations
or liquidity and capital resources, we have chosen to separate it both to
highlight the discussion and because we believe the proposed discussion
would present information that is better communicated separately to promote
understanding.
The proposed MD&A discussion must be presented in language, and a
format, that is clear, concise and understandable to the average investor.112
The disclosure should not be presented in such a way that only an investor
who is also an accountant or an expert on a particular industry would be
able to understand it fully. To reinforce the importance of the disclosure
being presented in a manner that investors will understand, we also would
specify that the proposed disclosure must not be presented, for example,
solely as a single discussion of the aggregate consequences of multiple
critical accounting estimates or the aggregate consequences of the initial
application of multiple new accounting policies.113 Because a company may
identify and discuss more than one critical accounting estimate or more than
one newly adopted accounting policy, and those estimates or those policies
could materially affect a company’s financial presentation in differing ways,
a separate discussion of the application of each estimate and each new
accounting policy will facilitate investors’ understanding of the implications
of each one.
Boilerplate disclosures that do not specifically address the company’s particu-
lar circumstances and operations also would not satisfy the proposed require-
ments.114 Disclosure that could easily be transferred from year to year, or
from company to company, with no change would neither inform investors
adequately nor reflect the independent thinking that must accompany the
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periodic assessment by management that is intended under the proposal.
Finally, the purpose of the proposed disclosure would be hindered if a com-
pany were to include disclosures that consisted principally of blanket disclaim-
ers of legal responsibility for its application of a new accounting policy or its
development of its critical accounting estimates in light of the uncertainties
associated with them. While the Commission fully expects companies to
craft the proposed disclosure responsibly to take advantage of any available
safe harbors, simple disclaimers of legal liability would be contrary to the
disclosure goals underlying the proposal and would not be permitted.115
We solicit comment on the disclosure presentation aspects of the
proposals.
• Should the proposed disclosure be presented in a separate section of
MD&A or should we require that it be integrated into the other discussions
of financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations
and liquidity and capital resources when the proposed disclosure is closely
related to an aspect discussed in those separate sections of MD&A?
• Should other requirements relating to the language and format be added
to the requirement for clear, concise and understandable disclosure? If
so, what requirements?
****
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able to companies satisfying their terms and conditions in making forward-looking statements in
connection with the proposed critical accounting estimates discussion.See Securities Act Section
27A, 15 U.S.C. §77z-2, Securities Act Rule 175, 17 CFR 230.175, Exchange Act Section 21E,
15 U.S.C. §78u-5, and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 CFR 240.3b-6.
13 A segment for financial reporting purposes is defined by Financial Accounting Standards Board
(‘‘FASB’’) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (‘‘SFAS’’) No. 131, Disclosures about
Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information (June 1997) (‘‘SFAS No. 131’’).
14 See Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303, Item 303 of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303
and Item 5 of Form 20-F, referenced in 17 CFR 249.220f. Although the current MD&A disclosure
requirements were adopted starting in 1980, earlier versions date back to 1968.See Securities
Act Release Nos. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980) [45 FR 63630] and 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968) [33 FR 18617].
See also Securities Act Release No. 5520 (Aug. 14, 1974) [39 FR 31894].
15 See Securities Act Release No. 6711 (Apr. 23, 1987) [52 FR 13715], Section II.
16 In assessing whether disclosure of a trend, event, etc. is required, management must consider
both whether it is reasonably likely to occur and whether a material effect is reasonably likely to
occur. As the Commission noted when it adopted the requirement, the ‘‘reasonably likely to occur’’
test is to be used rather than theBasic v. Levinson probability and magnitude test for materiality
of contingent events.See Securities Act Release No. 6835 (May 18, 1989) [54 FR 22427] at fns.
27-28 and accompanying text.
17 Securities Act Release No. 8056; FR-61 (Jan. 22, 2002) [67 FR 3746].
18 See American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (‘‘AICPA’’) Statement of Position (‘‘SOP’’)
No. 94-6, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties (Dec. 1994), (‘‘SOP 94-6’’),
paragraph B-20; See also AU §380, Communication with Audit Committees(‘‘AU §380’’) and AU
§508, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (Apr. 1998).
19 See APB No. 20, paragraph 10.
20 See APB No. 20, paragraph 33.
21 See SOP 94-6, particularly paragraphs 11-19.
22 See FASB SFAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies(Mar. 1975) (‘‘SFAS No. 5’’), paragraph
1, which defines a contingency as ‘‘an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving
uncertainty as to possible gain . . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved
when one or more future events occur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertainty may confirm
the acquisition of an asset or the reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment of an asset or
the incurrence of a liability.’’
23 The term ‘‘reasonably possible’’ as used in SOP 94-6 is consistent with its use in SFAS No. 5.
See SOP 94-6, fn. 7. SFAS No. 5 states that ‘‘reasonably possible’’ means the chance of a future
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transaction or event occurring is more than remote but less than likely. Reasonably possible
events are less likely to occur than probable events.
24 SOP 94-6, paragraph 17, notes: ‘‘Whether the estimate meets the criteria for disclosure under
this SOP does not depend on the amount that has been reported in the financial statements, but
rather on the materiality of the effect that using a different estimate would have had on the financial
statements. Simply because an estimate resulted in the recognition of a small financial statement
amount, or no amount, does not mean that disclosure is not required under this SOP.’’
25 See SOP 94-6, paragraph 14.
26 See SFAS No. 5, paragraph 8. An estimated loss should be accrued whenboth it is probable
that an asset has been impaired or a liability has been incurred and the amount of the loss can
be reasonably estimated. Also, when it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a liability
has been incurred and the reasonable estimate of the loss is a range, the company is required
to accrue an amount for the loss.See FASB Interpretation No. 14, Reasonable Estimation of the
Amount of a Loss (Sept. 1976), paragraph 3.
27 See SFAS No. 5, paragraph 2.
28 See APB Opinion No. 22, Disclosure of Accounting Policies (Apr. 1972) (‘‘APB No. 22’’).
29 See APB No. 22, paragraphs 6-7. APB No. 22 defines accounting policies of a reporting entity
as ‘‘the specific accounting principles and the methods of applying those principles that are judged
by the management of the entity to be the most appropriate in the circumstances to present fairly
financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. . . .’’ APB No. 22, paragraph 6, as amended.
30 See APB No. 22, paragraph 12.
31 Id.
32 In addition to the examples cited in the paragraph, see the disclosure requirements in FASB
SFAS No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments (Dec. 1991); FASB SFAS
No. 123, Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation(Oct. 1995) (‘‘SFAS No. 123’’); and FASB
SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets(Aug. 2001)
(‘‘SFAS No. 144’’).
33 See FASB SFAS No. 132, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement
Benefits (Feb. 1998).
34 See FASB SFAS No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and
Extinguishments of Liabilities (a replacement of FASB Statement No. 125) (Sept. 2000).
35 See Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 43, Restatement and Revision of Accounting
Research Bulletins (June 1953), Chapter 2, ‘‘Form of Statements,’’ Section A, ‘‘Comparative
Financial Statements,’’ paragraph 3, and paragraph 2 (‘‘the well recognized principle that any
change in practice which affects comparability should be disclosed’’).
36 See APB No. 22, paragraph 12.
37 See APB No. 20, paragraph 6.
38 See APB No. 20, paragraph 8.
39 See Securities Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 21, 2000) [65 FR 4585] (suggesting that additions
to financial disclosure outside the financial statements could help address concerns relating to
lack of transparency in some aspects of financial reporting within the financial statements).
40 These could include estimates made on a one-time basis, on a few occasions, or on a recurring
basis.
41 When a company has selected an accounting policy from acceptable alternatives, it is required
under GAAP to make certain disclosures about that accounting policy. See APB No. 22, paragraph
12. See supra fns. 28-31 and accompanying text. U.S. GAAP provides only a limited number of
situations in which more than one method of accounting would be considered acceptable. Over
the years, the combined efforts of accounting standard setters, the accounting profession, public
and non-public companies, and regulatory agencies have significantly reduced the number of
acceptable alternatives in U.S. GAAP. See APB No. 22, paragraph 5. Areas remaining in U.S.
GAAP in which there are acceptable alternatives include inventory pricing and depreciation
methods.See APB No. 20, paragraph 9. See also SFAS No. 123 (providing a choice of accounting
methods for an employee stock option or similar equity instrument).
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42 See APB No. 20, paragraph 16.
43 See Accounting Series Release No. 177 (Sept. 10, 1975) [40 FR 46107], as codified in the
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §304.02,Preferability Letters, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶73,096. See also Item 601(b)(18) of Regulations S-K and S-B, 17 CFR 229.601(b)(18) and 17
CFR 228.601(b)(18). A preferability letter generally is not required when a company adopts a
new accounting policy as a result of implementing a new accounting pronouncement or rule
issued by the FASB, AICPA or SEC.
44 See APB No. 20, paragraphs 17-30.
45 Id.
46 See AU §380, paragraphs 7 and 8.
47 See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 8040, FR-60 (Dec. 12, 2001) [66 FR 65013].
48 See SOP No. 81-1, Accounting for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-
Type Contracts (July 1981).
49 In addition to the information specifically required, a company would be required to provide any
other information necessary to keep its disclosure from being materially misleading.See Securities
Act Rule 408, 17 CFR 230.408, and Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 CFR 240.12b-20.
50 If those changes could have a material effect on the company’s liquidity or capital resources,
then the company also would have to explain that effect.
51 As described below, we would phase in the three-year period and use two years for small
business issuers.
52 The proposed rules would apply equally to business development companies. Business develop-
ment companies are defined in Section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. See
15 USC §80a-2(a)(48). Business development companies are a category of closed-end investment
companies that are not required to register under the Investment Company Act, but file Forms
10-K and 10-Q, and also include MD&A in their annual reports to shareholders.
53 Other examples of accounting estimates include: property and casualty insurance loss reserves,
current obligations that will be fulfilled over several years, future returns of products sold, the
amount of cash flows expected to be generated by a specific group of assets, revenues from
contracts accounted for by the percentage of completion method and pension and warranty
expenses. See AU §342, paragraph 2. For a more detailed list, see the Appendix to AU §342.
54 ‘‘Critical accounting estimate’’ is defined in proposed Item 303(b)(3)(ii)(B) of Regulation S-B,
17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(ii)(B); proposed Item 303(c)(2)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR
229.303(c)(2)(ii); and proposed Item 5.E.2.(b) of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
55 See proposed Instruction 3 to paragraph (b)(3) of Item 303 of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR
228.303(b)(3); proposed Instruction 4 to paragraph (c) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR
229.303(c); and proposed Instruction 3 to Item 5.E of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
56 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(A) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(A); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(i) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(i); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(a) of Form
20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
57 See also Securities Act Release No. 8056, FR-61 (Jan. 22, 2002)[67 FR 3746], Section II.B.
(providing an example of a critical accounting estimate related to non-exchange traded contracts
accounted for at fair value).
58 See supra fn. 16.
59 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(B) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(B); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(ii); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(b) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
60 For example, an estimate of fair value used to measure an impairment loss on a long-lived
asset may not itself appear as a line item in the financial statements.
61 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(C) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(C); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(iii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(iii); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(c) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
62 ‘‘Reasonably possible’’ would have the same meaning as defined in SFAS No. 5.See supra
fn. 23. See also proposed Item 303(b)(3)(ii)(D) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(ii)(D);
proposed Item 303(c)(2)(iv) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(2)(iv); and proposed Item
5.E.2.(d) of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
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63 ‘‘Near-term’’ would have the same meaning as defined in SOP 94-6 at paragraph 7.See
proposed Item 303(b)(3)(ii)(C) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(ii)(C); proposed Item
303(c)(2)(iii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(2)(iii); and proposed Item 5.E.2.(c) of Form
20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
64 For example, companies would be required to select meaningful changes in material assumptions
and not ones so minute as to avoid, or materially understate, any demonstration for investors of
sensitivity. See proposed Instruction 1 to paragraph (b)(3) of Item 303 of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR
228.303(b)(3); proposed Instruction 1 to paragraph (c) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR
229.303(c); and proposed Instruction 1 to Item 5.E of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
65 Where use of only one positive change, or use of only one negative change, would render the
analysis materially misleading, companies would have to include more than one assumed positive
change, or more than one assumed negative change, to avoid that result.
66 In completing the analysis, companies would have to consider whether assumed events that
alter the most material assumption also could have some impact on other assumptions made in
formulating the critical accounting estimate. For example, if a company were to assume a reason-
ably possible near-term change in fuel prices occurred, that change may impact multiple assump-
tions underlying a critical accounting estimate that each take fuel prices into account. Companies
would have to determine whether and how their other assumptions would change and disclose
the aggregate effect of all of those changes.
67 For an example of when this could take place,see infra Example 3 in Section III.D.
68 See, e.g., Item 303(a)(1)-(2) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a)(1)-(2).
69 See, e.g., Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a).
70 See, e.g., Item 303(a)(3)(i) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a)(3)(i).
71 See, e.g., Item 303(a)(3)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
72 See, e.g., Instruction 3(A) to Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a).
73 See, e.g., Instruction 3(B) to Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a).
74 See proposed Item 303(c)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(iv), and proposed
Item 5.E.3.(d) of Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f. As part of its disclosure, a company would have
to include discussion of assumptions that changed materially from a prior period but did not cause
the estimate itself to change by a material amount. For example, a company could change
two or more material assumptions underlying an accounting estimate, but the changes in the
assumptions could have an offsetting impact, resulting in no material change to the amount of
the accounting estimate recorded in the financial statements.
75 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(D) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(D). These
periods correspond to the time frame currently encompassed by the MD&A requirements applica-
ble to each of those types of companies.
76 Compare APB No. 20, paragraph 33, which requires financial statement disclosure of the effect
on income before extraordinary items, net income, and related per share amounts of the current
period for a change in an estimate not made in the ordinary course of accounting that materially
affects several future periods.
77 Of course, the phase-in of the specific MD&A disclosure about changes in estimates would not
delay the effect of the rest of the proposed changes or affect the requirements for disclosure
under current MD&A rules.
78 See Exchange Act Release No. 42266 (Dec. 22, 1999) [64 FR 73389] and Item 306 of Regulation
S-K, 17 CFR 229.306.
79 See Item 306(a)(2) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.306(a)(2), SAS No. 61, Communication with
Audit Committees (Apr. 1988) (‘‘SAS 61’’) and SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications
(Dec. 1999) (‘‘SAS 90’’) (amending SAS 61 and AU §380).
80 SAS 61, paragraph 8.
81 See AU §380, paragraph 11 (added by SAS 90).
82 See Item 306(a)(1) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.306(a)(1).
83 See Item 306(a)(4) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.306(a)(4).
84 See Securities Act Release No. 8040, FR-60 (Dec. 12, 2001) [66 FR 65013].
85 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(E) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(E); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(v) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(v); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(e) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
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86 The proposed MD&A disclosure is distinguishable from the audit committee report in annual
proxy or information statements. Under the proxy requirements, the audit committee must prepare
a report and state whether it recommended, based on its review and discussions with management
and the auditors, that the financial statements be included in the Form 10-K. In our proposals,
we would not require an audit committee report or recommendation, but only that the company
state whether or not discussions between the audit committee and senior management occurred
and, if they did not, why not. We therefore are not convinced that a liability exemption like that
applicable to the audit committee report is necessary for disclosure in MD&A of whether or not a
company’s senior management has discussed the development and selection of critical accounting
estimates, and the disclosure in MD&A regarding them.
87 If the registrant is not a corporation, the disclosure would address senior management’s discus-
sions with the equivalent group responsible for the oversight of the financial reporting process.
88 This disclosure would be required in annual reports filed with the Commission, annual reports
to shareholders, registration statements and proxy and information statements. When a new
critical accounting estimate is identified in a quarterly report, there also would be disclosure in
the Form 10-Q or Form 10-QSB regarding whether the development, selection and disclosure
regarding the estimate was discussed by management with the audit committee of the board of
directors.
89 See Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(a).
90 See Securities Act Release No. 6835 (May 18, 1989) [54 FR 22427].
91 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iii)(F) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iii)(F); proposed
Item 303(c)(3)(vi) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(3)(vi); and proposed Item 5.E.3.(f) of
Form 20-F, 17 CFR 249.220f.
92 See SFAS No. 131 for requirements as to presentation of segment disclosure in the financial
statements.
93 Certain foreign private issuers providing disclosure under Item 17 of Form 20-F are not required
to provide segment disclosure in their filed financial statements and therefore would not be required
to provide a quantitative discussion of the identified segments.
94 Any discussion on a segment basis would appear in the section of MD&A devoted to critical
accounting estimates, and not in the separate discussion of segment results in MD&A.
95 See Securities Act Release No. 8056, FR-61 (Jan. 22, 2002)[67 FR 3746], Section II.B.
96 SFAS No. 144 superseded SFAS No. 121 and is effective for financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001.
97 See AU §342, paragraph 4. In evaluating the reasonableness, the auditor’s objective is ‘‘to
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to provide a reasonable assurance that—
a. All accounting estimates that could be material to the financial statements have been
developed.
b. Those accounting estimates are reasonable in the circumstances.
c. The accounting estimates are presented in conformity with applicable accounting principles
and are properly disclosed.’’
AU §342, paragraph 7. The auditor normally focuses on key factors and assumptions that are
significant to the accounting estimate, that are sensitive to variations, that are deviations from
historical patterns or that are subjective and susceptible to misstatement and bias.See AU §342,
paragraph 9.
98 See AU §550, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements(‘‘AU
§550’’).
99 See Codification of Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements (‘‘AT’’) §101,Attest
Engagements and AT §701, Management’s Discussion and Analysis.
100 AT §701 contemplates two levels of service by an auditor with respect to MD&A: an ‘‘examina-
tion’’ of an MD&A presentation and a more limited ‘‘review’’ of an MD&A presentation. Unlike an
examination, a review culminates with the auditor giving negative assurance. The auditor’s review
report states whether any information came to the auditor’s attention to cause him or her to believe
that: the MD&A presentation taken as a whole does not include in all material respects the required
elements of the disclosure; the historical financial amounts have not been accurately derived, in
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all material respects, from the company’s financial statements; or the underlying information,
determinations, estimates and assumptions of the company do not provide a reasonable basis
for the disclosures contained in the MD&A. In undertaking a review, an auditor is expected to
apply analytical procedures and make inquiries of people at the company who are responsible
for financial, accounting and operational matters, but is not expected to test accounting records
through inspection or observation, obtain corroborating evidence in response to inquiries, or take
other steps required during an MD&A examination. An auditor’s review report is not intended to
be filed with the Commission.See AT §701, paragraph 2.
101 See AT §701, paragraph 5.
102 See AT §701, paragraphs 28-29.
103 See AT §701, paragraph 6.
104 Goldman Sachs engaged an auditor to review its MD&A disclosure in connection with its initial
public offering. See Form S-1, Commission File No. 333-74449. In addition, in the course of
reading agreements between issuers and their underwriters created in connection with registered
offerings, the staff has noted that approximately 50 companies have agreed to engage an auditor
to conduct an examination of the company’s MD&A disclosure as a condition to closing.
105 In 1998, we issued a cease-and-desist order in a settlement with Sony Corporation that required
Sony to engage an independent auditor to examine its MD&A disclosure for the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1999. See SEC v. Sony Corporation, Litigation Release No. 15832 (Aug. 5, 1998).
106 See supra fn. 100.
107 The procedures performed by an independent accountant to issue a review report on the
financial statements filed in a Form 10-Q generally would include reading information such as
that found in the MD&A section of the Form 10-Q. Further, the independent accountant’s associa-
tion with those financial statements would require the independent accountant to read the MD&
A. See AU §722, Interim Financial Information, paragraph 35 and AU §550, paragraph 4.
108 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(v) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(v), and proposed
Item 303(c)(5) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(5). To assist companies in preparing quarterly
updates, we would allow them to presume that investors have read, or have access to, the
discussion of critical accounting estimates in their previously filed Exchange Act annual reports
and any quarterly reports filed subsequent to the most recent annual report.
109 See APB No. 22, paragraphs 12 and 15.
110 See proposed Item 303(b)(3)(iv) of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR 228.303(b)(3)(iv); proposed Item
303(c)(4) of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR 229.303(c)(4); and proposed Item 5.E.4. of Form 20-F, 17
CFR 249.220f. These proposed disclosures would not be required if the initial adoption of an
accounting policy solely results from adoption of new accounting literature issued by a recognized
accounting standard setter (including, in the U.S., new accounting pronouncements or rules issued
by the FASB, AICPA or SEC or a new consensus of the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF)).
111 See supra fn. 31 and accompanying text.
112 See proposed Instruction 3 to paragraph (b)(3) of Item 303 of Regulation S-B, 17 CFR
228.303(b)(3); proposed Instruction 4 to paragraph (c) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 CFR
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[Author’s Note: For some time, the staff of the Securities and Exchange
Commission studied and analyzed the relative merits of quantitative versus
qualitative materiality. In August of 1999, the staff issued SAB No. 99—
‘‘Materiality’’coming down solidly on the side of qualitative materiality as the
standard accountants should apply. The staff rejected exclusive reliance on
quantitative measures to determine if an item was material.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99—Materiality
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 211
[Release No. SAB 99]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
Action: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
Summary: This staff accounting bulletin expresses the views of the staff that
exclusive reliance on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality
in preparing financial statements and performing audits of those financial
statements is inappropriate; misstatements are not immaterial simply
because they fall beneath a numerical threshold.
*Source: SAB No. 99 is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/acctrps/sab99.htm.
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Date: August 12, 1999
For Further Information Contact: W. Scott Bayless, Associate Chief
Accountant, or Robert E. Burns, Chief Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant
(202-942-4400), or David R. Fredrickson, Office of General Counsel (202-
942-0900), Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20549-1103; electronic addresses: BaylessWS@sec.gov;
BurnsR@sec.gov; FredricksonD@sec.gov.
Supplementary Information: The statements in the staff accounting bulle-
tins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published
as bearing the Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations
and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office




Date: August 12, 1999
Part 211–(AMEND) Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 to the
table found in Subpart B.
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
The staff hereby adds Section M to Topic 1 of the Staff Accounting Bulletin
Series. Section M, entitled ‘‘Materiality,’’ provides guidance in applying mate-
riality thresholds to the preparation of financial statements filed with the
Commission and the performance of audits of those financial statements.
Staff Accounting Bulletins
Topic 1: Financial Statements
* * * * *
M. Materiality
1. Assessing Materiality
Facts: During the course of preparing or auditing year-end financial state-
ments, financial management or the registrant’s independent auditor
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becomes aware of misstatements in a registrant’s financial statements. When
combined, the misstatements result in a 4% overstatement of net income
and a $.02 (4%) overstatement of earnings per share. Because no item in
the registrant’s consolidated financial statements is misstated by more than
5%, management and the independent auditor conclude that the deviation
from generally accepted accounting principles (‘‘GAAP’’) is immaterial and
that the accounting is permissible.1
Question: Each Statement of Financial Accounting Standards adopted by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (‘‘FASB’’) states, ‘‘The provisions
of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items.’’ In the staff’s
view, may a registrant or the auditor of its financial statements assume the
immateriality of items that fall below a percentage threshold set by manage-
ment or the auditor to determine whether amounts and items are material
to the financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. The staff is aware that certain registrants, over
time, have developed quantitative thresholds as ‘‘rules of thumb’’ to assist
in the preparation of their financial statements, and that auditors also have
used these thresholds in their evaluation of whether items might be consid-
ered material to users of a registrant’s financial statements. One rule of
thumb in particular suggests that the misstatement or omission of an item2
that falls under a 5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly
egregious circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior
management. The staff reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements that exclusive reliance on this or any percentage or numerical
threshold has no basis in the accounting literature or the law.
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide
the basis for a preliminary assumption that—without considering all relevant
circumstances—a deviation of less than the specified percentage with respect
to a particular item on the registrant’s financial statements is unlikely to be
material. The staff has no objection to such a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ as an initial
step in assessing materiality. But quantifying, in percentage terms, the magni-
tude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality; it
cannot appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant
considerations. Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users of a
registrant’s financial statements. A matter is ‘‘material’’ if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important. In its State-
ment of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, the FASB stated the essence
of the concept of materiality as follows:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if,
in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such
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that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the
report would have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction
of the item.3
This formulation in the accounting literature is in substance identical to the
formulation used by the courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. The
Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if there is—
a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘‘total mix’’ of informa-
tion made available.4
Under the governing principles, an assessment of materiality requires that
one views the facts in the context of the ‘‘surrounding circumstances,’’ as
the accounting literature puts it, or the ‘‘total mix’’ of information, in the words
of the Supreme Court. In the context of a misstatement of a financial statement
item, while the ‘‘total mix’’ includes the size in numerical or percentage terms
of the misstatement, it also includes the factual context in which the user of
financial statements would view the financial statement item. The shorthand
in the accounting and auditing literature for this analysis is that financial
management and the auditor must consider both ‘‘quantitative’’ and ‘‘qualita-
tive’’ factors in assessing an item’s materiality.5 Court decisions, Commission
rules and enforcement actions, and accounting and auditing literature6 have
all considered ‘‘qualitative’’ factors in various contexts.
The FASB has long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a
numerical formula. In its Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB noted that
some had urged it to promulgate quantitative materiality guides for use in a
variety of situations. The FASB rejected such an approach as representing
only a ‘‘minority view,’’ stating—
The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be made
only by those who have all the facts. The Board’s present position is that
no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account
all the considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment.7
The FASB noted that, in certain limited circumstances, the Commission and
other authoritative bodies had issued quantitative materiality guidance, citing
as examples guidelines ranging from one to ten percent with respect to a
variety of disclosures.8 And it took account of contradictory studies, one
showing a lack of uniformity among auditors on materiality judgments, and
another suggesting widespread use of a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ of five to ten percent
of net income.9 The FASB also considered whether an evaluation of material-
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ity could be based solely on anticipating the market’s reaction to accounting
information.10
The FASB rejected a formulaic approach to discharging ‘‘the onerous duty
of making materiality decisions’’11 in favor of an approach that takes into
account all the relevant considerations. In so doing, it made clear that—
[M]agnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circum-
stances in which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be a
sufficient basis for a materiality judgment.12
Evaluation of materiality requires a registrant and its auditor to considerall
the relevant circumstances, and the staff believes that there are numerous
circumstances in which misstatements below 5% could well be material.
Qualitative factors may cause misstatements of quantitatively small amounts
to be material; as stated in the auditing literature:
As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations
in materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come
to the auditor’s attention could have a material effect on the financial state-
ments.13
Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small
misstatement of a financial statement item are—
• whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measure-
ment or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of
imprecision inherent in the estimate14
• whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends
• whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus
expectations for the enterprise
• whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa
• whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the
registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role
in the registrant’s operations or profitability
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with regula-
tory requirements
• whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan
covenants or other contractual requirements
• whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s
compensation—for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of
bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation
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• whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transac-
tion.
This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the material-
ity of a quantitatively small misstatement.15 Among other factors, the demon-
strated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to certain
types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard
quantitatively small misstatements as material. Consideration of potential
market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself ‘‘too blunt an
instrument to be depended on’’ in considering whether a fact is material.16
When, however, management or the independent auditor expects (based,
for example, on a pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement
may result in a significant positive or negative market reaction, that expected
reaction should be taken into account when considering whether a misstate-
ment is material.17
For the reasons noted above, the staff believes that a registrant and the
auditors of its financial statements should not assume that even small inten-
tional misstatements in financial statements, for example those pursuant to
actions to ‘‘manage’’ earnings, are immaterial.18 While the intent of manage-
ment does not render a misstatement material, it may provide significant
evidence of materiality. The evidence may be particularly compelling where
management has intentionally misstated items in the financial statements to
‘‘manage’’ reported earnings. In that instance, it presumably has done so
believing that the resulting amounts and trends would be significant to users
of the registrant’s financial statements.19 The staff believes that investors
generally would regard as significant a management practice to over- or
under-state earnings up to an amount just short of a percentage threshold
in order to ‘‘manage’’ earnings. Investors presumably also would regard as
significant an accounting practice that, in essence, rendered all earnings
figures subject to a management-directed margin of misstatement.
The materiality of a misstatement may turn on where it appears in the financial
statements. For example, a misstatement may involve a segment of the
registrant’s operations. In that instance, in assessing materiality of a misstate-
ment to the financial statements taken as a whole, registrants and their
auditors should consider not only the size of the misstatement but also the
significance of the segment information to the financial statements taken as
a whole.20 ‘‘A misstatement of the revenue and operating profit of a relatively
small segment that is represented by management to be important to the
future profitability of the entity’’21 is more likely to be material to investors
than a misstatement in a segment that management has not identified as
especially important. In assessing the materiality of misstatements in seg-
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ment information—as with materiality generally—situations may arise in prac-
tice where the auditor will conclude that a matter relating to segment
information is qualitatively material even though, in his or her judgment, it is
quantitatively immaterial to the financial statements taken as a whole.22
Aggregating and Netting Misstatements
In determining whether multiple misstatements cause the financial state-
ments to be materially misstated, registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements should consider each misstatement separately and the aggregate
effect of all misstatements.23 A registrant and its auditor should evaluate
misstatements in light of quantitative and qualitative factors and ‘‘consider
whether, in relation to individual line item amounts, subtotals, or totals in the
financial statements, they materially misstate the financial statements taken
as a whole.’’24 This requires consideration of the significance of an item to
a particular entity (for example, inventories to a manufacturing company),
the pervasiveness of the misstatement (such as whether it affects the presen-
tation of numerous financial statement items), and the effect of the misstate-
ment on the financial statements taken as a whole. . . .25
Registrants and their auditors first should consider whether each misstate-
ment is material, irrespective of its effect when combined with other misstate-
ments. The literature notes that the analysis should consider whether the
misstatement of ‘‘individual amounts’’ causes a material misstatement of the
financial statements taken as a whole. As with materiality generally, this
analysis requires consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors.
If the misstatement of an individual amount causes the financial statements
as a whole to be materially misstated, that effect cannot be eliminated by
other misstatements whose effect may be to diminish the impact of the
misstatement on other financial statement items. To take an obvious example,
if a registrant’s revenues are a material financial statement item and if they
are materially overstated, the financial statements taken as a whole will be
materially misleading even if the effect on earnings is completely offset by
an equivalent overstatement of expenses.
Even though a misstatement of an individual amount may not cause the
financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misstated, it may
nonetheless, when aggregated with other misstatements, render the financial
statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading. Registrants and
the auditors of their financial statements accordingly should consider the
effect of the misstatement on subtotals or totals. The auditor should aggregate
all misstatements that affect each subtotal or total and consider whether the
page 243 05-15-03 11:49:57
19-Appendix B.indd   237 6/28/10   10:10:58 AM
238
Financial Reporting Fraud244 Financial Reporting Fraud
misstatements in the aggregate affect the subtotal or total in a way that
causes the registrant’s financial statements taken as a whole to be materially
misleading.26
The staff believes that, in considering the aggregate effect of multiple mis-
statements on a subtotal or total, registrants and the auditors of their financial
statements should exercise particular care when considering whether to
offset (or the appropriateness of offsetting) a misstatement of an estimated
amount with a misstatement of an item capable of precise measurement. As
noted above, assessments of materiality should never be purely mechanical;
given the imprecision inherent in estimates, there is by definition a corre-
sponding imprecision in the aggregation of misstatements involving estimates
with those that do not involve an estimate.
Registrants and auditors also should consider the effect of misstatements
from prior periods on the current financial statements. For example, the
auditing literature states,
Matters underlying adjustments proposed by the auditor but not recorded by
the entity could potentially cause future financial statements to be materially
misstated, even though the auditor has concluded that the adjustments are
not material to the current financial statements.27
This may be particularly the case where immaterial misstatements recur in
several years and the cumulative effect becomes material in the current
year.
2. Immaterial Misstatements That are Intentional
Facts: A registrant’s management intentionally has made adjustments to
various financial statement items in a manner inconsistent with GAAP. In each
accounting period in which such actions were taken, none of the individual
adjustments is by itself material, nor is the aggregate effect on the financial
statements taken as a whole material for the period. The registrant’s earnings
‘‘management’’ has been effected at the direction or acquiescence of man-
agement in the belief that any deviations from GAAP have been immaterial
and that accordingly the accounting is permissible.
Question: In the staff’s view, may a registrant make intentional immaterial
misstatements in its financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. In certain circumstances, intentional immaterial
misstatements are unlawful.
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Considerations of the Books and Records Provisions Under the
Exchange Act
Even if misstatements are immaterial,28 registrants must comply with Sections
13(b)(2)-(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Exchange Act’’). 29
Under these provisions, each registrant with securities registered pursuant
to Section 12 of the Exchange Act,30 or required to file reports pursuant to
Section 15(d),31 must make and keep books, records, and accounts, which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of assets of the registrant and must maintain internal accounting controls
that are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that, among other things,
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial
statements in conformity with GAAP.32 In this context, determinations of what
constitutes ‘‘reasonable assurance’’ and ‘‘reasonable detail’’ are based not
on a ‘‘materiality’’ analysis but on the level of detail and degree of assurance
that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.33 Accord-
ingly, failure to record accurately immaterial items, in some instances, may
result in violations of the securities laws.
The staff recognizes that there is limited authoritative guidance34 regarding
the ‘‘reasonableness’’ standard in Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act. A
principal statement of the Commission’s policy in this area is set forth in an
address given in 1981 by then Chairman Harold M. Williams.35 In his address,
Chairman Williams noted that, like materiality, ‘‘reasonableness’’ is not an
‘‘absolute standard of exactitude for corporate records.’’36 Unlike materiality,
however, ‘‘reasonableness’’ is not solely a measure of the significance of a
financial statement item to investors. ‘‘Reasonableness,’’ in this context,
reflects a judgment as to whether an issuer’s failure to correct a known
misstatement implicates the purposes underlying the accounting provisions
of Sections 13(b)(2)-(7) of the Exchange Act.37
In assessing whether a misstatement results in a violation of a registrant’s
obligation to keep books and records that are accurate ‘‘in reasonable detail,’’
registrants and their auditors should consider, in addition to the factors dis-
cussed above concerning an evaluation of a misstatement’s potential materi-
ality, the factors set forth below.
• The significance of the misstatement. Though the staff does not believe
that registrants need to make finely calibrated determinations of signifi-
cance with respect to immaterial items, plainly it is ‘‘reasonable’’ to treat
misstatements whose effects are clearly inconsequential differently than
more significant ones.
• How the misstatement arose. It is unlikely that it is ever ‘‘reasonable’’
for registrants to record misstatements or not to correct known misstate-
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ments—even immaterial ones—as part of an ongoing effort directed by
or known to senior management for the purposes of ‘‘managing’’ earnings.
On the other hand, insignificant misstatements that arise from the opera-
tion of systems or recurring processes in the normal course of business
generally will not cause a registrant’s books to be inaccurate ‘‘in reasonable
detail.’’38
• The cost of correcting the misstatement.The books and records provi-
sions of the Exchange Act do not require registrants to make major expen-
ditures to correct small misstatements.39 Conversely, where there is little
cost or delay involved in correcting a misstatement, failing to do so is
unlikely to be ‘‘reasonable.’’
• The clarity of authoritative accounting guidance with respect to the
misstatement. Where reasonable minds may differ about the appropriate
accounting treatment of a financial statement item, a failure to correct it
may not render the registrant’s financial statements inaccurate ‘‘in reason-
able detail.’’ Where, however, there is little ground for reasonable disagree-
ment, the case for leaving a misstatement uncorrected is correspondingly
weaker.
There may be other indicators of ‘‘reasonableness’’ that registrants and their
auditors may ordinarily consider. Because the judgment is not mechanical,
the staff will be inclined to continue to defer to judgments that ‘‘allow a
business, acting in good faith, to comply with the Act’s accounting provisions
in an innovative and cost-effective way.’’40
The Auditor’s Response to Intentional Misstatements
Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act requires auditors to take certain actions
upon discovery of an ‘‘illegal act.’’41The statute specifies that these obligations
are triggered ‘‘whether or not [the illegal acts are] perceived to have a material
effect on the financial statements of the issuer. . . .’’ Among other things,
Section 10A(b)(1) requires the auditor to inform the appropriate level of
management of an illegal act (unless clearly inconsequential) and assure
that the registrant’s audit committee is ‘‘adequately informed’’ with respect
to the illegal act.
As noted, an intentional misstatement of immaterial items in a registrant’s
financial statements may violate Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act and
thus be an illegal act. When such a violation occurs, an auditor must take
steps to see that the registrant’s audit committee is ‘‘adequately informed’’
about the illegal act. Because Section 10A(b)(1) is triggered regardless of
whether an illegal act has a material effect on the registrant’s financial state-
ments, where the illegal act consists of a misstatement in the registrant’s
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financial statements, the auditor will be required to report that illegal act to
the audit committee irrespective of any ‘‘netting’’ of the misstatements with
other financial statement items.
The requirements of Section 10A echo the auditing literature. See, for exam-
ple, Statement on Auditing Standards No. (‘‘SAS’’) 54, ‘‘Illegal Acts by Cli-
ents,’’ and SAS 82, ‘‘Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.’’
Pursuant to paragraph 38 of SAS 82, if the auditor determines there is
evidence that fraud may exist, the auditor must discuss the matter with the
appropriate level of management. The auditor must report directly to the
audit committee fraud involving senior management and fraud that causes
a material misstatement of the financial statements. Paragraph 4 of SAS 82
states that ‘‘misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial
statements to deceive financial statement users.’’42 SAS 82 further states
that fraudulent financial reporting may involve falsification or alteration of
accounting records; misrepresenting or omitting events, transactions or other
information in the financial statements; and the intentional misapplication
of accounting principles relating to amounts, classifications, the manner of
presentation, or disclosures in the financial statements.43 The clear implication
of SAS 82 is that immaterial misstatements may be fraudulent financial
reporting.44
Auditors that learn of intentional misstatements may also be required to (1)
re-evaluate the degree of audit risk involved in the audit engagement, (2)
determine whether to revise the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures
accordingly, and (3) consider whether to resign.45
Intentional misstatements also may signal the existence of reportable condi-
tions or material weaknesses in the registrant’s system of internal accounting
control designed to detect and deter improper accounting and financial
reporting.46 As stated by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, in its 1987 report,
The tone set by top management—the corporate environment or culture
within which financial reporting occurs—is the most important factor contribut-
ing to the integrity of the financial reporting process. Notwithstanding an
impressive set of written rules and procedures, if the tone set by management
is lax, fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur.47
An auditor is required to report to a registrant’s audit committee any reportable
conditions or material weaknesses in a registrant’s system of internal
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accounting control that the auditor discovers in the course of the examination
of the registrant’s financial statements.48
GAAP Precedence Over Industry Practice
Some have argued to the staff that registrants should be permitted to follow
an industry accounting practice even though that practice is inconsistent with
authoritative accounting literature. This situation might occur if a practice is
developed when there are few transactions and the accounting results are
clearly inconsequential, and that practice never changes despite a subse-
quent growth in the number or materiality of such transactions. The staff
disagrees with this argument. Authoritative literature takes precedence over
industry practice that is contrary to GAAP.49
General Comments
This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting
or auditing literature.50 This SAB and the authoritative accounting literature
cannot specifically address all of the novel and complex business transactions
and events that may occur. Accordingly, registrants may account for, and
make disclosures about, these transactions and events based on analogies
to similar situations or other factors. The staff may not, however, always be
persuaded that a registrant’s determination is the most appropriate under
the circumstances. When disagreements occur after a transaction or an
event has been reported, the consequences may be severe for registrants,
auditors, and, most importantly, the users of financial statements who have
a right to expect consistent accounting and reporting for, and disclosure of,
similar transactions and events. The staff, therefore, encourages registrants
and auditors to discuss on a timely basis with the staff proposed accounting
treatments for, or disclosures about, transactions or events that are not
specifically covered by the existing accounting literature.
Footnotes
1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (‘‘AICPA’’), Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards (‘‘AU’’) §312, ‘‘Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit,’’ states that
the auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning and setting the scope
for the audit and (b) evaluating whether the financial statements taken as a whole are fairly
presented in all material respects in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
The purpose of this Staff Accounting Bulletin (‘‘SAB’’) is to provide guidance to financial manage-
ment and independent auditors with respect to the evaluation of the materiality of misstatements
that are identified in the audit process or preparation of the financial statements (i.e., (b) above).
This SAB is not intended to provide definitive guidance for assessing ‘‘materiality’’ in other contexts,
such as evaluations of auditor independence, as other factors may apply. There may be other
rules that address financial presentation. See, e.g., Rule 2a-4, 17 CFR 270.2a-4, under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.
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2 As used in this SAB, ‘‘misstatement’’ or ‘‘omission’’ refers to a financial statement assertion that
would not be in conformity with GAAP.
3 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Account-
ing Information (‘‘Concepts Statement No. 2’’), 132 (1980). See also Concepts Statement No. 2,
Glossary of Terms—Materiality.
4 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, determinations of materiality require
‘‘delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set
of facts and the significance of those inferences to him . . . .’’ TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450.
5 See, e.g., Concepts Statement No. 2, 123–124; AU §312.10 (‘‘. . . materiality judgments are
made in light of surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative
considerations.’’); AU §312.34 (‘‘Qualitative considerations also influence the auditor in reaching
a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.’’). As used in the accounting literature
and in this SAB, ‘‘qualitative’’ materiality refers to the surrounding circumstances that inform an
investor’s evaluation of financial statement entries. Whether events may be material to investors
for non-financial reasons is a matter not addressed by this SAB.
6 See, e.g., Rule 1-02(o) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.1-02(o), Rule 405 of Regulation C, 17
CFR 230.405, and Rule 12b-2, 17 CFR 240.12b-2; AU §§312.10 - .11, 317.13, 411.04 n. 1, and
508.36; In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation, 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Parnes
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90
F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996); In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. (‘‘AAER’’) 1140 (June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Eugene Gaughan, AAER 1141
(June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Thomas Scanlon, AAER 1142 (June 30, 1999); and In re
Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, Sec. Act Rel. No. 7518 (March 25, 1998).
7 Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 (1980).
8 Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 and 166.
9 Concepts Statement No. 2, 167.
10 Concepts Statement No. 2, 168–69.
11 Concepts Statement No. 2, 170.
12 Concepts Statement No. 2, 125.
13 AU §312.11.
14 As stated in Concepts Statement No. 2, 130: Another factor in materiality judgments is the
degree of precision that is attainable in estimating the judgment item. The amount of deviation
that is considered immaterial may increase as the attainable degree of precision decreases. For
example, accounts payable usually can be estimated more accurately than can contingent liabilities
arising from litigation or threats of it, and a deviation considered to be material in the first case
may be quite trivial in the second. This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance
in the accounting literature regarding accounting estimates. See, e.g., Accounting Principles Board
Opinion No. 20, Accounting Changes 10, 11, 31–33 (July 1971).
15 The staff understands that the Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force (‘‘Task Force’’) was convened
in March of 1998 and has made recommendations to the Auditing Standards Board including
suggestions regarding communications with audit committees about unadjusted misstatements.
See generally Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force, ‘‘Materiality in a Financial Statement Audit—
Considering Qualitative Factors When Evaluating Audit Findings’’ (August 1998). The Task Force
memorandum is available at www.aicpa.org.
16 See Concepts Statement No. 2, 169.
17 If management does not expect a significant market reaction, a misstatement still may be
material and should be evaluated under the criteria discussed in this SAB.
18 Intentional management of earnings and intentional misstatements, as used in this SAB, do not
include insignificant errors and omissions that may occur in systems and recurring processes in
the normal course of business. See notes 38 and 50 infra.
19 Assessments of materiality should occur not only at year-end, but also during the preparation
of each quarterly or interim financial statement. See, e.g., In the Matter of Venator Group, Inc.,
AAER 1049 (June 29, 1998).
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20 See, e.g., In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., AAER 1140 (June 30, 1999).
21 AUI §326.33.
22 Id.
23 The auditing literature notes that the ‘‘concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either
individually or in the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.’’ AU §312.03. See also AU §312.04.
24 AU §312.34. Quantitative materiality assessments often are made by comparing adjustments
to revenues, gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, stockholders’ equity, or individual
line items in the financial statements. The particular items in the financial statements to be
considered as a basis for the materiality determination depend on the proposed adjustment to
be made and other factors, such as those identified in this SAB. For example, an adjustment to
inventory that is immaterial to pretax income or net income may be material to the financial





28 FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (‘‘Standards’’ or ‘‘Statements’’) generally
provide that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial items.’’ This
SAB is consistent with that provision of the Statements. In theory, this language is subject to the
interpretation that the registrant is free intentionally to set forth immaterial items in financial
statements in a manner that plainly would be contrary to GAAP if the misstatement were material.
The staff believes that the FASB did not intend this result.
29 15 U.S.C. §§78m(b)(2)-(7).
30 15 U.S.C. §78l.
31 15 U.S.C. §78o(d).
32 Criminal liability may be imposed if a person knowingly circumvents or knowingly fails to imple-
ment a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies books, records or accounts.
15 U.S.C. §§78m(4) and (5). See also Rule 13b2-1 under the Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.13b2-
1, which states, ‘‘No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book,
record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.’’
33 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(7). The books and records provisions of section 13(b) of the Exchange Act
originally were passed as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘‘FCPA’’). In the conference
committee report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, the committee stated,
The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to clarify that the current
standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision. The concept of
reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including
the costs of compliance.
Cong. Rec. H2116 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
34 So far as the staff is aware, there is only one judicial decision that discusses Section 13(b)(2)
of the Exchange Act in any detail, SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724
(N.D. Ga. 1983), and the courts generally have found that no private right of action exists under
the accounting and books and records provisions of the Exchange Act. See e.g., Lamb v. Phillip
Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) and JS Service Center Corporation v. General Electric
Technical Services Company, 937 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
35 The Commission adopted the address as a formal statement of policy in Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 17500 (January 29, 1981), 46 FR 11544 (February 9, 1981), 21 SEC Docket
1466 (February 10, 1981).
36 Id. at 46 FR 11546.
37 Id.
38 For example, the conference report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA stated,
The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement
policy that penalties not be imposed for insignificant or technical infractions or inadvertent conduct.
The amendment adopted by the Conferees [Section 13(b)(4)] accomplishes this by providing that
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criminal penalties shall not be imposed for failing to comply with the FCPA’s books and records
or accounting provisions. This provision [Section 13(b)(5)] is meant to ensure that criminal penalties
would be imposed where acts of commission or omission in keeping books or records or administer-
ing accounting controls have the purpose of falsifying books, records or accounts, or of circum-
venting the accounting controls set forth in the Act. This would include the deliberate falsification
of books and records and other conduct calculated to evade the internal accounting controls
requirement.
Cong. Rec. H2115 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
39 As Chairman Williams noted with respect to the internal control provisions of the FCPA, ‘‘[t]hou-
sands of dollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds.’’ 46 FR 11546.
40 Id., at 11547.
41 Section 10A(f) defines, for purposes of Section 10A, an ‘‘illegal act’’ as ‘‘an act or omission that
violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law.’’ This is broader than the
definition of an ‘‘illegal act’’ in AU §317.02, which states, ‘‘Illegal acts by clients do not include
personal misconduct by the entity’s personnel unrelated to their business activities.’’
42 AU §316.04. See also AU §316.03. An unintentional illegal act triggers the same procedures
and considerations by the auditor as a fraudulent misstatement if the illegal act has a direct and
material effect on the financial statements. See AU §§110 n. 1, 316 n. 1, 317.05 and 317.07.
Although distinguishing between intentional and unintentional misstatements is often difficult, the
auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial state-
ments are free of material misstatements in either case. See AU §316 note 3.
43 AU §316.04. Although the auditor is not required to plan or perform the audit to detect misstate-
ments that are immaterial to the financial statements, SAS 82 requires the auditor to evaluate
several fraud ‘‘risk factors’’ that may bring such misstatements to his or her attention. For example,
an analysis of fraud risk factors under SAS 82 must include, among other things, consideration
of management’s interest in maintaining or increasing the registrant’s stock price or earnings
trend through the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices, whether management has
a practice of committing to analysts or others that it will achieve unduly aggressive or clearly
unrealistic forecasts, and the existence of assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on
significant estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties. See AU
§§316.17a and .17c.
44 AU §§316.34 and 316.35, in requiring the auditor to consider whether fraudulent misstatements
are material, and in requiring differing responses depending on whether the misstatement is
material, make clear that fraud can involve immaterial misstatements. Indeed, a misstatement
can be ‘‘inconsequential’’ and still involve fraud.
Under SAS 82, assessing whether misstatements due to fraud are material to the financial
statements is a ‘‘cumulative process’’ that should occur both during and at the completion of the
audit. SAS 82 further states that this accumulation is primarily a ‘‘qualitative matter’’ based
on the auditor’s judgment. AU §316.33. The staff believes that in making these assessments,
management and auditors should refer to the discussion in Part 1 of this SAB.
45 AU §§316.34 and 316.36. Auditors should document their determinations in accordance with
AU §§316.37, 319.57, 339, and other appropriate sections.
46 See, e.g., AU §316.39.
47 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting at 32 (October 1987).
See also Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective-
ness of Corporate Audit Committees (February 8, 1999).
48 AU §325.02. See also AU §380.09, which, in discussing matters to be communicated by the
auditor to the audit committee, states,
The auditor should inform the audit committee about adjustments arising from the audit that could,
in his judgment, either individually or in the aggregate, have a significant effect on the entity’s
financial reporting process. For purposes of this section, an audit adjustment, whether or not
recorded by the entity, is a proposed correction of the financial statements. . . .
49 See AU §411.05.
50 The FASB Discussion Memorandum, Criteria for Determining Materiality, states that the financial
accounting and reporting process considers that ‘‘a great deal of the time might be spent during
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the accounting process considering insignificant matters . . . . If presentations of financial informa-
tion are to be prepared economically on a timely basis and presented in a concise intelligible
form, the concept of materiality is crucial.’’ This SAB is not intended to require that misstatements
arising from insignificant errors and omissions (individually and in the aggregate) arising from the
normal recurring accounting close processes, such as a clerical error or an adjustment for a
missed accounts payable invoice, always be corrected, even if the error is identified in the audit
process and known to management. Management and the auditor would need to consider the
various factors described elsewhere in this SAB in assessing whether such misstatements are
material, need to be corrected to comply with the FCPA, or trigger procedures under Section 10A
of the Exchange Act. Because this SAB does not change current law or guidance in the accounting
or auditing literature, adherence to the principles described in this SAB should not raise the costs
associated with recordkeeping or with audits of financial statements.
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[Author’s Note: After promulgating the bulletin on materiality (No. 99), the 
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued bulletin No. 101 on 
another important issue, revenue recognition, in December 1999. After 
publishing the initial bulletin, though, companies that filed with the SEC asked 
for more time to examine the impact of this bulletin on their revenue 
recognition policies and procedures, and the staff granted two extensions with 
the issuance of bulletins Nos. 101A and 101B. For the latest updates, readers 
should refer to the SEC's Codification of Staff Accounting Bulletins, Topic 13: 
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION                                      
 
17 CFR Part 211  
[Release No. SAB 104]  
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104  
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.  
ACTION: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin.  
SUMMARY: This staff accounting bulletin revises or rescinds portions of the 
interpretative guidance included in Topic 13 of the codification of staff 
accounting bulletins in order to make this interpretive guidance consistent 
with current authoritative accounting and auditing guidance and SEC rules 
and regulations. The principal revisions relate to the rescission of material no 
longer necessary because of private sector developments in U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles.  
This staff accounting bulletin also rescinds the Revenue Recognition in 
Financial Statements Frequently Asked Questions and Answers document 
issued in conjunction with Topic 13. Selected portions of that document have 
been incorporated into Topic 13. 
 
DATE: December 17, 2003  
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chad Kokenge or Shelly Luisi in 
the Office of the Chief Accountant (202) 942-4400, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20549-1103.  
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The statements in staff accounting 
bulletins are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they 
published as bearing the Commission’s approval. They represent 
interpretations and practices followed by the Division of Corporation Finance 
and the Office of Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure 
requirements of the Federal securities laws.  
 Margaret H. McFarland  
 Deputy Secretary  
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Date: December 17, 2003  
Part 211 – (AMEND)  
Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is 
amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104 to the table found in 
Subpart B.  
STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN NO. 104  
[Note: The text of SAB 104 will not appear in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.]  
The staff hereby revises Topic 13 of the Staff Accounting Bulletin Series as 
follows:  
1. Topic 13.A.1 is modified as follows: 
a. The examples of existing literature referenced in the first paragraph 
are deleted. 
b. The last paragraph, including footnote 7, is added to make 
reference to EITF Issue 00-21, “Revenue Arrangements with 
Multiple Deliverables,” which governs how to determine if revenue 
arrangements contain more than one unit of accounting. 
2. Topic 13.A.2 is modified as follows: 
a. Question 3 (formerly Question 1 of the staff’s Revenue Recognition 
in Financial Statements Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 
document (FAQ)) is added.  
3. Topic 13.A.3 is modified as follows:  
a. The subheading Bill and hold arrangements is added. 
b. Topic 13.A.3(a) Question is formerly Question 3. 
c. The subheading Customer acceptance is added. 
d. Topic 13.A.3(b) Question 1 (formerly Question 5 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. 
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e. Topic 13.A.3(b) Question 2 (formerly Question 6 of the FAQ) is 
added. The facts, question and interpretive response are modified 
to reflect the evaluation of the arrangement in the context of 
separate units of accounting. In addition, the last paragraph of the 
interpretive response is deleted due to the issuance of EITF Issue 
00-21. 
f. Footnote 29 is added to highlight that the changes to Topic 13.A.3(b) 
Question 2 are to facilitate an analysis of revenue recognition, not 
interpret EITF Issue 00-21. 
g. Topic 13.A.3(b) Question 3 (formerly Exhibit A Example 1 Scenario 
A of the FAQ) is added. 
h. Topic 13.A.3(b) Question 4 (formerly Exhibit A Example 1 Scenario 
B of the FAQ) is added. 
i. Topic 13.A.3(b) Question 5 (formerly Exhibit A Example 1 Scenario 
C of the FAQ) is added. 
j. The subheading Inconsequential or perfunctory performance 
obligations is added. 
k. Topic 13.A.3(c) Question 1 (formerly Question 2 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question and interpretive response are modified from 
the FAQ to reflect the evaluation of the arrangement in the context 
of a single unit of accounting. The question format is conformed. 
l. Topic 13.A.3(c) Question 2 (formerly Question 3 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question and interpretive response are modified from 
the FAQ to reflect the evaluation in the context of a single unit of 
accounting. 
m. Topic 13.A.3(c) Question 3 (formerly Question 7 of the FAQ) is 
added. The facts, question and interpretive response are modified 
to reflect the evaluation of the arrangement in the context of 
combined deliverables, which result in a single unit of accounting. 
In addition, the interpretive response is modified to delete the last 
four sentences as this guidance is no longer necessary due to the 
issuance of EITF 00-21. 
n. The segue sentence and related footnote discussing delivery or 
performance of multiple deliverables is deleted to eliminate 
redundancy. 
20-Appendix C.indd   250 7/6/10   2:31:32 PM
Appendix C: SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104—Revenue Recognition
251
o. The subheading License fee revenue is added. 
p. Topic 13.A.3(d) Question (formerly Question 9 of the FAQ) is 
added. The interpretive response is modified to eliminate 
redundancy. 
q. The subheading Layaway sales arrangements is added. 
r. Topic 13.A.3(e) Question is formerly Question 4. 
s. The subheading Nonrefundable up-front fees is added. 
t. The examples in Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 1 (formerly Question 5) 
are modified to include the examples from what was formerly 
Question 10 of the FAQ. Guidance in the interpretive response is 
added and conformed from Question 10 of the FAQ which clarifies 
the incurrence of substantive costs does not necessarily indicate 
there is a separate earnings event, and that the determination of a 
separate earnings event should be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. 
u. Footnote 36 is added to clarify the staff’s view regarding the vendor 
activities associated with up-front fees. 
v. Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 2 (formerly Question 6) is modified to 
reflect the evaluation in the context of a single unit of accounting. 
w. Footnote 29 is deleted. The subject matter of footnote 29 is 
conformed and included in Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 3; accordingly, 
Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 3 reflects the guidance formerly located in 
footnote 29. 
x. Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 4 (formerly Question 15 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. 
y. Topic 13.A.3(f) Question 5 (formerly Question 16 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. 
z. The subheading Deliverables within an arrangement is added. 
aa. Topic 13.A.3(g) Question (formerly Question 8 of the FAQ) is 
added and is modified to reflect the evaluation of the question 
under EITF Issue 00-21. 
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bb. Footnote 45 is added to clarify the staff’s view of the obligation 
described in Topic 13.A.3(g) Question under FIN 45.  
4. Topic 13.A.4 is modified as follows:  
a. The subheading Refundable fees for services is added. 
b. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 1 is formerly Question 7. 
c. Footnote 56 is added to include guidance from Question 23 of the 
FAQ. 
d. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 2 (formerly Question 18 of the FAQ) is 
added. 
e. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 3 (formerly Question 19 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. 
f. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 4 (formerly Question 20 of the FAQ) is 
added. 
g. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 5 (formerly Question 21 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. 
h. Topic 13.A.4(a) Question 6 (formerly Question 22 of the FAQ) is 
added. 
i. The subheading Estimates and changes in estimates is added. 
j. Topic 13.A.4(b) Question 1 is formerly Question 9. 
k. Topic 13.A.4(b) Question 2 (formerly Question 24 of the FAQ) is 
added. 
l. Topic 13.A.4(b) Question 3 (formerly Question 25 of the FAQ) is 
added. The question format is conformed. The last two sentences 
of the interpretive response are deleted to eliminate redundancy. 
m. Topic 13.A.4(b) Question 4 (formerly Question 26 of the FAQ) is 
added. 
n. Topic 13.A.4(b) Question 5 (formerly Question 27 of the FAQ) is 
added.  
o. The subheading Contingent rental income is added. 
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p. Topic 13.A.4(c) Question is formerly Question 8. 
q. The subheading Claims processing and billing services is added. 
r. Topic 13.A.4(d) Question (formerly Question 28 of the FAQ) is 
added. The facts are modified to reflect to evaluation in the context 
of a single unit of accounting.  
5. Topic 13.A.5 is deleted. This topic provided guidance on income statement 
presentation and whether transactions should be presented on a gross as a 
principal or net as an agent basis. EITF Issue 99-19, “Reporting Revenue 
Gross as a Principal versus Net as an Agent”, which was issued subsequent 
to SAB 101, provides such guidance. Therefore, this guidance is no longer 
necessary.  
6. Topic 13.B is modified as follows: 
a. The interpretive response to Question 1 is modified to reference 
multiple units of accounting in lieu of multiple elements. 
b. Question 2 is modified to delete the reference to Question 10 of 
Topic 13.A and Topic 8.A. 
c. Question 3 (formerly Question 29 of the FAQ) is added. 
d. Question 4 (formerly Question 30 of the FAQ) is added. 
e. Question 5 (formerly Question 31 of the FAQ) is added.  
 
Topic 13: REVENUE RECOGNITION 
A. Selected Revenue Recognition Issues  
1. Revenue recognition - general 
The accounting literature on revenue recognition includes both broad 
conceptual discussions as well as certain industry-specific guidance.1 If a 
transaction is within the scope of specific authoritative literature that provides 
revenue recognition guidance, that literature should be applied. However, in 
the absence of authoritative literature addressing a specific arrangement or a 
1 The February 1999 AICPA publication "Audit Issues in Revenue Recognition" provides an 
overview of the authoritative accounting literature and auditing procedures for revenue 
recognition and identifies indicators of improper revenue recognition. 
20-Appendix C.indd   253 7/6/10   2:31:32 PM
254
Financial Reporting Fraud
specific industry, the staff will consider the existing authoritative accounting 
standards as well as the broad revenue recognition criteria specified in the 
FASB's conceptual framework that contain basic guidelines for revenue 
recognition.  
Based on these guidelines, revenue should not be recognized until it is 
realized or realizable and earned.2 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(b) 
states that "an entity's revenue-earning activities involve delivering or 
producing goods, rendering services, or other activities that constitute its 
ongoing major or central operations, and revenues are considered to have 
been earned when the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do 
to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues" [footnote reference 
omitted]. Paragraph 84(a) continues "the two conditions (being realized or 
realizable and being earned) are usually met by the time product or 
merchandise is delivered or services are rendered to customers, and 
revenues from manufacturing and selling activities and gains and losses from 
sales of other assets are commonly recognized at time of sale (usually 
meaning delivery)" [footnote reference omitted]. In addition, paragraph 84(d) 
states that "If services are rendered or rights to use assets extend 
continuously over time (for example, interest or rent), reliable measures 
based on contractual prices established in advance are commonly available, 
and revenues may be recognized as earned as time passes." 
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned 
when all of the following criteria are met: 
• Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists,3 
• Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered,4 
  
                                                            
2 Concepts Statement 5, paragraphs 83-84; ARB 43, Chapter 1A, paragraph 1; Opinion 10, 
paragraph 12. The citations provided herein are not intended to present the complete population of 
citations where a particular criterion is relevant. Rather, the citations are intended to provide the 
reader with additional reference material.    
3 Concepts Statement 2, paragraph 63 states "Representational faithfulness is correspondence or 
agreement between a measure or description and the phenomenon it purports to represent." The 
staff believes that evidence of an exchange arrangement must exist to determine if the accounting 
treatment represents faithfully the transaction. See also SOP 97-2, paragraph 8. The use of the 
term "arrangement" in this SAB Topic is meant to identify the final understanding between the 
parties as to the specific nature and terms of the agreed-upon transaction. 
4 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 84(a), (b), and (d). Revenue should not be recognized until the 
seller has substantially accomplished what it must do pursuant to the terms of the arrangement, 
which usually occurs upon delivery or performance of the services. 
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• The seller's price to the buyer is fixed or determinable,5 and 
• Collectibility is reasonably assured.6 
Some revenue arrangements contain multiple revenue-generating activities. 
The staff believes that the determination of the units of accounting within an 
arrangement should be made prior to the application of the guidance in this 
SAB Topic by reference to the applicable accounting literature.7 
2. Persuasive evidence of an arrangement 
Question 1 
Facts: Company A has product available to ship to customers prior to the end 
of its current fiscal quarter. Customer Beta places an order for the product, 
and Company A delivers the product prior to the end of its current fiscal 
quarter. Company A's normal and customary business practice for this class 
of customer is to enter into a written sales agreement that requires the 
signatures of the authorized representatives of the Company and its customer 
to be binding. Company A prepares a written sales agreement, and its 
authorized representative signs the agreement before the end of the quarter. 
However, Customer Beta does not sign the agreement because Customer 
Beta is awaiting the requisite approval by its legal department. Customer 
Beta's purchasing department has orally agreed to the sale and stated that it 
is highly likely that the contract will be approved the first week of Company 
A's next fiscal quarter. 
Question: May Company A recognize the revenue in the current fiscal quarter 
for the sale of the product to Customer Beta when (1) the product is delivered 
by the end of its current fiscal quarter and (2) the final written sales 
agreement is executed by Customer Beta's authorized representative within a 
few days after the end of the current fiscal quarter? 
                                                            
5 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(a); Statement 48, paragraph 6(a); SOP 97-2, paragraph 8. 
SOP 97-2 defines a "fixed fee" as a "fee required to be paid at a set amount that is not subject to 
refund or adjustment. A fixed fee includes amounts designated as minimum royalties." Paragraphs 
26-33 of SOP 97-2 discuss how to apply the fixed or determinable fee criterion in software 
transactions. The staff believes that the guidance in paragraphs 26 and 30-33 is appropriate for 
other sales transactions where authoritative guidance does not otherwise exist. The staff notes that 
paragraphs 27 through 29 specifically consider software transactions, however, the staff believes 
that guidance should be considered in other sales transactions in which the risk of technological 
obsolescence is high. 
6 ARB 43, Chapter 1A, paragraph 1 and Opinion 10, paragraph 12. See also Concepts Statement 
5, paragraph 84(g) and SOP 97-2, paragraph 8. 
7 See EITF Issue 00-21 paragraph 4 for additional discussion. 
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Interpretive Response: No. Generally the staff believes that, in view of 
Company A's business practice of requiring a written sales agreement for this 
class of customer, persuasive evidence of an arrangement would require a 
final agreement that has been executed by the properly authorized personnel 
of the customer. In the staff's view, Customer Beta's execution of the sales 
agreement after the end of the quarter causes the transaction to be 
considered a transaction of the subsequent period.8 Further, if an 
arrangement is subject to subsequent approval (e.g., by the management 
committee or board of directors) or execution of another agreement, revenue 
recognition would be inappropriate until that subsequent approval or 
agreement is complete.  
Customary business practices and processes for documenting sales 
transactions vary among companies and industries. Business practices and 
processes may also vary within individual companies (e.g., based on the 
class of customer, nature of product or service, or other distinguishable 
factors). If a company does not have a standard or customary business 
practice of relying on written contracts to document a sales arrangement, it 
usually would be expected to have other forms of written or electronic 
evidence to document the transaction. For example, a company may not use 
written contracts but instead may rely on binding purchase orders from third 
parties or on-line authorizations that include the terms of the sale and that are 
binding on the customer. In that situation, that documentation could represent 
persuasive evidence of an arrangement. 
The staff is aware that sometimes a customer and seller enter into "side" 
agreements to a master contract that effectively amend the master contract. 
Registrants should ensure that appropriate policies, procedures, and internal 
controls exist and are properly documented so as to provide reasonable 
assurances that sales transactions, including those affected by side 
agreements, are properly accounted for in accordance with GAAP and to 
ensure compliance with Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(i.e., the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). Side agreements could include 
cancellation, termination, or other provisions that affect revenue recognition. 
The existence of a subsequently executed side agreement may be an 
indicator that the original agreement was not final and revenue recognition 
was not appropriate. 
  
                                                            
8 AU Section 560.05. 
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Question 2 
Facts: Company Z enters into an arrangement with Customer A to deliver 
Company Z's products to Customer A on a consignment basis. Pursuant to 
the terms of the arrangement, Customer A is a consignee, and title to the 
products does not pass from Company Z to Customer A until Customer A 
consumes the products in its operations. Company Z delivers product to 
Customer A under the terms of their arrangement. 
Question: May Company Z recognize revenue upon delivery of its product to 
Customer A? 
Interpretive Response: No. Products delivered to a consignee pursuant to a 
consignment arrangement are not sales and do not qualify for revenue 
recognition until a sale occurs. The staff believes that revenue recognition is 
not appropriate because the seller retains the risks and rewards of ownership 
of the product and title usually does not pass to the consignee. 
Other situations may exist where title to delivered products passes to a buyer, 
but the substance of the transaction is that of a consignment or a financing. 
Such arrangements require a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances 
of the transaction, as well as an understanding of the rights and obligations of 
the parties, and the seller's customary business practices in such 
arrangements. The staff believes that the presence of one or more of the 
following characteristics in a transaction precludes revenue recognition even 
if title to the product has passed to the buyer: 
1. The buyer has the right to return the product and: 
(a) the buyer does not pay the seller at the time of sale, and the buyer 
is not obligated to pay the seller at a specified date or dates.9 
(b) the buyer does not pay the seller at the time of sale but rather is 
obligated to pay at a specified date or dates, and the buyer's 
obligation to pay is contractually or implicitly excused until the 
buyer resells the product or subsequently consumes or uses the 
product,10 
                                                            
9 Statement 48, paragraphs 6(b) and 22. 
10 Statement 48, paragraphs 6(b) and 22. The arrangement may not specify that payment is 
contingent upon subsequent resale or consumption. However, if the seller has an established 
business practice permitting customers to defer payment beyond the specified due date(s) until the 
products are resold or consumed, then the staff believes that the seller's right to receive cash 
representing the sales price is contingent. 
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(c) the buyer's obligation to the seller would be changed (e.g., the 
seller would forgive the obligation or grant a refund) in the event of 
theft or physical destruction or damage of the product,11 
(d) the buyer acquiring the product for resale does not have economic 
substance apart from that provided by the seller,12 or 
(e) the seller has significant obligations for future performance to 
directly bring about resale of the product by the buyer.13 
2. The seller is required to repurchase the product (or a substantially identical 
product or processed goods of which the product is a component) at specified 
prices that are not subject to change except for fluctuations due to finance 
and holding costs,14 and the amounts to be paid by the seller will be adjusted, 
as necessary, to cover substantially all fluctuations in costs incurred by the 
buyer in purchasing and holding the product (including interest).15 The staff 
believes that indicators of the latter condition include: 
(a) the seller provides interest-free or significantly below market 
financing to the buyer beyond the seller's customary sales terms 
and until the products are resold, 
(b) the seller pays interest costs on behalf of the buyer under a third-
party financing arrangement, or 
(c) the seller has a practice of refunding (or intends to refund) a portion 
of the original sales price representative of interest expense for the 
period from when the buyer paid the seller until the buyer resells 
the product. 
3. The transaction possesses the characteristics set forth in EITF Issue 95-1 
and does not qualify for sales-type lease accounting. 
4. The product is delivered for demonstration purposes.16 
                                                            
11 Statement 48, paragraph 6(c). 
12 Statement 48, paragraph 6(d). 
13 Statement 48, paragraph 6(e). 
14 Statement 49, paragraph 5(a). Paragraph 5(a) provides examples of circumstances that meet this 
requirement. As discussed further therein, this condition is present if (a) a resale price guarantee 
exists, (b) the seller has an option to purchase the product, the economic effect of which compels 
the seller to purchase the product, or (c) the buyer has an option whereby it can require the seller 
to purchase the product. 
15 Statement 49, paragraph 5(b). 
16 See SOP 97-2, paragraph 25. 
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This list is not meant to be a checklist of all characteristics of a consignment 
or a financing arrangement, and other characteristics may exist. Accordingly, 
the staff believes that judgment is necessary in assessing whether the 
substance of a transaction is a consignment, a financing, or other 
arrangement for which revenue recognition is not appropriate. If title to the 
goods has passed but the substance of the arrangement is not a sale, the 
consigned inventory should be reported separately from other inventory in the 
consignor's financial statements as "inventory consigned to others" or another 
appropriate caption.  
Question 3  
Facts: The laws of some countries do not provide for a seller's retention of a 
security interest in goods in the same manner as established in the U.S. 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). In these countries, it is common for a 
seller to retain a form of title to goods delivered to customers until the 
customer makes payment so that the seller can recover the goods in the 
event of customer default on payment. 
Question: Is it acceptable to recognize revenue in these transactions before 
payment is made and title has transferred?  
Interpretive Response: Presuming all other revenue recognition criteria have 
been met, the staff would not object to revenue recognition at delivery if the 
only rights that a seller retains with the title are those enabling recovery of the 
goods in the event of customer default on payment. This limited form of 
ownership may exist in some foreign jurisdictions where, despite technically 
holding title, the seller is not entitled to direct the disposition of the goods, 
cannot rescind the transaction, cannot prohibit its customer from moving, 
selling, or otherwise using the goods in the ordinary course of business, and 
has no other rights that rest with a titleholder of property that is subject to a 
lien under the U.S. UCC. On the other hand, if retaining title results in the 
seller retaining rights normally held by an owner of goods, the situation is not 
sufficiently different from a delivery of goods on consignment. In this 
particular case, revenue should not be recognized until payment is received. 
Registrants and their auditors may wish to consult legal counsel 
knowledgeable of the local law and customs outside the U.S. to determine the 
seller's rights. 
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3. Delivery and performance 
a. Bill and hold arrangements  
Facts: Company A receives purchase orders for products it manufactures. At 
the end of its fiscal quarters, customers may not yet be ready to take delivery 
of the products for various reasons. These reasons may include, but are not 
limited to, a lack of available space for inventory, having more than sufficient 
inventory in their distribution channel, or delays in customers' production 
schedules. 
Question: May Company A recognize revenue for the sale of its products 
once it has completed manufacturing if it segregates the inventory of the 
products in its own warehouse from its own products? 
May Company A recognize revenue for the sale if it ships the products to a 
third-party warehouse but (1) Company A retains title to the product and (2) 
payment by the customer is dependent upon ultimate delivery to a customer-
specified site?  
Interpretative Response: Generally, no. The staff believes that delivery 
generally is not considered to have occurred unless the customer has taken 
title and assumed the risks and rewards of ownership of the products 
specified in the customer's purchase order or sales agreement. Typically this 
occurs when a product is delivered to the customer's delivery site (if the terms 
of the sale are "FOB destination") or when a product is shipped to the 
customer (if the terms are "FOB shipping point"). 
The Commission has set forth criteria to be met in order to recognize revenue 
when delivery has not occurred.17 These include: 
1. The risks of ownership must have passed to the buyer; 
2. The customer must have made a fixed commitment to purchase the goods, 
preferably in written documentation; 
  
                                                            
17 See In the Matter of Stewart Parness, AAER 108 (August 5, 1986); SEC v. Bollinger Industries, 
Inc., et al, LR 15093 (September 30, 1996); In the Matter of Laser Photonics, Inc., AAER 971 
(September 30, 1997); In the Matter of Cypress Bioscience Inc., AAER 817 (September 19, 1996). 
Also see Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 84(a). and SOP 97-2, paragraph 22. 
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3. The buyer, not the seller, must request that the transaction be on a bill and 
hold basis.18 The buyer must have a substantial business purpose for 
ordering the goods on a bill and hold basis; 
4. There must be a fixed schedule for delivery of the goods. The date for 
delivery must be reasonable and must be consistent with the buyer's 
business purpose (e.g., storage periods are customary in the industry); 
5. The seller must not have retained any specific performance obligations 
such that the earning process is not complete; 
6. The ordered goods must have been segregated from the seller's inventory 
and not be subject to being used to fill other orders; and 
7. The equipment [product] must be complete and ready for shipment. 
The above listed conditions are the important conceptual criteria that should 
be used in evaluating any purported bill and hold sale. This listing is not 
intended as a checklist. In some circumstances, a transaction may meet all 
factors listed above but not meet the requirements for revenue recognition. 
The Commission also has noted that in applying the above criteria to a 
purported bill and hold sale, the individuals responsible for the preparation 
and filing of financial statements also should consider the following factors:19 
1. The date by which the seller expects payment, and whether the seller has 
modified its normal billing and credit terms for this buyer;20 
2. The seller's past experiences with and pattern of bill and hold transactions; 
3. Whether the buyer has the expected risk of loss in the event of a decline in 
the market value of goods; 
4. Whether the seller's custodial risks are insurable and insured; 
5. Whether extended procedures are necessary in order to assure that there 
are no exceptions to the buyer's commitment to accept and pay for the goods 
sold (i.e., that the business reasons for the bill and hold have not introduced a 
contingency to the buyer's commitment). 
                                                            
18 Such requests typically should be set forth in writing by the buyer. 
19 See Note 17, supra. 
20 Such individuals should consider whether Opinion 21 pertaining to the need for discounting the 
related receivable, is applicable. Opinion 21, paragraph 3(a), indicates that the requirements of that 
Opinion to record receivables at a discounted value are not intended to apply to "receivables and 
payables arising from transactions with customers or suppliers in the normal course of business 
which are due in customary trade terms not exceeding approximately one year" (emphasis added). 
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Delivery generally is not considered to have occurred unless the product has 
been delivered to the customer's place of business or another site specified 
by the customer. If the customer specifies an intermediate site but a 
substantial portion of the sales price is not payable until delivery is made to a 
final site, then revenue should not be recognized until final delivery has 
occurred.21 
b. Customer acceptance  
After delivery of a product or performance of a service, if uncertainty exists 
about customer acceptance, revenue should not be recognized until 
acceptance occurs.22 Customer acceptance provisions may be included in a 
contract, among other reasons, to enforce a customer's rights to (1) test the 
delivered product, (2) require the seller to perform additional services 
subsequent to delivery of an initial product or performance of an initial service 
(e.g., a seller is required to install or activate delivered equipment), or (3) 
identify other work necessary to be done before accepting the product. The 
staff presumes that such contractual customer acceptance provisions are 
substantive, bargained-for terms of an arrangement. Accordingly, when such 
contractual customer acceptance provisions exist, the staff generally believes 
that the seller should not recognize revenue until customer acceptance 
occurs or the acceptance provisions lapse. 
Question 1  
Question: Do circumstances exist in which formal customer sign-off (that a 
contractual customer acceptance provision is met) is unnecessary to meet 
the requirements to recognize revenue? 
Interpretive Response: Yes. Formal customer sign-off is not always 
necessary to recognize revenue provided that the seller objectively 
demonstrates that the criteria specified in the acceptance provisions are 
satisfied. Customer acceptance provisions generally allow the customer to 
cancel the arrangement when a seller delivers a product that the customer 
has not yet agreed to purchase or delivers a product that does not meet the 
specifications of the customer's order. In those cases, revenue should not be 
                                                            
21 SOP 97-2, paragraph 22. 
22 SOP 97-2, paragraph 20. Also, Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(b) states "revenues are 
considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to 
be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenues." If an arrangement expressly requires 
customer acceptance, the staff generally believes that customer acceptance should occur before 
the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented 
by the revenues, especially when the seller is obligated to perform additional steps. 
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recognized because a sale has not occurred. In applying this concept, the 
staff observes that customer acceptance provisions normally take one of four 
general forms. Those forms, and how the staff generally assesses whether 
customer acceptance provisions should result in revenue deferral, are 
described below: 
(a) Acceptance provisions in arrangements that purport to be for trial or 
evaluation purposes.23 In these arrangements, the seller delivers a product to 
a customer, and the customer agrees to receive the product, solely to give 
the customer the ability to evaluate the delivered product prior to acceptance. 
The customer does not agree to purchase the delivered product until it 
accepts the product. In some cases, the acceptance provisions lapse by the 
passage of time without the customer rejecting the delivered product, and in 
other cases affirmative acceptance from the customer is necessary to trigger 
a sales transaction. Frequently, the title to the product does not transfer and 
payment terms are not established prior to customer acceptance. These 
arrangements are, in substance, consignment arrangements until the 
customer accepts the product as set forth in the contract with the seller. 
Accordingly, in arrangements where products are delivered for trial or 
evaluation purposes, revenue should not be recognized until the earlier of 
when acceptance occurs or the acceptance provisions lapse. 
In contrast, other arrangements do not purport to be for trial or evaluation 
purposes. In these instances, the seller delivers a specified product pursuant 
to a customer's order, establishes payment terms, and transfers title to the 
delivered product to the customer. However, customer acceptance provisions 
may be included in the arrangement to give the purchaser the ability to 
ensure the delivered product meets the criteria set forth in its order. The staff 
evaluates these provisions as follows: 
(b) Acceptance provisions that grant a right of return or exchange on the 
basis of subjective matters. An example of such a provision is one that allows 
the customer to return a product if the customer is dissatisfied with the 
product.24 The staff believes these provisions are not different from general 
rights of return and should be accounted for in accordance with Statement 48. 
Statement 48 requires that the amount of future returns must be reasonably 
estimable in order for revenue to be recognized prior to the expiration of 
return rights.25 That estimate may not be made in the absence of a large 
                                                            
23 See, for example, SOP 97-2, paragraph 25.   
24 Statement 48, paragraph 13. 
25 Statement 48, paragraph 6(f). 
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volume of homogeneous transactions or if customer acceptance is likely to 
depend on conditions for which sufficient historical experience is absent.26 
Satisfaction of these requirements may vary from product-to-product, 
location-to-location, customer-to-customer, and vendor-to-vendor.  
(c) Acceptance provisions based on seller-specified objective criteria. An 
example of such a provision is one that gives the customer a right of return or 
replacement if the delivered product is defective or fails to meet the vendor's 
published specifications for the product.27 Such rights are generally identical 
to those granted to all others within the same class of customer and for which 
satisfaction can be generally assured without consideration of conditions 
specific to the customer. Provided the seller has previously demonstrated that 
the product meets the specified criteria, the staff believes that these 
provisions are not different from general or specific warranties and should be 
accounted for as warranties in accordance with Statement 5. In this case, the 
cost of potentially defective goods must be reliably estimable based on a 
demonstrated history of substantially similar transactions.28 However, if the 
seller has not previously demonstrated that the delivered product meets the 
seller's specifications, the staff believes that revenue should be deferred until 
the specifications have been objectively achieved. 
(d) Acceptance provisions based on customer-specified objective criteria. 
These provisions are referred to in this document as "customer-specific 
acceptance provisions" against which substantial completion and contract 
fulfillment must be evaluated. While formal customer sign-off provides the 
best evidence that these acceptance criteria have been met, revenue 
recognition also would be appropriate, presuming all other revenue 
recognition criteria have been met, if the seller reliably demonstrates that the 
delivered products or services meet all of the specified criteria prior to 
customer acceptance. For example, if a seller reliably demonstrates that a 
delivered product meets the customer-specified objective criteria set forth in 
the arrangement, the delivery criterion would generally be satisfied when title 
and the risks and rewards of ownership transfers unless product performance 
may reasonably be different under the customer's testing conditions specified 
by the acceptance provisions. Further, the seller should consider whether it 
would be successful in enforcing a claim for payment even in the absence of 
formal sign-off. Whether the vendor has fulfilled the terms of the contract 
before customer acceptance is a matter of contract law, and depending on 
                                                            
26 Statement 48, paragraphs 8(c) and 8(d). 
27 Statement 5, paragraph 24 and Statement 48, paragraph 4(c). 
28 Statement 5, paragraph 25. 
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the facts and circumstances, an opinion of counsel may be necessary to 
reach a conclusion. 
Question 2 
Facts: Consider an arrangement that calls for the transfer of title to equipment 
upon delivery to a customer's site. However, customer-specific acceptance 
provisions permit the customer to return the equipment unless the equipment 
satisfies certain performance tests. The arrangement calls for the vendor to 
perform the installation. Assume the equipment and the installation are 
separate units of accounting under EITF Issue 00-21.29 
Question: Must revenue allocated to the equipment always be deferred until 
installation and on-site testing are successfully completed?  
Interpretive Response: No. The staff would not object to revenue recognition 
for the equipment upon delivery (presuming all other revenue recognition 
criteria have been met for the equipment) if the seller demonstrates that, at 
the time of delivery, the equipment already meets all of the criteria and 
specifications in the customer-specific acceptance provisions. This may be 
demonstrated if conditions under which the customer intends to operate the 
equipment are replicated in pre-shipment testing, unless the performance of 
the equipment, once installed and operated at the customer's facility, may 
reasonably be different from that tested prior to shipment. 
Determining whether the delivered equipment meets all of a product's criteria 
and specifications is a matter of judgment that must be evaluated in light of 
the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction. Consultation with 
knowledgeable project managers or engineers may be necessary in such 
circumstances. 
For example, if the customer acceptance provisions were based on meeting 
certain size and weight characteristics, it should be possible to determine 
whether those criteria have been met before shipment. Historical experience 
with the same specifications and functionality of a particular machine that 
demonstrates that the equipment meets the customer's specifications also 
may provide sufficient evidence that the currently shipped equipment satisfies 
the customer-specific acceptance provisions. 
If an arrangement includes customer acceptance criteria or specifications that 
cannot be effectively tested before delivery or installation at the customer's 
                                                            
29 This fact is provided as an assumption to facilitate an analysis of revenue recognition in this fact 
pattern. No interpretation of Issue 00-21 is intended. 
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site, the staff believes that revenue recognition should be deferred until it can 
be demonstrated that the criteria are met. This situation usually will exist 
when equipment performance can vary based on how the equipment works in 
combination with the customer's other equipment, software, or environmental 
conditions. In these situations, testing to determine whether the criteria are 
met cannot be reasonably performed until the products are installed or 
integrated at the customer's facility. 
Although the following questions provide several examples illustrating how 
the staff evaluates customer acceptance, the determination of when 
customer-specific acceptance provisions of an arrangement are met in the 
absence of the customer's formal notification of acceptance depends on the 
weight of the evidence in the particular circumstances. Different conclusions 
could be reached in similar circumstances that vary only with respect to a 
single variable, such as complexity of the equipment, nature of the interface 
with the customer's environment, extent of the seller's experience with the 
same type of transactions, or a particular clause in the agreement. The staff 
believes management and auditors are uniquely positioned to evaluate the 
facts and arrive at a reasoned conclusion. The staff will not object to a 
determination that is well reasoned on the basis of this guidance. 
Question 3 
Facts: Company E is an equipment manufacturer whose main product is 
generally sold in a standard model. The contracts for sale of that model 
provide for customer acceptance to occur after the equipment is received and 
tested by the customer. The acceptance provisions state that if the equipment 
does not perform to Company E's published specifications, the customer may 
return the equipment for a full refund or a replacement unit, or may require 
Company E to repair the equipment so that it performs up to published 
specifications. Customer acceptance is indicated by either a formal sign-off 
by the customer or by the passage of 90 days without a claim under the 
acceptance provisions. Title to the equipment passes upon delivery to the 
customer. Company E does not perform any installation or other services on 
the equipment it sells and tests each piece of equipment against its 
specifications before shipment. Payment is due under Company E's normal 
payment terms for that product 30 days after customer acceptance. 
Company E receives an order from a new customer for a standard model of 
its main product. Based on the customer's intended use of the product, 
location and other factors, there is no reason that the equipment would 
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operate differently in the customer's environment than it does in Company E's 
facility. 
Question: Assuming all other revenue recognition criteria are met (other than 
the issue raised with respect to the acceptance provision), when should 
Company E recognize revenue from the sale of this piece of equipment? 
Interpretive Response: While the staff presumes that customer acceptance 
provisions are substantive provisions that generally result in revenue deferral, 
that presumption can be overcome as discussed above. Although the 
contract includes a customer acceptance clause, acceptance is based on 
meeting Company E's published specifications for a standard model. 
Company E demonstrates that the equipment shipped meets the 
specifications before shipment, and the equipment is expected to operate the 
same in the customer's environment as it does in Company E's. In this 
situation, Company E should evaluate the customer acceptance provision as 
a warranty under Statement 5. If Company E can reasonably and reliably 
estimate the amount of warranty obligations, the staff believes that it should 
recognize revenue upon delivery of the equipment, with an appropriate 
liability for probable warranty obligations. 
Question 4  
Facts: Assume the same facts about Company E’s equipment, contract terms 
and customary practices as in Question 3 above. Company E enters into an 
arrangement with a new customer to deliver a version of its standard product 
modified as necessary to fit into a space of specific dimensions while still 
meeting all of the published vendor specifications with regard to performance. 
In addition to the customer acceptance provisions relating to the standard 
performance specifications, the customer may reject the equipment if it does 
not conform to the specified dimensions. Company E creates a testing 
chamber of the exact same dimensions as specified by the customer and 
makes simple design changes to the product so that it fits into the testing 
chamber. The equipment still meets all of the standard performance 
specifications. 
Question: Assuming all other revenue recognition criteria are met (other than 
the issue raised with respect to the acceptance provision), when should 
Company E recognize revenue from the sale of this piece of equipment? 
Interpretive Response: Although the contract includes a customer acceptance 
clause that is based, in part, on a customer specific criterion, Company E 
demonstrates that the equipment shipped meets that objective criterion, as 
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well as the published specifications, before shipment. The staff believes that 
the customer acceptance provisions related to the standard performance 
specifications should be evaluated as a warranty under Statement 5. If 
Company E can reasonably and reliably estimate the amount of warranty 
obligations, it should recognize revenue upon delivery of the equipment, with 
an appropriate liability for probable warranty obligations. 
Question 5 
Facts: Assume the same facts about Company E’s equipment, contract terms 
and customary practices as in Question 3 above. Company E enters into an 
arrangement with a new customer to deliver a version of its standard product 
modified as necessary to be integrated into the customer's new assembly line 
while still meeting all of the standard published vendor specifications with 
regard to performance. The customer may reject the equipment if it fails to 
meet the standard published performance specifications or cannot be 
satisfactorily integrated into the new line. Company E has never modified its 
equipment to work on an integrated basis in the type of assembly line the 
customer has proposed. In response to the request, Company E designs a 
version of its standard equipment that is modified as believed necessary to 
operate in the new assembly line. The modified equipment still meets all of 
the standard published performance specifications, and Company E believes 
the equipment will meet the requested specifications when integrated into the 
new assembly line. However, Company E is unable to replicate the new 
assembly line conditions in its testing. 
Question: Assuming all other revenue recognition criteria are met (other than 
the issue raised with respect to the acceptance provision), when should 
Company E recognize revenue from the sale of this piece of equipment? 
Interpretive Response: This contract includes a customer acceptance clause 
that is based, in part, on a customer specific criterion, and Company E cannot 
demonstrate that the equipment shipped meets that criterion before shipment. 
Accordingly, the staff believes that the contractual customer acceptance 
provision has not been met at shipment. Therefore, the staff believes that 
Company E should wait until the product is successfully integrated at its 
customer's location and meets the customer-specific criteria before 
recognizing revenue. While this is best evidenced by formal customer 
acceptance, other objective evidence that the equipment has met the 
customer-specific criteria may also exist (e.g., confirmation from the customer 
that the specifications were met).  
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c. Inconsequential or perfunctory performance obligations 
Question 1 
Question: Does the failure to complete all activities related to a unit of 
accounting preclude recognition of revenue for that unit of accounting? 
Interpretive Response: No. Assuming all other recognition criteria are met, 
revenue for the unit of accounting may be recognized in its entirety if the 
seller's remaining obligation is inconsequential or perfunctory. 
A seller should substantially complete or fulfill the terms specified in the 
arrangement related to the unit of accounting at issue in order for delivery or 
performance to have occurred.30 When applying the substantially complete 
notion, the staff believes that only inconsequential or perfunctory actions may 
remain incomplete such that the failure to complete the actions would not 
result in the customer receiving a refund or rejecting the delivered products or 
services performed to date. In addition, the seller should have a 
demonstrated history of completing the remaining tasks in a timely manner 
and reliably estimating the remaining costs. If revenue is recognized upon 
substantial completion of the terms specified in the arrangement related to 
the unit of accounting at issue, all related costs of performance or delivery 
should be accrued. 
Question 2 
Question: What factors should be considered in the evaluation of whether a 
remaining obligation related to a unit of accounting is inconsequential or 
perfunctory? 
Interpretive Response: A remaining performance obligation is not 
inconsequential or perfunctory if it is essential to the functionality of the 
delivered products or services. In addition, remaining activities are not 
inconsequential or perfunctory if failure to complete the activities would result 
in the customer receiving a full or partial refund or rejecting (or a right to a 
refund or to reject) the products delivered or services performed to date. The 
terms of the sales contract regarding both the right to a full or partial refund 
and the right of return or rejection should be considered when evaluating 
whether a portion of the purchase price would be refundable. If the company 
has a historical pattern of granting such rights, that historical pattern should 
                                                            
30 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(b) states "revenues are considered to have been earned 
when the entity has substantially accomplished what it must do to be entitled the benefits 
represented by the revenues." 
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also be considered even if the current contract expressly precludes such 
rights. Further, other factors should be considered in assessing whether 
remaining obligations are inconsequential or perfunctory. For example, the 
staff also considers the following factors, which are not all-inclusive, to be 
indicators that a remaining performance obligation is substantive rather than 
inconsequential or perfunctory: 
• The seller does not have a demonstrated history of completing the 
remaining tasks in a timely manner and reliably estimating their costs. 
• The cost or time to perform the remaining obligations for similar 
contracts historically has varied significantly from one instance to 
another. 
• The skills or equipment required to complete the remaining activity are 
specialized or are not readily available in the marketplace. 
• The cost of completing the obligation, or the fair value of that obligation, 
is more than insignificant in relation to such items as the contract fee, 
gross profit, and operating income allocable to the unit of accounting. 
• The period before the remaining obligation will be extinguished is 
lengthy. Registrants should consider whether reasonably possible 
variations in the period to complete performance affect the certainty that 
the remaining obligations will be completed successfully and on budget. 
• The timing of payment of a portion of the sales price is coincident with 
completing performance of the remaining activity. 
Registrants' determinations of whether remaining obligations are 
inconsequential or perfunctory should be consistently applied. 
Question 3 
Facts: Consider a unit of accounting that includes both equipment and 
installation because the two deliverables do not meet the separation criteria 
under EITF Issue 00-21. This may be because the equipment does not have 
value to the customer on a standalone basis, there is no objective and 
reliable evidence of fair value for the installation or there is a general right of 
return when the installation is not considered probable and in control of the 
vendor.  
Question: In this situation, must all revenue be deferred until installation is 
performed?  
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Interpretive Response: Yes, if installation is essential to the functionality of 
the equipment.31 Examples of indicators that installation is essential to the 
functionality of equipment include: 
The installation involves significant changes to the features or 
capabilities of the equipment or building complex interfaces or 
connections; 
• The installation services are unavailable from other vendors.32 
Conversely, examples of indicators that installation is not essential to the 
functionality of the equipment include:  
• The equipment is a standard product; 
• Installation does not significantly alter the equipment's capabilities; 
• Other companies are available to perform the installation.33 
If it is determined that the undelivered service is not essential to the 
functionality of the delivered product but a portion of the contract fee is not 
payable until the undelivered service is delivered, the staff would not consider 
that obligation to be inconsequential or perfunctory. Generally, the portion of 
the contract price that is withheld or refundable should be deferred until the 
outstanding service is delivered because that portion would not be realized or 
realizable.34 
d. License fee revenue 
Facts: Assume that intellectual property is physically delivered and payment 
is received on December 20, upon the registrant's consummation of an 
agreement granting its customer a license to use the intellectual property for 
a term beginning on the following January 1. 
Question: Should the license fee be recognized in the period ending 
December 31?  
Interpretive Response: No. In licensing and similar arrangements (e.g., 
licenses of motion pictures, software, technology, and other intangibles), the 
staff believes that delivery does not occur for revenue recognition purposes 
                                                            
31 See SOP 97-2, paragraph 13. 
32 See SOP 97-2, paragraphs 68-71 for analogous guidance. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(a) and Statement 48, paragraph 6(b). 
•
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until the license term begins.35 Accordingly, if a licensed product or 
technology is physically delivered to the customer, but the license term has 
not yet begun, revenue should not be recognized prior to inception of the 
license term. Upon inception of the license term, revenue should be 
recognized in a manner consistent with the nature of the transaction and the 
earnings process. 
e. Layaway sales arrangements 
Facts: Company R is a retailer that offers "layaway" sales to its customers. 
Company R retains the merchandise, sets it aside in its inventory, and 
collects a cash deposit from the customer. Although Company R may set a 
time period within which the customer must finalize the purchase, Company R 
does not require the customer to enter into an installment note or other fixed 
payment commitment or agreement when the initial deposit is received. The 
merchandise generally is not released to the customer until the customer 
pays the full purchase price. In the event that the customer fails to pay the 
remaining purchase price, the customer forfeits its cash deposit. In the event 
the merchandise is lost, damaged, or destroyed, Company R either must 
refund the cash deposit to the customer or provide replacement merchandise.  
Question: In the staff's view, when may Company R recognize revenue for 
merchandise sold under its layaway program? 
Interpretive Response: Provided that the other criteria for revenue recognition 
are met, the staff believes that Company R should recognize revenue from 
sales made under its layaway program upon delivery of the merchandise to 
the customer. Until then, the amount of cash received should be recognized 
as a liability entitled such as "deposits received from customers for layaway 
sales" or a similarly descriptive caption. Because Company R retains the risks 
of ownership of the merchandise, receives only a deposit from the customer, 
and does not have an enforceable right to the remainder of the purchase 
price, the staff would object to Company R recognizing any revenue upon 
receipt of the cash deposit. This is consistent with item two (2) in the 
Commission's criteria for bill-and-hold transactions which states "the 
customer must have made a fixed commitment to purchase the goods." 
  
                                                            
35 SOP 00-2, paragraph 7. 
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f. Nonrefundable up-front fees 
Question 1 
Facts: Registrants may negotiate arrangements pursuant to which they may 
receive nonrefundable fees upon entering into arrangements or on certain 
specified dates. The fees may ostensibly be received for conveyance of a 
license or other intangible right or for delivery of particular products or 
services. Various business factors may influence how the registrant and 
customer structure the payment terms. For example, in exchange for a 
greater up-front fee for an intangible right, the registrant may be willing to 
receive lower unit prices for related products to be delivered in the future. In 
some circumstances, the right, product, or service conveyed in conjunction 
with the nonrefundable fee has no utility to the purchaser separate and 
independent of the registrant's performance of the other elements of the 
arrangement. Therefore, in the absence of the registrant's continuing 
involvement under the arrangement, the customer would not have paid the 
fee. Examples of this type of arrangement include the following: 
• A registrant sells a lifetime membership in a health club. After paying a 
nonrefundable "initiation fee," the customer is permitted to use the 
health club indefinitely, so long as the customer also pays an additional 
usage fee each month. The monthly usage fees collected from all 
customers are adequate to cover the operating costs of the health club. 
• A registrant in the biotechnology industry agrees to provide research and 
development activities for a customer for a specified term. The customer 
needs to use certain technology owned by the registrant for use in the 
research and development activities. The technology is not sold or 
licensed separately without the research and development activities. 
Under the terms of the arrangement, the customer is required to pay a 
nonrefundable "technology access fee" in addition to periodic payments 
for research and development activities over the term of the contract. 
• A registrant requires a customer to pay a nonrefundable "activation fee" 
when entering into an arrangement to provide telecommunications 
services. The terms of the arrangement require the customer to pay a 
monthly usage fee that is adequate to recover the registrant's operating 
costs. The costs incurred to activate the telecommunications service are 
nominal. 
• A registrant charges users a fee for non-exclusive access to its web site 
that contains proprietary databases. The fee allows access to the web 
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site for a one-year period. After the customer is provided with an 
identification number and trained in the use of the database, there are 
no incremental costs that will be incurred in serving this customer. 
• A registrant charges a fee to users for advertising a product for sale or 
auction on certain pages of its web site. The company agrees to 
maintain the listing for a period of time. The cost of maintaining the 
advertisement on the web site for the stated period is minimal. 
• A registrant charges a fee for hosting another company's web site for 
one year. The arrangement does not involve exclusive use of any of the 
hosting company's servers or other equipment. Almost all of the 
projected costs to be incurred will be incurred in the initial loading of 
information on the host company's internet server and setting up 
appropriate links and network connections. 
Question: Assuming these arrangements qualify as single units of accounting 
under EITF Issue 00-2136, when should the revenue relating to 
nonrefundable, up-front fees in these types of arrangements be recognized? 
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that registrants should consider the 
specific facts and circumstances to determine the appropriate accounting for 
nonrefundable, up-front fees. Unless the up-front fee is in exchange for 
products delivered or services performed that represent the culmination of a 
separate earnings process,37 the deferral of revenue is appropriate. 
In the situations described above, the staff does not view the activities 
completed by the registrants (i.e., selling the membership, signing the 
contract, enrolling the customer, activating telecommunications services or 
providing initial set-up services) as discrete earnings events.38 The terms, 
conditions, and amounts of these fees typically are negotiated in conjunction 
with the pricing of all the elements of the arrangement, and the customer 
would ascribe a significantly lower, and perhaps no, value to elements 
ostensibly associated with the up-front fee in the absence of the registrant's 
performance of other contract elements. The fact that the registrants do not 
                                                            
36 The staff believes that the vendor activities associated with the up-front fee, even if considered a 
deliverable to be evaluated under EITF Issue 00-21, will rarely provide value to the customer on a 
standalone basis. 
37 See Concepts Statement 5, footnote 51, for a description of the "earning process." 
38 In a similar situation, lenders may collect nonrefundable loan origination fees in connection with 
lending activities. The FASB concluded in Statement 91 that loan origination is not a separate 
revenue-producing activity of a lender, and therefore, those nonrefundable fees collected at the 
outset of the loan arrangement are not recognized as revenue upon receipt but are deferred and 
recognized over the life of the loan (paragraphs 5 and 37). 
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sell the initial rights, products, or services separately (i.e., without the 
registrants' continuing involvement) supports the staff's view. The staff 
believes that the customers are purchasing the on-going rights, products, or 
services being provided through the registrants' continuing involvement. 
Further, the staff believes that the earnings process is completed by 
performing under the terms of the arrangements, not simply by originating a 
revenue-generating arrangement. 
While the incurrence of nominal up-front costs helps make it clear that there 
is not a separate earnings event in the telecommunications example above, 
incurrence of substantive costs, such as in the web hosting example above, 
does not necessarily indicate that there is a separate earnings event. 
Whether there is a separate earnings event should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis. Some have questioned whether revenue may be recognized in 
these transactions to the extent of the incremental direct costs incurred in the 
activation. Because there is no separable deliverable or earnings event, the 
staff would generally object to that approach, except where it is provided for 
in the authoritative literature (e.g., Statement 51). 
Supply or service transactions may involve the charge of a nonrefundable 
initial fee with subsequent periodic payments for future products or services. 
The initial fees may, in substance, be wholly or partly an advance payment for 
future products or services. In the examples above, the on-going rights or 
services being provided or products being delivered are essential to the 
customers receiving the expected benefit of the up-front payment. Therefore, 
the up-front fee and the continuing performance obligation related to the 
services to be provided or products to be delivered are assessed as an 
integrated package. In such circumstances, the staff believes that up-front 
fees, even if nonrefundable, are earned as the products and/or services are 
delivered and/or performed over the term of the arrangement or the expected 
period of performance39 and generally should be deferred and recognized 
systematically over the periods that the fees are earned.40 
Some propose that revenue should be recognized when the initial set-up is 
completed in cases where the on-going obligation involves minimal or no cost 
or effort and should, therefore, be considered perfunctory or inconsequential. 
                                                            
39 The revenue recognition period should extend beyond the initial contractual period if the 
relationship with the customer is expected to extend beyond the initial term and the customer 
continues to benefit from the payment of the up-front fee (e.g., if subsequent renewals are priced at 
a bargain to the initial up-front fee). 
40 A systematic method would be on a straight-line basis, unless evidence suggests that revenue is 
earned or obligations are fulfilled in a different pattern, in which case that pattern should be 
followed. 
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However, the staff believes that the substance of each of these transactions 
indicates that the purchaser is paying for a service that is delivered over time. 
Therefore, revenue recognition should occur over time, reflecting the 
provision of service.41 
Question 2 
Facts: Company A provides its customers with activity tracking or similar 
services (e.g., tracking of property tax payment activity, sending delinquency 
letters on overdue accounts, etc.) for a ten-year period. Company A requires 
customers to prepay for all the services for the term specified in the 
arrangement. The on-going services to be provided are generally automated 
after the initial customer set-up. At the outset of the arrangement, Company A 
performs set-up procedures to facilitate delivery of its on-going services to the 
customers. Such procedures consist primarily of establishing the necessary 
records and files in Company A's pre-existing computer systems in order to 
provide the services. Once the initial customer set-up activities are complete, 
Company A provides its services in accordance with the arrangement. 
Company A is not required to refund any portion of the fee if the customer 
terminates the services or does not utilize all of the services to which it is 
entitled. However, Company A is required to provide a refund if Company A 
terminates the arrangement early. Assume Company A's activities are not 
within the scope of Statement 91 and that this arrangement qualifies as a 
single unit of accounting under EITF Issue 00-21.42 
Question: When should Company A recognize the service revenue?  
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that, provided all other revenue 
recognition criteria are met, service revenue should be recognized on a 
straight-line basis, unless evidence suggests that the revenue is earned or 
obligations are fulfilled in a different pattern, over the contractual term of the 
arrangement or the expected period during which those specified services will 
be performed,43 whichever is longer. In this case, the customer contracted for 
the on-going activity tracking service, not for the set-up activities. The staff 
notes that the customer could not, and would not, separately purchase the 
set-up services without the on-going services. The services specified in the 
arrangement are performed continuously over the contractual term of the 
arrangement (and any subsequent renewals). Therefore, the staff believes 
that Company A should recognize revenue on a straight-line basis, unless 
                                                            
41 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 84(d). 
42 See Note 36, supra. 
43 See Note 39, supra. 
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evidence suggests that the revenue is earned or obligations are fulfilled in a 
different pattern, over the contractual term of the arrangement or the 
expected period during which those specified services will be performed, 
whichever is longer. 
In this situation, the staff would object to Company A recognizing revenue in 
proportion to the costs incurred because the set-up costs incurred bear no 
direct relationship to the performance of services specified in the 
arrangement. The staff also believes that it is inappropriate to recognize the 
entire amount of the prepayment as revenue at the outset of the arrangement 
by accruing the remaining costs because the services required by the 
contract have not been performed.  
Question 3 
Facts: Assume the same facts as in Question 2 above.  
Question: Are the initial customer set-up costs incurred by Company A within 
the scope of SOP 98-5? 
Interpretive Response: Footnote 1 of SOP 98-5 states that “this SOP does 
not address the financial reporting of costs incurred related to ongoing 
customer acquisition, such as policy acquisition costs in Statement 60…and 
loan origination costs in Statement 91… The SOP addresses the more 
substantive one-time efforts to establish business with an entirely new class 
of customers (for example, a manufacturer who does all of its business with 
retailers attempts to sell merchandise directly to the public).” As such, the set-
up costs incurred in this example are not within the scope of SOP 98-5. 
The staff believes that the incremental direct costs (Statement 91 provides an 
analogous definition) incurred related to the acquisition or origination of a 
customer contract in a transaction that results in the deferral of revenue, 
unless specifically provided for in the authoritative literature, may be either 
expensed as incurred or accounted for in accordance with paragraph 4 of 
Technical Bulletin 90-1 or paragraph 5 of Statement 91. The staff believes the 
accounting policy chosen for these costs should be disclosed and applied 
consistently. 
Question 4 
Facts: Assume the same facts as in Question 2 above. 
Question: What is the staff's view of the pool of contract acquisition and 
origination costs that are eligible for capitalization?  
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Interpretive Response: As noted in Question 3 above, Statement 91 includes 
a definition of incremental direct costs in its glossary. Paragraph 6 of 
Statement 91 provides further guidance on the types of costs eligible for 
capitalization as customer acquisition costs indicating that only costs that 
result from successful loan origination efforts are capitalized. The FASB staff 
has published an Implementation Guide on Statement 91 that provides 
additional guidance on the costs that qualify for capitalization as customer 
acquisition costs. Further, Technical Bulletin 90-1 also requires capitalization 
of incremental direct customer acquisition costs and requires that those costs 
be "identified consistent with the guidance in paragraph 6 of Statement 91." 
Although the facts of a particular situation should be analyzed closely to 
capture those costs that are truly direct and incremental, the staff generally 
would not object to an accounting policy that results in the capitalization of 
costs in accordance with paragraph 6(a) and (b) of Statement 91 or Technical 
Bulletin 90-1. Registrants should disclose their policies for determining which 
costs to capitalize as contract acquisition and origination costs.  
Question 5 
Facts: Assume the same facts as in Question 2 above. Based on the 
guidance in Questions 2, 3 and 4 above, Company A has capitalized certain 
direct and incremental customer set-up costs associated with the deferred 
revenue. 
Question: Over what period should Company A amortize these costs? 
Interpretive Response: When both costs and revenue (in an amount equal to 
or greater than the costs) are deferred, the staff believes that the capitalized 
costs should be charged to expense proportionally and over the same period 
that deferred revenue is recognized as revenue.44 
g. Deliverables within an arrangement  
Question: If a company (the seller) has a patent to its intellectual property 
which it licenses to customers, the seller may represent and warrant to its 
licensees that it has a valid patent, and will defend and maintain that patent. 
Does that obligation to maintain and defend patent rights, in and of itself, 
constitute a deliverable to be evaluated under EITF Issue 00-21? 
Interpretive Response: No. Provided the seller has legal and valid patents 
upon entering the license arrangement, existing GAAP on licenses of 
                                                            
44 Technical Bulletin 90-1, paragraph 4. 
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intellectual property (e.g., SOP 97-2, SOP 00-2, and SFAS No. 50) does not 
indicate that an obligation to defend valid patents represents an additional 
deliverable to which a portion of an arrangement fee should be allocated in an 
arrangement that otherwise qualifies for sales-type accounting. While this 
clause may obligate the licenser to incur costs in the defense and 
maintenance of the patent, that obligation does not involve an additional 
deliverable to the customer. Defending the patent is generally consistent with 
the seller's representation in the license that such patent is legal and valid. 
Therefore, the staff would not consider a clause like this to represent an 
additional deliverable in the arrangement.45 
4. Fixed or determinable sales price 
a. Refundable fees for services 
A company's contracts may include customer cancellation or termination 
clauses. Cancellation or termination provisions may be indicative of a 
demonstration period or an otherwise incomplete transaction. Examples of 
transactions that financial management and auditors should be aware of and 
where such provisions may exist include "side" agreements and significant 
transactions with unusual terms and conditions. These contractual provisions 
raise questions as to whether the sales price is fixed or determinable. The 
sales price in arrangements that are cancelable by the customer is neither 
fixed nor determinable until the cancellation privileges lapse.46 If the 
cancellation privileges expire ratably over a stated contractual term, the sales 
price is considered to become determinable ratably over the stated term.47 
Short-term rights of return, such as thirty-day money-back guarantees, and 
other customary rights to return products are not considered to be 
cancellation privileges, but should be accounted for in accordance with 
Statement 48.48 
Question 1 
Facts: Company M is a discount retailer. It generates revenue from annual 
membership fees it charges customers to shop at its stores and from the sale 
of products at a discount price to those customers. The membership 
arrangements with retail customers require the customer to pay the entire 
membership fee (e.g., $35) at the outset of the arrangement. However, the 
                                                            
45 Note, however, the staff believes that this obligation qualifies as a guarantee within the scope of 
FIN 45, subject to a scope exception from the initial recognition and measurement provisions.    
46 SOP 97-2, paragraph 31. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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customer has the unilateral right to cancel the arrangement at any time during 
its term and receive a full refund of the initial fee. Based on historical data 
collected over time for a large number of homogeneous transactions, 
Company M estimates that approximately 40% of the customers will request 
a refund before the end of the membership contract term. Company M's data 
for the past five years indicates that significant variations between actual and 
estimated cancellations have not occurred, and Company M does not expect 
significant variations to occur in the foreseeable future.  
Question: May Company M recognize in earnings the revenue for the 
membership fees and accrue the costs to provide membership services at the 
outset of the arrangement? 
Interpretive Response: No. In the staff's view, it would be inappropriate for 
Company M to recognize the membership fees as earned revenue upon 
billing or receipt of the initial fee with a corresponding accrual for estimated 
costs to provide the membership services. This conclusion is based on 
Company M's remaining and unfulfilled contractual obligation to perform 
services (i.e., make available and offer products for sale at a discounted 
price) throughout the membership period. Therefore, the earnings process, 
irrespective of whether a cancellation clause exists, is not complete. 
In addition, the ability of the member to receive a full refund of the 
membership fee up to the last day of the membership term raises an 
uncertainty as to whether the fee is fixed or determinable at any point before 
the end of the term. Generally, the staff believes that a sales price is not fixed 
or determinable when a customer has the unilateral right to terminate or 
cancel the contract and receive a cash refund. A sales price or fee that is 
variable until the occurrence of future events (other than product returns that 
are within the scope of Statement 48) generally is not fixed or determinable 
until the future event occurs. The revenue from such transactions should not 
be recognized in earnings until the sales price or fee becomes fixed or 
determinable. Moreover, revenue should not be recognized in earnings by 
assessing the probability that significant, but unfulfilled, terms of a contract 
will be fulfilled at some point in the future. Accordingly, the revenue from such 
transactions should not be recognized in earnings prior to the refund 
privileges expiring. The amounts received from customers or subscribers (i.e., 
the $35 fee mentioned above) should be credited to a monetary liability 
account such as "customers' refundable fees." 
The staff believes that if a customer has the unilateral right to receive both (1) 
the seller's substantial performance under an arrangement (e.g., providing 
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services or delivering product) and (2) a cash refund of prepaid fees, then the 
prepaid fees should be accounted for as a monetary liability. In consideration 
of whether the monetary liability can be derecognized, Statement 140 
provides that liabilities may be derecognized only if (1) the debtor pays the 
creditor and is relieved of its obligation for the liability (paying the creditor 
includes delivery of cash, other financial assets, goods, or services or 
reacquisition by the debtor of its outstanding debt securities) or (2) the debtor 
is legally released from being the primary obligor under the liability.49 If a 
customer has the unilateral right to receive both (1) the seller's substantial 
performance under the arrangement and (2) a cash refund of prepaid fees, 
then the refund obligation is not relieved upon performance of the service or 
delivery of the products. Rather, the seller's refund obligation is relieved only 
upon refunding the cash or expiration of the refund privilege.  
Some have argued that there may be a limited exception to the general rule 
that revenue from membership or other service transaction fees should not be 
recognized in earnings prior to the refund privileges expiring. Despite the fact 
that Statement 48 expressly does not apply to the accounting for service 
revenue if part or all of the service fee is refundable under cancellation 
privileges granted to the buyer,50 they believe that in certain circumstances a 
potential refund of a membership fee may be seen as being similar to a right 
of return of products under Statement 48. They argue that revenue from 
membership fees, net of estimated refunds, may be recognized ratably over 
the period the services are performed whenever pertinent conditions of 
Statement 48 are met, namely, there is a large population of transactions that 
grant customers the same unilateral termination or cancellation rights and 
reasonable estimates can be made of how many customers likely will 
exercise those rights. 
The staff believes that, because service arrangements are specifically 
excluded from the scope of Statement 48, the most direct authoritative 
literature to be applied to the extinguishment of obligations under such 
contracts is Statement 140. As noted above, because the refund privilege 
extends to the end of the contract term irrespective of the amount of the 
service performed, Statement 140 indicates that the liability would not be 
extinguished (and therefore no revenue would be recognized in earnings) 
until the cancellation or termination and related refund privileges expire. 
Nonetheless, the staff recognizes that over the years the accounting for 
membership refunds evolved based on analogy to Statement 48 and that 
                                                            
49 Statement 140, paragraph 16. 
50 Statement 48, paragraph 4. 
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practice did not change when Statement 140 became effective. Reasonable 
people held, and continue to hold, different views about the application of the 
accounting literature. 
Pending further action in this area by the FASB, the staff will not object to the 
recognition of refundable membership fees, net of estimated refunds, as 
earned revenue over the membership term in the limited circumstances 
where all of the following criteria have been met:51  
• The estimates of terminations or cancellations and refunded revenues are 
being made for a large pool of homogeneous items (e.g., membership or 
other service transactions with the same characteristics such as terms, 
periods, class of customers, nature of service, etc.). 
• Reliable estimates of the expected refunds can be made on a timely 
basis.52 Either of the following two items would be considered indicative of 
an inability to make reliable estimates: (1) recurring, significant differences 
between actual experience and estimated cancellation or termination 
rates (e.g., an actual cancellation rate of 40% versus an estimated rate of 
25%) even if the impact of the difference on the amount of estimated 
refunds is not material to the consolidated financial statements53 or (2) 
recurring variances between the actual and estimated amount of refunds 
that are material to either revenue or net income in quarterly or annual 
financial statements. In addition, the staff believes that an estimate, for 
purposes of meeting this criterion, would not be reliable unless it is 
remote54 that material adjustments (both individually and in the aggregate) 
to previously recognized revenue would be required. The staff presumes 
that reliable estimates cannot be made if the customer's termination or 
cancellation and refund privileges exceed one year. 
  
                                                            
51 The staff will question further analogies to the guidance in Statement 48 for transactions 
expressly excluded from its scope. 
52 Reliability is defined in Concepts Statement 2 as "the quality of information that assures that 
information is reasonably free from error and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to 
represent." Paragraph 63 of Concepts Statement 5 reiterates the definition of reliability, requiring 
that "the information is representationally faithful, verifiable, and neutral." 
53 For example, if an estimate of the expected cancellation rate varies from the actual cancellation 
rate by 100% but the dollar amount of the error is immaterial to the consolidated financial 
statements, some would argue that the estimate could still be viewed as reliable. The staff 
disagrees with that argument. 
54 The term "remote" is used here with the same definition as used in Statement 5. 
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• There is a sufficient company-specific historical basis upon which to 
estimate the refunds,55 and the company believes that such historical 
experience is predictive of future events. In assessing these items, the 
staff believes that estimates of future refunds should take into 
consideration, among other things, such factors as historical experience 
by service type and class of customer, changing trends in historical 
experience and the basis thereof (e.g., economic conditions), the impact 
or introduction of competing services or products, and changes in the 
customer's "accessibility" to the refund (i.e., how easy it is for customers 
to obtain the refund). 
• The amount of the membership fee specified in the agreement at the 
outset of the arrangement is fixed, other than the customer's right to 
request a refund.  
If Company M does not meet all of the foregoing criteria, the staff believes 
that Company M should not recognize in earnings any revenue for the 
membership fee until the cancellation privileges and refund rights expire. 
If revenue is recognized in earnings over the membership period pursuant to 
the above criteria, the initial amounts received from customer or subscribers 
(i.e., the $35 fee mentioned above) should be allocated to two liability 
accounts. The amount of the fee representing estimated refunds should be 
credited to a monetary liability account, such as "customers' refundable fees," 
and the remaining amount of the fee representing unearned revenue should 
be credited to a nonmonetary liability account, such as "unearned revenues." 
For each income statement presented, registrants should disclose in the 
footnotes to the financial statements the amounts of (1) the unearned 
revenue and (2) refund obligations as of the beginning of each period, the 
amount of cash received from customers, the amount of revenue recognized 
in earnings, the amount of refunds paid, other adjustments (with an 
explanation thereof), and the ending balance of (1) unearned revenue and (2) 
refund obligations. 
If revenue is recognized in earnings over the membership period pursuant to 
the above criteria, the staff believes that adjustments for changes in 
estimated refunds should be recorded using a retrospective approach 
                                                            
55 Paragraph 8 of Statement 48 notes various factors that may impair the ability to make a 
reasonable estimate of returns, including the lack of sufficient historical experience. The staff 
typically expects that the historical experience be based on the particular registrant's historical 
experience for a service and/or class of customer. In general, the staff typically expects a start-up 
company, a company introducing new services, or a company introducing services to a new class 
of customer to have at least two years of experience to be able to make reasonable and reliable 
estimates. 
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whereby the unearned revenue and refund obligations are remeasured and 
adjusted at each balance sheet date with the offset being recorded as earned 
revenue.56 
Companies offering memberships often distribute membership packets 
describing and discussing the terms, conditions, and benefits of membership. 
Packets may include vouchers, for example, that provide new members with 
discounts or other benefits from third parties. The costs associated with the 
vouchers should be expensed when distributed. Advertising costs to solicit 
members should be accounted for in accordance with SOP 93-7. Incremental 
direct costs incurred in connection with enrolling customers (e.g., 
commissions paid to agents) should be accounted for as follows: (1) if 
revenue is deferred until the cancellation or termination privileges expire, 
incremental direct costs should be either (a) charged to expense when 
incurred if the costs are not refundable to the company in the event the 
customer obtains a refund of the membership fee, or (b) if the costs are 
refundable to the company in the event the customer obtains a refund of the 
membership fee, recorded as an asset until the earlier of termination or 
cancellation or refund; or (2) if revenue, net of estimated refunds, is 
recognized in earnings over the membership period, a like percentage of 
incremental direct costs should be deferred and recognized in earnings in the 
same pattern as revenue is recognized, and the remaining portion should be 
either (a) charged to expense when incurred if the costs are not refundable to 
the company in the event the customer obtains a refund of the membership 
fee, or (b) if the costs are refundable to the company in the event the 
customer obtains a refund of the membership fee, recorded as an asset until 
the refund occurs.57 All costs other than incremental direct costs (e.g., indirect 
costs) should be expensed as incurred.  
  
                                                            
56 The staff believes deferred costs being amortized on a basis consistent with the deferred revenue 
should be similarly adjusted. Such an approach is generally consistent with the amortization 
methodology in Statement 91, paragraph 19. 
57 Statement 91, paragraph 5 and Technical Bulletin 90-1, paragraph 4 both provide for the deferral 
of incremental direct costs associated with acquiring a revenue-producing contract. Even though 
the revenue discussed in this example is refundable, if a registrant meets the aforementioned 
criteria for revenue recognition over the membership period, the staff would analogize to this 
guidance. However, if neither a nonrefundable contract nor a reliable basis for estimating net cash 
inflows under refundable contracts exists to provide a basis for recovery of incremental direct costs, 
the staff believes that such costs should be expensed as incurred. See SAB Topic 13.A.3.f. 
Question 3. 
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Question 2 
Question: Will the staff accept an analogy to Statement 48 for service 
transactions subject to customer cancellation privileges other than those 
specifically addressed in the previous question? 
Interpretive Response: The staff has accepted the analogy in limited 
circumstances due to the existence of a large pool of homogeneous 
transactions and satisfaction of the criteria in the previous question. 
Examples of other arrangements involving customer cancellation privileges 
and refundable service fees that the staff has addressed include the 
following: 
• a leasing broker whose commission from the lessor upon a commercial 
tenant's signing of a lease agreement is refundable (or in some cases, is 
not due) under lessor cancellation privileges if the tenant fails to move 
into the leased premises by a specified date. 
• a talent agent whose fee receivable from its principal (i.e., a celebrity) for 
arranging a celebrity endorsement for a five-year term is cancelable by 
the celebrity if the celebrity breaches the endorsement contract with its 
customer. 
• an insurance agent whose commission received from the insurer upon 
selling an insurance policy is refundable in whole for the 30-day period 
that state law permits the consumer to repudiate the contract and then 
refundable on a declining pro rata basis until the consumer has made 
six monthly payments. 
In the first two of these cases, the staff advised the registrants that the portion 
of revenue subject to customer cancellation and refund must be deferred until 
no longer subject to that contingency because the registrants did not have an 
ability to make reliable estimates of customer cancellations due to the lack of 
a large pool of homogeneous transactions. In the case of the insurance 
agent, however, the particular registrant demonstrated that it had a sufficient 
history of homogeneous transactions with the same characteristics from 
which to reliably estimate contract cancellations and satisfy all the criteria 
specified in the previous question. Accordingly, the staff did not object to that 
registrant's policy of recognizing its sales commission as revenue when its 
performance was complete, with an appropriate allowance for estimated 
cancellations. 
  




Question: Must a registrant analogize to Statement 48, or may it choose to 
defer all revenue until the refund period lapses as suggested by Statement 
140 even if the criteria above for analogy to Statement 48 are met? 
Interpretive Response: The analogy to Statement 48 is presented as an 
alternative that would be acceptable to the staff when the listed conditions are 
met. However, a registrant may choose to defer all revenue until the refund 
period lapses. The policy chosen should be disclosed and applied 
consistently. 
Question 4 
Question: May a registrant that meets the above criteria for reliable estimates 
of cancellations choose at some point in the future to change from the 
Statement 48 method to the Statement 140 method of accounting for these 
refundable fees? May a registrant change from the Statement 140 method to 
the Statement 48 method? 
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that Statement 140 provides a 
preferable accounting model for service transactions subject to potential 
refunds. Therefore, the staff would not object to a change from the Statement 
48 method to the Statement 140 method. However, if a registrant had 
previously chosen the Statement 140 method, the staff would object to a 
change to the Statement 48 method. 
Question 5 
Question: Is there a minimum level of customers that must be projected not to 
cancel before use of Statement 48 type accounting is appropriate? 
Interpretive Response: Statement 48 does not include any such minimum. 
Therefore, the staff does not believe that a minimum must apply in service 
transactions either. However, as the refund rate increases, it may be 
increasingly difficult to make reasonable and reliable estimates of cancellation 
rates. 
Question 6 
Question: When a registrant first determines that reliable estimates of 
cancellations of service contracts can be made (e.g., two years of historical 
evidence becomes available), how should the change from the complete 
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deferral method to the method of recognizing revenue, net of estimated 
cancellations, over time be reflected? 
Interpretive Response: Changes in the ability to meet the criteria set forth 
above should be accounted for in the manner described in paragraph 6 of 
Statement 48, which addresses the accounting when a company experiences 
a change in the ability to make reasonable estimates of future product 
returns. 
b. Estimates and changes in estimates 
Accounting for revenues and costs of revenues requires estimates in many 
cases; those estimates sometimes change. Registrants should ensure that 
they have appropriate internal controls and adequate books and records that 
will result in timely identification of necessary changes in estimates that 
should be reflected in the financial statements and notes thereto. 
Question 1 
Facts: Paragraph 8 of Statement 48 lists a number of factors that may impair 
the ability to make a reasonable estimate of product returns in sales 
transactions when a right of return exists.58 The paragraph concludes by 
stating "other factors may preclude a reasonable estimate." 
Question: What "other factors," in addition to those listed in paragraph 8 of 
Statement 48, has the staff identified that may preclude a registrant from 
making a reasonable and reliable estimate of product returns? 
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that the following additional factors, 
among others, may affect or preclude the ability to make reasonable and 
reliable estimates of product returns: (1) significant increases in or excess 
levels of inventory in a distribution channel (sometimes referred to as 
"channel stuffing"), (2) lack of "visibility" into or the inability to determine or 
observe the levels of inventory in a distribution channel and the current level 
of sales to end users, (3) expected introductions of new products that may 
result in the technological obsolescence of and larger than expected returns 
of current products, (4) the significance of a particular distributor to the 
registrant's (or a reporting segment's) business, sales and marketing, (5) the 
                                                            
58 These factors include "a) the susceptibility of the product to significant external factors, such as 
technological obsolescence or changes in demand, b) relatively long periods in which a particular 
product may be returned, c) absence of historical experience with similar types of sales of similar 
products, or inability to apply such experience because of changing circumstances, for example, 
changes in the selling enterprise's marketing policies and relationships with its customers, and d) 
absence of a large volume of relatively homogeneous transactions." 
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newness of a product, (6) the introduction of competitors' products with 
superior technology or greater expected market acceptance, and (7) other 
factors that affect market demand and changing trends in that demand for the 
registrant's products. Registrants and their auditors should carefully analyze 
all factors, including trends in historical data, which may affect registrants' 
ability to make reasonable and reliable estimates of product returns. 
The staff reminds registrants that if a transaction fails to meet all of the 
conditions of paragraphs 6 and 8 in Statement 48, no revenue may be 
recognized until those conditions are subsequently met or the return privilege 
has substantially expired, whichever occurs first.59 Simply deferring 
recognition of the gross margin on the transaction is not appropriate. 
Question 2 
Question: Is the requirement cited in the previous question for "reliable" 
estimates meant to imply a new, higher requirement than the "reasonable" 
estimates discussed in Statement 48?  
Interpretive Response: No. "Reliability" of financial information is one of the 
qualities of accounting information discussed in Concepts Statement 2. The 
staff's expectation that estimates be reliable does not change the existing 
requirement of Statement 48. If management cannot develop an estimate that 
is sufficiently reliable for use by investors, the staff believes it cannot make a 
reasonable estimate meeting the requirements of that standard. 
Question 3 
Question: Does the staff expect registrants to apply the guidance in Question 
1 of Topic 13.A.4(a) above to sales of tangible goods and other transactions 
specifically within the scope of Statement 48? 
Interpretive Response: The specific guidance above does not apply to 
transactions within the scope of Statement 48. The views set forth in 
Question 1 of Topic 13.A.4(a) are applicable to the service transactions 
discussed in that Question. Service transactions are explicitly outside the 
scope of Statement 48. 
Question 4 
Question: Question 1 of Topic 13.A.4(a) above states that the staff would 
expect a two-year history of selling a new service in order to be able to make 
                                                            
59 Statement 48, paragraph 6. 
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reliable estimates of cancellations. How long a history does the staff believe 
is necessary to estimate returns in a product sale transaction that is within the 
scope of Statement 48? 
Interpretive Response: The staff does not believe there is any specific length 
of time necessary in a product transaction. However, Statement 48 states that 
returns must be subject to reasonable estimation. Preparers and auditors 
should be skeptical of estimates of product returns when little history with a 
particular product line exists, when there is inadequate verifiable evidence of 
historical experience, or when there are inadequate internal controls that 
ensure the reliability and timeliness of the reporting of the appropriate 
historical information. Start-up companies and companies selling new or 
significantly modified products are frequently unable to develop the requisite 
historical data on which to base estimates of returns. 
Question 5 
Question: If a company selling products subject to a right of return concludes 
that it cannot reasonably estimate the actual return rate due to its limited 
history, but it can conservatively estimate the maximum possible returns, 
does the staff believe that the company may recognize revenue for the 
portion of the sales that exceeds the maximum estimated return rate? 
Interpretive Response: No. If a reasonable estimate of future returns cannot 
be made, Statement 48 requires that revenue not be recognized until the 
return period lapses or a reasonable estimate can be made.60 Deferring 
revenue recognition based on the upper end of a wide range of potential 
return rates is inconsistent with the provisions of Statement 48. 
c. Contingent rental income 
Facts: Company A owns and leases retail space to retailers. Company A 
(lessor) renews a lease with a customer (lessee) that is classified as an 
operating lease. The lease term is one year and provides that the lease 
payments are $1.2 million, payable in equal monthly installments on the first 
day of each month, plus one percent of the lessee's net sales in excess of 
$25 million if the net sales exceed $25 million during the lease term (i.e., 
contingent rental). The lessee has historically experienced annual net sales in 
excess of $25 million in the particular space being leased, and it is probable 
that the lessee will generate in excess of $25 million net sales during the term 
of the lease. 
                                                            
60 Statement 48, paragraph 6(f). 
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Question: In the staff's view, should the lessor recognize any rental income 
attributable to the one percent of the lessee's net sales exceeding $25 million 
before the lessee actually achieves the $25 million net sales threshold? 
Interpretive Response: No. The staff believes that contingent rental income 
"accrues" (i.e., it should be recognized as revenue) when the changes in the 
factor(s) on which the contingent lease payments is (are) based actually 
occur.61 
Statement 13 paragraph 19(b) states that lessors should account for 
operating leases as follows: "Rent shall be reported in income over the lease 
term as it becomes receivable according to the provisions of the lease. 
However, if the rentals vary from a straight-line basis, the income shall be 
recognized on a straight-line basis unless another systematic and rational 
basis is more representative of the time pattern in which use benefit from the 
leased property is diminished, in which case that basis shall be used." 
Statement 29 amended Statement 13 and clarifies that "lease payments that 
depend on a factor that does not exist or is not measurable at the inception of 
the lease, such as future sales volume, would be contingent rentals in their 
entirety and, accordingly, would be excluded from minimum lease payments 
and included in the determination of income as they accrue." [Summary] 
Paragraph 17 of Statement 29 provides the following example of determining 
contingent rentals: 
A lease agreement for retail store space could stipulate a monthly 
base rental of $200 and a monthly supplemental rental of one-fourth of 
one percent of monthly sales volume during the lease term. Even if the 
lease agreement is a renewal for store space that had averaged 
monthly sales of $25,000 for the past 2 years, minimum lease 
payments would include only the $200 monthly base rental; the 
supplemental rental is a contingent rental that is excluded from 
minimum lease payments. The future sales for the lease term do not 
exist at the inception of the lease, and future rentals would be limited 
to $200 per month if the store were subsequently closed and no sales 
were made thereafter.  
Technical Bulletin 85-3 addresses whether it is appropriate for lessors in 
operating leases to recognize scheduled rent increases on a basis other than 
as required in Statement 13, paragraph 19(b). Paragraph 2 of Technical 
Bulletin 85-3 states "using factors such as the time value of money, 
                                                            
61 Lessees should follow the guidance established in EITF Issue 98-9. 
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anticipated inflation, or expected future revenues [emphasis added] to 
allocate scheduled rent increases is inappropriate because these factors do 
not relate to the time pattern of the physical usage of the leased property. 
However, such factors may affect the periodic reported rental income or 
expense if the lease agreement involves contingent rentals, which are 
excluded from minimum lease payments and accounted for separately under 
Statement 13, as amended by Statement 29." In developing the basis for why 
scheduled rent increases should be recognized on a straight-line basis, the 
FASB distinguishes the accounting for scheduled rent increases from 
contingent rentals. Paragraph 13 states "There is an important substantive 
difference between lease rentals that are contingent upon some specified 
future event and scheduled rent increases that are unaffected by future 
events; the accounting under Statement 13 reflects that difference. If the 
lessor and lessee eliminate the risk of variable payments by agreeing to 
scheduled rent increases, the accounting should reflect those different 
circumstances." 
The example provided in Statement 29 implies that contingent rental income 
in leases classified as sales-type or direct-financing leases becomes 
"accruable" when the changes in the factors on which the contingent lease 
payments are based actually occur. Technical Bulletin 85-3 indicates that 
contingent rental income in operating leases should not be recognized in a 
manner consistent with scheduled rent increases (i.e., on a straight-line basis 
over the lease term or another systematic and rational allocation basis if it is 
more representative of the time pattern in which the leased property is 
physically employed) because the risk of variable payments inherent in 
contingent rentals is substantively different than scheduled rent increases. 
The staff believes that the reasoning in Technical Bulletin 85-3 supports the 
conclusion that the risks inherent in variable payments associated with 
contingent rentals should be reflected in financial statements on a basis 
different than rental payments that adjust on a scheduled basis and, 
therefore, operating lease income associated with contingent rents would not 
be recognized as time passes or as the leased property is physically 
employed. Furthermore, prior to the lessee's achievement of the target upon 
which contingent rentals are based, the lessor has no legal claims on the 
contingent amounts. Consequently, the staff believes that it is inappropriate to 
anticipate changes in the factors on which contingent rental income in 
operating leases is based and recognize rental income prior to the resolution 
of the lease contingencies. 
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Because Company A's contingent rental income is based upon whether the 
customer achieves net sales of $25 million, the contingent rentals, which may 
not materialize, should not be recognized until the customer's net sales 
actually exceed $25 million. Once the $25 million threshold is met, Company 
A would recognize the contingent rental income as it becomes accruable, in 
this case, as the customer recognizes net sales. The staff does not believe 
that it is appropriate to recognize revenue based upon the probability of a 
factor being achieved. The contingent revenue should be recorded in the 
period in which the contingency is resolved. 
d. Claims processing and billing services 
Facts: Company M performs claims processing and medical billing services 
for healthcare providers. In this role, Company M is responsible for preparing 
and submitting claims to third-party payers, tracking outstanding billings, and 
collecting amounts billed. Company M's fee is a fixed percentage (e.g., five 
percent) of the amount collected. If no collections are made, no fee is due to 
Company M. Company M has historical evidence indicating that the third-
party payers pay 85 percent of the billings submitted with no further effort by 
Company M. Company M has determined that the services performed under 
the arrangement are a single unit of accounting. 
Question: May Company M recognize as revenue its five percent fee on 85 
percent of the gross billings at the time it prepares and submits billings, or 
should it wait until collections occur to recognize any revenue? 
Interpretive Response: The staff believes that Company M must wait until 
collections occur before recognizing revenue. Before the third-party payer has 
remitted payment to Company M's customers for the services billed, 
Company M is not entitled to any revenue. That is, its revenue is not yet 
realized or realizable.62 Until Company M's customers collect on the billings, 
Company M has not performed the requisite activity under its contract to be 
entitled to a fee.63 Further, no amount of the fee is fixed or determinable or 
collectible until Company Ms' customers collect on the billings. 
 
  
                                                            
62 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(a). 
63 Concepts Statement 5, paragraph 83(b). 
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Question: What disclosures are required with respect to the recognition of 
revenue? 
Interpretive Response: A registrant should disclose its accounting policy for 
the recognition of revenue pursuant to Opinion 22. Paragraph 12 thereof 
states that "the disclosure should encompass important judgments as to 
appropriateness of principles relating to recognition of revenue . . .." Because 
revenue recognition generally involves some level of judgment, the staff 
believes that a registrant should always disclose its revenue recognition 
policy. If a company has different policies for different types of revenue 
transactions, including barter sales, the policy for each material type of 
transaction should be disclosed. If sales transactions have multiple units of 
accounting, such as a product and service, the accounting policy should 
clearly state the accounting policy for each unit of accounting as well as how 
units of accounting are determined and valued. In addition, the staff believes 
that changes in estimated returns recognized in accordance with Statement 
48 should be disclosed, if material (e.g., a change in estimate from two 
percent of sales to one percent of sales). 
Regulation S-X requires that revenue from the sales of products, services, 
and other products each be separately disclosed on the face of the income 
statement.64 The staff believes that costs relating to each type of revenue 
similarly should be reported separately on the face of the income statement. 
MD&A requires a discussion of liquidity, capital resources, results of 
operations and other information necessary to an understanding of a 
registrant's financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of 
operations.65 This includes unusual or infrequent transactions, known trends 
or uncertainties that have had, or might reasonably be expected to have, a 
favorable or unfavorable material effect on revenue, operating income or net 
income and the relationship between revenue and the costs of the revenue. 
Changes in revenue should not be evaluated solely in terms of volume and 
price changes, but should also include an analysis of the reasons and factors 
contributing to the increase or decrease. The Commission stated in FRR 36 
that MD&A should "give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant 
through the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective 
                                                            
64 See Regulation S-X, Article 5-03(b)(1) and (2). 
65 See Regulation S-K, Article 303 and FRR 36. 
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analysis of the registrant's financial condition and results of operations, with a 
particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future."66 Examples 
of such revenue transactions or events that the staff has asked to be 
disclosed and discussed in accordance with FRR 36 are: 
• Shipments of product at the end of a reporting period that significantly 
reduce customer backlog and that reasonably might be expected to 
result in lower shipments and revenue in the next period. 
• Granting of extended payment terms that will result in a longer collection 
period for accounts receivable (regardless of whether revenue has been 
recognized) and slower cash inflows from operations, and the effect on 
liquidity and capital resources. (The fair value of trade receivables 
should be disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements when 
the fair value does not approximate the carrying amount.)67 
• Changing trends in shipments into, and sales from, a sales channel or 
separate class of customer that could be expected to have a significant 
effect on future sales or sales returns. 
• An increasing trend toward sales to a different class of customer, such 
as a reseller distribution channel that has a lower gross profit margin 
than existing sales that are principally made to end users. Also, 
increasing service revenue that has a higher profit margin than product 
sales. 
• Seasonal trends or variations in sales. 
• A gain or loss from the sale of an asset(s).68 
Question 2 
Question: Will the staff expect retroactive changes by registrants to comply 
with the accounting described in this bulletin? 
Interpretive Response: All registrants are expected to apply the accounting 
and disclosures described in this bulletin. The staff, however, will not object if 
registrants that have not applied this accounting do not restate prior financial 
statements provided they report a change in accounting principle in 
accordance with Opinion 20 and Statement 3 no later than the fourth fiscal 
                                                            
66 FRR 36, also see In the Matter of Caterpillar Inc., AAER 363 (March 31, 1992). 
67 Statement 107. 
68 Gains or losses from the sale of assets should be reported as "other general expenses" pursuant 
to Regulation S-X, Article 5-03(b)(6). Any material item should be stated separately. 
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quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December 15, 1999. In periods 
subsequent to transition, registrants should disclose the amount of revenue (if 
material to income before income taxes) recognized in those periods that was 
included in the cumulative effect adjustment. If a registrant files financial 
statements with the Commission before applying the guidance in this bulletin, 
disclosures similar to those described in SAB Topic 11.M should be provided. 
However, if registrants have not previously complied with GAAP, for example, 
by recording revenue for products prior to delivery that did not comply with 
the applicable bill-and-hold guidance, those registrants should apply the 
guidance in Opinion 20 for the correction of an error.69 In addition, registrants 
should be aware that the Commission may take enforcement action where a 
registrant in prior financial statements has violated the antifraud or disclosure 
provisions of the securities laws with respect to revenue recognition. 
Question 3 
Question: The previous question indicates that the staff will not object to 
cumulative effect-type transition so long as the prior accounting does not 
represent an error. Could a company whose prior accounting does not 
represent an error voluntarily adopt a new method consistent with this SAB 
Topic by restatement of prior periods, rather than through a cumulative catch-
up adjustment? 
Interpretive Response: In most instances, no. Opinion 20 does not permit 
restatement of financial statements for a change in accounting principle that 
does not represent correction of an error, except in very rare circumstances.70 
An exception is a company that is filing publicly for the first time. As stated in 
paragraph 29 of Opinion 20, those companies are permitted to reflect the 
adoption of the new policy via a restatement, and the staff believes that 
approach is usually necessary to avoid confusing investors in an initial public 
offering.  
Question 4 
Question: Should a registrant reporting a change in accounting principle as a 
result of this SAB Topic file a preferability letter? 
                                                            
69 Opinion 20, paragraph 13 and paragraphs 36-37 describe and provide the accounting and 
disclosure requirements applicable to the correction of an error in previously issued financial 
statements. Because the term "error" as used in Opinion 20 includes "oversight or misuse of facts 
that existed at the time that the financial statements were prepared," that term includes both 
unintentional errors as well as intentional fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of 
assets as described in SAS 99. 
70 See, for example, Opinion 20, paragraph 27. 
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Interpretive Response: No preferability letter is required if an accounting 
change is made in response to a newly issued Staff Accounting Bulletin. 
Question 5 
Question: If a company had not previously adjusted sales revenues, but 
deferred recognition of the gross margin of estimated returns for a transaction 
subject to Statement 48, how should it present a current change in 
accounting to reduce revenue and cost of sales for estimated returns? 
Interpretive Response: Paragraph 7 of Statement 48 states that "sales 
revenue and cost of sales reported in the income statement shall be reduced 
to reflect estimated returns." Statement 48 does not provide for recognition of 
sales and costs of sales while deferring gross margin under any 
circumstance. This SAB Topic provides no new guidance on this point. If a 
registrant has failed to comply with GAAP, the registrant should retroactively 
revise prior financial statements in the manner set forth in Opinion 20 and 
Statement 16.  
  
 





INANCIAL EPORTING RAUDF R F 
SUPPLEMENTAL CHECKLIST
[Author’s Note: The following checklist addresses internal controls issues, 
taken from the discussion in this book, specific to suspected financial reporting 
fraud. The checklist is intended to be a supplement to other commonly used 
internal control checklists and procedures.  For auditing purposes, this 
checklist is recommended (though not required) when fraud is suspected. If the 
nature of the suspected fraud can be limited to specific areas, only portions of 
the checklist need be used.] 
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Financial Reporting Fraud Supplemental Checklist  Yes No NA Ref 
1. Incentives/Pressures     
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a 
greater likelihood of potential financial reporting fraud.    
 
a. Is there a perception among management of the company 
or individual operating units that there is extraordinary 
pressure (over and above the pressures typically associated 
with this industry) to achieve a higher level of reported 
earnings? • • • ____ 
b. Do management compensation agreements tie 
compensation or bonuses to higher levels of reported 
earnings? • • • ____ 
c. Is there extraordinary pressure from outside shareholders 
or other outsiders to improve the value of company stock? • • • ____ 
d. With regard to shares held by management or major 
shareholders, could the existence of any of the following 
provide an incentive to maintain or increase reported 
earnings, especially in the near term? • • • ____ 
 • Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans 
that postpone ownership • • • ____ 
 • Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers 
from acquiring shares until specified dates or the 
occurrence of specific events • • • ____ 
 • Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares 
that can be sold on U. S. securities exchanges on a 
given trading day • • • ____ 
 • Income tax provisions that afford more favorable 
treatment to capital gains in shares held for a sufficient 
period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the 
restriction being that the government would receive 
more of the sale proceeds if the share sales were 
classified as short-term capital gains) • • • ____ 
 • Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding 
significant blocks of stock past some event, such as the 
record date of an annual shareholders meeting, before 
they can be sold 
• • • ____ 
e. Is the company in danger of losing its listing on a major 
stock exchange, or is it attempting to obtain a new listing? • • • ____ 
f. Is there extraordinary pressure, whether explicit or 
implicit, to continue to report a rising trend in earnings 
and/or revenues? • • • ____ 
(continued)
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g. Is the company operating close to or in violation of the 
limits of financial covenants, such as minimum 
shareholders’ equity, maximum debt-to-equity ratios, or 
minimum current ratios, contained in bank credit facility 
agreements or other debt instruments? • • • ____ 
h. For firms doing business in regulated industries, is the 
company operating close to or in violation of the financial 
restrictions set by regulators or by statute? • • • ____ 
2. Quantitative Characteristics     
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a 
greater likelihood of potential financial reporting fraud. 
    
a. When calculating the following indexes for the previous 
and the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-
over-year increase greater than 10 percent (meaning, an 
index greater than 1.1)? • • • ____ 
 • Days’ Sales in Receivables Index • • • ____ 
 • Gross Margin Index • • • ____ 
 • Asset Quality Margin Index • • • ____ 
 • Sales Growth Index • • • ____ 
b. When calculating the following indexes for the previous 
and the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-
over-year increase greater than 10 percent more than 
increases for similar indexes of peer (same industry) 
companies? 
• • • ____ 
 • Days’ Sales in Receivables Index • • • ____ 
 • Gross Margin Index • • • ____ 
 • Asset Quality Index • • • ____ 
 • Sale’s Growth Index • • • ____ 
c. Is the change in working capital over the past year 
(excluding cash changes) relative to total assets at the end 
of the period more than 20 percent greater than similar 
calculations for peer companies? • • • ____ 
3. Qualitative Predictors: The Audit Committee     
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a 
need to take action to improve the integrity and 
effectiveness of the Audit Committee. 
    
a. Has the board of directors failed to designate an audit 
committee or failed to approve a charter for an audit 
committee? • • • ____ 
  (continued)
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b. If there is an audit committee, do any of the following 
conditions exist with regard to members of that 
committee? 
• • • ____ 
 • A director being employed by the corporation or any of 
its affiliates for the current year or any of the past five 
years • • • ____ 
 • A director accepting any compensation from the 
corporation or any of its affiliates other than 
compensation for board service or benefits under a tax-
qualified retirement plan • • • ____ 
 • A director being a member of the immediate family of 
an individual who is or has been in any of the past five 
years employed by the corporation or any of its 
affiliates as an executive officer • • • ____ 
 • A director being a partner in or a controlling 
shareholder, or to which the corporation made, or from 
which the corporation received, payments that are or 
have been significant to the corporation or business 
organization in any of the past five years • • • ____ 
 • A director being employed as an executive of another 
company while any of the corporation’s executives 
serves on that company’s compensation committee • • • ____ 
c. Are there less than three audit committee members with at 
least some financial accounting experience? • • • ____ 
d. Is it not clear or not the case that the audit committee—     
 • Should be responsible for selecting the outside auditors? • • • ____ 
 • Has a formal written statement from the outside 
auditors describing all relationships between the 
auditors and the company? • • • ____ 
 • Regularly discusses with the outside auditors all aspects 
of the propriety or lack thereof of the company’s 
accounting practices? • • • ____ 
 • Receives all reports of internal control deficiencies in a 
timely manner from both internal and outside auditors? • • • ____ 
4. Other Qualitative Predictors     
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a 
greater likelihood of potential financial reporting fraud. 
    
a. Has the company had a history of internal control 
problems, whether those problems resulted in the detection 
of financial reporting or any other type of fraud? • • • ____ 
(continued)
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b. Does the company chief executive officer engage in 
micro-management or other practices that could unduly 
influence accounting decision-makers with regard to 
financial reporting reporting? • • • ____ 
c. Are outside auditors unaware of any interim or quarterly 
financial reports or financial statements prepared for 
selected outside parties such as banks or investors? • • • ____ 
d. In establishing and reviewing internal controls, has 
management failed to establish adequately the key metrics 
or guidelines to determine the extent and frequency of 
internal auditor review? • • • ____ 
e. Is there a lack of evidence that management has properly 
communicated the internal control guidelines and 
procedures to appropriate personnel? • • • ____ 
f.  Does it appear that management does not assess the 
quality of its internal controls over time? • • • ____ 
g. Have any audit tests detected significant risks not 
previously known to management? • • • ____ 
h. Is there a history of using a quantitative standard for 
materiality, such as a percentage of earnings or assets, to 
excuse failure to correct known accounting errors or 
irregularities? 
• • • ____ 
5. Special Areas     
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section should 
generate further inquiry to determine if specific internal 
controls need to be improved. 
    
Failure to Record Loss Contingencies     
a. Given the nature of the company’s business, is it likely 
that any of the following issues could be relevant? • • • ____ 
 • Collectibility of receivables • • • ____ 
 • Obligations related to product warranties and product 
defects • • • ____ 
 • Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property • • • ____ 
 • Threat of expropriation of assets • • • ____ 
 • Pending or threatened litigation • • • ____ 
 • Actual or possible claims and assessments • • • ____ 
 • Guarantees of indebtedness of others • • • ____ 
 • Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase 
related property) that have been sold • • • ____ 
(continued)
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b. With regard to possible contingencies, do any of the 
following exist? • • • ____ 
 • The incidence of claims prior to the date of financial 
statements • • • ____ 
 • Correspondence with (and bills from) outside legal 
counsel • • • ____ 
 • Internal correspondence within production and research 
staffs as to the need to address a critical problem with a 
product already on the market • • • ____ 
 • Internal correspondence among department heads of 
production, R&D, general counsel, and senior 
management about postproduction problems and 
product claims • • • ____ 
 • External correspondence between the manufacturer and 
its customers about a given product concerning special 
price concessions or special return privileges  • • • ____ 
 • The incidence of special or over-budget freight charges 
to accommodate returns and/or the shipment of 
replacement product • • • ____ 
 • Shifting of production schedules to manufacture 
replacement product • • • ____ 
 • Halting manufacture of the product in question • • • ____ 
 • Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research 
projects to applications engineering relating to redesign 
of existing products • • • ____ 
 • Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts 
to customers on a regular basis over a period of weeks 
or months that indicate some arrangement to 
compensate for product defects • • • ____ 
c. If there is a suspected contingency, does correspondence 
between departments or within departments indicate a 
problem? • • • ____ 
d. If a contingency is likely to exist, has management used an 
inadequate or inappropriate standard for quantifying the 
potential claim? • • • ____ 
Failure to Record Asset Writeoffs     
a. Has the company’s industry experienced rapid changes in 
engineering or materials applications that may lead to asset 
writeoffs due to obsolescence? • • • ____ 
(continued)
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b. Is the industry in which the company operates very cost 
competitive? • • • ____ 
c. Has the company experienced any of the following? • • • ____ 
 • Significant changes in customer demand • • • ____ 
 • Significant loss of business to a competitor • • • ____ 
 • A need to obtain or retain a customer relationship by 
bidding below cost • • • ____ 
d. When reviewing fixed asset schedules with production or 
divisional personnel, have any of the following occurred? 
    
 • A significant decrease in the market value of an asset • • • ____ 
 • A significant change in the extent or manner in which 
an asset is used or a significant physical change in an 
asset 
• • • ____ 
 • A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the 
business climate that could affect the value of an asset 
or an adverse action or assessment by a regulator • • • ____ 
 • An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the 
amount originally expected to acquire or construct an 
asset • • • ____ 
 • A current period operating or cash-flow loss combined 
with a history of operating or cash-flow losses or a 
projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing 
losses associated with an asset used for the purpose of 
producing revenue • • • ____ 
e. Is there evidence of significant changes in production or 
product demand? • • • ____ 
f. From the review of moving expenses and discussion with 
production personnel, does it appear that any equipment 
has been moved off the shop floor into storage? • • • ____ 
g. Does the company fail to maintain profitability analyses 
by product line or by customer? • • • ____ 
h. Upon reviewing profitability analyses, does it appear that 
certain products have not been historically profitable? • • • ____ 
i. For historically unprofitable product lines, to justify not 
writing down assets for impairment, has management used 
any of the following? • • • ____ 
 • Overly optimistic forecasts of future profitability • • • ____ 
 • Out-of-date forecasts • • • ____ 
 • Forecasts not prepared or reviewed by personnel with 
line responsibility for production • • • ____ 
(continued)
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j. If written narratives accompany the forecasts, do they 
discuss downside possibilities that management has not 
adequately taken into account? • • • ____ 
k. Are there any facts now known that would invalidate 
assumptions contained in the forecast? • • • ____ 
l. For investments in non-publicly traded securities, have any 
of the following occurred? • • • ____ 
 • Does the company have financial data adequate to 
determine historical profitability of the investee? • • • ____ 
 • If the investee has not been historically profitable, has 
management failed to write down the investment based 
upon an overly optimistic forecast? • • • ____ 
 • If the investee has not been historically profitable, has 
management failed to write down the investment based 
upon a forecast prepared by management with business 
or family ties to the investor company? • • • ____ 
Acquisition Contingencies and Cookie Jar Reserves     
a. Were contingencies established without a clear purpose or 
justification?  • • • ____ 
b. If contingencies were established by a current period 
charge to income, were earnings excluding the charge in 
excess of management or outside expectations?  • • • ____ 
c. Were contingencies established at or near the close of a 
reporting period?  • • • ____ 
d. Were contingencies established without adequate review 
by senior management?  • • • ____ 
e. Upon review of charges to a given contingency, are there 
charges for expenses that are not appropriate to the stated 
purpose of the contingency?  • • • ____ 
f. Was the timing of the takedown of contingencies 
coincident with achieving certain financial targets set by 
management or outsiders? • • • ____ 
g. Was the amount of the takedown of contingencies for a 
given period necessary to achieve certain financial targets 
set by management or outsiders? • • • ____ 
h. Has any of the following occurred with regard to 
acquisition contingencies? • • • ____ 
(continued)
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 • Were contingencies established after twelve months 
from the date of the acquisition? • • • ____ 
 • Were contingencies set up for items not related to the 
acquisition? • • • ____ 
 • Does the quantity of costs allocated to the contingency 
in a given period cause earnings to reach certain 
financial targets set by management or outsiders? • • • ____ 
Cost Shifting     
a. Has management made a recent change in policy with 
regard to capitalizing previously expensed costs? • • • ____ 
b. Has a change in policy with regard to capitalizing 
previously expensed costs not been disclosed in company 
financial statements? • • • ____ 
c. Has management proposed to capitalize a new category of 
expenditure that customarily is expensed on peer-group 
firm financial statements? • • • ____ 
d. Does the timing of changes in policy with regard to 
capitalizing expenses coincide with any of the following? • • • ____ 
 • Implementation of a management bonus plan or 
calculation of bonuses under that plan • • • ____ 
 • Commencement of the sale of stock or the search for an 
equity partner • • • ____ 
 • Implementation of a new credit facility or recent 
problems in maintaining financial covenants under an 
existing facility  • • • ____ 
e. But for the capitalization of certain expenses, would any of 
the following occur? • • • ____ 
 • Management would not receive certain bonuses or other 
benefits under a management compensation plan. • • • ____ 
 • In the opinion of securities analysts, appraisers, or 
underwriters, the company’s share price would be 
significantly lower. • • • ____ 
 • The company would be in violation of loan or debt 
covenants. • • • ____ 
f. Does the capitalization of expenses cause the firm’s Asset 
Quality Index to increase significantly in excess of 
increases (if any) for its industry peers? • • • ____ 
  (continued)
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g. If company management provides segment or subsidiary 
financial data, especially if management or outsiders tend 
to point to performance of that segment or subsidiary in 
their discussions of company performance, has either of 
the following occurred? • • • ____ 
 • Have expenses been incurred by the parent that relates 
to the segment or subsidiary? • • • ____ 
 • Have other segments or subsidiaries incurred expenses 
that should be allocated to the segment or subsidiary in 
question? • • • ____ 
h. Has senior management failed to establish proper 
procedures for allocating or apportioning costs among 
affiliates or, if there is a policy, is there evidence that 
adherence is lax or that there have been documented 
lapses? 
• • • ____ 
i. Is there correspondence among heads of affiliates 
concerning disputes over expense allocations or 
apportionment that has not come to the attention of the 
audit committee?  • • • ____ 
j. Were contingencies established at the parent company for 
expenses anticipated for subsidiaries? • • • ____ 
k. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability 
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to the parent or 
another subsidiary? • • • ____ 
l. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability 
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to contingencies 
established at the parent level or in another subsidiary?  • • • ____ 
m. Is there any correspondence between accounting personnel 
at the parent and subsidiary levels that describe special 
procedures for certain costs that are incurred by the 
subsidiary but not charged to earnings of that subsidiary? • • • ____ 
Recording Fictitious Revenues      
a. If the company requires signed agreements from customers 
before revenue is recognized, have sales personnel 
indicated or stated any of the following? • • • ____ 
 • Their managers have approved as income sales 
contracts that were not signed as of the period end. • • • ____ 
 • Unsigned contracts were recorded as revenue under the 
premise that key buyer personnel had given verbal 
approvals. • • • ____ 
 • Unsigned contracts were recorded as revenue under the 
premise that key buyer personnel had signed the 
contract but the contract was held up for other reasons. • • • ____ 
(continued)
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b. Have there been prior internal control failures with sales 
cutoff? • • • ____ 
c. If fabricated contracts are suspected, have the sales cutoff 
tests performed by internal or outside auditors failed to 
look for the fabrication and substitution of contracts? • • • ____ 
d. Have sales cutoff tests failed to examine the history of 
sales returns and reversals over time? • • • ____ 
e. With regard to the requirement for timely delivery, has any 
of the following occurred? 
    
 • Are there lapses in documentation of delivery?  • • • ____ 
 • Have customers complained about receiving deliveries 
too early? • • • ____ 
 • Have returns from a certain customer or reseller been 
abnormally high? • • • ____ 
f. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are 
receiving unusually generous sales terms for returns or 
refunds? • • • ____ 
g. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are 
receiving unusually low prices or above-average 
discounts? 
• • • ____ 
h. Is the price for component products sold by the company 
dependent, at least in part, upon the price of the final 
product sold by another company? • • • ____ 
i. Have royalties been accrued to income prior to receipt of 
confirmation from the payor that royalties are owed? • • • ____ 
j. Do department heads have the authority to both approve 
sales and the recognition of related revenue in the financial 
statements? • • • ____ 
k. Is there a lack of review of sales revenue recognition at the 
senior management level? • • • ____ 
l. Is there a history of revenue being recognized improperly? • • • ____ 
m. Have department heads approved significant refunds or 
returns that are out of the ordinary or appear to violate 
company policies? • • • ____ 
n. Have refunds or returns been historically high for a certain 
department? • • • ____ 
o. Have the reasons for refunds and returns not been 
documented or, if documented, have the reasons given 
been insufficient? • • • ____ 
  (continued)
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p. Has senior management failed to review or been lax in 
reviewing significant sales refunds and returns? • • • ____ 
q. If side letters are suspected, has either of the following 
occurred? • • • ____ 
 • Engineers, technicians, or others involved with the 
installation of the products indicated that certain 
customers made additional demands before agreeing to 
buy. • • • ____ 
 • There are notes or letters in sales files indicating that 
customer demands had been made to allow for returns 
or refunds. • • • ____ 
r. Are sales approved before obtaining credit checks for new 
customers or for existing customers that are experiencing 
financial difficulties? • • • ____ 
s. Is there an unusual concentration of orders from small or 
distressed customers occurring near the end of a reporting 
period or sales contest? • • • ____ 
6. Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates (CAPE) 
 
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section should prompt a re-evaluation of 
internal controls and communications between senior management, internal and outside 
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors. A yes answer may also prompt 
disclosures to and discussions with the audit committee. 
a. Management’s assessment of the range of potential issues that could rise to 
the level of becoming a CAPE appears: 
i. To ignore significant issues identified in notes to the financial 
statements, 
ii. To ignore significant issues identified in management letters and 
other communications from outside auditors, including SAS 114 
meetings, 
iii. To ignore significant issues identified by internal auditors, 
iv. To be constructed either hastily or simply in an effort to provide a 
list that appears to comport with reporting requirements, or 
v. To be a mere recitation of general accounting policies without any 
substantive analysis of risks from alternative accounting 
interpretations or estimates. 
b. Having discovered a deficiency in the list of potential issues that could rise to 
the level of becoming a CAPE, neither management nor the board of 
directors have taken corrective action, which may include retaining forensic 
accountants. 
c. Of the range of potential issues that could rise to the level of becoming a 
CAPE,  
i. Management’s analysis of accounting policies appears to be 
incomplete in that significant alternative treatments were ignored, 
ii. Management’s analysis of accounting policies appears to be 
inaccurate in that alternative accounting policies were incorrectly 
interpreted, 
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iii. Management’s analysis of accounting estimates failed to account for 
reasonably likely potential negative changes in cash flows, or  
iv. Management’s analysis of accounting estimates ignored information 
that significantly increased the likelihood of a previously assessed 
potential negative change in cash flows. 
d. For critical accounting policies presented to the audit committee, 
management’s analysis of alternative accounting treatments appears to be 
biased against those policies because 
i. Management has misstated the scope or applicability of alternative 
accounting treatments, 
ii. Management has mischaracterized the nature of alternative 
accounting treatments, 
iii. Management has omitted relevant alternative accounting treatments, 
or 
iv. Management incorrectly assessed the materiality of alternative 
accounting treatments. 
e. For critical accounting policies presented to the audit committee, 
management’s analysis of alternative accounting treatments appears to be 
biased in favor of management’s recommended policy because 
i. Management has misstated the scope or applicability of 
management’s recommended policy, 
ii. Management has mischaracterized the nature of management’s 
recommended policy, or 
iii. Management incorrectly assessed the materiality of management’s 
recommended policy. 
f. For critical accounting estimates presented to the audit committee, 
management’s analysis 
i. Fails to account for the full range of reasonably likely cash flows 
under different circumstances, 
ii. Fails to account for known data relating to quoted markets or 
comparable asset values, or 
iii. Incorrectly applies valuation models or methodology. 
g. Management fails to update its analyses of CAPE and/or fails to notify the 
audit committee in a timely manner should there be a change in facts known 
to management. 
h. Management fails to update its analyses of CAPE and/or fails to notify the 
audit committee in a timely manner should there be a change in accounting 
policy (due to action of accounting standard setters or due to firm 
management’s decision to change). 
i. Management has not discussed with firm outside auditors either 
management’s analysis of CAPE or changes to the analysis of CAPE. 
j. Management has not consulted with firm internal auditors regarding 
management’s analysis of CAPE or changes to the analysis of CAPE. 
k. Disagreements by and between management and internal auditors have not 
been shared with the audit committee. 
l. For those meetings of the audit committee in which management presents 
CAPE or changes to CAPE, the minutes do not indicate any substantive 
review or discussion. 
m.  For those meetings of the audit committee in which management presents 
CAPE or changes to CAPE, the minutes do not indicate that corrective action 
was taken when needed. 
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